Opinion
WR-95,035-01
11-01-2023
EX PARTE JAMES RENFRO, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 2013-437,890-A IN THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT FROM LUBBOCK COUNTY
Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Keel, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., and Slaughter, J., joined.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Applicant pleaded guilty to continuous sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary because he had an incorrect understanding of the plea bargain, specifically as it pertained to the applicable punishment range and parole consequences of his plea. In support, Applicant argues that the trial court erroneously admonished him during the plea hearing as to the punishment range for the offense and to his parole eligibility.
Applicant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) erroneously advising him as to the punishment range and his parole eligibility, and (2) failing to correct the trial court's erroneous admonishments during the plea hearing. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommends that relief be denied based on laches or, alternatively, on the merits. We disagree. We do not believe that laches should bar relief in this particular case because the record shows that Applicant's guilty plea was involuntary.
Trial counsel filed an affidavit alleging he accurately advised Applicant regarding the parole consequences of pleading guilty. Applicant alleges that, at the time he entered his guilty plea, he incorrectly believed that he was pleading to a thirty-year sentence with the possibility of parole after serving fifteen years when in reality that he was pleading to a thirty-year sentence that had to be served day-for-day. The transcript from the plea hearing supports Applicant's, not trial counsel's, allegations. It shows that the trial court affirmatively misadvised Applicant that he would be eligible for parole after serving half of his sentence when he was in fact ineligible for parole, that Applicant confirmed that this was his understanding, and that trial counsel (as well as the State) not only failed to correct the trial court's erroneous admonishment but affirmed its accuracy. Applicant credibly asserts that the difference between his understanding and reality regarding his parole eligibility was a "deal breaker"; He would have exercised his right to a jury trial had he been advised and admonished correctly about parole.
Relief is granted. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The judgment in cause number 2013-437,890 in the 140th District Court of Lubbock County is set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Lubbock County to answer the charges as set out in the indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of this Court's mandate.
Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
On June 18, 2014, Applicant pled guilty to continuous sexual abuse of a child, a first-degree felony, and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02. He did not appeal. Unfortunately, at the time of his plea, the convicting court admonished Applicant that the minimum prison sentence for his offense was five years and that he would be eligible for parole after serving at least fifty percent of his sentence. In fact, the minimum term of imprisonment for continuous sexual abuse of a child is twenty-five years. Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(h). Moreover, conviction under Section 21.02 of the Penal Code renders an inmate ineligible for parole. See Tex. Gov't Code § 508.145(a)(2) ("(a) An inmate is not eligible for release on parole if the inmate is . . . serving a sentence for any of the following offenses under the Penal Code: . . . (2) Section 21.02.").
Now, nearly nine years later, Applicant has filed an application seeking postconviction habeas corpus relief on the grounds of involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel related to his improper judicial admonishment. The Court grants relief, specifically noting that the doctrine of laches should not bar it in this case. Majority Opinion at 1-2. I disagree.
As I recently explained in Ex parte Ross, No. WR-94,371-02, 2023 WL 6133230 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2023) (Yeary, J., dissenting), this Court's laches analysis under Ex parte Perez, does not properly begin and end with an assessment of the prejudice caused to an adverse party by "neglect to assert [a] right or claim . . . taken together with [the] lapse of time. . . ." Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (quoting Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486, 487 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Rather, "neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law, should have been done" likewise bars equitable relief. Id.
Applicant waited nearly nine years after he was convicted to bring this application. His explanation for this delay is that he was too poor to afford a copy of the transcript which shows the trial court improperly stated the terms of his sentence and parole eligibility and that his trial counsel failed to object-evidence necessary to support his claims. This transcript, however, is only thirteen pages long. Given the likely minimal cost of obtaining such a brief transcript, a bare claim of poverty does not strike me as a sufficient explanation for Applicant's otherwise unreasonably long delay.
I would deny relief. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION
Keel, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Keller, P.J., and Slaughter, J., joined.
Applicant pled guilty to continuous sexual abuse of a child. He claims that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was misadvised about the range of punishment and parole eligibility. He fails to show a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had been advised correctly about these matters.
On the contrary, correct advice about the range of punishment would have only further discouraged Applicant from going to trial. He was told the range was five to 99 years or life, but it was 25 to 99 years or life. The State's 30-year offer would have seemed even more attractive given the minimum he faced as compared with the minimum he was told he faced.
The 30-year offer was also favorable to him because the State had a strong case. The State says its evidence included testimony from the ten-year-old victim, her outcry to a school counselor describing two years of sexual abuse, her forensic interview-the usual kind of evidence. But in addition, the State says there were carpet samples from the victim's bedroom bearing Applicant's semen, and it had Applicant's non-custodial, recorded confession to several instances of indecency with a child. Applicant says the State also had the victim's bedsheet and Applicant's typed statement. This was a strong case for the prosecution.
Given the true range of punishment, the strength of the State's case, and the low-end offer, it is unlikely that Applicant would have insisted on trial if he had been told the correct range of punishment.
As for parole, Applicant was told that he would be eligible after serving half his sentence, but there is no parole for continuous sexual abuse of a child. Still, he likely would not have insisted on trial if he had understood the parole reality because the 30-year offer would have been hard to beat at trial, and acquittal was unlikely.
Finally, he does not claim he would have insisted on trial if he had been correctly advised; he claims that he would have either insisted on trial or negotiated a better plea agreement. The latter claim undermines the former.
We should deny relief. Since the Court does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.