Summary
holding that a wait of more than four years to bring suit for smoking related health conditions was unreasonable because due diligence would have informed plaintiffs of numerous suits by state governments years prior to filing suit
Summary of this case from Estate of Rosario v. Falken Tire Corp.Opinion
Civ. Nos. 02-2171 (HL), 02-2172 (HL), 02-2174 (HL), 03-1642 (HL), 03-1900 (HL).
March 30, 2004
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are several motions to dismiss filed by defendants Philip Morris Inc. and other cigarette manufacturers. Specifically, defendants argue that the complaints filed by the estates of Santos Castro Martinez (02-2171), Sheridan Collazo Lopez (02-2172), Felipe Larregui Reyes (02-2174), and Jesus Guerra Pandal (03-1642) should be dismissed because their claims are time barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs, however, assert that the statute of limitations has been tolled because they were not aware they had a valid cause of action until at least November of 2001.
Defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss in Luis de Jesus-Diaz v. Philip Morris Inc (03-1900). However, this case involves multiple defendants many of whom are still alive today. Accordingly, the issues and arguments presented by defend ants are different than those addressed in this opinion. The Court will issue a separate opinion and order assessing the merits of these arguments at a later time.
Standard for Motion to Dismiss
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pled factual averments as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1994). A court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless it is clear that the plaintiff will be un able to prove any set of facts which would entitle it to recovery. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991). This deferential standard is not a "toothless tiger." Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir. 1996). The court is not obliged to accept "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). In this regard, it is well established that "[g]ranting a motion to dismiss based on a limitations defense is entirely appropriate when the pleader's allegations leave no doubt that an asserted claim is time barred." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Insur. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509 (2001).
Factual Background
The facts in this case are taken as true from the various complaints and amended complaints filed by the plaintiffs. Santos Castro Martinez ("Castro Martinez") was diagnosed with a cardio pulmonary condition in 1994 and died in 2001. Felipe Larregui Reyes was diagnosed with cancer in 1974 and subsequently died from lung cancer and other related conditions in 1991. Similarly, Jesus Guerra Pandal was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1987 and died from the disease in 1993. Finally, Sheridan Collazo Lopez died in 1998 from pulmonary emphysema which had been diagnosed in 1996. Plaintiffs allege that these medical conditions and subsequent deaths were the direct result of cigarette use by the decedents.
Discussion
Plaintiffs' complaint does not specify any particular statute from which relief may be granted. This comes as no surprise since plaintiffs acknowledge that large portions of the complaints are copied verbatim from a previous complaint filed by the United States of America against the defendants. Nevertheless, plaintiffs do make references to diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, a generous reading of the complaint indicates that plaintiffs are seeking a remedy under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code which governs personal injury claims. 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5141 (2000). Article 1868 of the Code, however, establishes a one year limitation period for personal injury claims, which begins to run after the date of accrual of the claim. 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5298(2) (1994); Ramon-Baez v. Bossolo-Lopez, 240 F.3d 92, 93 (1st Cir. 2001).
"For accrual purposes, the injured person must have both notice of [the] injury and knowledge of the likely identity of the tortfeasor." Espada v. Lugo, 312 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002). The notice requirement is satisfied when there is "some outward or physical signs through which the aggrieved party may become aware and realize that he or she has suffered an injurious aftereffect, which when known becomes a damage even if at the time its full scope and extent cannot be weighed." Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1997). Knowledge of the tortfeasor requires "some level of reasonable likelihood of legal liability on the part of the person or entity that caused the injury." Id., at 14. However, knowledge of the "exact name of the tortfeasor or the precise intracorporate relationships" is not required. Kaiser v. Armstrong World Indus, Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1989). Moreover, actual knowledge is not necessary "where by due diligence, such knowledge would likely have been acquired." Espada, 312 F.3d at 4. The "diligence required is that of a `reasonable man' under like circumstances. If a plaintiff's lack of knowledge is due to his own negligence or carelessness, the prescriptive period will commence on the date the alleged tort occurred." Rosado Serrano v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., Inc. 797 F. Supp. 98, 102 (1992).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs had both notice and knowledge prior to 2001 that: 1) there was a potential link between the decedents' illnesses and smoking; and 2) that they had a potential cause of action against the defendants. In support, defendants cite to the fact that all of the plaintiffs were either diagnosed with or died from smoking-related illnesses before 1996. Each plaintiff had access to numerous physicians and health professionals who could have in formed them of the causes of these illnesses. Similarly, defendants correctly note that since 1966 all cigarette packages sold in Puerto Rico have contained a strong warning from the Surgeon General concerning the health hazards associated with smoking. Indeed, plaintiffs own complaint refers to various studies and research dating back to the 1940s indicating that a reasonable person would have and should have known prior to 2001 that smoking is one of the leading causes of cancer, emphysema, heart disease and death. This is reinforced by the fact that Courts through out the United States have held that the health risks associated with smoking are "common knowledge" to the general public. See, e.g., Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2002); Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1996); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir. 1988); McKay v. Republic Tobacco Co., 2001 WL 122223 at *2 (E.D.Pa. 2001); Guilbeault v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 84 F. Supp.2d 263, 273 (D.R.I. 2000); Gibbs v. Republic Tobacco, L.P., 119 F. Supp.2d 1288, 1294 (M.D.Fla. 2000); Tillman v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 89 F. Supp.2d 1297, 1301 (S.D.Ala. 2000).
Moreover, the Court believes that due diligence would have also led plaintiffs to learn of their potential causes of action against the defendants well before 2001. In the late 1990s several state governments and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed suit against the defendants claiming that they had conspired to mislead and deceive the public regarding the addictive nature of and the health-related risks associated with smoking. See e.g. Rossello v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., et al., Civ. No. 97-1910 (June 17, 1997). The Court believes that a reasonable person, knowing full well that smoking had resulted in the death of a loved one, would have been aware of these lawsuits and the unprecedented settlements they yielded. Indeed, "by 1998 the settlement between the nation's biggest tobacco companies and various states received ample news coverage." Alicano Ayala v. Philip Morris, Inc. 263 F. Supp.2d 311, 318 (D.P.R. 2003) ( citing Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2002) ("By 1997, after several more States had filed similar law suits, the major tobacco manufacturers negotiated with a group of State Attorneys General to reach a comprehensive nationwide settlement of the claims."). Accordingly, defendants knew or should have known by 1999 the author of the harm.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants' fraud and deception ultimately stopped the clock on the limitation period. It is true, that the statute of limitations can be tolled "[i]f a plaintiff's suspicions that she may have been the victim of a tort are assuaged by the person who caused the injury." Rodriguez-Suris, 123 F.3d at 16. However, plaintiffs are incorrect in their assertion that defendants dissemination of false information "nullify the warnings on the cigarette packs and cigarette advertising, and create uncertainty." As the First Circuit has correctly noted, "tolling may be halted by further information that renders plaintiff's reliance on those assurances no longer reasonable, so that plaintiff then has an obligation of diligent investigation." Espada, 312 F.3d at 4. The Court firmly believes that extensive public information about the dangers of smoking coupled with the widespread coverage given to lawsuits filed against defendants in the late 1990s renders plaintiffs' alleged reliance on defendants assurances completely "unreasonable."
Moreover, while the statue of limitations may be tolled, "it is the plaintiff [who] bears the burden of proving timeliness by establishing that she lacked the necessary knowledge or imputed knowledge before instituting the action." Espada, 312 F.3d at 4. Plaintiffs have clearly failed to meet this burden. Neither the complaint nor the opposition to defendants' motion allege any investigation or diligent efforts by plaintiffs to determine the cause of the injuries. There is also no mention of any specific statements or information by defendants that plaintiffs actually relied upon in assuaging their suspicions. Instead, plaintiffs make the incredulous claim that they only became aware that smoking was potentially the cause of decadents' illnesses after the fall of 2001. In other words, plaintiffs would like the Court to believe that this realization came no earlier then seven years after Santos Castro Martinez was diagnosed with heart disease, five years after Sheridan Collazo Lopez was diagnosed with emphysema, ten years after Felipe Larregui Reyes died of lung cancer, and eight years after Jesus Guerra Pandal died of lung cancer. This is the type of "bald assertion" and "unsupportable conclusion" that the Court is completely within its prerogative to reject when determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Indeed, in two cases filed before this District involving virtually identical issues, two different courts rejected these arguments and granted defendants motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. See Aliciano Ayala, supra and Molina-Velez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 286 F. Supp.2d 185 (D.P.R. 2003). Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, the Court joins the other courts in this District in rejecting plaintiffs contentions and in granting defend ants' motion to dismiss.