Opinion
08-21-00016-CR
05-26-2022
EX PARTE LUIS CARLOS MEDRANO.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court #1 of El Paso County, Texas (TC # 20040D03900-34I-01)
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
OPINION
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, CHIEF JUSTICE
Appellant, Luis Carlos Medrano, appeals the denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant seeks habeas corpus relief from a 2005 order of deferred adjudication that the trial court entered after he pled guilty to the second-degree felony of possessing more than four but less than 200 grams of cocaine in violation of Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115. Based on the terms of the 2005 plea agreement, the trial court deferred the adjudication of Appellant's guilt, placed him on community supervision for ten years, imposed a sentence of ninety days, and fined him $1,500. After Appellant entered his guilty plea, immigration officials detained him and placed him into deportation proceedings when he returned to the United States from Mexico. The record is silent regarding whether Appellant was ever deported.
Almost sixteen years later, Appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus relief under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.072. Appellant asserted in his application that he received ineffective assistance from counsel because his counsel failed to adequately challenge the admissibility of evidence seized under an allegedly invalid search warrant, did not file a motion to suppress his oral confession, and failed to advise Appellant of the State's burden of proof at trial. Appellant also claims his counsel "affirmatively misrepresent[ed] to him that he could remain in the United States so long as he accepted the probated sentence and served his 90-day jail commitment on the weekends." According to Appellant, counsel's deficiencies render his guilty plea involuntary. He, therefore, requested the trial court vacate his conviction. The State filed an answer in which it asserted, among other things, that laches barred Appellant's claims.
The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 11.072(6)(b). It adopted the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the habeas corpus relief sought by Appellant. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 11.072(7)(a). The findings of fact include the following:
1. The applicant, Luis Carlos Medrano (hereinafter Medrano), was indicted for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, over 4 grams but less than 200 grams in one count in cause number 2004D03900 in the 34th Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas, Impact Court.
2. Medrano pled guilty to that offense on January 20, 2005.
. . .
4. Medrano was represented by attorney Duane A. Baker.
. . .
6. Medrano filed his writ application on October 5, 2020.
. . .
8. This Court finds that Medrano's trial counsel, Duane A. Baker, died on January 23, 2013.
9. This Court finds no justifiable excuse for Medrano's unreasonable delay in filing his writ application more than 15 years after his guilty plea, and more than 7 years after his trial counsel died.
10. This Court has been presented with no compelling reasons by Medrano to excuse his unreasonable delay in filing his writ application.
11. This Court finds that the case agent, Javier Monreal, Detective, has no present memory of the facts of the offense and would be unable to testify at any evidentiary pre-trial hearings or at a contested trial of this case from his memory.
12. This Court finds that the case agent, Javier Monreal, Detective, is the officer who seized the cocaine in this case, was the officer who Medrano confessed his knowing possession of the cocaine, was the affiant on the search warrant under which the cocaine was seized, and was the one who received the information from a vetted confidential informant that provided the probable cause for the search warrant.
13. This Court finds that the State has been prejudiced in its ability to conduct evidentiary pre-trial hearings or try Medrano in a contested trial if a new trial were granted.
. . .
16. This Court finds that the State has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the applicant's writ allegations due to the death of Medrano's trial counsel, Duane A. Baker, and the loss of memory of the case agent, Javier Monreal, Detective.
Consequently, the trial court found that Appellant's "writ claims are all barred by the doctrine of laches." This appeal followed.
The State notes in its brief that this appeal should be dismissed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) because the trial court's certificate of Appellant's right to appeal indicates that Appellant does not have the right to appeal. The Court, however, determined before the parties filed their briefs that the trial court's certification was defective. The trial court has subsequently filed a corrected trial certification which allows us to consider the trial court's denial of the Habeas Corpus application. Consequently, we do not reconsider the issue here.
DISCUSSION
Issues
Appellant presents ten issues on appeal. In his first issue, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying his writ of habeas corpus. In Issue Two, Appellant argues the trial court erred in concluding that laches bars all of his claims. Appellant's remaining issues assert the trial court erred in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective in his representation of Appellant.
Standard of Review
We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny habeas corpus relief. Ex Parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 323-24 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and defer to the trial court's implied factual findings supported by the record. Id. at 325-26. This degree of deference applies even where, as here, "no witnesses testify and all of the evidence is submitted in written affidavits." Id. at 326. We will reverse the trial court's ruling only if we conclude it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and made without reference to guiding rules or principles. Ex Parte Aguilar, No. 08-14-00204-CR, 2016 WL 921904, at *3 (Tex.App.-El Paso March 9, 2016, pet. ref'd)(not designated for publication).
Evidentiary Hearing
As a threshold matter, Appellant contends in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding whether or not to render habeas relief. The State counters that Article 11.072 "does not require the habeas court to hold any hearing-let alone an evidentiary hearing-before rendering its decision." We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus on affidavits alone.
Upon receiving a habeas corpus application, the trial court may dispose of it in one of two ways. "If the court determines from the face of an application or documents attached to the application that the applicant is manifestly entitled to no relief, the court shall enter a written order denying the application as frivolus." Tex.Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 11.072(7)(a). "In all other cases, a second procedure applies, and the trial court cannot rule on the application without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law." Ex Parte Baldez, 510 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.). In this case, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, meaning that the trial court did not find the application frivolous on its face. We review a trial court's decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate a non-frivolous habeas application for abuse of discretion. Ex Parte Salazar, 510 S.W.3d 619, 626-27 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2016, pet. ref'd).
"Article 11.072 does not require a hearing when the issues can be resolved without one." Ex Parte Arjona, 402 S.W.3d 312, 319 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2013, no pet.). We find based on the record in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a hearing since, as we explain below, Appellant's application is barred by the doctrine of laches. As a result, we overrule Appellant's first issue.
Laches
The common-law doctrine of laches is defined as "neglect to assert [a] right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, [that] operates as a bar in a court of equity." Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). In Ex Parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), the Court of Criminal Appeals determined the doctrine of laches was appropriate for application in the habeas corpus context. See also Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 210; Ex Parte Bowman, 447 S.W.3d 887, 888 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014)(holding "that laches applies to Art. 11.072."). Whether laches applies is a question of fact to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Ex Parte Bowman, 447 S.W.3d at 888; Ex Parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014). Courts should consider, among other things, the length of the delay, and the degree and type of prejudice borne by the State resulting from the delay. Ex Parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 666-67. "[T]he longer an applicant delays filing his application, and particularly when an applicant delays filing for much more than five years after conclusion of direct appeals, the less evidence the State must put forth in order to demonstrate prejudice." Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d at 217-18. A habeas applicant's "delay may be excused when the record shows that (1) an applicant's delay was not unreasonable because it was due to a justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, (2) the State would not be materially prejudiced as a result of the delay, or (3) the applicant is entitled to equitable relief for other compelling reasons, such as new evidence that shows he is actually innocent of the offense." Ex Parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667.
Appellant pled guilty to the indictment on January 20, 2005. And immigration authorities initiated deportation proceedings against him shortly after. Appellant did not file his application for a writ of habeas corpus, however, until October 5, 2020. He has not provided an excuse for his almost sixteen-year delay at the trial court or here on appeal. But delay alone is insufficient to establish the laches bar. Ex Parte Bowman, 447 S.W.3d at 888. To establish laches, the State must make a particularized showing of prejudice. Ex Parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 488. The State asserts that Appellant's delay in filing his application until after his attorney's death prevents it from investigating and responding to Appellant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. It also argues that the police officer who located and seized the cocaine, applied for the search warrant, and took Appellant's confession in 2005 has no independent recollection of the facts of Appellant's arrest and case. Consequently, the State claims it would be unable to prove its case in the event of a new trial or even get through contested pretrial evidentiary hearings. It was well within the trial court's discretion to find that Appellant's delay prejudiced the State. Under the circumstances of this case-which include Appellant's almost sixteen-year delay in requesting habeas corpus relief, that he provided no excuse for his delay, and the degree and type of prejudice to the State as a result of the delay-the State met its burden under the doctrine of laches.
As a result, we overrule Appellant's second issue on appeal. Because this Court's ruling on Appellant's second issue is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address Appellant's remaining issues.
We note that the trial court certified Appellant's right to appeal in this case, but the certification does not bear Appellant's signature indicating that he was informed of his rights to appeal and to file a pro se petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(d). We thus find that the certification is defective and has not been signed by Appellant or his attorney.
To remedy this defect, the Court ORDERS Appellant's attorney, pursuant to Tex.R.App.P. 48.4, to send Appellant a copy of this opinion and this Court's judgment, to notify Appellant of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review, and to inform Appellant of the applicable deadlines. See Tex.R.App.P. 48.4, 68. Appellant's attorney is further ORDERED, to comply with all the requirements of Tex.R.App.P. 48.4.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of the trial court.