Opinion
1190322
05-01-2020
EX PARTE Jermaine Lindell HOSTON (In re: Ex parte Jermaine Lindell Hoston (In re: State of Alabama v. Jermaine Lindell Hoston))
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals (Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-18-1648; Holbrook E. Reid, J.; Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-19-0038) Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for petitioner. Submitted on petitioner's brief only.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals (Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-18-1648; Holbrook E. Reid, J.; Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-19-0038)
Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Submitted on petitioner's brief only.
BRYAN, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin and Stewart, JJ., dissent.
PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Jermaine Lindell Hoston was indicted for murder, and he moved to dismiss the indictment based on self-defense. See § 13A-3-23(d)(1) and (2), Ala. Code 1975 (providing immunity from prosecution based on self-defense and providing for a pretrial hearing to determine whether a defendant is so immune). At the hearing on his motion to dismiss, Hoston and the State presented conflicting evidence regarding whether Hoston killed George C. Tucker, Jr., in self-defense. The trial court denied the motion, stating only that "there is a question of fact that exists for a jury to determine."
Hoston petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for mandamus review. The court denied the petition by unpublished order, interpreting the trial court's ruling as a finding that Hoston failed to meet his burden of proving self-defense. See § 13A-3-23(d)(2) ("During any pretrial hearing to determine immunity, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is immune ...."). Hoston petitioned this Court for certiorari review.
I dissent from this Court's denial of review, because the trial court's statement was not a finding that Hoston failed to meet his burden on immunity and because a trial court is required to make an affirmative finding as to whether the defendant has met his burden.
First, contrary to the Court of Criminal Appeals' analysis, the trial court did not find that Hoston failed to meet his pretrial burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the trial court declined to make such a finding, electing instead to deny immunity solely because the evidence conflicted. It appears that the trial court viewed the hearing as parallel to a hearing on a civil motion for a summary judgment, in which the motion must be denied if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Cf. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Second, the trial court's approach was inconsistent with the procedure created by the self-defense-immunity statute. The statute provides:
"(2) Prior to the commencement of a trial in a case in which a defense is claimed under this section, the court having jurisdiction over the case, upon motion of the defendant, shall conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether force, including deadly force, used by
the defendant was justified or whether it was unlawful under this section. During any pretrial hearing to determine immunity, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is immune from criminal prosecution.
"(3) If, after a pretrial hearing under subdivision (2), the court concludes that the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that force, including deadly force, was justified, the court shall enter an order finding the defendant immune from criminal prosecution and dismissing the criminal charges.
"(4) If the defendant does not meet his or her burden of proving immunity at the pre-trial hearing, he or she may continue to pursue the defense of self-defense or defense of another person at trial...."
§ 13A-3-23(d) (emphasis added). The emphasized language makes clear that, within the structure of the hearing, the trial court must make a finding as to whether the defendant has met his immunity burden. Unlike on a civil summary-judgment motion, the court cannot deflect the issue to the jury because the evidence conflicts.
Moreover, requiring an affirmative finding comports with this Court's strong view of the statutory self-defense immunity. In Ex parte Watters, 220 So. 3d 1093 (Ala. 2016), we reasoned that "immunity" means protection from litigation, not merely from trial. Thus, we held that the nature of the immunity required a pretrial hearing (even before the statute was amended to require one) and that it should be held as early as practicable in a case. Id. at 1096-99. In contrast, here the trial court's approach would render the immunity illusory by obviating the need for a pretrial hearing whenever the evidence on self-defense conflicts, which is virtually always the case.
Finally, in applying similar self-defense-immunity statutes, other states' high courts have held that a trial court must make an affirmative finding on immunity. State v. John, 460 P.3d 1122 (Wy. 2020) ; State v. Hardy, 305 Kan. 1001, 390 P.3d 30 (2017) ; State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 407-10, 709 S.E.2d 662, 663-65 (2011) ; Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010) ; cf. Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 754-55 (Ky. 2009) (holding that, for purposes of statutory immunity, trial court was required to make finding as to whether probable cause that defendant did not act in self-defense existed).
This case raises an important question of first impression that affects the right of Alabamians to be free from prosecution when they act in self-defense. Accordingly, I would grant certiorari review.
Bolin and Stewart, JJ., concur.