Opinion
CASE NO. IP 02-0993-C-B/S
December 12, 2003
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant General Electric Company has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against it. Defendant contends that because the Indiana Workers Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' cause of action, Plaintiffs cannot state a claim in this court upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons explained below, we concur, and therefore, GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Georgia Diane Hardin ("Mrs. Hardin"), and Indiana resident, is the widow of David L. Hardin ("Mr. Hardin") as well as the personal representative of his estate. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3. Plaintiff Jason L. Hardin, a minor, is the only child of Mr. and Mrs. Hardin. Id. ¶ 2. On August 22, 2000, Mr. Hardin suffered cardiac arrest while at work at the North Curry Pike plant of Defendant General Electric Company ("GE"), in Bloomington, Indiana ("the GE Plant"). Id. ¶ 5; Pls.' Interrog. Resp. 2(f). Mr. Hardin had been a GE employee for 28 years. Id. GE is a New York corporation with its principal place of business located in Connecticut. Not. of Removal 15.
At the time Mr. Hardin went into cardiac arrest and collapsed, he was engaged in his normal job duties, which did not involve exertion or physical activity. Compl. ¶ 6. Following his collapse, his co-workers called the medical facility at the GE Plant ("the Clinic") for help. Pls.' Interrog. Resp. 10. At the time of Mr. Hardin's cardiac arrest, GE had contracted with Defendants American Occupational Health Management, Inc. d/b/a CHD Meridian Healthcare, Meridian Corporate Healthcare, Meridian Comp of New York, Inc., John Doe, M.D., and unidentified physician, and an Anonymous Corporation (collectively "the CHD Defendants") to provide medical services at the Clinic. Id. ¶ 7, 14. The Clinic staff included a medical emergency response team. Id. ¶ 7.
The allegedly negligent response of GE and the CHD Defendants to Mr. Hardin's cardiac arrest form the basis of Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims against them. Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiffs contend that as a result of the CHD Defendants' delay in responding to Mr. Hardin's cardiac arrest, which delay was due at least in part to the institutional negligence of GE, he suffered severe and irreversible brain damage because of a lack of blood, and consequently oxygen, flow to the brain. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Hardin remained in a vegetative state from August 22, 2000, until September 15, 2001, when he died. Id. ¶ 10.
On August 20, 2002, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in this court, asserting a claim for wrongful death against GE, and in a separate count, one against the CHD Defendants. In GE's Response to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed September 3, 2002, GE affirmatively raised the defense that Plaintiffs' claim against it was subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. On April 25, 2003, GE filed this motion seeking summary judgment on the same grounds.
Legal Analysis Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden rests on the moving party, GE in this case, to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). After the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings" and point to evidence of a genuine factual dispute precluding summary judgment. Id. at 322-23. "If the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in her favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against her." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); Celotex 477 U.S. at 322-24;Anderson. 477 U.S. at 249-52.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits, nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge. 24 F.3d at 290. Therefore, in considering a motion for summary judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Venters v. City of Delphi. 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1997). If genuine doubts remain, and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330(7th Cir. 1989). But if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322; Waldridge. 24 F.3d at 920.
Indiana Worker's Compensation Act
In moving for summary judgment, GE argues that the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act, Indiana Code § 22-3-1, et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against it. InEvans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1986), the Indiana Supreme Court held that recovery against an employer for personal injury or death (1) by accident (2) arising out of employment and (3) in the course of employment can be sought exclusively under the Worker's Compensation Act ["the Act"]. Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC. Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ind. 1994); see also Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6. Although, because of diversity jurisdiction, application of the Act to a plaintiffs claim does not relieve federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction as it does state courts, federal courts, too, are bound by the exclusivity provision of the Act. Gonzales v. Union Carbide Corp., 580 F. Supp. 249, 252 (N.D. Ind. 1983). If the Act is found to apply, a plaintiff's claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. Claims that do not meet any one of the three jurisdictional prerequisites fall outside the scope of the Act and may be pursued in court. Perry, 637 N.E.2d at 1285, citing Evans. 491 N.E.2d at 973.
The exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act, Indiana Code § 22-3-2-6, states that "[t]he rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to Indiana Code §§ 22-3-2-22-3-6 on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, the employee's personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death, except for remedies available under Indiana Code § 5-2-6.1."
GE's motion is framed as a motion for summary judgment in lieu of a motion to dismiss because some of the facts recited here were developed outside of the pleadings.
The injury of which Plaintiffs complain is not Mr. Hardin's heart attack per se, but the failures of GE —
A heart attack from a pre-existing condition is a "risk personal to the employee," which is universally noncompensable under the Act. Kovatch v. A.M. Gen., 679 N.E.2d 940, 943-44 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997).
to properly [sic] supervise the clinic to ensure that they [sic] were able to respond to emergencies in a competent and timely fashion, . . . to establish an adequate system to assist emergency personnel in locating injured employees, . . . to establish a system to clear aisle-ways for emergencies, . . . to establish a protocol for the timely summoning of outside medical assistance, . . . to locate emergency equipment, including AEDs, throughout the plant, . . . [and] to train employees in emergency response procedures and other inadequacies in the design and implementation of General Electric's emergency response protocols.
Pls.' Br. at 12. Plaintiffs assert that this institutional negligence contributed to the delay in treatment of Mr. Hardin's heart attack, which exacerbated his already grave condition and resulted in his death.
The parties do not dispute that Mr. Hardin's injury was an accident or that it occurred "in the course of his employment at GE. Pl's. Br. at 10. Rather, they dispute only whether his injury "arose out of his employment with GE. An accidental injury "arises out of employment" when a causal nexus exists between the action resulting in the injury and the employee's employment. Wine-Settergren v. Lamey. 716 N.E.2d 381, 389-90 (Ind. 1999) citing Gordon v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1362, 1365 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992). This nexus is established when a reasonably prudent person considers the injury to be born out of a risk incidental to the employment. Id. The "risk does not need to be expected or foreseen to be incidental to employment. As a general rule, `a risk is incidental to the employment if the risk involved is not one to which the public at large is subjected.'" Conway ex rel. Conway v. Sch. City of E. Chicago. 734 N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
"Arising out of refers to the origin and cause of the injury, while "in the course of refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Conway ex rel. Conway v. Sch. City of East Chicago. 734 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (citing Rogers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 655 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995)).
In Wine-Settergren. the Indiana Supreme Court interpreted "employment" to mean "more than merely performing services directly related to the job for which the employee was hired." 716 N.E.2d at 389-90. Activities incidental to one's employment include personal acts reasonably necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of an employee even though they are not technically acts of service to the employer.Evans. 491 N.E.2d at 976. This statement of the law is referred to as the "health, comfort, and convenience rule." Washing up after work, satisfying thirst, seeking fresh air, answering telephone calls, eating lunch, or going to the toilet are examples of personal acts that have been held to be in the pursuit of personal comfort or convenience and thus incidental to employment. Ind. Mich. Elec. Co. v. Morgan 494 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
GE cites Tarr v. Jablonskl 569 N.E.2d 378 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991), for the on-point proposition that an employee's injury or death may also be said to arise out of his employment if "it is alleged to have occurred through the administration of in-plant medical or emergency services that are provided as incidental to the employment."Id. at 379. The facts and legal theories of Tarr track closely those of this case. The decedent-employee in Tarr suffered a heart attack at work, which neither party contended was caused by his work duties. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that negligence on the part of the paramedics failed to prevent the decedent-employee's death.
In this case, Plaintiffs cannot challenge the general finding by Indiana courts that seeking medical care at the employer's on-site health facility is an act so incidental to employment as to be considered arising out of employment. E.g., McDaniel v. Sage, 366 N.E.2d 202, 204-5 (Ind.App. 1977) (instructing courts to look not to the original illness that caused the plaintiff to visit the employer's health facilities, but to the circumstances causing the injury (the medical treatment itself), and to ask whether visiting an employer's health facilities was a service which an employee might be expected to utilize). Plaintiffs do not address this finding of the Indiana courts, but instead assert that the health, comfort, and convenience rule should not apply to this case because Mr. Hardin did not perform an affirmative act in furtherance of his health, comfort, and convenience, such as visiting the health clinic. We note, however, that in Tarr the paramedics came to the decedent-employee's work station to administer treatment, and the court held that such "events" arose out of his employment. Tarr, 569 N.E.2d at 379. Application of the health, comfort and convenience rule cannot turn on the nature of the employee's injury, i.e., whether the employee is physically able to visit the health clinic or whether emergency personnel must come to him. In either case, the employer has provided on-site medical assistance that it expects its employees to utilize.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Tarr by arguing that Tarr is limited to injuries caused by co-employees. Although Plaintiffs are correct that the paramedics inTarr were employees of the defendant-employer and not independent contractors as they are in this case, the paramedics' employment status is not material to the question of whether the estate of the decedent-employee may recover from the defendant-employer for an injury arising out of the decedent-employee's employment. The CHD Defendants' employment status does not change the crucial fact that GE, as well as the employer in Tarr. provided in-plant emergency assistance as a service to its employees incidental to their employment. Because Mr. Hardin's injury is alleged to have been caused by the negligent administration of in-plant medical or emergency services provided as incidental to employment, we find that (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists and (2) the health, comfort, and convenience rule applies to this case, bringing Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against GE within the exclusive purview of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act.
Plaintiffs also appeal to public policy and contend that followingTarr would create "an exceedingly dangerous precedent" because when it is applied with its companion case, Jablonski v. Inland Steel Co., 575 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991), it implies "that post-accident negligence can never be the basis for liability either at common law or under workers' compensation." Pl's. Br. at 13-14. Plaintiffs' argument is misplaced, however. As was the case inTarr. the question of liability is not before us. The only question before us on GE's motion for summary judgment is whether the Act precludes Plaintiffs from pursuing a civil action. For the reasons explained above, we conclude that it does. Because Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against GE upon which relief may be granted, weGRANT summary judgment in favor of GE. Conclusion
Defendant General Electric Company has moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim. For the reasons explicated above, we find that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the health, comfort, and convenience rule applies to this case, bringing Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against GE within the scope of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision. Because Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against GE upon which relief may be granted, we GRANT summary judgment in favor of GE.
It is so ORDERED.