Opinion
C042415
7-29-2003
Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of B.C.; KATHLEEN R. SYLVIA, as Public Guardian, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. B.C., Objector and Appellant.
Objector B.C. suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, a condition leading to frequent hospitalizations and the appointment of petitioner Yolo County Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as temporary conservator. Following the initial appointment, the Public Guardian filed a petition for reappointment of conservator for an additional one-year period. B. requested a trial to determine whether she continued to be gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (the LPS Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The jury found B. gravely disabled, and the court ordered the Public Guardian reappointed conservator for an additional one-year period. B. appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict, the court erred in instructing the jury regarding present grave disability and the nature of conservatorship, and insufficient evidence supports the trial courts imposition of restrictions on B.s ability to drive. We affirm the judgment (order of reappointment).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July of 2001 the Public Guardian filed a petition pursuant to section 5350, alleging B. suffered from a mental disorder rendering her gravely disabled. The Public Guardian sought to be appointed as conservator of the person and estate of B. The superior court appointed the Public Guardian as temporary conservator, granting the Public Guardian the right to hospitalize B. The order also deprived B. of the privilege of driving and the right to enter into contracts without the conservators approval, and disqualified her from possessing a firearm.
B. appealed the appointment of a temporary conservator. After a hearing, the court ordered the temporary letters of conservatorship to remain in effect.
Following the ruling, B. requested a jury trial. On the day of trial, B. waived her right to a jury. The court found B. gravely disabled. The court appointed the Public Guardian as conservator and ordered the conservatorship to expire on July 30, 2002. The court also ordered B. be denied the privilege of possessing a drivers license.
B. appealed the courts appointment of the Public Guardian. We affirmed the order appointing the conservator, finding substantial evidence that B.s mental illness rendered her gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of B.C. (Feb. 11, 2002, C039058) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. filed a petition for rehearing in the trial court. The court denied B.s request to remove her from conservatorship.
On July 1, 2002, the Public Guardian filed a petition for reappointment of conservator for an additional one-year period. B. requested a trial.
A jury trial followed. George Graman, M.D., an expert in psychiatry and psychology who had treated B. for the past six years, testified. Dr. Graman interviewed B. monthly; the interviews lasted anywhere from five to 15 minutes. B. remained guarded during the interviews, providing one-word answers to questions.
Based on his observations of B. and his review of her records, Dr. Graman diagnosed B. as suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. Without medication, she suffers from hallucinations.
Dr. Graman recounted B.s history of mental illness. Since 1996 B. has suffered 10 psychiatric hospitalizations. During a previous hospitalization, she repeated to herself the phrase "God damn." B. also believed there were insects everywhere, insects no one else saw. She accused one of her housemates of extreme body odor.
In April 2001, while on medication, B. was hospitalized. She was convinced "there was some kind of order in the world that was placing things in her brain and in the brains of other people and she felt that the CIA was involved . . . ." Her fears left her quite distraught.
Following the hospitalization, B.s medication was increased. She began receiving Haldol injections. However, B.s willingness to take her medication became a major problem.
B. became verbally and physically aggressive, threatening others. During her hospitalization, she struck at her roommates with kitchen utensils.
The previous year, prior to imposition of the original conservatorship, B. lived in an apartment with roommates. However, her condition rapidly deteriorated. According to Dr. Graman, B. "was evicted because she wasnt paying her rent and because she wasnt caring for the house. [P] . . . [P] She would leave body waste in a shared bathroom. She would also leave food out on the counter for days to the point where it would become inedible, so there were health aspects as well as the nonpayment of rent." B. told her housemates eight-year-old son that his father had raped her. In addition, Dr. Graman testified B. ran up a $ 1,400 phone bill, using up over half her income and making it impossible to budget her funds to provide for her basic needs. B. failed to come to the clinic for her shots, and full bottles of medication were found among her belongings.
Dr. Graman stated B. possesses limited insight into her mental illness. At times she acknowledges her illness; at other times she denies being ill. Dr. Gramans mission is to convince B. her illness requires treatment, an idea she resists. She also resists treatment and requires supervision to take her medication.
In Dr. Gramans opinion, B. suffers from paranoid schizophrenia rendering her gravely disabled "at this time." Although the ability to clothe herself is not an issue, B. has difficulty providing for her food and shelter. Her aggressiveness and problems with hygiene jeopardize her ability to maintain a living situation. Food would become an issue if B. left the treatment program. Dr. Graman believed B. faced a poor prognosis without a conservator, and he did not see any alternative to a conservatorship given her illness.
Dr. Graman stated he was pleased with B.s current placement at Fruitridge Transitional Home (Fruitridge). At Fruitridge, residents enjoy a degree of freedom, and B. had not abused that freedom. She had not missed either meals or medication. B.s last serious psychotic symptoms occurred the previous April; increasing her medication alleviated the symptoms. However, without a conservatorship, Fruitridge cannot force B. to take her medication.
During cross-examination, Dr. Graman observed: "I think if [B.] left the facility today she might well be able to find an apartment, and I think she could use her money to buy food. My concern is that shed stop taking her medicine and in three months wed be back to acute hospitalization and we go through the whole thing again." Dr. Graman believed it likely B. would stop her medication and decompensate. During a previous hospitalization, a hearing was required to make B. take her medication. Remaining in Fruitridge for an additional four to six months under the conservatorship would improve her chances of succeeding and moving into a board and care facility.
Dr. Graman noted that in the past, B. successfully lived alone in the community: "You know, there was a long period of time where — before her first conservatorship when [B.] functioned very well in the community. [B.] is an intelligent, educated person. She was working on a masters degree in public health administration, and she was getting her injections, and she was succeeding. [P] She ran into some roadblocks, and you know, things fell apart unfortunately, but during that period of time . . . she accepted the treatment and is [sic] doing well."
Paul Aleven, a conservatorship officer with the Public Guardians office and B.s conservator since the previous February, also testified. The Public Guardian maintains a file on B., which includes reports from the facility in which she resides, doctors reports and assessments, case notes, and financial information letters.
Aleven manages B.s finances and meets with her when she is "willing to be interviewed." The interviews have been very short.
Initially, B. was placed in a hospital. She later transferred to Crestwood Redding, a highly structured, locked facility. She was then transferred to American River, another locked facility that provides residents opportunities to return to the community for brief periods.
Currently, B. resides at Fruitridge, an unlocked facility providing a higher level of care than a board and care facility. Fruitridge staff work with mentally ill clients, helping with grocery shopping, cooking meals, and dispensing medication. Aleven testified the Public Guardians ultimate goal is to see B. living independently. However, B. needs to be able to shop on her own, make medical appointments, and maintain her medical regimen prior to the end of the conservatorship. Currently, B. performs none of these tasks at Fruitridge.
In addition, Aleven surmised, given B.s past history of eviction, finding housing might prove problematic. According to Aleven, a prospective landlord would be more willing to work with the Public Guardian as conservator than with B. acting on her own.
One month previously, B. had informed Aleven she could live with her mother in Southern California. However, B.s mother denied she had a place for B. to stay. B. currently expresses a desire to remain at Fruitridge. However, Aleven believes if the conservatorship were removed, Fruitridge would evict B. if she refused medication.
Aleven stated B. has no family members willing to assist her. He noted a friend had agreed to provide B. with transportation but not food, clothing, or shelter.
Aleven considered B. gravely disabled. Her lack of insight into her illness concerned him, and Aleven believed this lack of insight would prevent her from following through on her treatment.
B. testified on her own behalf. She stated she feels fine taking her medication. She makes her own appointments to get her shots and remembers them on her own. While at Fruitridge, she can move about the community, and she takes walks and goes out to lunch.
B. agreed she suffers from a mental illness and stated that if released from the conservatorship she would have it treated. B. stated: "I understand that I would need to go to my outpatient appointments and to have my medication given to me by way of injection, and I understand that I would need to have my prescriptions filled. [P] . . . [P] I think its utmost important. I think its extremely important."
If the conservatorship ends, B. plans to remain at Fruitridge. She explained how she would budget, shop for food, prepare dinner, and take care of other necessities. B. researched the availability of an apartment and is currently on a waiting list for a subsidized apartment. She planned to stay at Fruitridge until she found an apartment.
According to B.: ". . . Ive gained insight to my illness, and I know very well that I have to take my medication or I wont be able to manage my welfare in the community in a sustaining fashion, and I know that if I do take my medication that I have a very good likelihood of staying off the conservatorship and out of any sort of trouble with the Public Guardians office." B. feels confident she can find housing and food and manage her finances.
However, during cross-examination, B. denied she ever heard voices, but testified: ". . . I guess I have had feelings that its gotten under control." She denied threatening or having any physical altercations with housemates. She testified her previous eviction stemmed from her disapproval of things at the house; she simply stopped paying rent. She denied any incidents precipitated the eviction. B. admitted the landlord might have called the police and that she ended up in the hospital.
B. acknowledged the American River staff noted she was verbally aggressive. According to B., she is not verbally aggressive; the staff made the notation because "they had to put something."
The jury found B. gravely disabled. The court ordered the Public Guardian be reappointed conservator for an additional one-year period, expiring on July 29, 2003. The court found, in accordance with the jurys verdict: "The conservatee is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder, and is unwilling to accept or incapable of accepting treatment voluntarily." The court found the most appropriate placement to be Fruitridge, and ordered B. be denied all rights and privileges specified in the original conservatorship order. B. filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF GRAVE DISABILITY
B. challenges the jurys finding that she suffers from a present grave disability. She argues the evidence must reveal a life-threatening inability to provide food, clothing, or shelter. In addition, B. contends the Public Guardian presented only evidence of the possibility that she might slip into a state of grave disability in the future, not that she presently suffers from a grave disability.
Background
The LPS Act was enacted "to end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment" of mentally disordered and developmentally disabled persons. ( § 5001, subd. (a); Conservatorship of Benvenuto (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 226 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Benvenuto).) The clear import of the LPS Act is to use the involuntary commitment power of the state sparingly and only for those truly necessary cases where a gravely disabled person is incapable of providing for his or her basic needs, either alone or with help from others. (Conservatorship of Smith (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d 903, 908, 232 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Smith).)
The court may establish a conservatorship under the LPS Act for any person who is gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. ( § 5350.) "Gravely disabled" is defined as "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." ( § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish or renew an LPS conservatorship. (Conservatorship of Johnson (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 693, 696 (Johnson).)
When reviewing the establishment or renewal of a conservatorship, we employ the substantial evidence test to determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability. The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to support such a finding. (Johnson , supra, 235 Cal. App. 3d at p. 697.) We review the whole record in the light most favorable to the trial court judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence, that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. (Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 1577, 254 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Walker).)
Gravity of Disability
B. and the Public Guardian disagree as to how extreme a persons disability must be for that person to be found gravely disabled. B. argues a persons inability to provide food, clothing, or shelter must be life threatening. In support, B. cites Smith, supra, 187 Cal. App. 3d 903.
In Smith, the trial court found Smith gravely disabled and placed her under a conservatorship. Smith, who had no fixed income or home address, began an around-the-clock vigil outside a church. She became disruptive and refused any shelter or income "in order to suffer with Christ." (Smith, supra, 187 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 906-907.) At trial, a psychiatrist concluded Smith was gravely disabled because her mental disorder caused behavior that brought her into conflict with the community. The psychiatrist also concluded that, despite the disorder, Smith could feed and clothe herself and provide her own place to live. (Id. at p. 907.)
The appellate court reversed the order of conservatorship. The court found insufficient evidence to support a gravely disabled finding, noting: "Bizarre or eccentric behavior, even if it interferes with a persons normal intercourse with society, does not rise to a level warranting conservatorship except where such behavior renders the individual helpless to fend for herself or destroys her ability to meet those basic needs for survival. Only then does the interest of the state override her individual liberty interests." (Smith, supra, 187 Cal. App. 3d at p. 909.)
As the Smith court observed, the psychiatric testimony revealed Smith was able to obtain food, clothing, and shelter and regularly received offers of help, which she sometimes accepted. (Smith, supra, 187 Cal. App. 3d at p. 910.) In passing, the court made the statements B. highlights in her appeal: "No evidence was adduced to show that appellant, because of her mental condition, was suffering from malnutrition, overexposure, or any other sign of poor health or neglect. Her refusal to seek shelter is not life threatening. There was uncontradicted evidence that she accepts offers of food and money from friends and relatives. Appellant evinces a strong, sincere — if unorthodox — belief in God, her religion and her place in religion. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant is not gravely disabled to justify appointment of a conservator. [Fn. omitted.] [P] We do not say, however, that from a more complete record appellant could not be adjudicated gravely disabled." (Ibid.)
Smith does not, as B. contends, require evidence of a life-threatening inability to provide for oneself in order to find "grave disability." In Smith, testimony established Smith could, despite her religious fervor, feed, clothe, and shelter herself. Given that Smith was capable of providing for her basic needs, the only evidence of grave disability was her bizarre behavior and unusual religious beliefs. The court found no evidence this behavior had degraded Smiths physical condition and thus no grave disability.
Timing of Grave Disability
B. also contends the Public Guardian failed to present sufficient evidence that she currently suffers from a grave disability. According to B., the Public Guardians entire case rested on a supposition of her future relapse into grave disability, not her current inability to provide for her own food, clothing, or shelter. This supposition, B. contends, runs afoul of our decisions in Benvenuto, supra, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1030 and Conservatorship of Murphy (1982) 134 Cal. App. 3d 15, 184 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Murphy).
In Murphy, the public guardian petitioned the court for reappointment as conservator of appellant Murphy. At the hearing, two experts testified that, at the time of the hearing, Murphy was capable of providing for his own food, clothing, and shelter. However, the experts also testified that if Murphy managed his own affairs he would once again indulge in alcohol and become gravely disabled. (Murphy, supra, 134 Cal. App. 3d at p. 17.)
The trial court reaffirmed the conservatorship based on the reasonable probability that, left to his own devices, Murphy "would very shortly be back in the realm of those who are greatly disabled because of . . . the ingestion of alcohol." (Murphy, supra, 134 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 17-18.) The trial court continued: "It may sound like rampant paternalism, but in my view, that is a characteristic which is currently present in part of his make-up, and has to be taken into account in determining grave disability." (Id. at p. 18.)
We reversed. We noted a finding of grave disability denotes a finding of current grave disability: "Here, both expert witnesses testified Murphy was presently capable of managing his own affairs, i.e., capable of providing for his food, clothing and shelter. Their determination, and the courts, that Murphy was gravely disabled was based upon a likelihood that if he were released he would at some future time return to the use of alcohol. The pivotal issue is whether Murphy was presently gravely disabled, and the evidence demonstrated he was not." (Murphy, supra, 134 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 18-19.)
We revisited the logic of Murphy in Benvenuto. Benvenuto suffered from schizophrenia, but medication remediated the mental illness. Because of the medication, Benvenuto possessed the ability to provide for his food, shelter, and clothing needs. At the hearing on the reappointment of a conservator, an expert testified, "It is probable that if he continues with the treatment program he would continue not to be gravely disabled. It is possible that he would remain stable or improve if taken off conservatorship, assuming that he complies with the treatment program." (Benvenuto, supra, 180 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1033.) However, the expert opined that if Benvenuto went to live with his mother as proposed, he would likely regress and once again become gravely disabled. (Ibid.) The trial court reestablished the conservatorship.
We reversed, reasoning: "The circumstances here mirror those in the Murphy case. In Murphy the conservatee was not presently gravely disabled but medical witnesses thought he would likely soon become so because of his propensity to take the drug ethanol. Here Benvenuto is not presently gravely disabled but medical witnesses thought he would likely soon become so because of his propensity not to take the drug Prolixin. We discern no principled basis for distinction between these circumstances." (Murphy, supra, 180 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1034.)
We agree with B.s assertion that a finding of grave disability requires a current, not probable or potential future, inability to provide for food, clothing, and shelter. However, we disagree with B.s assertion that no evidence presented at her trial supported a finding of her current grave disability.
Dr. Graman, B.s physician for the past six years, testified extensively regarding the course of her mental illness. Dr. Graman stated, without equivocation, that he believed B. at the time of the trial lacked the ability to provide food, clothing, or shelter for herself. Dr. Graman testified about B.s lack of insight into her own condition and recounted her past history of failure to provide herself with basic necessities.
Dr. Graman also testified that, even while medicated, B. suffered a psychiatric episode requiring hospitalization. During the episode, which occurred four months before the hearing, B. believed "some kind of order in the world . . . was placing things in her brain." She suspected the CIA of complicity along with powerful people in the community.
Dr. Graman based his diagnosis of present grave disability on B.s past mental history, her prior eviction, her inability to remain in a board and care facility in 2001, and on her reluctance to take medication. He also found B. lacked insight into her mental illness.
B.s own testimony reflected a lack of awareness of her condition and a refusal to confront the implications of foregoing treatment. Although she confirmed her medical diagnosis, B. flatly denied ever hearing voices. She testified she had gained insight into her illness but refused to accept any responsibility for her eviction from the apartment. According to B., she never threatened her fellow patients or housemates, totally discounting the episodes reflected in her medical history. When asked about the verbal aggression notation on her medical chart, B. provided only a vague rationalization, failing to acknowledge any complicity in the diagnosis.
Such a lack of insight into ones mental illness and the concomitant reluctance to accept treatment provides evidence in support of a finding of grave disability. (Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1577; Conservator of Guerrero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 442, 446-447 (Guerrero).)
In Walker, a physician diagnosed Walker as suffering for over 20 years from paranoid schizophrenia. Walker possessed sufficient "cognitive awareness" to be able to provide for his food, clothing, and shelter as long as he took his medication. However, because he believed he was not ill, Walker refused to take his medication or seek treatment. Without medication, Walker could not provide for his basic needs. (Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1575-1576.) The trial court reappointed the conservator.
On appeal, Walker argued he was not gravely disabled at the time of trial. According to Walker, the trial court renewed the conservatorship based on the "likelihood" he would stop taking his medication, a stance invalidated in Benvenuto, supra, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1030 and Murphy, supra, 134 Cal. App. 3d 15. (Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1576-1577.)
The appellate court affirmed. The court found Benvenuto and Murphy distinguishable: "In both cases, doctors had testified the subject conservatees could manage their own affairs. . . . [P] Here, Dr. Levy testified that appellant remained gravely disabled because he had no insight into his mental illness. He did not believe he was ill, nor did he believe he needed medication. The evidence was undisputed that without the medication, appellant could not provide for himself. Given the opportunity to dispute the statements that he lacked insight into his illness and would not take his medication if released, appellant could offer nothing more than his statement that he had taken the medicine before. Such testimony, however, did not controvert the doctors opinion that appellant still needed 24-hour supervision. Indeed, the fact that appellant had been gravely disabled and committed in 1986 was evidence which the court could consider that appellant did not take his medication on a voluntary basis." (Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1577.)
In Guerrero, testimony at trial established that Guerrero suffered from paranoid schizophrenia for 20 years. Guerrero refused medication and indicated he did not believe he was mentally ill. One of Guerreros physicians testified Guerrero lacked the necessary acumen to rent an apartment, shop, or take a bus without assistance. The physician concluded Guerrero would not be able to provide for his food, clothing, or shelter if released from an institutional setting. (Guerrero , supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-445.) In contrast, Guerrero denied being delusional and stated he was capable of caring for himself. He located a board and care facility in which to live and testified he would continue taking his medication even without the conservatorship. (Id. at p. 445.)
The jury found Guerrero gravely disabled. On appeal, Guerrero challenged a jury instruction that allowed the jury to take into consideration evidence of Guerreros past failure to take medication and lack of insight into his medical condition. (Guerrero , supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 445.) According to Guerrero, the instruction impermissibly expanded the definition of gravely disabled since the possibility of a future failure to take medication is unrelated to present grave disability. (Ibid.)
The appellate court affirmed. The court found the challenged instruction did not run afoul of Benvenuto or Murphy, but instead followed the rationale of Walker. The court noted Guerreros physician testified that Guerrero, because of his mental illness, could not provide for his basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter without the assistance of others. Such assistance was unavailable outside of the conservatorship. In addition, Guerreros mental condition would further deteriorate without medication. The court concluded the jury instruction "provided an appropriate framework for the jury to consider these factors when determining whether Guerrero was presently gravely disabled." (Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 446-447.)
Here, Dr. Graman testified B. currently lacked the ability to provide for her basic needs. He based his conclusion on a variety of factors, including her lack of insight into her illness and her failure to pursue treatment in the past. B.s own testimony also reflected a dearth of understanding of her illness. We find this testimony provides reasonable, credible, and solid evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find B. gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. (Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1577.)
Since we find substantial evidence in the testimony of Dr. Graman and B. to support the jurys finding, we do not address B.s contention that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Aleven, the conservatorship officer.
Third Party Assistance
B. contends uncontroverted evidence reveals the availability of third party assistance in providing for her basic needs. Therefore, she does not meet the standard for grave disability.
As B. points out, the LPS Act provides, and the jury was instructed, that a person is not gravely disabled if she "can survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help provide for the persons basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter" and if the third person expresses in writing a willingness to help. ( § 5350, subd. (e).) B. argues such assistance was available to her.
The only evidence of third party assistance consists of a letter from a friend offering to "help [B.] live independently by providing occasional transportation when arranged for ahead of time." This offer of help pertains only to transportation; it makes no mention of food, clothing, or shelter. Given such limited evidence of assistance, the jury could reasonably conclude B. lacked third party assistance sufficient to provide for her basic needs.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Definition of Present Grave Disability
B. argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of present grave disability. According to B., the instruction allowed the jury to find her gravely disabled if her condition deteriorated in the future but did not require a finding of present grave disability.
The court instructed: "In determining whether [B.] . . . is presently gravely disabled you may consider evidence of her past failure to take mental health medication when prescribed and you may consider evidence of [B.s] lack of insight into her mental condition. [P] If you find [B.] will not take her medication unless required to do so and that a mental disorder makes her unable to provide for her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter without such medication, then you may conclude [B.] is gravely disabled."
Defense counsel objected to the instruction. The court found the instruction appropriate, noting it mirrored language in Guerrero, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 442. On appeal, B. contends Guerrero does not apply in the present case since she was not gravely disabled at the time of trial.
We disagree. As we noted, ante, substantial evidence supports a finding that B., at the time of trial, suffered from a grave disability. Dr. Graman testified B.s mental disorder, even under medication, impairs her ability to provide for her own clothing, food, or shelter. While medicated, B. suffered a psychiatric episode requiring hospitalization. In Dr. Gramans opinion, B.s judgment remains impaired. B.s own testimony reflected a lack of awareness into the nature and consequences of her condition.
As in Guerrero, the evidence at trial established the appellant currently suffered from a grave disability. The challenged instruction does not provide an erroneous definition of grave disability. The instruction focuses on current grave disability and informs the jury that in making the determination, it may consider evidence of past failure to take medication and a lack of insight. The instruction does not give the jury free rein to find grave disability based solely on a perceived future potential to forego medication and become disabled. We find no error.
Purpose of Conservatorship
B. also contends the court erred in instructing the jury as to the purpose of the conservatorship. The instruction, B. argues, provides a "benevolent" description of conservatorship and sways the jury in favor of granting the petition.
The court instructed the jury: "The purpose of this proposed conservatorship is the custodial care, diagnosis, treatment, and protection of persons who are unable to take care of themselves and who, for their own well-being and the safety of others, cannot be left adrift in the community. The commitment may not reasonably be deemed punishment either in its design or in its purpose."
Defense counsel objected to the instruction, arguing it "downplays the extreme nature of the inability to take care of themselves as is required by [Smith, supra, 187 Cal. App. 3d 903] . . . ." The court found the instruction appropriate, noting: "I see the focus of the instruction as the comment to the jury that they should not consider the question of punishment as an issue in this case . . . ."
B. argues the instruction erroneously refocused the jurys attention from the standard for commitment to the question of punishment. In support, B. cites People v. Collins (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 690 (Collins).
In Collins, a criminal defendant challenged an order committing him to a mental facility as a mentally disordered offender. The jury instructions, when combined, told the jury its verdict would determine whether defendant would be treated as an in-patient or released. (Collins, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 692-695.) The appellate court reversed. The court reasoned: "[A] jury may be instructed about the consequences of a verdict regarding mental illness when it is designed to alleviate fear and prejudice toward the mentally ill. It is error, however, to instruct on the consequences of such a verdict when it would encourage the jury to ignore the evidence and decide the case based on their fear." (Id. at p. 695.)
The instructions in the present case suffer from no such infirmity. As the trial court noted, the instruction informed the jury they should not consider the question of punishment. Such an instruction does not exacerbate juror fears to the detriment of their deliberations. The language of the instruction tracks the language of sections 5001 and 5350.1; it does not focus the jurors attention on the consequences of their verdict. We find no error.
III. RESTRICTION ON DRIVING
Finally, B. contends the court erred in restricting her ability to possess a drivers license. According to B., no evidence supported such a restriction.
We disagree. At trial, Dr. Graman testified regarding the numerous medications B. was taking. According to Dr. Graman, the medications caused serious side effects, including tremors. In addition, Dr. Gramans declaration, which is part of the court record, specifically recommends that B. be denied the privilege of driving. Dr. Graman based his recommendation on his examination of B.
We find the facts before us distinguishable from those in Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1572, cited by B. In Walker, the public guardian requested the special disabilities previously imposed on Walker be continued for another year. (Walker, supra, 206 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1577-1578.) The appellate court reversed the trial courts imposition of special disabilities. The court found: "The basis for the courts order in this regard is unclear on this record." (Id. at p. 1578.) Here, the record reveals support for the imposition of restrictions on driving.
DISPOSITION
The order reappointing the conservator is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.