Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1397, SECTION "C" (2).
July 22, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant's, Williams Field Services-Gulf Coast Company, L.P.'s ("Williams") to Strike References to Jury Trial and Plaintiff's, Epic Technical Services, Inc.'s ("Epic") Motion for Jury Trial. For that following reasons Defendant's Motion is DENIED and Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.
Although neither party has filed a jury demand, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this case has been designated as a jury trial in the record since the first preliminary conference held by the Courtroom Deputy on June 25, 2002. ( See Rec. Doc. 11) (referring to this action as a jury trial and setting forth scheduling deadlines for jury selection). Both parties were represented at this preliminary conference with James Holliday and John Broders in attendance. (Id.). Also, at that time, both parties received notice that this case was placed on the Court's jury calendar. (Id.).
On February 10, 2003, Williams moved to continue trial and specifically referred to this case as a jury trial in its motion. (Rec. Doc. 37 at 1). On February 21, 2003, the parties submitted a joint Pre-Trial Order, signed by both parties in preparation for the Pre-Trial Conference on February 25, 2003. The joint Pre-Trial Order designated this case as a jury trial "[a]t Defendant's request." (See Pre-Trial Order, tendered for filing at 48, ¶ 14). On February 24, 2003 at the parties bequest, the Court conducted a telephone status conference to discuss, inter alia, Williams's motion to continue and as a result on February 25, 2003, the Court continued the trial set for March 18, 2003. (Rec. Doc. 44). On February 27, 2003, the Courtroom Deputy conducted a second preliminary conference with James Holliday for Epic and John Broders for Williams in attendance in order to select a new trial date. (See Rec. Doc. 45). Notice of this conference with reference to trial by jury was entered into the record and forwarded to the parties. (Id.).
It is undisputed that Epic waived its right to jury trial by failing to make the written demand required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). The rules, however, allow a party an opportunity for relief from that waiver. Rule 39(b) provides: "Notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues." Id. "[W]hen the discretion of the court is invoked under Rule 39(b), the court should grant a jury trial in the absence of strong and compelling reasons to the contrary." Rhodes v. Amarillo Hospital Dist., 654 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir, 1981) (quoting Swofford v. B W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 962 (1965)).
Although the Court has broad discretion under Rule 39(b) to relieve a party from waiver of jury trial, Daniel Int'l Corp. v. Fischbach Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, reh'g denied en banc 921 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), "mere inadvertence on the part of the moving party" is insufficient grounds to justify relief. Rhodes, 654 at 1154. In the instant case, however, the record reflects that "mere inadvertence on the part of [Epic]" is not the sole circumstance upon which this issue should be determined.
In Daniel Int'l, the Fifth Circuit recognized five factors distilled by the Eleventh Circuit that district courts should consider in the exercise of discretion under Rule 39(b):
(1) whether the case involves issues which are best tried to a jury;
(2) whether granting the motion would result in a disruption of the court's schedule or that of an adverse party;
(3) the degree of prejudice to the adverse party;
(4) the length of the delay in having requested a jury trial; and
(5) the reason for the movant's tardiness in requesting a jury trial.Id. at 1064 (citing Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983); and Quillin v. Penrod Drilling Co., 648 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (E.D.Tex. 1986).
Application of the Parrot factors shows the following. First, this case is a contract dispute. As in Daniel Int'l, "[d]espite the fact that it involve[s] extensive documentation, its operative issues [are] well within the comprehension of a jury." Id. at 1064 (citing Pinemont Bank v. Belk, 722 F.2d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1984). The Court notes that the issues involved in the contract dispute in Daniel Int'l, are very similar to those in the case at bar. See id. (describing factual dispute concerning "who was responsible for delay, what notice was given, and the reasonableness of completion costs — [is] the sort usually tried to a jury").
Second, there is no disruption to the Court's or the Williams' schedule. As in Daniel Int'l this case has been placed on the jury calendar for a considerable amount of time — in this case, well over a year and the record reflects that the Court has been prepared to try this case as a jury trial. Additionally, Williams, has had constructive notice that this case was scheduled to be tried by jury since June 25, 2002. More significantly, Williams participated and signed the joint Pre-Trial Order and independently filed into the record a motion to continue trial, both of which refer to this case a jury trial.
The fact that the Pre-Trial Order was never entered into the record is not dispositive, however, reference to the jury trial at Williams' request in this document is one of many factors taken into consideration by the Court.
Epic alleges that Williams initially requested the jury trial at the original Preliminary Conference ( see Rec. Doc. 63 at 2) and the Pre-Trial Order supports the conclusion that at some point Williams did in fact request it, however, the Court has no knowledge of this fact and makes no determination as to how this case became designated as a jury trial absent any written jury demand entered into the record. However, the Court notes that the Courtroom Deputy has informed the Court that if a party mentions at the preliminary conference that it intends to enter a jury demand, she routinely notices the case on the jury calendar.
Third, as noted above this case has been designated a jury trial for well over a year, and evidence in the record indicates that at the latest, Williams has had actual notice of this fact since February 21, 2003. Any prejudice here, would be to Epic, who has reasonably expected this case would be tried to a jury. Williams cannot claim that it has suffered any surprise and has filed no previous objection to trial by jury.
Fourth, although Epic failed to file a written jury demand pursuant to Rule 38, this case was noticed as a jury trial by the Court on June 25, 2003, approximately two months after William removed the matter to federal court. Essentially, Epic claims that it failed to file a written jury demand because it relied on the Williams' alleged request for jury trial at the first pre-trial conference and the Court's June 25, 2003 designation of this case as jury trial. ( See generally Rec. Doc. 63). Here, there is no delay on the part of Epic in requesting a jury trial as this case has been noticed as a jury trial for over a year. Epic promptly moved for a jury trial upon receipt of Williams motion to strike jury reference. Any tactical maneuvering on the eve of trial is more aptly assigned to Williams and its motion to strike jury references.
The Court notes that on July 1, 2003, Defendant moved for expedited hearing on both its motion to strike jury references and its second motion to continue trial. On July 14, 2003, the Court denied Defendant's second motion to continue trial specifically citing Defendant's dilatory approach to discovery as insufficient grounds to warrant a second continuance. (Rec. Doc. 64).
Fifth, the reason for Epic's tardiness in requesting a jury trial as discussed above is borne out by the record. As in Daniel Int'l this case has been placed on the Court's jury calendar for a considerable amount of time. Further, the Court is not persuaded by Williams' attempt to distinguish Daniel Int'l based on the fact that in that case the non-moving party failed to object to an untimely jury demand. In fact, this case is factually very similar to Daniel Int'l. Here, for some unclear reason this case was placed on the Court's jury calender on June 25, 2002. Well aware of this fact for a considerable amount of time, Williams failed to file an objection until approximately one month before trial. "Instead of [Epic] attempting to secure a jury trial, we here have [Williams] moving to strike the case from the jury calendar. The fair question is why [Williams] was tardy in raising the issue, and whether [Williams] was the party whose inadvertence allowed the matter to appear and remain on the jury calendars." Daniel Int'l, 916 F.2d at 1065.
Application of the five factors distilled in Parrot and approved of by the Fifth Circuit in Daniel Int'l support maintaining this case as a jury trial. As in Daniel Int'l "much more than [Epic's] inadvertence [is] present here. It is the actions of [Williams] and the court which weigh so heavily in our Rule 39(b) calculus." Id. at 1066.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's, Williams Field Services-Gulf Coast Company, L.P.'s Motion to Strike References to Jury Trial is hereby DENIED and IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's, Epic Technical Services, Inc.'s Motion for Jury Trial is hereby GRANTED.