Opinion
Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Wheaton A. Gray, Judge.
COUNSEL:
Lamberson & Middlecoff, for Appellant.
J. W. Ahern, for Respondent.
JUDGES: In Bank. McFarland, J. Garoutte, J., Harrison, J., Van Fleet, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.
OPINION
McFARLAND, Judge
This is a motion made by respondent to dismiss the appeal in the above-entitled cause.
One of the grounds of the motion is, that the judgment appealed from was entered in pursuance of an express written stipulation of all the parties, including the appellant. It appears from the record that such a stipulation was made, and that the judgment was entered in accordance therewith; and that it was further expressly stipulated that no appeal should be taken from said judgment.
It is well settled that judgments and orders by consent will not be reviewed. (Societe Francaise D'Epargnes v. Beardslee , 63 Cal. 160; Thompson v. Connolly , 43 Cal. 636; Mecham v. McKay , 37 Cal. 158, and cases there cited; Meerholz v. Sessions , 9 Cal. 278; Brotherton v. Hart , 11 Cal. 406.) In the cases above cited there was no motion to dismiss, and the judgments were affirmed, because the court would not review a judgment or order made by consent of the appellant. But in Oullahan v. Morrissey , 73 Cal. 297, the appeal was dismissed because the judgment was entered with the consent of the appellant; and in San Francisco v. Certain Real Estate , 42 Cal. 513, the court, per Crockett, J., said: "It is objected, in limine, that we ought not to entertain this appeal, for the reason that the judgment from which it was taken was entered pro forma and by consent. If the record discloses this fact, it would be our duty to dismiss the appeal, as we have repeatedly decided that we will not review judgments or orders entered by consent."
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.