Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC311869. Aurelio N. Munoz, Judge.
J. B. Casas, Jr., for Plaintiff and Appellant
Law Offices of Rosario Perry, Rosario Perry and Jacqueline M. Fabe for Defendant and Respondent.
DOI TODD, J.
Appellant Manuel L. Espinosa appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for partition of real property he jointly owned with respondent Micaela C. Reyes. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding that his partition action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties met in Mexico in 1972. At that time, respondent was unaware that appellant was already married. The parties began a relationship that produced two daughters. In 1974 or 1975 respondent moved to the United States “without papers,” and paid appellant to bring her two older daughters from Mexico to live with her.
Respondent testified that in 1987 or 1988, she and her oldest daughter wanted to purchase a house located on Exposition Boulevard in Los Angeles (the property) but did not qualify for a loan. Respondent sought appellant’s help, but he did not qualify either. They worked with an agent named Mr. Brown who suggested that in order to get a loan, the property be purchased in the name “James and Betty Jones.” Respondent never met the Joneses. At that time respondent spoke almost no English and relied on appellant to translate for her.
The property was purchased in the Jones’s names in July 1988. In April 1989, the Joneses executed a grant deed transferring title to appellant and respondent as joint tenants. Respondent testified that she did not see this grant deed until 1998 and that it was never her intention to buy the house with appellant or to put his name on the title. Respondent admitted seeing appellant’s name on the property tax bills, but did not understand that he was on the title. The mortgage bills were in the Joneses’ names.
Respondent testified that she gave appellant $2,500 toward the down payment, and that between 1988 and 1990 she gave appellant cash for the monthly mortgage payments. She did not have a checking account at that time. She testified that appellant did not make any mortgage payments and that her oldest daughter contributed to the mortgage payments.
Appellant denied that respondent made any payments during this time frame and produced a series of canceled checks for mortgage payments he made in 1988 and 1989. The parties’ daughters testified that they saw respondent give cash to appellant several times during that period. The parties stipulated that respondent has made all the monthly mortgage and property tax payments on the property since 1990.
Respondent wanted to repair a storage area in the back of the property for use as a small apartment. Appellant testified that he agreed to buy the house on the condition that rent from this room be used to pay his share of the mortgage. Respondent testified that she never agreed to rent this room and always intended it to be occupied by her daughters and their children, and the evidence showed that they primarily occupied this room. Appellant testified that he paid his brother-in-law and another person $15,000 to repair this room. Respondent testified that appellant contributed no more than $500 toward the repairs.
In 1991, appellant and respondent ended their relationship when appellant began dating a mutual friend. Appellant was still married at that time. Appellant testified that during the time the parties were together, he lived with respondent “most of the time.” Respondent denied that he ever stayed with her more than a night or two at a time. Respondent also testified that appellant never supported her financially, even when she asked for his help, such as to repair the roof. Respondent supported herself by working at See’s Candies and other factories, by cleaning offices and through welfare and food stamps.
In 2004, appellant filed the instant action seeking partition of the property. Respondent filed an answer asserting 23 affirmative defenses, including laches. Respondent also filed a cross-complaint seeking quiet title, damages for slander of title, cancellation of cloud on title, equitable offsets for back child support, assault and battery and declaratory relief. Respondent later amended her cross-complaint to add appellant’s wife as a cross-defendant.
The cross-complaint was severed and the partition action proceeded to court trial. After hearing the parties’ conflicting testimony, the trial court denied appellant’s request for partition, finding that respondent had met her burden of proving the equitable defenses of laches and the “fundamental unfairness” of such relief. The trial court noted that appellant waited to file his action until 13 years “after he abandoned [respondent] so he could begin a relationship with their mutual friend” and 14 years after he “last contributed financially to the ownership or maintenance of the property.” The court found that appellant provided no evidence justifying such a lengthy delay in filing suit. The court also found that respondent “is a woman of limited means and forcing a sale of the home she has lived in for 18 years would be to her substantial prejudice.” Finally, the court found appellant’s testimony that he paid $15,000 for repairs to the back room of the property to be incredible. The court awarded appellant $18,814.08, without interest, for his equitable share of the property, which consisted of two years of mortgage payments.
The case was then transferred to another court for further proceedings and judgment was eventually entered awarding ownership of the property to respondent in fee simple. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The equitable remedy of partition is codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 872.010 et seq. Absent a waiver, a joint tenant is entitled to partition as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.710, subd. (b); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich (1952) 39 Cal.2d 48, 50.) But courts have held that the right of a cotenant to partition is subject to certain limitations, including the “‘requirement of fairness.’” (American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1015.) Laches may also be an appropriate defense to an action for partition. (Simon v. Simon (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1049.) “[L]aches is defined as an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right, causing prejudice to an adverse party such as to render the granting of relief to the other party inequitable. [Citation.] Thus, if a trial court finds (1) unreasonable delay; and (2) prejudice, and if its findings are not palpable abuses of discretion, a finding of laches will be upheld on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Plescia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 252, 256; accord, California School Employees Assn., Tustin Chapter No. 450 v. Tustin Unified School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 510, 521.)
Appellant asserts that in this case there was neither an inexcusable delay on his part in filing the partition action nor prejudice to respondent. We do not agree. Appellant and respondent ended their relationship in 1991, but appellant did not file this lawsuit until 2004. He cites no evidence in the record to explain this delay. The trial court did not err in finding the delay to be unreasonable. Moreover, the trial court found that respondent would be substantially prejudiced by a forced sale of the house she has lived in for more than 18 years, noting that, she “is a woman of limited means.” Appellant challenges this finding by arguing there is no evidence that respondent changed her position to her detriment and that it is improper for a court to deny partition on the basis of economic loss to a cotenant. He primarily relies on Hunter v. Schultz (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 24 to support his position. We find his reliance misplaced.
In Hunter, Ann and her husband Melvin acquired a residence together as joint tenants in 1950. Ann left the property in 1952 and never returned. (Hunter v. Schultz, supra, 240 Cal.App.2dat p. 26.) In 1954, Melvin married Hildegard and they occupied, maintained and improved the property. (Ibid.) In 1962, with a view toward divorcing Melvin, Hildegard contacted Ann and asked her to start partition proceedings. (Id. at pp. 26–27.) Ann filed the partition action in 1962. The trial court found that Ann was not guilty of laches and the appellate court affirmed. Hildegard argued that had she known Ann owned one-half of the property, she and Melvin would not have maintained, improved and invested their money in the property and would have kept better records of their expenditures. (Id. at pp. 28–29.) But the evidence showed that Hildegard had known for several years that Ann was a co-owner of the property, including the time during which improvements were made to the property, that Melvin had always known about Ann’s ownership interest, and that Ann was unaware of the improvements being made to the property. (Id. at p. 29.) Under these circumstances, the appellate court concluded that neither Hildegard nor Melvin suffered damages because of Ann’s conduct. (Id. at p. 30.)
By contrast here, the evidence showed that respondent did not see the grant deed naming appellant as a joint tenant on the property until 1998, 10 years after the property was purchased. She testified that she wanted to purchase the property with her oldest daughter and that it was never her intention to purchase the property with appellant or to have his name on the title. Though she admitted seeing property tax bills with appellant’s name, she had poor English skills, was unsophisticated and did not understand that appellant was on the title. While the trial court credited appellant with two years of mortgage payments on the property in 1988 and 1989, the evidence was undisputed that respondent made all payments on the property from 1990 forward. Respondent also paid for improvements to the property. The trial court did not believe appellant’s testimony that he paid for the improvements, and we are bound by this finding. (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254.) After 1991 when the parties’ relationship ended, respondent had full responsibility for the upkeep and maintenance of the property and continuously lived at the property, while appellant did not live at the property or contribute financially or otherwise toward maintenance of the property. We agree with the trial court that the facts of this case are more similar to those in Simon v. Simon, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 1044.
In Simon, husband and wife acquired a residence and an unimproved lot as joint tenants. The wife abandoned the husband and their son in 1971. Thereafter the husband lived in the residence with their son and made all payments associated with the property. (Simon v. Simon, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1045, 1046.) An interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered in 1972 and a final judgment was entered in 1973. (Id. at p. 1045.) In 1982 the wife filed an action for partition and declaratory relief to establish her community property interest in the two properties. (Id. at p. 1046.) The trial court’s determination that the wife was guilty of laches was affirmed on appeal. (Id. at p. 1049.) The appellate court found that the wife’s failure to explain her delay in bringing suit constituted inexcusable delay. (Id. at p. 1049.) As to prejudice, the court stated that the husband had a reasonable belief “that all legal issues concerning the properties had been resolved, that those properties constituted assets available to him for any necessary purpose, and that his decisions in connection with raising the couples’ son could be made without reference to any potential claim to an interest in those properties by [the wife]. No more was required to be shown.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, the trial court here balanced the equities before it and reasonably concluded that laches barred appellant’s partition action. On the record before us, appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.
Appellant mentions in passing that he is entitled to the appreciated value of the property and other offsets. But to the extent he purports to make these separate arguments without a separate heading or subheading, as required, these issues are waived. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 586, fn. 28.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover her costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.