Opinion
Civil No. 03-0809 RHS/WDS.
July 15, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 14, 2004.[Doc. No. 61]. The Court having considered the pleadings on file in the above captioned cause, the arguments and authorities propounded by the respective parties, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds the motion is not well-taken and should be denied.
Plaintiff, George Evans, was an industrial hygienist at Intel from 1994 to 2003. He alleges that Intel violated an implied contract of employment with him and retaliated against him for suggesting different method of air quality testing.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff "had recurrent performance issues" during his employment at Intel, and that the company's actions were reasonable in response to those issues. Plaintiff's contends that Defendant pressured him to publically repudiate his concerns about the nature of CUB scrubber emissions from the Intel facility. Plaintiff was not terminated from his position and he must therefore establish that Intel constructively discharged him in order to recover on his claim.
The Supreme Court recently explained that to establish "constructive discharge," a plaintiff must "show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that [the employee's] resignation qualified as a fitting response." Pennsylvania State Police v. Suder, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004). Working conditions, when viewed objectively, must be so difficult that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.Yearous v. Niobrara County Mem.Hosp., 128 F. 3d 1351, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998). An employee must reasonably explore any option short of resignation.Id.
In order to prevail on its summary judgment motion, Intel must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court's job in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or draw inferences from the facts, but, rather, to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 255 (1986). The inquiry a court must make is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [factfinder] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52.
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.See Magnum Foods, Inc., v. Continental Casualty Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1497 (10th Cir. 1994). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the existence of triable issues. World if Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. 1985). Factual inferences tending to show triable issues must be considered in the light most favorable to the existence of those issues. See Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2000) (drawing of legitimate inferences from facts is jury function, not judge function on motion for summary judgment). In cases that involve a party's state of mind, the granting of summary judgment is especially questionable. See, e.g., LeFevre v. Space Communications Co., 771 F. 2d 421, 423 (10th Cir. 1985) (State of mind . . . is difficult to prove and great circumspection is required where summary judgment is sought on an issue involving state of mind. (quoting Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F. 2d 461, 468 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (citations omitted)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's work was unsatisfactory and that the allegedly "adverse actions" by Defendant (requiring him to renegotiate payment of a debt he owed Intel, instructing him to remove the suggestion of plume modeling from an internal document, giving him a Corrective Action Plan to remedy performance deficiencies) were taken were a result of choices Plaintiff made. Plaintiff contends that Intel's actions were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff's protected activity (expressing environmental concerns regarding air quality).
The Court can make no determination here regarding the credibility of Plaintiff's and Defendant's version of the events except to note that disputes of material fact do exist which require that this case proceed to trial. See Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1994). Viewing the factual record and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Gullickson v. Southwest Airlines Pilots' Assoc., 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 1996), the Court finds that the factual issues are sufficiently unresolved so that a reasonable fact-finder could view Defendants' actions toward Plaintiff as a constructive discharge. Accordingly, Defendant's summary judgment motion must be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Intel's Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 14, 2004 [Doc. No. 61] is hereby DENIED.