Opinion
No. 2-664 / 01-1730.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, PAUL RIFFEL, Judge.
Everly appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.
Brian Miller, Hampton, for appellant.
Joel Yunek of Laird, Heiny, McManigal, Winga, Duffy Stambaugh, P.L.C., Mason City, for appellees.
Considered by HECHT, P.J., and VAITHESWARAN and EISENHAUER, JJ.
A manager of a Hy-Vee store in Mason City detained Travis Everly at the check-out counter based on his belief Everly had just aborted an attempt to steal a bottle of rum. Everly was taken to a back room where he remained for between thirty to forty-five minutes. The State subsequently charged Everly with fifth-degree theft but a district court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal.
Everly sued Hy-Vee for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and other wrongs. In a sealed verdict, the jury found for Everly on his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims and awarded him $612, the amount of attorney fees he incurred in defending the criminal action.
Hy-Vee does not challenge the award of attorney fees. See Whalen v. Connelly, 621 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Iowa 2000) (reaffirming incidental costs to defend against a lawsuit are not special damages in a malicious prosecution action).
Everly moved for a new trial, asserting the award was inadequate because it did not include a component for emotional distress. With the consent of both parties, the district court asked the jurors why they had declined to award this type of damage. The court did not report the discussion but summarized the jurors' responses in its ruling on the new trial motion. Based on their responses, the court denied the new trial motion. This appeal followed.
We review the denial of a new trial motion for an abuse of discretion. Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa 1996). In determining whether a damage award is adequate, "the key question is whether after examining the record, `giving the jury its right to accept or reject whatever portions of the conflicting evidence it chose, the verdict effects substantial justice between the parties.'" Id. (quoting Kautman v. Mar-Mac Community Sch. Dist., 255 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Iowa 1977)). The verdict need only have a "reasonable relationship to the loss suffered" to be sustained. Jackson v. Roger, 507 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). Where the evidence indicates the verdict is within a reasonable range, we will not interfere with the jury's determination. Olsen v. Drahos, 229 N.W.2d 741, 742 (Iowa 1975). Comparison of damages awarded in different cases is not a satisfactory procedure for determining adequacy. Kaiser v. Stathas, 263 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa 1978) (citations omitted). If a party claims the jury's award of certain types of damages and not others is inconsistent, we will set aside the verdicts only if they "are so logically and legally inconsistent that they cannot be reconciled." Blume v. Auer, 576 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
Everly argues that the jury's finding of liability mandated an award for "emotional distress, personal humiliation, and embarrassment, and deprivation of liberty" in addition to the attorney fee award. In support of this contention, he cites Yoch v. City of Cedar Rapids, 353 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984), in which our court held that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action who was only awarded attorney fees was entitled to a new trial and "compensation for mental anguish and suffering from the wrongful charge and arrest." Yoch, 353 N.W.2d at 99-100. While Yoch appears to be compelling authority for Everly's position, we agree with the district courts reasoning for declining to follow it. The court stated:
The Court shared with counsel its concern as to a possible inconsistent verdict and proposed that it inquire from the jury as to its reason or reasons for awarding attorney fees while declining to award damages for mental pain and suffering. Counsel consented to the inquiry. Upon inquiry the Court ascertained that the jury had determined from the evidence presented at trial that Plaintiff and his companions had intended to shoplift a bottle of liquor and had concealed the bottle for that purpose. However, the jury further determined that once Plaintiff had observed that his companion had been detained by store personnel that Plaintiff changed his mind and placed the bottle on the conveyor belt at the checkout lane. After the Plaintiff placed the bottle on the conveyor belt, he was confronted by Defendant Low and detained and issued a citation for fifth degree theft. Based upon those findings the jury concluded that the Plaintiff was wrongfully detained and prosecuted for fifth degree theft and was entitled to recover attorney fees incurred in defending the prosecution which was ultimately dismissed but he was not entitled to recover damages for mental pain and suffering since he had intended to commit a theft before his accomplice was detained.
The court concluded that "the jury's findings were supported by sufficient evidence and the damage award was commensurate with Plaintiff's injury as determined by the jury from the evidence."
We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the jury was free to conclude that Everly's emotional suffering was negligible. The record reflects he was briefly detained at the store. Although he stated he was "shocked" by the detention and thought about the incident "quite a bit," he conceded no one ridiculed him as a result of the incident, he did not see a doctor or psychologist for stress, and he was not claiming any lost wages. In contrast, the plaintiff in Yoch was arrested outside her work place and was handcuffed and transported to a police station and then to jail for several hours, all for asserted nonpayment of a $17.75 gasoline bill that she insisted she had paid. Id. at 97.
We affirm the district court's denial of Everly's new trial motion. We decline to consider Everly's second argument that the court abused its discretion in considering the jurors' post trial, unrecorded statements, as Everly's counsel consented to this procedure. See McCracken v. Edward D. Jones, 445 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) ("it is elementary a litigant cannot complain of error which he has invited or to which he has assented."); cf. Neumann v. Service Parts Headquarters, 572 N.W.2d 175, 176 n. 1 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (suggesting plaintiff may not have preserved error, as she agreed to a sealed verdict).