Opinion
NUMBER 13-17-00140-CR
06-07-2018
EX PARTE HECTOR GARCIA
On appeal from the 24th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Hector Garcia challenges the trial court's denial of his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.08 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). In one issue, Garcia contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus because double jeopardy and collateral estoppel bar the State from prosecuting him on a single count of failure to stop and render aid following an accident resulting in death, a second-degree felony. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021(c)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the initial indictment, Garcia operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and the motor vehicle he operated struck and killed Natalie Nicole Luna, a pedestrian. A grand jury indicted Garcia on three counts: (1) intoxication manslaughter, a second-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.); (2) failure to stop and render aid following an accident resulting in death, a second-degree felony, see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021(c)(1)(A); and (3) criminally negligent homicide, a state jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Garcia moved to quash the second count, and the trial court granted his motion to quash. State v. Garcia, No. 13-15-00235-CR, 2016 WL 2854255, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 12, 2016, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The remaining two counts were tried to a jury. Id. The jury found Garcia not guilty on the two counts presented to it, and the trial court signed judgments acquitting Garcia of those two counts. Id. Subsequently, the State appealed the trial court's order granting Garcia's motion to quash the second count. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.)). We reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at *5.
On remand, Garcia filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.08. Specifically, Garcia argued that the State was barred from prosecuting him because all three initial counts arose "from the same victim for the same incident." Meanwhile, the State moved to amend the indictment to correct typographical errors in count 2. The trial court granted the State's motion to amend the indictment, and it denied Garcia's pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. This appeal followed.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an applicant may use a pretrial writ of habeas corpus to assert his or her constitutional protections regarding double jeopardy. See Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of Garcia's pretrial habeas application based on the Double Jeopardy Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Id.; see also, Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (providing that collateral estoppel is embodied within the Double Jeopardy Clause).
II. DISCUSSION
In Garcia's sole issue, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus because the judgments acquitting him of the intoxication manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide counts trigger double jeopardy and collateral estoppel bars. Thus, according to Garcia, the State is barred from prosecuting him on the remaining count of failure to stop and render aid following an accident resulting in death.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision concerning an article 11.08 habeas application "in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and must uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion." Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Ex parte Peterson, 117 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). A trial court abuses its discretion if that decision falls outside the wide range of reasonable disagreement or if that decision is made without reference to guiding rules or principles of law. Ex parte Alakayi, 102 S.W.3d 426, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (applying abuse of discretion in article 11.08 habeas case); see generally McGee v. State, 233 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (generally defining abuse-of-discretion standard).
B. Double Jeopardy
1. Applicable Law
The Double Jeopardy Clause, contained within the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects an accused against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977)); see Ex parte Denton, 399 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When the prosecutions involve distinct statutory provisions, as in this case, we apply the Blockburger test and ask whether the offenses contain the same elements or whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697 (1993); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Ex parte Castillo, 469 S.W.3d 165, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In Texas, when resolving whether two crimes are the same for double-jeopardy purposes, we focus on the elements alleged in the charging instrument. Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
2. Analysis
The intoxication manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide counts in the original indictment allege that on February 8, 2014 in Victoria County, Garcia did then and there:
The amended failure to stop and render aid count, contained in an amended indictment filed after our remand of Garcia's first appeal, alleges that on February 8, 2014 in Victoria County, Garcia did then and there:
COUNT 1 — INTOXICATION MANSLAUGHTER
§49.08 P.C./2ND DEGREE FELONY []
Operate a motor vehicle in a public place while the said defendant was intoxicated by reason of the introduction of a combination of alcohol, controlled substances and dangerous drugs into the defendant's body, and did by reason for such intoxication cause the death of another, namely, Natalie Nicole Luna, by accident or mistake, to-wit: by failing to avoid a group of pedestrians in the roadway, striking and killing Natalie Nicole Luna[;]
. . .
COUNT 3 — CRIMINAL NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
§19.05 P.C./STATE JAIL FELONY []
By criminal negligence, cause the death of an individual, Natalie Nicole Luna, by failing to avoid a group of pedestrians in the roadway, striking and killing Natalie Nicole Luna[.]
COUNT 2 — ACCIDENT INVOLVING PERSONAL INJURY/DEATH
(failure to stop/render aid)
550.021(c)(l)(A) TRANS. CODE/2nd DEGREE FELONY []
Intentionally and knowingly, on a public place, operate a vehicle involved in striking a pedestrianand causingresulting in the death of another, namely, Natalie Nicole Luna, and the defendant, Hector Garcia, knowing the accident occurred, intentionally and knowingly failed to comply with the requirements of Transportation Code Section550.023550.021; namely:
1. Immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close as possible to the scene of the accident;
2. Immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehicle is not stopped at the scene of the accident;(Additions underlined, omissions struck through, as in original). Both indictments—the original and amended—allege that Garcia used a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of or immediate flight from the offenses.
3. Immediately determine whether a person is involved in the accident, and if a person is involved in the accident, whether that person requires aid;
4. Remain at the scene of the accident until the defendant complied with the requirements of Transportation Code Section 550.023
Garcia argues that all three counts share a common element—striking Luna with a motor vehicle. This commonality, according to Garcia, triggers the Double Jeopardy Clause. Under Blockburger, we disagree. In the intoxication manslaughter count, the State was required to prove that Garcia's intoxication caused Luna's death. The State was not required to prove that Garcia was intoxicated—much less that his intoxication caused Luna's death—in the failure to stop and render aid count. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 370. In the criminally negligent homicide count, the State was required to prove that Garcia, by criminal negligence, caused Luna's death. Even if we accepted Garcia's premise that causing Luna's death is a common element in both the criminally negligent homicide count and failure to stop and render aid count, the failure to stop and render aid count requires the additional element of Garcia not stopping, returning, or remaining at the scene or determining whether Luna required aid. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 370.
Garcia's double jeopardy challenge fails.
C. Collateral Estoppel
1. Applicable Law
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is embodied within the Double Jeopardy Clause, provides "that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit relating to the same event or situation." Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970)). Collateral estoppel applies to facts necessarily decided in the first proceeding. York v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 795); Ex parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d at 440; Gonzalez v. State, 301 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. ref'd). To determine what a jury necessarily decided, a court examines the record of the prior proceeding to determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other than that which the defendant argues is foreclosed from consideration. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.
Both appellate and trial courts must examine the entire record of the prior proceeding to determine precisely what specific facts were actually decided and whether resolution of those facts necessarily forecloses further proceedings. Guajardo v. State, 109 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate through an examination of the record of the first proceeding "that the [factual] issue he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding." Id. at 460 (citations omitted). In the absence of a complete record, "no reviewing court can address whether collateral estoppel might apply in a particular context or whether a trial court erred in rejecting that claim in a specific case." Id. at 457.
2. Analysis
The State contends that Garcia's failure to present us with the record of the trial culminating in the judgments of acquittal requires us to reject Garcia's collateral estoppel argument. We agree. See id. at 461 (providing that in evaluating a collateral estoppel claim an appellate court is not permitted to speculate about the factual findings in a prior proceeding and must review the entire testimonial record in the first proceeding to determine precisely what specific facts were actually decided and whether the resolution of those facts necessarily forecloses further proceedings).
Under the record requirement of Guajardo, Garcia's collateral estoppel challenge fails. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia's pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. Garcia's sole issue is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's order denying Garcia's pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 7th day of June, 2018.