Opinion
No. FST CV 11 6009458 S
October 25, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On May 9, 2011, the plaintiff, Gregory Errgong-Weider, filed a two-count complaint against the defendant, The United Congregational Church of Norwalk, and he makes the following allegations in the first count. The defendant is a Connecticut non-stock corporation and an autonomous member church of the United Church of Christ. The defendant is organized and operates according to its constitution and bylaws. Pursuant to the bylaws of the defendant, the plaintiff has served as pastor since September 25, 1994. The bylaws provide that the pastor is a voting member of the congregation. The bylaws further state that unless otherwise provided in the defendant's constitution or bylaws, all business shall be conducted under Roberts' Rules of Order.
The plaintiff also alleges the following. On February 4, 2011, the clerk of the defendant issued a "notice of call" that called a special meeting of the congregation for February 20, 2011. The notice stated that the purpose of the meeting was to vote on the recommendations in the report of Reverend Jim Stinson. Among the recommendations included in the report were to remain an active congregation, to set a specific date for becoming a part-time pastoral status and thereafter to begin negotiating a last date for the current pastor to complete his ministry at the defendant. The meeting was held on February 20, 2011, and forty-four members of the total roster of approximately 135 members of the defendant were present, including the plaintiff as a voting member. After a number of items of business were conducted, the moderator of the defendant told the plaintiff to leave the meeting as they were going to discuss the plaintiff's pastorate. A member then moved to terminate the plaintiff's contract and to authorize the church council to hire an interim pastor and to search for a part time pastor. A vote was taken, and twenty-seven voted in favor of the motion, ten voted against it and three abstained.
The plaintiff alleges that the meeting improperly conducted business outside the "notice of call" in contravention of the defendant's bylaws. Specifically, the meeting was not called to terminate the contract of the plaintiff but to accept the recommendations of the Reverend Jim Stinson, none of which called for the termination of the plaintiff's contract. Moreover, the making of the motion and the vote on it were in contravention of the bylaws in that the plaintiff was improperly barred from participating in the meeting as a member of the congregation. Furthermore, the vote on the motion did not pass by the required two-thirds majority because the plaintiff was improperly barred from the proceedings and had he been permitted to vote, he would have voted against the motion or would have abstained, thereby rendering the total number of votes less than the two-thirds majority needed to pass a motion. Finally, the party who seconded the motion to bring to a vote the termination of the plaintiff's contract was not a member of the defendant, and Roberts' Rules of Order provide that only members may make or second motions. The plaintiff thus alleges that the vote on the underlying motion violated the defendant's bylaws. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the defendant did not terminate the plaintiff's pastorate in accordance with its bylaws and that the plaintiff is still the pastor of the defendant.
In the second count, the plaintiff alleges the following. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant pursuant to a contract. The contract provided short-term disability coverage, which included full salary and benefits, a parsonage for the pastor that could be used by the pastor's family, and pay for the cost of utilities and repairs. On November 28, 2010, the plaintiff suffered a detached retina, which rendered him disabled and qualified him for short-term disability. The defendant did not pay the plaintiff's salary and benefits during the period of disability beginning on December 28, 2010. Instead, the plaintiff received disability benefits from a disability insurer engaged by the defendant for the plaintiff until March 14, 2011. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment as to the contractual relationship between him and the defendant, including whether the plaintiff: (1) is due the shortfall between the short-term disability payments and his salary from the date the disability payments started until the date his disability ended; (2) is due his full salary and benefits from the date he was certified to return to work at the end of his disability until the end of his employment; and (3) is allowed to continue to use the parsonage until the end of his employment and for such period thereafter as is determined by the court.
On June 23, 2011, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint (#101.00) on the ground that the court cannot inquire into the ecclesiastical rules of a church under the First Amendment, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion asked the court to dismiss all claims in plaintiff's complaint, "with the exception of the portion of Count Two in which he requests the difference between his short term disability benefits and his salary." The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of its motion. (#102.00.) On July 26, 2011, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion (#104.00) to which the defendant filed a memorandum in reply on August 17, 2011 (#105.00). The plaintiff filed a surreply on August 26, 2011 (#106.00). The matter was heard on the short calendar on September 6, 2011.
The defendant has moved to dismiss all counts of the plaintiff's complaint with the exception of the plaintiff's claim seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to the difference between his short-term disability benefits and salary. At the short calendar on September 6, 2011, the court inquired as to whether a motion to dismiss was proper when the defendant's motion to dismiss did not claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to entire complaint. The plaintiff waived any procedural objections to the manner in which the question of the court's jurisdiction was raised. Consequently, the court will consider the motion to dismiss as submitted.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706 (2010). "The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone . . . Where, however . . . the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346-47 (2001). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 802 (2009). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12 (2003). "It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins. Co., 294 Conn. 206, 214 (2009).
In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant makes the following arguments. First, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes the court from declaring whether the defendant complied with its own bylaws or from declaring whether the plaintiff remains pastor of the defendant. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of religious institutions to decide matters of faith, doctrine and church governance without interference from any governmental agency, including the courts. A minister's employment relationship with his church implicates internal church discipline, faith and organization, all of which are governed by ecclesiastical custom and law. Accordingly, the courts lack jurisdiction over employment disputes such as the one involved in the present case. Second, the court cannot adjudicate the second count of the plaintiff's complaint since that count, like the first count, would require judicial intrusion into rules, policies and decisions that are unmistakably of an ecclesiastical nature. Specifically, to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to continue to receive a salary and benefits or that he be allowed to remain in the parsonage, the court would need to decide whether the defendant's termination of the plaintiff's employment was invalid, a decision which the court is constitutionally forbidden to make.
In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff claims that despite the fact that the plaintiff was employed as the defendant's minister, the plaintiff is not asking the court to apply ecclesiastical rules or religious doctrine. Instead, the plaintiff is asking the court to apply secular law to the actions of the defendant, a Connecticut non-stock corporation governed by General Statutes § 33-1038(b). That statute allows officers or members, like the plaintiff, to challenge the actions of a corporation. In the plaintiff's view, the case is not about who will preach from the pulpit of the church, but about whether the defendant has, in fact, acted officially within its authority to terminate the plaintiff's employment. The plaintiff concedes that if the defendant organization, in accordance with applicable procedures, actually acted to terminate the plaintiff, even wrongfully, based upon an alleged qualitative deficiency of the plaintiff or even for no reason at all, the court may well lack jurisdiction. However, the plaintiff claims that the purported act of the organization in terminating the plaintiff's contract simply was not authorized by a proper vote of the congregation and hence was a nullity.
The defendant argues that, notwithstanding the plaintiff's procedural claims, the recent case of Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759 (2011) is controlling and that the ministerial exception bars claims that a religious institution failed to follow its own procedures and bylaws in terminating a religious employee. The defendant further argues that even though § 33-1038(b) expressly authorizes a member of a non-stock corporation to challenge such corporation's power to act, the adjudication of the plaintiff's claim requires the court to police the defendant's compliance with its internal laws, which, it claims, the court is barred from doing under the First Amendment.
In his surreply, the plaintiff makes the following arguments. The nature of the dispute is entirely non-religious, does not invoke church doctrine and does not require the court to make a qualitative review of the defendant's organization or internal workings. The plaintiff is not asking the court to adjudicate whether the defendant's acts were wrongful. Rather, the plaintiff is alleging that the defendant did not act or that its purported act was ineffective to terminate the plaintiff's contract because the defendant organization did not, in fact, authorize or support it in the manner required by its bylaws and required procedures. In his view, the plaintiff is not asking the court to review how the defendant applied its religious doctrine, but rather is asking the court to render a declaratory judgment as to whether the church actually acted to terminate his contract.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the jurisdiction of courts over intrachurch disputes in several cases, producing a body of case law that, at times, has produced confusion for the lower courts. See I. Ellman, "Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes," 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1378, 1400 ("The Supreme Court decisions from Watson to Jones suggest a troubled court unable to find an acceptable framework for analysis of the basic issue: what is the proper rule for civil courts to apply when asked to adjudicate internal church disputes?"). However, throughout the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area, one point has remained clear: The Supreme Court has consistently noted a distinction between hierarchical churches and congregational churches in answering whether and the extent to which courts have jurisdiction over internal church disputes.
The Supreme Court has never articulated a test to be applied in determining whether a religious organization constitutes a "hierarchical" church and a "congregational" church. Nevertheless, the appellate court of California has provided a clear and concise definition of each. See New v. Kroeger, 167 Cal.App.4th 800, 815-16, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 (2008), cert. dismissed, 202 P.3d 1089, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 701 (2009). That court defined a hierarchical church as "one in which individual churches are organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine[, and] with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head vested with ultimate ecclesiastical authority over the individual congregations and members of the entire organized church . . . It has long been established that in such a hierarchical church, an individual local congregation that affiliates with the national church body becomes a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, . . . under its government and control, and . . . bound by its orders and judgments . . . In contrast, a congregational church is defined as one strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and [one that] so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In Watson v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court for the first time directly addressed the issue of judicial intervention in intrachurch disputes. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 20 L.Ed 666 (1871). The case involved a Presbyterian church in Louisville, Kentucky that had divided into two factions during the Civil War, a proslavery faction, comprised of a majority of the congregation's ruling "elders," and an antislavery faction, composed of a majority of the church members. The antislavery faction brought an action to oust the proslavery elders from their control over church property. Meanwhile, the proslavery faction had joined forces with sympathizers in other congregations to form the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States, the hierarchy to which this faction now claimed allegiance. See I. Ellman, supra, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1385-86 (summarizing the facts of Watson). The Court overturned a decision by the lower court which had conducted a detailed inquiry into the adjudication of the dispute by higher church authorities. The court found that the proslavery elders had abandoned any rights they might have had in the church when they rejected the authority of the Presbyterian Church and joined the new pro-slavery church. Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 734.
In its decision, the Court also addressed the jurisdictional question, creating a separate standard for hierarchical churches and congregational churches. The Court classified three types of cases regarding the "rights to property held by ecclesiastical bodies." Id., 722. The first type of case involved title to property given to religious organizations by will or deed conditioned on the "teaching, support, or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief." Id. The court found no constitutional barriers to a court's consideration of such cases. Id.
The second type of case "is when property is held by a religious congregation which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority." Id. The court found that the question before it did not fall into this category. This category involves "a strictly congregational or independent organization, governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government . . ." Id., 724. As for these types of disputes, the Court held: "In such cases where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to use the property." Id., 725. In other words, the Court held that courts have jurisdiction over disputes within congregational churches. Id.
The third type of case is "where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body . . . is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control . . ." Id., 722. The court held: "In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them." Id., 727. The Court defined "judicatories" as ecclesiastical judicial bodies that "entertain appeals from the decisions of those below, and prescribe corrective measures in other cases." Id. Thus, the Court mandated a principle of deference to the decisions of hierarchical institutions.
The distinction between hierarchical churches and congregational churches was further discussed by Justice Brennan in a concurrence of a per curiam decision of the Supreme Court. See Maryland Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan asserted that courts may resolve church property disputes in one of three ways. Id., 368. As for the first way, Justice Brennan stated: "States may adopt the approach of Watson v. Jones . . . and enforce the property decisions made within a church of congregational polity by a majority of its members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government . . . and within a church of hierarchical polity by the highest authority that has ruled on the dispute at issue . . ." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan added that the courts may exercise jurisdiction over property disputes within hierarchical churches and congregational churches "only if the appropriate church governing body can be determined without the resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive inquiry into religious polity." Id., 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Brennan explicitly acknowledged the distinction between hierarchical churches and congregational churches that Watson established.
The Supreme Court confirmed its position that courts may entertain jurisdiction over certain disputes within congregational churches in Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872). In that case, two factions formed in a Baptist church. The intrachurch dispute began when seven trustees were elected in accordance with the church rules at a regular meeting of the congregation. A few months later, a minority group of the church elected four trustees in place of those elected at the regular meeting at a time when an election of trustees was not in order. These four trustees claimed possession of the church property. The trustees who alleged to have been elected by a majority of the congregation filed suit against the other trustees and Bouldin, the founder of the church and a self-professed trustee. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed. Id., 132-35.
The church had been organized in accordance with the constitution of the general Baptist Church of the United States, in which the "congregational form of government prevails." Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 133, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872).
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court made explicit its jurisdiction to examine the actions of the congregation. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that although it could not decide "who ought to be members of the church . . . we may inquire whether the resolution of expulsion was the act of the church, or of persons who were not the church and who consequently had no right to excommunicate others." Id., 139-40. The Supreme Court then stated that an action by a minority of the church congregation "was not the action of the church, and that it was wholly inoperative. In a congregational church, the majority, if they adhere to the organization and to the doctrines, represent the church. An expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void act." Id., 140. Moreover, in rendering its decision, the Supreme Court relied on church documents and rules. The Supreme Court referenced the election rules of the church as stated in the Baptist Church Manual, and the Supreme Court also cited the church minutes to indicate that the seven trustees were elected at a regular meeting of the congregation. Id., 138. Further indicating its reliance on church procedural rules in rendering a decision, the Supreme Court concluded by stating that trustees "cannot be removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or meeting, without warning, and acting without charges, without citation or trial, and in direct contravention of the church rules." (Emphasis added.) Id., 140. Therefore, the Supreme Court assumed that it had jurisdiction over church election disputes — at least in a congregational context — and that it could rely on church procedural rules in reaching the merits of the case.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed specifically the issue of judicial involvement in disputes involving congregational churches since Bouldin, the Supreme Court has decided several cases involving intrachurch disputes within the context of hierarchical churches. These cases are important in that they establish basic principles for judicial involvement in intrachurch disputes that can be applied to disputes within congregational churches. See Maryland Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., supra, 396 U.S. 368 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] State may adopt any one of [three] various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court did not take up the issue of internal church disputes again until 1929, in the case of Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, CT Page 22613 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929). In that case, the Supreme Court noted an exception to the deference rule for hierarchical churches in cases of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness." Id., 16.
Bouldin is the only case in which the Supreme Court has reviewed a dispute within a congregational setting. See I. Ellman, supra, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1387 n. 27 ("Although the Supreme Court has not decided any other cases involving congregational churches, it has explicitly relied on the hierarchical nature, rather than congregational nature, of the churches involved in the cases it has decided").
However, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d. 151 (1976), the Supreme Court described the Gonzalez exception as "dicta" and noted that the court had actually applied the exception in any matter presented to it. In that case, the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, a hierarchical church suspended and ultimately removed Milivojevich as bishop of the American-Canadian diocese of that church. Milivojevich alleged that his suspension and removal were procedurally and substantively defective under the internal regulations of the church and, accordingly, were arbitrary and invalid. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Milivojevich. Id., 697-98. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must defer to the decisions of hierarchical churches as to their own internal governance. Id., 698. "[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them." Id., 724-25.
In addition to reasserting the Watson standard for hierarchical churches, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrariness prong of the Gonzalez exception was not constitutional. "For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense `arbitrary' must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits . . ." Id., 713.
However, throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court qualified its holding by suggesting that it applies only to hierarchical churches. For instance, in commenting on the constitutional problems associated with the arbitrariness exception, the Supreme Court limited its holding to hierarchical churches: "[W]hether or not there is room for `marginal civil court review' under the narrow rubrics of `fraud' or `collusion' when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no `arbitrariness' exception — in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations — is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law." (Emphasis added.) Id. The Supreme Court did not state that such a rule applied in cases involving congregational cases, nor did the court explain how Bouldin fit in with the Supreme Court's latest rule. See also id., 710 (prefacing a quote from Watson with the qualification, "[w]ith respect to hierarchical churches . . .").
Prior to Milivojevich, however, the Court decided a number of church cases, the most significant of which was Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). In Hull, the Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to resolve a property dispute between factions within a Presbyterian church. A dispute arose between two local Presbyterian churches in Georgia and the general Presbyterian church over control of the properties used until then by the local churches. Believing that certain actions and pronouncements of the general church were violations of that organization's constitution and departures from its doctrine and practice, the membership of the local churches voted to withdraw from the general church and to reconstitute the local churches as autonomous Presbyterian organizations. In response, the general church established an administrative commission to seek a conciliation. When conciliation could not be reached, the commission acknowledged the withdrawal of the local leadership and proceeded to take over the property of the local churches on behalf of the general church until new local leadership could be appointed. The local churches then filed suits to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the disputed property, title to which was held in the name of the local churches. The general church moved to dismiss the actions on the ground that civil courts lacked power to determine whether the general church had departed from its tenets of faith and practice. The motion to dismiss was denied, and the case was submitted to the jury on the theory that Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches. The jury returned a verdict for the local churches, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Id., 442-44.
See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960) (per curiam); and Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, supra, 393 U.S. 440.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory required courts "to determine matters at the very core of religion — the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role." Id., 450. The Supreme Court reasoned that " First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice . . . [T]he First Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes . . . the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine." (Citation omitted.) Id., 449.
Although the Supreme Court held that the courts have no role to play in disputes involving religious doctrine and practice, it acknowledged that courts still have limited jurisdiction over certain internal church disputes. The Supreme Court stated: "It is obvious . . . that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without `establishing' churches to which property is awarded." Id. The notion that courts may apply "neutral principles of law" in resolving church property disputes was further addressed and formally adopted by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), a five-to-four opinion.
Jones involved a property dispute following a schism in a Presbyterian church. In resolving the dispute, the Georgia state courts applied the neutral-principles approach, and the Supreme Court held that this approach was constitutional. Id., 602. The Supreme Court stated: "The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity." Id., 603. The Supreme Court also expressly allowed for courts to examine internal religious documents in applying the neutral-principles approach. "The neutral-principles method . . . requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general church. In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust. In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." Id., 604. While acknowledging potential difficulties in applying the neutral-principles approach, the Supreme Court nevertheless held: "On balance . . . the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in application . . . We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute." (Citation omitted.) Id.
In Jones, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that the church at issue "has a generally hierarchical or connectional form of government, as contrasted with a congregational form." (Emphasis added.) Id., 597-98. Nevertheless, Jones clearly established that state courts may constitutionally employ a neutral-principles approach in resolving hierarchical intrachurch disputes.
RECENT CONNECTICUT DECISIONS
In a very recent decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered the constitutional history of intrachurch disputes and decided to adopt and to apply the neutral-principles approach of Jones to a dispute within a hierarchical church. The Episcopal Church v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408 (2011). That case involved a dispute over the personal and real property of a local Episcopal parish. The local and principal Episcopal churches sought a declaratory judgment that the property was held in trust for them, while a former rector of the local church and twelve present or former officers or vestry members of the parish maintained that they possessed title to the property. Id., 410-12. In answering whether the court had jurisdiction, the court recognized the two approaches approved by the Supreme Court for resolving church property disputes: the Watson approach, and the Jones approach. In considering Watson, the court noted the three types of cases recognized in Watson and indicated the distinction between the second type, involving congregational churches, and the third type, involving hierarchical churches. The court stated that under the Watson approach: "[C]ivil courts must examine the polity of the general church to determine whether it is hierarchical, and, if they determine that it is, the decision of the higher authorities within the church must be respected." Id. Acknowledging the importance under Watson of the type of church at issue, the court added: "If the court determines that the general church is hierarchical, it leaves settlement of the dispute to the higher authorities within the church . . . If the court determines that the general church is not hierarchical, it applies the legal principles that govern voluntary associations." (Citation omitted.) Id., 427.
The court found that the neutral-principles approach of Jones was preferable. The court stated that it is immaterial whether the church's organization is hierarchical or congregational. "[I]f the court wishes to follow Jones, there is no need to determine whether the polity of the church is hierarchical because the only relevant evidence is that relating to the respective authority of the general and local churches on the matter of church property, which may be found in the applicable statutory provisions, deeds and other secular documents, as well as in the church constitution, canons and rules." Id., 428. Weighing the hierarchical approach of Watson against the neutral-principles approach, the court concluded that "the neutral principles of law approach is preferable because it provides the parties with a more level playing field, and the outcome in any given case is not preordained in favor of the general church, as happens in practice under the hierarchical approach." Id., 429. The court thus adopted the neutral-principles approach "in resolving future church property disputes." Id., 430.
Although Gauss held that the distinction between hierarchical churches and congregational churches is irrelevant for purposes of resolving church property disputes, it did not specifically address whether the distinction should be considered in resolving other types of internal church conflicts. In Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759 (2011), the court considered the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over an intrachurch dispute regarding an employment contract and articulated a specific standard. The case involved the Roman Catholic Church, a hierarchical church, and the court held that it would be constitutionally impermissible for the courts to intervene in determining whether a principal at a parochial school had been wrongfully terminated. The trial court had denied a motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that a determination as to whether a case was governed by the "ministerial exception" involved a factual inquiry as to whether the reasons stated for the plaintiff's dismissal were pretextual.
The only other type of case to which Connecticut has applied the neutral-principles approach is a defamation case. See Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, 120 Conn.App. 666 (2010). Connecticut courts have not applied the neutral-principles approach to contract or employment disputes. See Decorso v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 46 Conn.Sup. 386, 399 (2000) (declining to apply the neutral-principles approach to determine whether there was an implied contract because doing so would result in "excessive entanglement with the religious doctrines, teachings and internal affairs of the defendant Watchtower organization").
The court stated: "[W]e . . . conclude that, in considering whether the ministerial exception is applicable in a particular case, a Connecticut state court must follow the standard articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities . . . and consider whether: (1) the employment relationship is religious in nature; and (2) if so, whether adjudicating the particular claims and defenses in the case would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization." (Citation omitted.) Id. 761-62.
That exception was recognized by the Appellate Court in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 911, cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007).
The court did not rely upon the hierarchical structure of the defendant in Dayner, apparently finding that, with respect to employment-based disputes potentially covered by the ministerial exception, the form of church governance was irrelevant. Other jurisdictions have addressed the hierarchical-congregational distinction as to non-property disputes, with inconsistent conclusions. For instance, in Baugh v. Thomas, 56 N.J. 203, 205 (1970), the plaintiff was expelled from a Baptist church and dismissed as a member of the Board of Trustees of the church. The plaintiff challenged his dismissal, and the congregation voted on whether the plaintiff should be reinstated. The plaintiff alleged that thirty-one votes were against him and twenty-five were in his favor, but that one vote against him was disqualified because the voter was delinquent in the payment of her dues and that two other members who voted against him also should have been disqualified for the same reason. The plaintiff further alleged that there were four members present who abstained, and that the votes of these four members should have been counted for him in accordance with the constitution of the church since that document requires that abstentions be counted as affirmative votes. Accordingly, by the plaintiff's count, he should have been reinstated by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-eight. Id., 205-06.
Although Baugh was decided pre- Jones, it has never been overturned, and the New Jersey courts have continued to affirm its basic holding. See, e.g., Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 244 N.J.Super. 119, 136 (1990), aff'd, 128 N.J. 303 (1992) ("[A] party may seek judicial relief based on a church's failure to follow its own procedures") (citing Baugh v. Thomas).
The court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's claims, notwithstanding the fact that the case involved church documents and procedure. The court stated: "We cannot . . . accept the proposition that civil courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether established procedures of a religious organization, as proved, have been followed where a member is expelled from that organization . . . We believe that expulsion from a church or other religious organization can constitute a serious emotional deprivation which, when compared to some losses of property or contract rights, can be far more damaging to an individual. The loss of opportunity to worship in familiar surroundings is a valuable right which deserves the protection of the law where no constitutional barrier exists." Id., 208. The court then proceeded to equate congregational churches with non-profit organizations. "[E]xcept in cases involving religious doctrine, we can see no reason for treating religious organizations differently from other non-profit voluntary associations. In the context of other voluntary associations, we have held that there need not be a property right at stake for a court to assume jurisdiction. The status of membership in a voluntary association is sufficient to warrant at least limited judicial examination of the reason for expulsion." Id. Thus, in addition to holding explicitly that courts have jurisdiction to analyze whether church procedures and protocol have been followed, the court identified congregational churches as having characteristics similar to secular institutions and held that congregational churches should be treated like secular organizations in disputes over church procedure.
Other jurisdictions have held that the distinction between hierarchical churches and congregational churches is immaterial as to all types of intrachurch disputes. See, e.g., Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 441 Mass. 699, 708 (2004). Callahan involved the suspension of a minister of a congregational church by a church committee. After the review panel affirmed the decision of the committee, the minister filed suit with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), alleging discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation and disability. The MCAD dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the minister filed a civil action alleging a variety of claims. The court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims except parts of the defamation claim. Id., 717. The court held: "Today we hold that congregational as well as hierarchical churches are entitled to autonomy over church disputes touching on matters of doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline, and ministerial relationships." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 708. Specifically with regard to the minister's breach of contract claim, in which he alleged that the church did not follow its own written procedures in carrying out the investigation and disciplinary proceedings against the minister, the court stated: "Without addressing whether these [church] publications actually establish a contractual relationship . . . [w]e decline to venture into the realm of interpreting internal guidelines and procedures that have been adopted by the [United Church of Christ] . . . [A] church must be free to decide for itself what its obligations to its ministers are, without being subject to court interference." Id., 713. In its decision the court did not address the Supreme Court's holdings in Watson or Bouldin, which would have permitted the court to entertain jurisdiction of the dispute.
In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated its bylaws in purportedly terminating him from his position, and therefore, that his termination was not, in fact, the action of the defendant. In Dayner, the court approved of the application of the two-part test set forth in Rweyemamu v. Cote, supra, requiring the court to consider whether: (1) the employment relationship is religious in nature; and (2) if so, whether adjudicating the particular claims and defenses in the case would require the court to intrude into a religious institution's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization. There is no question that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as its pastor, a position which is, without doubt, religious in nature, thus meeting the first part of the test. The court finds that in addressing the question of whether the second part of the test is met, it must apply the "neutral principles of law" approach mandated by Gauss.
The issues raised by the plaintiff's complaint include: (1) whether the vote terminating his contract was taken at a meeting duly warned to consider that issue; (2) whether the motion to terminate his contract was properly seconded and, therefore, properly before the meeting; and (3) whether barring him from attendance at the meeting and preventing him from voting on the motion violated his rights as a member of the defendant non-stock corporation. The court finds that the resolution of these issues would not require the court to intrude upon the defendant's exclusive right to decide matters pertaining to doctrine or its internal governance or organization. Resolution of these issues involve questions of corporation law and the application of Robert's Rules of Order, not the application of religious doctrine or matters of governance outside the jurisdiction of the court. Under the neutral-principles approach as articulated in Gauss, the court may analyze the defendant's bylaws and constitution in resolving the dispute.
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, supra, and in Bouldin v. Alexander, supra, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claims and to apply "the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations" to resolve the dispute. See Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. 725. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint is denied.