Summary
finding plaintiff's evidence of pretext lacking because, among other things, "[h]is complaints were taken seriously and investigated by [d]efendant"
Summary of this case from Augustin v. Yale Club of New York CityOpinion
99 Civ. 8559 (JSM)
January 17, 2001
OPINION and ORDER
Carl Estrada ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII"), New York State's Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et. seq., and New York City's Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 et. seq., claiming that he was terminated from his position at Lehman Brothers, Inc. ("Defendant") in retaliation for complaining to his superiors about acts of racial discrimination. The parties cross-move for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted and plaintiff's motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began his employment as a proofreader in the Creative Services Center ("Creative Services") at Lehman Brothers in 1989. In July 1994, Plaintiff received a verbal warning for insubordination and was demoted from his position as Midnight Shift Lead proofreader based on his deficient supervisory skills and failure to abide by firm policy in taking breaks. (Leblang Aff. Ex. D.) A contemporary job performance evaluation filled out by Lori Miller ("Miller") also noted that Plaintiff at times made inappropriate and offensive remarks to his peers. In October 1994, Plaintiff was issued a second verbal warning because he continued to attempt to supervise his fellow proof readers, ignored instructions of supervisors, and had difficulty communicating with the management team and with his peers. (Leblang Aff. Exs. E, F.) He was warned by Miller, who had become manager of Creative Services, and two other supervisors that failure to improve would lead to progressive disciplinary action. Plaintiff received satisfactory performance evaluations in 1995 and 1996, although a continued problem with overly emotional communications was cited in July 1996. (Brualdi Decl., Miller Dep. Exs. 7, 8.)
In September 1996, Catherine Ginter ("Ginter"), a temporary operator in Creative Services, complained that plaintiff made inappropriate remarks about her appearance and called her over to his desk in order to point out mistakes that she had made, allegedly in violation of department procedure. (Leblang Aff., Miller Dep. at 19; Leblang Aff. Ex. G.) In response, Plaintiff filed a written complaint about Ginter with her supervisor, claiming that she had on several occasions approached him from behind and massaged his shoulders in a provocative manner. (Leblang Aff., Estrada Dep. at 243; Leblang Aff. Ex. H.) On September 24, 1996, Plaintiff was issued a performance memorandum ("September 1996 Performance Memorandum") by Miller and another supervisor, Louis Sciullo ("Sciullo"), outlining the complaints lodged by Ginter and noting that plaintiff had admitted to making the inappropriate statements in a conversation with Sciullo. (Leblang Aff. Ex. G.) plaintiff admits to making two such comments, as well as to frequently correcting Ginter's work, in a later memorandum. (Leblang Aff. Ex. K.) Plaintiff was told that the September 1996 Performance Memorandum would be placed in his permanent file.
In March 1997, plaintiff approached the offsite supervisor and asked why Ginter, who no longer worked at Lehman Brothers, had been removed. (Leblang Aff., Estrada Dep. at 212; Leblang Aff. Ex. I.) plaintiff apparently asked whether Ginter was terminated for insubordination and substandard performance. Miller met with plaintiff on April 1st and told him that such inquiries were inappropriate. (Leblang Aff. Ex. I; Leblang Aff., Estrada Dep. at 213.)
Several days later, Plaintiff filed two complaints with Jerry Callaghan ("Callaghan"), Managing Director and Head of the Trading Services Department. Plaintiff alleged that his supervisors had mishandled the investigation of Ginter's allegations against Plaintiff, and complained that Miller, now Vice president of Creative Services, was guilty of racial bias, lying, and mismanaging payroll funds, among other things. (Leblang Aff. Ex. J.) As to the latter charge, plaintiff claimed that Miller, an African American, gave black employees preferential treatment at the expense of non-blacks. Callaghan thereafter met with plaintiff pursuant to Lehman's open door policy, plaintiff told Callaghan that he would submit more detailed written complaints so that his allegations could be investigated. (Leblang Aff., Estrada Dep. at 262-63).
plaintiff refers to himself as white Hispanic in his complaint before this Court.
In June 1997, plaintiff sent a memorandum regarding his dissatisfaction with the Ginter investigation to Mary Di Maria ("Di Maria"), Senior Human Resources Generalist for Trading Services. (Leblang Aff. Ex. K.) In this memorandum, Plaintiff alleges that Ginter manufactured her allegations because Plaintiff was frequently unhappy with her work and she was afraid of being fired. plaintiff also characterizes Miller as "clueless," and asserts that her September 1996 performance Memorandum was "ridiculously" and "stupidly" worded. plaintiff claims that he was denied due process because he admitted to making some of the comments without realizing that Ginter's complaint would then be placed in his permanent file. Finally, Plaintiff suggests revisions to Defendant's sexual harassment policy designed to assist "those males who are heterosexuals and who are at the bottom of the corporate ladder." Di Maria and Alan Cohen ("Cohen"), Employee Relations Specialist, investigated Plaintiff's complaint and informed him on August 25, 1997, that the September 1996 Performance Memorandum was appropriate and would remain in plaintiff's file. (Leblang Aff. Ex. L.)
On September 12, 1997, plaintiff submitted to Callaghan a twenty-three-Page complaint regarding Miller. (Leblang Aff. Ex. M.) In the complaint, Plaintiff focuses on events that arose in 1994 when he was Midnight Shift Supervisor, and that continued to the present day. Plaintiff accuses Miller of favoring a temporary employee, Dionne Spencer ("Spencer"), who was also African American and who began working in the proofreading department in 1994. Plaintiff claims that Spencer was a substandard employee who spent more time on crossword puzzles and novels than on proofreading, and that Miller mismanaged payroll funds by retaining Spencer. Plaintiff states that his various complaints about Spencer went unheeded, and that other similarly non-performing white employees were terminated. He alleges that his co-worker, George Wright, complained to a supervisor about Spencer and was told that Spencer was "protected by higher-ups." In retaliation for his attempt to cut Spencer's days when he was shift supervisor, Plaintiff alleges that he was told untruthfully by Miller that consolidated breaks were no longer allowed. Plaintiff's unwillingness to follow the policy change led to his demotion and verbal warning in 1994. plaintiff also goes into great detail regarding his rejected attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the proofreading department by making suggestions for change, and argues that the verbal warnings he received in 1994 were unfair.
plaintiff also alleges that this same supervisor once dated Spencer.
A black employee, Reggie Mason, was allegedly not told of such a policy change until two years later.
Di Maria and Cohen investigated Plaintiff's allegations and concluded that they lacked merit. (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 49-50, 52-53, 70-73, 140). Despite a request from Di Maria and Cohen in late October 1997 that plaintiff meet with them to discuss the results of their investigation, Plaintiff instead sought to meet with Callaghan. (Leblang Affs. Ex. N, 0.) Callaghan referred plaintiff back to Di Maria and Cohen. (Leblang Aff. Ex. P.). Plaintiff did not meet with them until December.
Plaintiff received a satisfactory performance evaluation in October 1997, although his supervisor, Shelley Block ("Block") noted that plaintiff needed to improve his relationships in order to achieve consistent professional and appropriate behavior in all areas. (Brualdi Decl., Block Dep. Ex. 1.) Block also set a goal for plaintiff to "direct only appropriate work-related questions / comments to peers and supervisors and adhere to Lehman's policies and procedures, specifically the guidelines for appropriate workplace behavior." (Brualdi Decl., Block Dep. Ex. 1.)
On November 11, 1997, Plaintiff spoke with Block in a public hallway outside of Creative Services. (Leblang Aff., Ex. Q; Leblang Aff., Block Dep. at 54-55.) Plaintiff complained to her about Spencer's poor performance and Miller's favoritism, and stated more than once that Miller was a racist. (Leblang Aff., Ex. Q.; Leblang Aff., Block Dep. at 53-55.) Block informed Miller of the incident via email, stating that plaintiff was "very angry," and Miller in turn informed Di Maria, Cohen, and other managers. (Leblang Aff. Ex. Q.)
Upon the advice of Di Maria and Cohen, Callaghan allegedly decided on or before December 8, 1997, that Plaintiff should be terminated from his position at Lehman Brothers. (Leblang Aff., Callaghan Dep. at 49-54; Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 80-83.) Defendant's proffered reason for the termination was Plaintiff's continued course of inappropriate conduct and interference with his supervisors' administration of the proofreading department. (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 81; Leblang Aff., King Dep. at 50-51.) Cohen testified in his deposition that the November incident in which Plaintiff called Miller a racist in a "loud tone" was the "straw that broke the camel's back." (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 82-83.)
Plaintiff had been scheduled to meet with Di Maria and Cohen on December 8th in order to discuss the results of their investigation of his accusations about Miller. Defendant alleges that because the decision to terminate Plaintiff had been made, this meeting was canceled because Block was out of the office and her presence as plaintiff's supervisor was required at Plaintiff's termination meeting. (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 77-80, 88-91.)
On December 10, 1997, Plaintiff met with Block, Di Maria, and Cohen. Di Maria and Cohen informed Plaintiff of the results of their investigation of Plaintiff's complaint against Miller, and told plaintiff that he was being terminated due to his ongoing pattern of engaging in inappropriate conduct. Earlier that day, Plaintiff had sent email messages to Cohen, Di Maria, Callaghan, and others stating that he had contacted a labor attorney. (Leblang Aff. Exs. R, S.) In these messages, Plaintiff once again voiced his displeasure with Spencer's work performance and complained that no disciplinary action had been taken when Spencer once insulted him, as opposed to the swift action taken in response to Ginter's complaint against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims in this action that he was terminated by Defendant in retaliation for his complaints of racial bias against Miller. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that Plaintiff was terminated as a result of his ongoing history of inappropriate and insubordinate behavior in the workplace. Both parties move for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
To bring a claim for retaliatory termination under Title VII, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action. See id. In order to rebut the presumption that arises from establishment of a prima facie case, Defendant has the burden to produce competent evidence that, if taken as true, would permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the challenged employment action was taken for a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981). Once such a reason is proffered, the burden returns to plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a trial-worthy issue of pretext underlying Defendant's stated reason for termination. See id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.
Because New York courts look to federal law in adjudicating discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, see Reed v. A.W. Lawrence Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1177 (2d Cir. 1996); Ferrante v. American Lung Assoc., 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28 (1997); Burger v. Litton Indus., Inc., 91 Civ. 0918, 1996 WL 421449, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1996), those claims are evaluated under the same standards.
Defendant argues that plaintiff has not made his prima facie case because he has failed to establish a causal connection between the emails he sent on the morning of December 10, 1997, and his termination later that evening. Defendant points to the deposition testimony of Cohen, Block, and two other managers as evidence that the decision to terminate Plaintiff had been made either on or prior to December 8th. (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 80, 134; Sorensen Dep. at 22; Block Dep. at 48; King Dep. at 43.) Defendant focuses only on the emails of December 10th, as opposed to plaintiff's complaints in April and September 1997, because in Plaintiff's deposition testimony he explicitly states that he was fired as a result of sending the emails on the morning of December 10th. (Leblang Aff., Estrada Dep. at 16-17, 32-33.)
Plaintiff offers no evidence to rebut the testimony of his supervisors regarding when the decision to terminate him was made. However, his complaint alleges that he was terminated for lodging complaints of racial bias against Miller. Thus, even if the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made before December 10th, it could still have been made as a result of the complaints he filed in April and September 1997. Thus, for the purposes of this summary judgment motion, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case. But because Defendant has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, which plaintiff has failed to rebut, Plaintiff is unable to sustain his overall burden and avoid summary judgment.
Defendant points to Plaintiff's history of inappropriate behavior in the workplace as the basis for his termination, including offensive remarks made to co-workers and continued attempts to interfere with the administration of the proofreading department. Plaintiff's actions are documented in the two verbal warnings he received in 1994, several performance evaluations throughout his time with Defendant, the complaint filed by Ginter and the consequent September 1996 performance Memorandum issued by Miller, Miller's reprimand in 1996 after Plaintiff approached a supervisor and asked why Ginter was fired, and plaintiff's accusation in a public space that Miller was a racist. Because "[a]n employer does not violate Title VII when it takes adverse employment action against an employee to preserve a workplace environment that is governed by rules, subject to a chain of command, free of commotion, and conducive to the work of the enterprise," Defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination. Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2000); See also Rizzo-Puccio v. College Auxiliary Servs., Inc., 71 F. Supp.2d 47, 64 (N.D.N Y 1999), aff'd, 216 F.3d 1073 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion)
In order to rebut this showing, plaintiff must submit proof that the proffered explanation is false and therefore pretextual. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. Plaintiff may raise an inference of pretext either indirectly by showing that Defendant's stated reasons for its adverse action are not credible, or directly by showing that the action was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason. See Reeves v. Sanderson plumbing Prods. Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108 (2000); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825-26 (1973)). plaintiff fails to produce evidence sufficient to allow a rational fact-finder to conclude that Defendant's proffered reason for his discharge is pretextual.
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that his performance evaluations or warnings were falsely issued, or that his documented history of reprimands was otherwise manufactured. Indeed, he admits many times in his deposition, memoranda, and emails to engaging in the acts for which he was disciplined or warned about. The mere fact that he may disagree with his employer's actions or think that his behavior was justified does not raise an inference of pretext. See, e.g., Ricks v. Conde Nast Pubs., Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Jimoh v. Ernst Young, 908 F. Supp. 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
Nor has Plaintiff submitted evidence that retaliation for his formal complaints and emails alleging that Miller favored black employees was the true reason for his termination. plaintiff first relies on the generally satisfactory performance evaluations he received, including the satisfactory evaluation he received in October 1997, two months before he was fired. plaintiff suggests that these overall positive evaluations indicate that Defendant could not have been unhappy with plaintiff's workplace behavior, as it claims. However, these evaluations also include several references to Plaintiff's need to improve his communication skills and to engage in appropriate workplace behavior. No one disputes that Plaintiff was a terrific proofreader.
Next, Plaintiff points to statements made by several of Defendant's witnesses in their deposition testimony. (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 81-82; Brualdi Aff., King Dep. at 36-37; Kohn Reply Aff., King Aff.) Together, these statements do in fact indicate that the November incident outside of Creative Services, in which plaintiff told Block that Miller was a racist, was a precipitating factor in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. Defendant asserts that its displeasure with this incident stemmed from the public nature of the accusation, (Leblang Aff., Cohen Dep. at 81-82; Kohn Reply Aff., King Aff. ¶¶ 6-7), which already formed the basis of an investigation by Di Maria and Cohen.
Because plaintiff had submitted two memoranda several months previously, one twenty-three pages long, in which he detailed his accusations about Miller, it is not reasonable to infer that Defendant would fire Plaintiff in retaliation for making a one-time verbal complaint of a similar nature. Despite the fact that informal complaints are protected activity, see Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990), the nature of the encounter, in which plaintiff angrily accused Miller of racism in an area where he might be overheard, and where his allegations already formed the subject of an official investigation, does not give rise to an inference of pretext, see Matima, 228 F.3d at 80-81. Moreover, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence that Defendant's proffered reason for its unhappiness with this episode is false.
Similarly, to the extent that plaintiff alleges that the termination decision was made after he sent his emails containing similar accusations on the morning of December 10, 1997, Defendant had ample opportunity to fire Plaintiff in retaliation for his April and September complaints. It is therefore not reasonable to infer pretext from the fact that he was fired later that day, particularly where plaintiff has not rebutted Defendant's evidence that the termination decision was in fact made at least two days prior.
Plaintiff also notes that Callaghan testified that he could not remember why plaintiff was fired, and therefore he had no basis to dispute the allegation that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for making complaints about Miller. (Brualdi Aff., Callaghan Dep. at 72-73.) The fact that Callaghan could not remember why plaintiff was fired does not support an inference that plaintiff was fired for retaliatory reasons. Indeed, it is more likely that Callaghan would have remembered the reason for plaintiff's termination if it was in retaliation for his complaint about Miller.
Plaintiff's evidence of pretext is far too slim to permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that plaintiff was terminated as a result of lodging complaints that Miller was a racist. His complaints were taken seriously and investigated by Defendant. In addition, although Plaintiff need not prove that Defendant was engaging in discriminatory conduct by favoring black employees, the tenuous nature of plaintiff's claims about Miller do not support an inference that Defendant would seek to retaliate against plaintiff for making them. On the other hand, the ample proof of plaintiff's continued attempts to interfere with his supervisors' decisions, his difficulties communicating in an appropriate manner with colleagues and supervisors, and his lack of good judgment supports Defendant's stated reason for the termination. Although Plaintiff's motives to improve the efficiency and work quality of the proofreading department may have been good ones, his methods were not.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant's request for attorney's fees is denied.
SO ORDERED.