Opinion
NO. WR-62,099-02
12-10-2014
EX PARTE ROBERT LYNN PRUETT, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. B-01-M015-0-PR-B IN THE 156TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT BEE COUNTY
, filed a dissenting statement in which JOHNSON, J., joined.
DISSENTING STATEMENT
I dissent from the Court's dismissal of this 2014 subsequent application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus filed by Robert Lynn Pruett, applicant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071, § 5. This is the second application filed by applicant, who was sentenced to death for the 1999 capital murder of Daniel Nagle, a correctional officer at the McConnell Unit. See Pruett v. State, No. 74,370 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 22, 2004) (not designated for publication); Ex parte Pruett, 207 S.W.3d 767, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (denying initial application). Applicant presents two grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the basis of an inadequate investigation of mitigation evidence, and ineffective assistance of habeas counsel due to failure to challenge the false evidence used by the State. Today, this Court declines to consider the merits of these claims and dismisses this application for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the allegations fail to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071, § 5(a). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.071, § 5(a). I would instead hold that this Court has jurisdiction to address applicant's claims and would remand the case to the habeas court for consideration of those claims on the merits in light of my determination, after reviewing the allegations in this application, that applicant has presented a prima facie case on which relief could be granted. See Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 98, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (stating that, "to overcome the bar on subsequent writs," I would require applicant to make initial showing "that the underlying claim that was forfeited as a result of habeas counsel's error has some merit").
According to his application, at the sentencing phase of his trial, the jury heard testimony from applicant as well as testimony from six other people: his father, his brother, an assistant warden, a teacher, a cousin, and a clinical psychologist. Through the clinical psychologist, however, the jury heard the substance of statements from multiple people who had been interviewed by the psychologist. The psychologist testified that she spoke to nine people, including applicant's mother, his sister, an uncle, and three cousins, although several of these individuals now deny that they ever spoke with the psychologist. The numerous witnesses presented a picture of applicant's background, suggesting that he did not commit the stabbing for which he was incarcerated at the time the capital murder of Nagle occurred; his father was in and out of prison and was not a good father; his family often ate only one meal a day; he would sometimes cry out of hunger; his mother had mental problems and would sometimes disappear; he started getting high with his father when he was seven or eight years of age, and did harder drugs by age eleven; he was suicidal in prison; he earned his GED in prison; he was a good student in his class in prison; his father and other men physically abused his mother; and, generally speaking, his family had a history of sexual abuse.
First, applicant now provides new evidence that I conclude is prima facie evidence of a change in his sentencing profile, such as that he was the victim of sexual abuse as a child by his mother for an extended period of time, that his mother prostituted him to men, and that his extreme poverty required him and his mother to dig through dumpsters to look for food and to sleep in parks due to homelessness. I conclude that applicant has presented a prima facie case establishing the existence of additional mitigating evidence that, had it been presented to the jury, might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of applicant's moral culpability for this offense. See Buck, 418 S.W.3d at 113. In light of that determination, I would hold that this claim is worthy of remanding to the habeas court for consideration on the merits.
Second, applicant complains that his right to "due process was violated when the State failed to disclose deals that had been made with the inmate witnesses that testified during guilt/innocence and failed to correct false testimony." Applicant explains that his right to due process was violated by the State's failure to disclose that a deal had been made with Harold Mitchell and also by the State's failure to correct Mitchell's false testimony. Furthermore, he contends that his "right to due process was violated by the State's failing to disclose that inmates who desired to testify on Pruett's behalf were threatened and physically assaulted." Applicant argues that the factual basis of this claim was unavailable on the date that he filed his initial application. I also conclude that applicant has pleaded a prima facie case that his due process rights were violated, and I would remand this claim for consideration as to whether there is a factual basis showing that this claim was unavailable during his initial application, and, if so, consideration of the merits of this complaint.
I do not reach the ultimate merits of whether applicant has presented grounds on which habeas relief should be granted. Rather, I decide only that applicant has presented a prima facie case that his claims should be remanded to the habeas court for consideration of those claims on the merits. I thus respectfully dissent from the Court's dismissal of the application. Filed: December 10, 2014 Do Not Publish