Opinion
CA 9:22-cv-04705-DCC-MHC
10-31-2023
Calvin Epps, Petitioner, v. Warden, FCI Estill, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner Calvin Epps (“Petitioner”), a federal inmate currently incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Estill, petitions the court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Respondent Warden of FCI Estill (“Respondent”), filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). ECF No. 15. Petitioner filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. 18, and the time for Respondent to file a reply has now expired. The Motion is ripe for review.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), all pretrial proceedings in this matter have been assigned to the undersigned. Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's Motion be granted, and the Petition be dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an inmate currently confined at FCI Estill, South Carolina. On June 28, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to a 120-month term of imprisonment for Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute a Quantity of 5 kg or More of a Mixture Containing a Detectable Amount of Cocaine and a Quantity of 100 kg or More of a Mixture Containing a Detectable Amount of Marijuana, a 60-month term of imprisonment for Possession With Intent to Distribute a Quantity of 100 kg or More of a Mixture Containing a Detectable Amount of Marijuana, and a 60-month term of imprisonment for Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. ECF No. 15-1 at 1-2.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction on February 23, 2015. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied on September 8, 2015. See Epps v. United States, Civ. No. 5:15-cv-00138 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 8, 2015), Docket entry 10. Petitioner filed a motion in the Southern District of Texas for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which was denied on April 15, 2022. See United States v. Epps, Crim. No. 5:12-cr-00185-3 (S.D. Tex. filed April 14, 2022), Docket entry 601.
Petitioner's combined 180-month sentence computation began on June 28, 2013, the date on which it was imposed. ECF No. 15-1 at 2. Petitioner's current projected release date, with consideration for Good Conduct Time, is February 13, 2025. ECF No. 15-1 at 2.
Petitioner filed the current § 2241 action asserting that an incorrect custody classification score deemed him ineligible for Home Confinement under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Petitioner requests that this Court direct the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) “to remove its erroneous designation of Petitioner as a violent offender who is ineligible for CARES processing, and for whatever other relief this Honorable Court deems just.” ECF No. 1 at 7. Petitioner's grounds for relief are (1) he “has been denied for CARES release solely upon BOP classification of his offense as a crime of violence,” (2) the “US Supreme Court in Davis case held that 924C offenses are not crimes of violence,” and (3) the “[BOP] has not properly promulgated a regulation classifying 924c offenses as crimes of violence.” ECF No. 1 at 6.
Petitioner also filed an “Amended” Petition. See ECF No. 10. However, the Amended Petition appears to be identical to the Petition, with the only difference being that the Amended Petition does not contain any attachments. Compare ECF No. 1 with ECF No. 10.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Respondent moved under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 15 at 1-4. Because the parties submitted, and the Court considered, matters outside of the Petition, Respondent's Motion has been treated as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Habeas Corpus
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of this Petition pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). The primary means of attacking the validity of a federal conviction and sentence is through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, while a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241 is the proper method to challenge the computation or execution of a federal sentence. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678-79 (4th Cir. 2004).
A petitioner may bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if he is “attacking] the computation and execution of the sentence rather than the sentence itself.” United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); see also Diaz v. Warden, FCI Edgefield, No. 4:17-cv-00093-RBH, 2017 WL 2985974, at *2 (D.S.C. July 13, 2017) (noting a § 2241 petition “is the proper means for a federal prisoner to challenge the BOP's sentencing calculations”). A § 2241 petition challenging the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence generally addresses “such matters as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention[,] and prison conditions.” Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Manigault v. Lamanna, No. 8:06-047-JFA-BHH, 2006 WL 1328780, at *1 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (“A motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence, such as parole matters, computation of sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, and prison transfers.”). A § 2241 petition must be brought against the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, Rumsfeldv. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004), and “in the district of confinement rather than in the sentencing court,” Miller, 871 F.2d at 490. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2242.
III. DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that the Petition should be dismissed because (1) it is moot and (2) this Court lacks authority to review the BOP's placement decisions. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees.
A. Mootness
Respondent argues that the CARES Act provisions on home confinement have expired, rendering Petitioner's claims moot. The Court agrees.
The Constitution limits federal courts' jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). The controversy must be present at all stages of review. Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997). A federal court has no authority to give opinions on moot questions or to declare rules of law that cannot affect the matter at issue. Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Generally, an action is moot when “the issues presented are no longer ‘live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (citation omitted).
The BOP has the authority to designate the place of a prisoner's imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). This authority includes the ability to place a prisoner in home confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2) (providing a prisoner may be placed “in home confinement for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6 months”). The CARES Act included a provision allowing the BOP to increase the length of time an inmate could be placed on home confinement. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, (Mar. 27, 2020). The Attorney General directed the BOP to prioritize granting home confinement because of the pandemic, issuing two memoranda outlining the factors to consider. See ECF No. 15-1 at 10-14. The BOP subsequently issued guidance concerning which inmates to prioritize for home confinement. See ECF No. 15-1 at 15-17.
However, this authority to expand the duration of home confinement was only available to the BOP during the covered emergency period, which has ended. The CARES Act defines “covered emergency period” as “the period beginning on the date on which the President declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) with respect to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) and ending on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the national emergency declaration terminates.” CARES Act, § 12003(a)(2), 134 Stat. at *516. On April 10, 2023, President Biden signed into law H.J. Res. 7, which terminated the national emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic. H.J. Res. 7, 118th Cong. (approved Apr. 10, 2023). Therefore, thirty days later, on May 11, 2023, the “covered emergency period” ended and the home confinement provisions contained within the CARES Act expired. See United States v. Horton, No. CR ELH-19-115, 2023 WL 3390910, at *15 (D. Md. May 10, 2023) (noting Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J. Res. 7) seeking to end the national emergency, effective May 11, 2023).
Here, Petitioner alleges he “has been denied for CARES release solely upon BOP classification of his offense as a crime of violence.” ECF No. 1 at 6. Petitioner asks this Court to “[d]irect the federal Bureau of Prisons to remove its erroneous designation of Petitioner as a violent offender who is ineligible for CARES processing, and for whatever other relief this Honorable Court deems just.” ECF No. 1 at 7. Consequently, it appears that Petitioner seeks placement on home confinement under the authority granted by the CARES Act.
However, as noted above, the authority of the BOP to grant home confinement reverted to its pre-COVID-19 pandemic status on May 11, 2023. Because the CARES Act home confinement placement Petitioner seeks is no longer available, the Petition is now moot. Moreover, the BOP is again restricted by the requirement that the home confinement period not last more than the shorter of ten percent of the term of imprisonment or six months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). Petitioner's current release date is February 13, 2025, which means he has over six months remaining in his sentence. See ECF No. 15-1 at 3. Thus, he cannot qualify for home confinement.
B. Unable to review the BOP decision
Respondent further argues that-even if the Petition were not moot-this Court nevertheless lacks the authority to review the BOP's decision regarding where they house Petitioner. The Court agrees.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 permits challenges to the execution of a federal sentence, Congress has directed that the BOP's designation of an inmate's place of imprisonment is not subject to judicial review. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.”). Furthermore, the “CARES Act also did not alter § 3621(b) or otherwise provide a mechanism for the court to review the [BOP's] placement decisions.” Andrews v. Ramos, No. 5:22-HC-2114-FL, 2023 WL 1822837, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 8, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-6145, 2023 WL 3676776 (4th Cir. May 26, 2023), cert. dismissed sub nom. ANDREWS, ANTHONY v. RAMOS, WARDEN, No. 235467, 2023 WL 6558741 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2023). This District has likewise agreed that the BOP's authority over placement and housing decisions is discretionary and not subject to judicial review. See Holt v. Warden, C/A No. 0:22-158-RMG-PJG, 2022 WL 837526, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2022) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 0:22-00158-RMG, 2022 WL 836745 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2022).
Consequently, even if Petitioner's claim was not moot, this Court would be unable to review the BOP's placement decision because the BOP's authority on where to house inmates is completely discretionary and not subject to judicial review. Touzier v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 2110761, 2021 WL 3829618, at * 2 (11th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021) (stating the CARES Act does not provide federal courts with authority to grant inmates home confinement); McCarson v. Reherman, No. 2:20-1386-HMH, 2020 WL 2110770, at *2 (D.S.C. May 4, 2020) (“[W]hile the CARES Act affords the BOP broad discretion during the COVID-19 pandemic, the court lacks jurisdiction to order home confinement for McCarson under this provision.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 849 Fed.Appx. 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2021) (“The CARES Act does not empower the courts to order that an inmate's sentence be served in home confinement.”).
In his Response, Petitioner argues that, in fact, he never was seeking release under the CARES Act; rather, he was only challenging his custody classification as a violent offender. See ECF No. 18 at 6 (noting “he is contesting the BOP's misclassification only” (emphasis Petitioner's)); see also ECF No. 18 at 2. Petitioner appears to argue that the BOP's determination is at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)'s definition of a crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague. ECF No. 18 at 2-4. He further argues that he is “entitled to have this misclassification corrected,” arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows this Court to review the BOP's decision regarding his custody classification. ECF No. 18 at 5-6.
Petitioner's arguments fail for three reasons. First, it appears that Petitioner is no longer classified as a violent offender. See ECF No. 15 at 2 n.3 (“Petitioner does not have a violent offender categorization”); see also ECF No. 15-1 at 9. Thus, it appears Petitioner has already received the relief he seeks.
Second, if Petitioner is only challenging his custody classification, such a claim it is not cognizable under § 2241. See Fields v. Warden of Fed. Corr. Inst.-Bennettsville, No. 5:20-cv-01101-SAL-KDW, 2020 WL 8620171, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 21, 2020) (“For Petitioner to appropriately pursue a remedy under § 2241 he must be challenging the actual ‘fact or duration' of his sentence. Here, though, the BOP uses its own internal policies to determine Petitioner's custody classification. Any impact the points at issue have on Petitioner's custody classification would not change the fact or duration of Petitioner's sentence, nor does he argue they would. Rather, Petitioner is seeking a different classification so that he might be housed elsewhere. That is not the point of habeas relief.” (internal citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Fields v. Warden of Fed. Corr. Inst., No. 5:20-CV-1101-JD, 2021 WL 694847 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2021); see also Rodriguez v. Streeval, No. 7:20CV373, 2020 WL 3840424, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2020) (collecting cases and noting “[c]hallenges to a federal prisoner's custody classification, like the one brought by Rodriguez, are thus not cognizable in habeas under § 2241”).
Third, and in any event, this Court cannot provide such relief, as the BOP's decision over Petitioner's custody classification falls within the discretion afforded to the BOP by statute and is not subject to judicial review. See 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (providing that judicial review under the APA does not apply to determinations or decisions made under §§ 3621-3624); see also Kern v. Fikes, No. 21-CV-2211 (WMW/LIB), 2022 WL 2959973, at *8 (D. Minn. June 16, 2022) (“[B]ecause 18 U.S.C. § 3625 bars judicial review of both the BOP's discretionary decision of whether or not to transfer Petitioner to home confinement and the BOP's discretionary decision as to the Greater Severity PSF designation initially assigned to Petitioner, any APA claim within the present Habeas Petition which challenges these discretionary decisions necessarily fails.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-CV-2211 (WMW/LIB), 2022 WL 2953933 (D. Minn. July 26, 2022); Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 248 F.Supp.3d 172, 182 (D.D.C. 2017) (“BOP decisions involving custody classification and place of confinement are expressly exempt by statute from judicial review under the APA.” (citation omitted)).
Contrary to Petitioner's argument, neither the APA nor the Supreme Court's decision in Davis give this Court the ability to review the BOP's decision. See, e.g., Blocher v. Eischen, No. 22-CV-678 (PJS/DTS), 2022 WL 17406549, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2022) (denying § 2241 petition challenging the denial of placement in home confinement under the CARES Act where the BOP found that the petitioner's firearm offense was a violent crime, and noting that the petitioner's reliance on Davis (and other cases involving the imposition of criminal liability and penalties) to challenge a CARES Act decision was misplaced), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17404447 (D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2022); Pollock v. Kallis, No. CV 20-359(DSD/BRT), 2021 WL 2710013, at *3 (D. Minn. July 1, 2021) (“[Petitioner] argues that BOP Program Statement P5100.08 creates a liberty interest in his custody classification, and his liberty interest requires due process protection. The BOP's determination is an agency action, and, in order to seek judicial review of an agency action, the statute under which the BOP acted must not be precluded from judicial review under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). The BOP's classification determination was made under 18 U.S.C. § 3621, and those decisions are precluded by APA review.”), aff'd sub nom. Pollock v. Marske, No. 21-2570, 2022 WL 1218640 (8th Cir. Apr. 26, 2022).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and cited caselaw, Plaintiff's § 2241 Petition should be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Motion (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED and that this Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).