Opinion
E066517
12-11-2018
Estate of DAVID L. PATTERSON, Deceased. AUDELLA PATTERSON, Petitioner, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MERCEDES MURRAY et al., Objectors, Defendants and Respondents.
Audella Patterson, in pro. per., for Petitioner, Plaintiff, and Appellant. Law Offices of Mitchell I. Roth and Mitchell I. Roth for Objectors, Defendants, and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. PROPS1300718) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cynthia Ann Ludvigsen, Judge. Affirmed. Audella Patterson, in pro. per., for Petitioner, Plaintiff, and Appellant. Law Offices of Mitchell I. Roth and Mitchell I. Roth for Objectors, Defendants, and Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
This consolidated action involves probate petitions, a petition to contest the validity of a trust (trust petition), and a civil complaint. Appellant, Audella Patterson, brought the trust petition and the civil complaint, both relating to her interest in real property in Brawley, California (the Brawley property). In these pleadings, Audella principally alleges that she held title to the Brawley property as a joint tenant with her deceased brother, David Patterson. Other family members allegedly divested her of this joint tenancy by influencing David to sever the joint tenancy and transfer the Brawley property to his trust. After a bench trial on the trust petition and civil complaint, the court entered a judgment adverse to Audella and in favor of the family members. Audella advances numerous arguments on appeal, most dealing with the court's orders transferring the civil case from Imperial County Superior Court and consolidating it with the probate matter pending in San Bernardino County Superior Court. We conclude the court did not err in many of the respects she identifies, and where it did err, the error was not prejudicial. We therefore affirm.
For purposes of clarity, we will refer to the individuals who share a surname by their first names.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
David died in July 2013. Besides David and Audella, various family members are pertinent for our purposes: Davina Patterson, David's daughter; respondent, Gary Murray, David and Audella's brother; and respondents, Mercedes and Monica Murray, Gary's daughters. A. The Probate Petitions
Davina commenced this probate matter in the San Bernardino County Superior Court by filing a petition for letters of administration. Davina's petition declared that David had died intestate, and she was his only child and heir. She wanted the court to appoint her administrator of his estate.
David's nieces, Mercedes and Monica, filed a competing petition for probate of will and for letters testamentary. Mercedes and Monica's petition declared that David had a will naming them co-executors of his estate. The court appointed Mercedes and Monica special administrators of the estate pending resolution of the competing petitions.
The Probate Code enables a court to appoint a "special administrator" of an estate, which "may be for a specified term," whenever "the circumstances of the estate require the immediate appointment of a personal representative." (Prob. Code, § 8540.)
Davina later withdrew her petition for letters of administration but still objected to Mercedes and Monica serving as executors of the estate and wanted the court to appoint a public administrator. B. David's Trust and Audella's Petition Contesting the Validity of the Trust
David also had a living trust naming Mercedes and Monica successor trustees after his death. The trust document provided that, at David's death, Mercedes and Monica would each receive 50 percent of the trust estate, minus $5,000 for each of his grandchildren. The trust document also declared that David, as trustee, was "specifically not making any provision" for his daughter, Davina.
Audella filed the trust petition in the probate matter. She asserts the Brawley property has "become ensnarled in" the alleged "suspicious Trust." The trust petition alleges as follows: Audella, Gary, and David's mother had originally owned the Brawley property, but in 1985 she deeded it to the three of them as joint tenants. Later, when Gary was in the midst of a divorce, he quitclaimed the Brawley property to Audella and David as joint tenants. About five months before David's death, David transferred the Brawley property to his living trust by grant deed, unbeknownst to Audella and without her consent. The grant deed was "erroneous and suspect." Shortly after David's death, Mercedes, as successor trustee of David's trust, transferred the Brawley property to herself and Monica as joint tenants. Mercedes and Monica gave Gary power of attorney to act for them with respect to the Brawley property. Audella asserts Gary is the "principal mastermind" of this scheme to dispossess her of the Brawley property, and she is a beneficiary of the trust by virtue of her joint tenancy in the property.
The trust petition contends Gary, Mercedes, and Monica committed fraud and misrepresentation, unduly influenced David to set up the trust, and committed elder abuse against both David and Audella. Among other things, it asks the court to invalidate the trust or remove Mercedes and Monica as cotrustees; order an accounting by the cotrustees; appoint an "impartial" trustee; and declare that the joint tenancy of David and Audella in the Brawley property was never severed. C. Audella's Civil Complaint
Around the same time Audella filed her petition contesting David's trust, she filed a civil complaint in the Imperial County Superior Court. The complaint names David's estate, Mercedes, Monica, and Gary as defendants. The gravamen of the complaint is identical in substance to the trust petition. The complaint alleges that Audella and David held title to the Brawley property as joint tenants; by way of a "suspicious" grant deed, David transferred the Brawley property to his trust about five months before his death; Mercedes, as successor trustee of David's trust, transferred the Brawley property to herself and Monica as joint tenants; and the two women had given Gary power of attorney to act for them with respect to the property. The complaint alleges causes of action against all defendants for fraud and misrepresentation, quiet title, slander of title, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse.
A month or so after Audella filed the complaint, the parties appeared at a hearing in the probate matter. When her civil case came up, the parties had the following discussion:
"[Audella]: I filed a civil suit in Imperial County because they have jurisdiction. My property is in Brawley, and all of the actions have taken there [sic]. I did check with the civil court here and they instructed me that I have to file in Imperial County.
"THE COURT: Well if it's a trust action, it wouldn't be a civil case. It would be a probate matter.
"[Audella]: It's a trust and—against Gary, Mercy and Monica Murray for fraudulently filing on my property.
"[Counsel for Mercedes and Monica]: It's all the same thing, your Honor. It's just a trust instead of a probate. It should be consolidated.
"THE COURT: Well you all can wait five years in the civil court in Brawley to do this or we can bring it in here and deal with it.
"[Audella]: I have no objection to that.
"[Counsel for Mercedes and Monica]: I will prepare an order for consolidation."
The court then directed counsel for Mercedes and Monica, Mitchell I. Roth, to prepare a "stipulation for everyone to sign to transfer whatever action that is to this court and coordinate it with this." Roth replied: "I would just rather prepare an order and circulate it under the code, and if anybody has an objection, they can make an objection." The court told Roth to submit the order, after which it would hold the order for 10 days. If there were no objections, the court would sign it, "[t]hen somebody [could] take it down to Brawley and get that case moved" to the San Bernardino court.
This discussion about consolidation occurred on April 10, 2014. A hearing regarding the status of Audella's civil case occurred on June 2, 2014, in the probate court. The court had not yet entered any order transferring or consolidating the complaint. Roth said he had "sent an order," but had not "gotten it back." He also asserted that he had tried to file an answer and could not because the clerk had no order consolidating the civil case. The court did not have the proposed order and thought it might be "floating around." Roth told the court he would submit another order the next day and then file defendants' answer. In the meantime, Roth served Audella with defendants' answer in court, explaining: "And I'm going to—Just so there's no—it is a very contested case. I'm going to serve a copy of the answer right now to Ms. [Audella] Patterson and I would hope the record would reflect that."
Three days after this hearing, on June 5, 2014, the San Bernardino probate court filed two different orders relating to consolidation. The first order purported to be filed in the civil case—the caption identified Imperial County as the venue and listed the parties on the civil complaint as plaintiff and defendants. The second order purported to be filed in the probate case—the caption identified San Bernardino County as the venue, and the case name was In re the Estate of David L. Patterson. The court clerk in Imperial County stamped both of these orders "received" on June 17, 2014. Both orders stated that the civil case and probate case were consolidated and designated the probate case as the lead case. They also directed the parties to file all further pleadings in the probate case only.
On July 8, 2014, in the Imperial court, Audella filed a request for entry of default and an application for default judgment against Gary, Mercedes, and Monica. The court clerk declined to enter defendants' default with the following note: "Request: Default, NOT ENTERED—Case consol. [with] Lead Case in San Bernardino Co." On July 30, 2014, the Imperial court filed one of the orders consolidating the civil case and probate case. (This order thus bore two "filed" stamps—one from the San Bernardino clerk dated June 5, 2014, and one from the Imperial clerk dated July 30, 2014.)
The Imperial court held a hearing on August 6, 2014, regarding Audella's request to enter defendants' defaults. The court admitted to being "flummoxed" by the situation: "I would note at first it's an administerial [sic] act that the clerk enter defaults. But the inherent problem I have here, I can't quite figure out what is going on, because I have an order in this file from Judge Ludvigsen in San Bernardino—that's their Probate Case Number PROPS1300718. And it's an order for consolidation of this case with that case, that case being the lead case." The court noted that "[y]ou cannot consolidate cases that are pending in different courts" without first transferring one case, so that both cases are pending in the same court. The court thought the consolidation order "hint[ed] at transfer," but it did not order transfer, and the civil case was "kind of in limbo." Counsel for defendants, Roth, explained that he prepared the order and he "may have made a mistake." Roth said he would get a transfer order in the next 10 days. The court again noted: "The cart got before the horse because the way that works in [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1048 is you transfer the case first, then you have jurisdiction over it, then you consolidate it. . . . For whatever . . . reason, we got this one reversed. [¶] But the long and short of it is—I don't mean to sound flippant, but none of this is my problem in the sense that I'm not the Court of Appeal. I do not have the ability to reverse Judge Ludvigsen's order or do anything with it. . . . So I can and will take no further action in this case. I leave it to the parties to either take it up on a writ, take it up on appeal, or get a transfer order to do whatever you think is necessary to do." The court declined to rule on Audella's requests for default and default judgment and took the matters off calendar. It explained: "It's filed in the wrong action. I would advise the plaintiff if you want that to happen you need to file it in the probate case in San Bernardino. You'll get a judge there who will refuse to rule on it unless this case has been transferred by then. We have a quirky situation, but that's the way it goes."
Within the next two weeks after this hearing, first the San Bernardino court and then the Imperial court filed an "order granting change of venue/transfer order," transferring the civil case to San Bernardino. (Capitalization omitted.) After the transfer, in September 2014, defendants filed their answer to Audella's complaint. Audella filed another request for entry of their defaults and an application for default judgment in November 2015. The court returned the documents because "there [was] no basis for entry of the requested default and default judgment," as defendants had filed an answer to the complaint. D. Trial
The bench trial on the trust petition and Audella's civil complaint took place in May 2016. The court entered a judgment for defendants on the civil complaint and denied the trust petition in its entirety. Audella filed a timely notice of appeal. The court resolved Mercedes and Monica's probate petition later, and its ruling on that is not before us.
III. DISCUSSION
Audella primarily contends that the orders effecting the transfer of her civil case constituted reversible error. The transfer of her civil case was accomplished through much confusion and an irregular process, but the claimed errors either were not errors or were not prejudicial.
When noncomplex actions pending in different counties involve "a common question of fact or law," a judge may transfer an action from another court to that judge's court for "coordination." (Code Civ. Proc., § 403; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500 [setting forth rules for the "[t]ransfer and consolidation of noncomplex common-issue actions filed in different courts." (Capitalization omitted.)].) The court to which the action is transferred may order the two actions consolidated without any further motion or hearing. (§ 403; rule 3.500; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 12:345, pp. 12(I)-65 - 12(I)-66 ["Consolidation is limited to cases pending in the same court. Where cases having 'common questions' are pending in different courts, either court may order 'noncomplex' cases transferred to and consolidated with cases pending before the court . . . ."].)
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
The parties to the actions may stipulate to transfer or consolidation. (See McClure v Donovan (1949) 33 Cal.2d 717, 722 [parties orally stipulated to court's suggestion that guardianship and annulment proceedings be consolidated for trial, where "crux of both proceedings" was alleged mental deterioration of one party]; Phillips v. Beilsten (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 450, 456 [parties stipulated to transfer and then consolidation of two cases pending in different counties, a stipulation that was "plainly designed to avoid a multiplicity of actions in a situation where suits involving the same general subject matter were pending in different courts."].) In fact, when a party moves to transfer an action from another county, the party must declare that he or she "has made a good-faith effort to obtain agreement to the transfer and consolidation from all parties to the actions[.]" (Rule 3.500(c); § 403.)
As the court in Imperial County put it, "[t]he cart got before the horse" here. The San Bernardino court entered two orders consolidating the actions, and then several months later, an order transferring the civil case from Imperial County to San Bernardino County. Although this was not technically correct, and the court should have transferred the civil case first or simultaneously with consolidation, we fail to see how this irregular procedure harmed Audella. The ultimate result was that the civil case moved to San Bernardino and was tried with the trust petition. That also would have been the result had the court transferred and consolidated the civil case in the same order, rather than several months apart. Audella must show that, in the absence of the identified error, it is reasonably probable she would have obtained a more favorable result. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800 [explaining the standard for determining prejudice]; Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 853-854 ["Prejudice from error is never presumed but must be affirmatively demonstrated by the appellant."].) The exact same result is not a more favorable result, and the court's error was thus not prejudicial.
Other deviations from the proper process for transferring cases might have occurred, beyond the premature consolidation and belated transfer. The San Bernardino court's transfer order should have been sent to the Judicial Council and the presiding judge of the Imperial court. (Rule 3.500(e).) This procedure allows the Judicial Council's coordination staff to determine whether any courts have issued conflicting orders. (Rule 3.500(g).) If so, the presiding judges of those courts must confer with each other and the judges who issued the conflicting orders to resolve the conflict. (Ibid.) The record does not indicate whether the transfer order was ever sent to the Judicial Council or the presiding judge of the Imperial court. Still, we have no reason to believe this error—if it occurred—was prejudicial. There is no indication the Imperial court or any other court had issued an order conflicting with the transfer order, which would have required the intervention of the Judicial Council and the presiding judges of the courts.
Audella rejects this prejudice analysis and instead asserts that we must reverse the consolidation orders because they are void. She insists they "exceeded the jurisdiction" of the San Bernardino court because it entered them while the Imperial court still presided over the civil case, rendering the orders "illegal" and "forever void." She cites case law holding that an order exceeding the jurisdiction of the court is void. Audella fails to distinguish between lacking jurisdiction in a fundamental sense and mere procedural error. "In its most fundamental or strict sense, lack of jurisdiction means 'an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or parties.'" (In re Christian J. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 276, 279.) Actions by a court lacking fundamental jurisdiction are void. (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339.)
But the San Bernardino court did not lack subject matter or personal jurisdiction in this fundamental sense. This case presents a problem of venue—that is, the particular county in which an action is pending. The Code of Civil Procedure permits a court in one county to order that an action in another county be transferred to it and consolidated with another case. (§ 403.) The court erred in the sequence of procedural steps it took. This error "'does not reach the power of the court to act, but concerns instead a mistaken application of law.'" (Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1268.) Accordingly, we apply a traditional harmless error analysis, and as discussed, conclude the error was not prejudicial. (See In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 624 ["We typically apply a harmless-error analysis when a statutory mandate is disobeyed . . . ."].)
Audella charges several more errors relating to the consolidation orders. She contends the court erred "in that no order for consolidation was ever made." She contends that in April 2014, when the parties first discussed transferring the civil case to the probate court, the court ordered Roth to prepare an order for "coordination," not consolidation. It is true the court instructed Roth to prepare a "stipulation for everyone to sign to transfer whatever action that is to this court and coordinate it with this." (Italics added.) Roth is the one who used the term "consolidation" when describing the order he would prepare. But whether the court used the term "consolidation" or "coordination" hardly matters in this case. The pertinent statute authorizing the transfer of actions uses both terms. The statute refers to both transferring an action for "coordination" with another that involves common questions, and ordering the cases "consolidated," once transfer is accomplished. (§ 403.) And, looking at the discussion between the parties and the court in context, it is clear that all involved simply intended to move the civil case to San Bernardino and "deal with it" in the probate action, whether that was called consolidation, coordination, or both. In short, we disagree with Audella that the court's comments cannot be construed as an order for consolidation.
Next, Audella argues the court did not hold the proposed orders for 10 days before signing them, as the court said it would. She comes to this conclusion because the court filed the two consolidation orders on June 5, 2014, and they both recite that the parties stipulated to consolidate on June 2, 2014, a period of only three days. The parties actually stipulated at the hearing on April 10, 2014. At the June 2 hearing, Roth indicated he had submitted a proposed order to the court, but the court could not locate it, and Roth said he would submit another one. Thus, although the parties and the court discussed the proposed order on June 2, the stipulation occurred much earlier. The record does not reveal when Roth submitted the first (lost) proposed order to the court, and whether the court held it for 10 days, even if the court did not hold the second proposed order for 10 days. Assuming for the sake of argument that the court erred in not holding the proposed order for 10 days, we are not persuaded Audella was prejudiced. The court's avowed purpose for holding any proposed order was to see whether any party had objections to it. In her briefing, Audella does not describe how any objections she might have had would have made a material difference to the proceedings. Nor does she say in her briefing that she would have revoked her consent to trying the civil complaint in the probate matter. Ideally, the orders Roth prepared would have correctly identified the stipulation date as April 10, not June 2, but this amounts to a minor clerical error, not a prejudicial error resulting in a "miscarriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Along the same lines, Audella points out that the consolidation orders describe the civil case as a "Brawley County Civil Case," when Brawley is merely a city in Imperial County. Again, this was a minor clerical error, not prejudicial error. None of these sorts of clerical or typographical errors require reversal.
Audella also contends the court erred in that Roth did not serve his proposed orders on her within the prescribed time period. She relies on rule 5.125, which requires the party preparing a proposed order after hearing to serve the opposing party within 10 days of the hearing. (Rule 5.125(b)(1).) Rule 5.125 is part of the "Family Rules," which do not apply to proceedings "not found in the Family Code." (Rule 5.2(a), (c).) The rule does not apply to this nonfamily case. To the extent Audella is arguing Roth failed to serve the proposed orders on her at all, and they thus constituted improper ex parte communications, we are not persuaded this requires reversal. The record does not contain proofs of service for the proposed orders. Assuming Roth did not serve Audella with them, an improper ex parte communication compels reversal only when the appellant demonstrates prejudice, as with any other error. (Mathew Zaheri Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1315, 1318.) This argument thus suffers from the same problem as Audella's argument that the court did not hold the orders for 10 days. Her claimed inability to see the proposed orders before the court signed them meant that she could not make objections to them, but she has not explained how any of her objections would have made a material difference to the proceedings.
At oral argument, Audella asserted she would have objected to the proposed orders, had she seen them, on the ground that she never consented to consolidation. The record shows otherwise, as we set forth in part II.C. ("THE COURT: Well you all can wait five years in the civil court in Brawley to do this or we can bring it in here and deal with it. [¶] [Audella]: I have no objection to that. [¶] [Counsel for Mercedes and Monica]: I will prepare an order for consolidation.") Perhaps the larger problem for Audella is that, even if she never consented to consolidation or wanted to revoke her consent, we would remain convinced she suffered no prejudice. Defendants could have moved to transfer and consolidate the civil case with the probate case, and the court could have granted that motion even over Audella's opposition. (§ 403.) And it appears to us consolidation was well warranted. The primary allegations in the civil complaint and trust petition are nearly identical. As such, common questions of fact and law predominated, and consolidating the cases was efficient and convenient for the witnesses, counsel, parties, and court. (§§ 403, 404.1.) Audella has not refuted that the common questions of fact and law warranted consolidation.
Audella further takes issue with the San Bernardino court accepting defendants' answer for filing. She argues that San Bernardino was "the wrong court of jurisdiction at that time" because the Imperial court still had jurisdiction over the civil case. Moreover, she contends, her request to enter defendants' defaults "was already filed and alive" at the time. The San Bernardino court did not err in accepting the answer for filing. The September 2014 filing occurred after the August 2014 order transferring the case to San Bernardino. It follows that San Bernardino was the proper venue for filing. While Audella had earlier requested that the Imperial court enter defendants' defaults, the clerk there had declined to enter them in light of the consolidation order designating the San Bernardino case the lead case. At the Imperial court's subsequent hearing, the court advised Audella that if she wanted to pursue defendants' defaults, she needed to file the request "in the probate case in San Bernardino." Audella did not refile her request for defendants' defaults until long after defendants had filed their answer. At that point, entry of their defaults was no longer proper. (Goddard v. Pollock (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 137, 141 [noting that even late-filed responsive pleadings preclude the entry of default].)
Audella's remedy was to move to strike defendants' answer as untimely and then pursue default proceedings. (Goddard v. Pollock, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 141.) The court would have had broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to strike. (§ 436; Bank of Haywards v. Kenyon (1917) 32 Cal.App. 635, 636.) We question whether it would have stricken the answer, given that any untimeliness seems largely due to the confusion and "quirky situation" in which the parties found themselves, as a result of the irregular procedure used to transfer and consolidate the civil case. For instance, before Audella had pursued default proceedings in the Imperial court, Roth indicated that he had tried to file the answer in the San Bernardino court, but was refused because the clerk did not have a consolidation order on file. --------
Audella also generally appeals "all decisions, rulings, . . . hearings, [and] procedures" after the civil case transferred to San Bernardino, including the judgment against her. She reasons that, had the errors in preparing and filing the consolidation and transfer orders not occurred, the Imperial court would have heard her civil case. This would have been better for her, she argues, because the San Bernardino court was biased against her and favored Roth, who purportedly served as a judge pro tempore in San Bernardino. We reject this argument for several reasons.
First, as we have explained, had the consolidation and transfer orders been correctly prepared and filed, the civil case still would have transferred. The procedural and clerical errors did not render the orders void such that the civil case should have remained in Imperial County, and they did not render any and all subsequent orders void. Second, we have reviewed the entire record, and it does not support Audella's charges of judicial bias. The fact that Roth or the court may have made procedural errors does not substantiate this serious charge, nor does the fact that Roth may have served as a judge pro tempore. And, the fact that the court ruled against Audella does not demonstrate judicial bias. The court had a duty to decide this dispute, and as the fact finder, it was entitled to credit defendants' evidence over Audella's evidence. (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.) Notably absent from Audella's briefing is any attempt to show that substantial evidence does not support the judgment; she does not set forth the evidence adduced at trial, which we presume supports the judgment until an appellant shows otherwise. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1667.)
Lastly, Audella contends the court erred when it denied her request to call opposing counsel as a witness at trial. She maintains Roth "was a crucial figure in all this action" because of his multiple "violations of codes and procedures." The court acted squarely within its discretion by excluding Roth from testifying. (Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1476 [holding the abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence].) Roth's conduct was not relevant to the substantive issues for trial. (Evid. Code, § 350 ["No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence."].) The civil complaint and the trust petition alleged, in sum and substance, that defendants had dispossessed Audella of her interest in the Brawley property through illegal means, whether that was undue influence over David, elder abuse, fraud, or something else. Roth's claimed failures to comply with procedure during his representation of defendants had nothing to do with the gravamen of the civil complaint and the trust petition.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. (Rule 8.278(a)(1), (4).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. CODRINGTON
J.