Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No. SC086475 of Los Angeles County, Terry B. Friedman, Judge.
Law Offices of Edward A. Hoffman and Edward A. Hoffman for Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Ehsan Afaghi and Firouzeh Simab; Law Offices of Saul Reiss and Saul Reiss for Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
Appellants Nadjatollah Enayati and Hessamedin Enayati challenge an interlocutory order directing the partition of property. We affirm.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alaeddin Enayati initiated the underlying action in August 2005. On October 24, 2005, he filed his first amended complaint (FAC), which contained two sets of claims concerning distinct parcels of real property and different groups of defendants. Regarding the first parcel, a two-unit residential property located on Alcott Street in Los Angeles (the Alcott property), the FAC sought partition (Code Civ. Proc., §870 et seq.), an accounting, and a receiver, and asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion against Hessamedin -- appellant’s brother -- and several other parties (Alcott claims). The FAC alleged that Alaeddin and Hessamedin owned equal and undivided interests in the Alcott property, that Hessamedin had occupied a unit on the property without paying rent, and that Hessamedin had improperly denied Alaeddin a share of the rent from the other unit. Regarding the second property, a residence located in Beverly Hills (the Beverly Hills property), the FAC sought partition, cancellation of a deed, quiet title, and declaratory relief against Nadjatollah -- Alaeddin’s and Hessamedin’s father -- and other parties (Beverly Hills claims).
As the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended.
All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
On April 10, 2006, appellants filed a cross-complaint against Alaeddin, which asserted that each appellant owned an interest in the Beverly Hills property. Appellants requested the cancellation of a deed that had purportedly transferred an interest in the Beverly Hills property owned by Sorraya Faridian, Nadjatollah’s wife, to a trust controlled by Alaeddin. According to the cross-complaint, Alaeddin improperly caused Faridian to transfer her interest in the Beverly Hills property to the Sorraya Faridian Living Trust before she died. The cross-complaint further alleged that Alaeddin obtained personal control of the interest in question after Faridian died.
In early November 2006, Nadjatollah filed a petition in the probate court, challenging the Sorraya Faridian Living Trust and seeking a constructive trust (trust action). In the underlying action, appellants filed an ex parte application for an order “to sever and abate” the Beverly Hills claims. The application asserted: “As all causes of action pertaining to the Beverly Hills [p]roperty are predicated upon the validity of the Sorraya Faridian Living Trust, ... [the] invalidity of the trust would render moot the entire Beverly Hills [p]roperty portion of the [FAC].” Alaeddin opposed the application, contending that Nadjatollah’s trust action amounted to forum shopping because it involved the same issues raised in appellants’ cross-complaint. He proposed that the trust action be consolidated with the underlying action. On November 15, 2006, the trial court granted appellants’ application and stayed trial of the Beverly Hills claims.
In December 2006, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the Alcott claims. On January 3, 2007, it entered an interlocutory order directing the partition of the Alcott property by judicial sale. Under the interlocutory order, the court found that Alaeddin and Hessamedin owned undivided and equal shares of the Alcott property; that Alaeddin had prevailed on his claims for a partition, an accounting, and breach of fiduciary duty; that Alaeddin had dismissed his claim for conversion; and that Alaeddin was “the prevailing party” in the action.
On April 2, 2007, the trial court entered judgment on the Alcott claims. The judgment stated that Hessamadin was the successful bidder at the judicial sale; reiterated the findings in the interlocutory order regarding the parties’ interests in the property and the resolution of the Alcott claims; and found that Alaeddin was “the prevailing party in [the] action and [had] incurred costs and attorneys’ fees for the common benefit of the parties.” Alaeddin later made separate requests for an award of attorney fees and an award of costs, each of which was unsuccessful. He noticed appeals from the adverse rulings, which were ultimately consolidated.
In February 2008, while the appeals were pending, the probate court entered a judgment in Alaeddin’s favor on all of Nadjatollah’s claims in the trust action. In April 2008, the trial court in the underlying action set August 11, 2008, as the date for the trial on the Beverly Hills claims in the FAC. On April 22, 2008, Alaeddin sought leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC), which added Hessamedin as a defendant with respect to the Beverly Hills claims. He asserted that the FAC’s failure to name Hessamedin as a defendant with respect to the claims was “a clerical error.” In addition, he argued that Hessamedin had conducted himself as if he were a defendant regarding the Beverly Hills claims, as he had joined in Nadjatollah’s cross-complaint regarding the Beverly Hills property and in Nadjatollah’s application for a stay of the trial of the Beverly Hills claims. In opposing Alaeddin’s request, appellants maintained that the April 2007 judgment regarding the Alcott claims constituted a “final” judgment in the underlying action as to Hessamedin, and as such, barred any amendment to the FAC to assert new claims against him. On June 5, 2008, the trial court permitted Alaeddin to file the SAC.
Nadjatollah noticed an appeal from this judgment. In an unpublished opinion, Division One of the Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment (Enayati v. Enayati (Jan. 29, 2010, B207315)). As Division One issued its remittitur on April 28, 2010, the judgment is now final for purposes of a direct challenge.
Appellants challenged this ruling by petition for writ of mandate, which this court summarily denied (Enayati v. Superior Court (July 30, 2008, B209492) [nonpub. order]).
The bench trial on the Beverly Hills claims occurred on August 12, 2008. Later, on October 2, 2008, this court dismissed Alaeddin’s appeals from the rulings denying awards for attorney fees and costs following the April 2007 judgment regarding the Alcott claims (Enayati v. Enayati (Oct. 2, 2008, B202769, B200346) [nonpub. order of dismissal]). As explained in our order of dismissal, we requested and received supplemental briefing on whether the rulings were appealable, and concluded that they were not. We noted that although the January 2007 interlocutory order directing the sale of the Alcott property was appealable (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(9)), attorney fees and costs may not be awarded in connection with such orders in a partition action, but must be awarded in a final judgment. We further noted that the April 2007 judgment regarding the Alcott property did not constitute a final judgment as to Alaeddin and Hessamedin in the underlying action, as Hessamedin’s cross-complaint against Alaeddin with respect to the Beverly Hills property was still pending.
Generally, at the trial in a partition action, the trial court is obliged to determine whether the plaintiff has the right to partition. (§ 872.710, subd. (a); 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 72, p. 119.) “If the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to partition, it makes an interlocutory judgment determining the interests of the parties and ordering partition. The judgment may, but need not, determine the manner of partition. (Code Civ. Proc. [§] 872.720[, subd. (a)....)” (12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Real Property, § 75, at p. 121.) This interlocutory judgment is appealable. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(9); 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Real Property, § 75, at p. 122.) Following sale or division of the property, the trial court enters a final judgment stating the binding effect of any conveyances, and awarding attorney fees and other costs. (§ 874.210; 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Real Property, § 84, at p. 133; Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 645, 652 (Williams).)
Our dismissal order also rejected Hessamedin’s contention that Alaeddin’s appeals were not premature because the judgment in the trust action had resolved the merits of the cross-complaint. We stated: “The determination in the collateral action does not, by itself, constitute a final judgment on [Hessamedin’s] cross-complaint....” In addition, we observed that under the SAC, Hessamedin was “a party with respect to [Alaeddin’s] request for a partition of the [Beverly Hills] property.”
On November 3, 2008, the trial court entered an interlocutory order directing the partition of the Beverly Hills property by private sale. Under the order, the trial court found that Alaeddin and Nadjatollah each owned a 5/12 interest in the property; that Hessamedin owned the remaining 1/6 interest in the property; that Alaeddin had prevailed on his claims for partition, quiet title, and declaratory relief, and on the cross-complaint; and that Nadjatollah and Hessamedin had prevailed on Alaeddin’s claim for cancellation of a deed.
In the accompanying statement of decision, the trial court explained that as a result of the April 2007 judgment regarding the Alcott property and the February 2008 judgment in the trust action, the only claims in the SAC and in the cross-complaint requiring resolution at the bench trial were Alaeddin’s claims for partition of the Beverly Hills property, quiet title, and declaratory relief. The trial court noted that these claims were predicated on the interest in the Beverly Hills property that Alaeddin had obtained through the Sorraya Faridian Living Trust, whose validity had been determined in the trust action. After concluding that Alaeddin had prevailed on all but one of his claims related to Beverly Hills property and on appellants’ cross-complaint, the trial court found that Alaeddin was “the prevailing party in this action.”
According to the statement of decision, Alaeddin’s claim for cancellation of a deed was dismissed after Nadjatollah and Hessamedin sought nonsuit regarding the claim.
On December 31, 2008, Nadjatollah and Hessamedin noticed their appeal from the November 3, 2008, interlocutory order directing the partition of the Beverly Hills property.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend (1) that Alaeddin was erroneously permitted to file the SAC, (2) that the trial court improperly excluded evidence at trial, and (3) that the statement of decision contains improper findings regarding Alaeddin’s status as prevailing party. For the reasons explained below, we reject these contentions.
Appellants’ opening brief also asserts contentions predicated on the assumption that the judgment in the trust action would be reversed on appeal. We do not address these contentions, as the trust action judgment was affirmed on appeal (see fn. 3, ante).
A. Leave To File SAC
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Alaeddin leave to the file the SAC. We disagree.
Generally, “[t]he trial court has wide discretion in allowing amendment of pleadings and, as a matter of policy, the trial court’s ruling will be upheld unless a manifest or gross abuse of discretion is shown.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 1194, p. 625.) California courts have long embraced “[a] policy of great liberality in permitting amendments at any stage of the proceeding.” (Ibid.) In view of this policy, “it is a rare case in which ‘a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case.’ [Citations.] If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; accord, Redevelopment Agency v. Herrold (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1031.)
In granting Alaeddin leave to file the SAC, the trial court noted Alaeddin’s assertion that a clerical error explained his failure to name Hessamedin as a defendant regarding the Beverly Hills claims, and remarked that this explanation “strain[ed] credulity.” Nonetheless, pointing to the liberal policy favoring amendment, the trial court permitted Alaeddin to file the SAC, reasoning that Hessamedin was a “necessary part[y]” to the claims and that Hessamedin had ample notice of them.
We see no error in this ruling. Under the statutory scheme governing partition actions, Alaeddin was obliged to join as defendants “all persons having or claiming interests of record.” (§ 872.510.) Hessamedin had asserted an interest in the Beverly Hills property as early as April 2006, when he joined in Nadjatollah’s cross-complaint. As Hessamedin had long participated in the action and had ample notice regarding the Beverly Hills property claims, the trial court properly concluded that the filing of the SAC was not prejudicial to him.
Appellants contend that because the April 2007 judgment regarding the Alcott claims was a final judgment as to Hessamedin in the underlying action, the trial court erred in permitting Alaeddin to assert new claims against Hessamedin. They are mistaken. As explained below, the April 2007 judgment was not a final judgment as to Hessamedin because it did not encompass his cross-complaint against Alaeddin, which remained unadjudicated when Alaeddin was permitted to file the SAC.
Appellants also object to the trial court’s failure to address this contention when it granted Alaeddin leave to file the SAC. As we review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning (J.B. Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 6, 15), we will affirm the ruling on any theory properly supported by the record (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, fn. 1). Because appellants’ contention fails for the reasons stated below, the trial court’s failure to discuss the contention does not establish a basis for reversing its ruling.
The parties dispute the extent to which appellants’ contention is barred under the doctrine of the law of the case, in view of our July 2008 order summarily denying appellants’ writ petition regarding the filing of the SAC (see fn. 4, ante) and our October 2008 order dismissing Alaeddin’s appeals from the rulings following the April 2007 judgment. We conclude that neither order precludes our inquiry into the contention. Regarding the July 2008 order, summary denials of writ petitions do not establish law of the case. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 899.) Regarding the October 2008 order, although we relied in part on the SAC to establish that the April 2007 judgment was not a final judgment as to Hessamedin, we did not address whether the trial court properly permitted the filing of the SAC because this issue was not presented to us. As our Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine of law of the case is flexible, and may yield when its application would result in substantial injustice. (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 434-435.) Under the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that it is appropriate to determine whether the April 2007 judgment was a final judgment as to Hessamedin on grounds independent of the SAC.
The “one final judgment rule” is codified in section 904.1, subdivision (a). (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741.) As our Supreme Court has explained: “Subject to exceptions not applicable here, that subdivision authorizes an appeal ‘[f]rom a judgment, except... an interlocutory judgment, ’ i.e., from a judgment that is not intermediate or nonfinal but is the one final judgment. [Citation.] Judgments that leave nothing to be decided between one or more parties and their adversaries, or that can be amended to encompass all controverted issues, have the finality required by section 904.1, subdivision (a). A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of the causes of action framed by the pleadings, however, is necessarily ‘interlocutory’ [citation], subd. (a)), and not yet final, as to any parties between whom another cause of action remains pending.” (Ibid.)
Under these principles, “an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as ‘separate and independent’ from those remaining.” (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 743.) Moreover, “a judgment which resolves a complaint but does not resolve a cross-complaint pending between the same parties, is not final..., even if the complaint has been fully adjudicated.” (Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 109, 132.) Here, the April 2007 judgment resolved the FAC’s claims against Hassamedin, but contained no ruling regarding his cross-complaint, which remained pending.
Appellants contend that the April 2007 judgment effectively ended the litigation between Alaeddin and Hassamedin, as the merits of the cross-complaint were litigated in the trust action. They argue that “[t]he allegations of the cross-complaint had become the subject of the [trust] action when they were severed and bifurcated on November 15, 2006 and thus were no longer at issue [in the underlying action] once the [April 2007] judgment had been entered.” We reject this contention.
For purposes of the “one final judgment” rule, the term “judgment” means “the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding” (§ 577, italics added). (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698.) Our Supreme Court has articulated the following standard to determine whether ruling in an action is final: “‘It is not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative. As a general test, which must be adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.’” (Ibid., quoting Lyons v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670, italics added.)
Under this test, there was no “final” ruling in the underlying action regarding the cross-complaint when the trial court permitted Alaeddin to file the SAC in April 2008. In November 2006, the trial court stayed trial regarding the Beverly Hills property pending the outcome of the trust action; in April 2007, it issued the judgment regarding the FAC’s claims with respect to the Alcott property; and in April 2008, shortly before Alaeddin sought to file the SAC, the trial court set the date for trial regarding the Beverly Hills claims. Although the parties expected the trial court to resolve the cross-complaint and the Beverly Hills claims in light of the February 2008 judgment in the trust action, the trial court issued no order regarding the substantive consequences of the trust action judgment for the underlying action before the SAC was filed. As “‘judicial action on the part of the court’” was necessary to bridge the gap between the trust action judgment and the resolution of the cross-complaint (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698), there was no final judgment on the cross-complaint when Alaeddin filed the SAC.
Appellants’ reply brief contends that under the doctrine of res judicata, the entry of the February 2008 trust action judgment ended the litigation regarding their cross-complaint in the underlying action. This contention fails for two reasons. To begin, the trust action judgment was not final for purposes of the doctrine of res judicata until April 2010, when the appeal in the trust action was conclusively resolved (see fn. 3, ante). (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, §§343, 364, pp. 953-954, 986-988.) Accordingly, the doctrine did not foreclose litigation regarding the cross-complaint when the SAC was filed. Moreover, under the doctrine of res judicata, the preclusive effects of the judgment in an action are not automatically registered in a second action: a showing is necessary in the second action that the judgment satisfies the doctrine’s requirements. (Id. at § 348, p. 961.) No such showing had been made in the underlying action when the SAC was filed.
Appellants maintain that the April 2007 judgment must be viewed as a final judgment as to Hessamedin because the judge who executed it made remarks suggesting that he regarded the judgment as final. However, “an appellate court must determine from the substance and effect of the order or judgment whether it is final or interlocutory. The label placed upon the order or judgment by the trial court is not conclusive.” (Peninsula Prop. Co. v. County Santa Cruz (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 669, 678.)
Appellants also suggest that Alaeddin should be estopped from denying its finality, as he often acted as if it was final as to Hessamedin, including noticing the appeals from the adverse rulings following the April 2007 judgment. As appellants advance this contention with no supporting legal argument regarding the applicable principles of estoppel, they have forfeited it. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 844, fn. 3.) In sum, the trial court properly permitted Alaeddin to file the SAC.
B. Motion In Limine
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting a motion in limine by Alaeddin that barred them from showing that they had paid an excessive share of the expenses related to the Beverly Hills property. Under the statutory scheme governing partitions, “[t]he court may, in all cases, order allowance, accounting, contribution, or other compensatory adjustment among the parties according to the principles of equity.” (§ 872.140.) Accordingly, when a partition by sale is ordered, the trial court is authorized to adjust the allocation of the sale proceeds to reflect contributions to the payment of taxes, maintenance costs, and improvement expenses. (Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1194.) Appellants argue that the ruling on the motion in limine denied them an opportunity to recover their contributions to these payments. They are mistaken.
As appellants raise no other contention of error regarding the evidence excluded by the ruling on the motion in limine, we limit our inquiry to the sole contention they have presented.
After appellants filed their lists of trial exhibits and witnesses, Alaeddin filed a motion in limine for an order excluding some of the exhibits and witnesses. Noting that the parties’ complaints and answers requested no accounting or credit for contribution with respect to the Beverly Hills property, Alaeddin argued that the exhibits were irrelevant to the issues to be litigated at trial, as the exhibits concerned appellants’ mortgage payments and other property-related expenses. In addition, he argued that exhibits and witnesses should be excluded because they were not disclosed in discovery. In opposing the motion, appellants argued that none of Alaeddin’s discovery requests clearly encompassed the exhibits and witnesses, that most of the exhibits and witnesses had been disclosed in discovery, and that the exhibits were relevant to “the accounting aspect of the case.” Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion without stating the basis for its ruling.
Under these circumstances, we will affirm the ruling on any theory properly supported by the record (see fn. 8, ante).
We see no error in the ruling. Generally, a claim for recovery of property-related payments in a partition action must be raised in some manner in the complaints or answers. As Witkin explains, when a party seeks “incidental relief” in a partition action -- that is, “an allowance for the value of improvements, the payment of taxes, or expenditures for the care and maintenance of the property” -- the party is obliged to plead “the facts justifying that relief” in his or her complaint or answer. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 684, p. 104; see id. at § 679, p. 101.) Thus, in Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 538-539, the appellate court held that the trial court erroneously issued a default judgment in a partition action that included incidental relief not raised in the complaint. In noting that the award of relief violated the pleading requirements for default judgments, the appellate court stated: “Likewise, while a court generally may provide an accounting in a partition action..., it cannot do so at the expense of a defendant’s constitutional right to notice.” (Id. at p. 539.)
The requirement that incidental relief must be raised in some manner in the pleadings reflects the principles governing partition actions in other states. “[A]lthough there is considerable divergence of view, under the facts and circumstances of particular cases, as to what allegations in pleadings in partition actions are sufficient to justify the granting of incidental or collateral relief, there is general agreement that such relief may not be granted in the entire absence of allegations of facts showing the claimant’s right thereto or a prayer that such relief be granted him.” (Annot., Necessity and Sufficiency of Pleading in Partition Action to Authorize Incidental Relief (1950) 11 A.L.R.2d 1449, 1451, italics added [discussing cases]; see Hawkins v. McCowan (Tex.Ct.App. 1952) 246 S.W.2d 322, 325 [recovery for improvements properly denied in partition action because “[t]here [was] no pleading to support such a recovery”]; Keene v. Stewart (Okla. 1949) 202 Okla. 38 [210 P.2d 157, 159-160] [in partition action, trial court properly excluded evidence bearing on incidental relief “not reflected in the pleadings”]; Guy v. Mayes (Mo. 1911) 235 Mo. 390 [138 S.W. 510, 512][“We are not aware of any rule of law in this state whereby in a partition suit the court may award to defendants a lien upon or an interest in the land which they do not by their pleadings directly or indirectly claim.”].)
Here, the parties’ pleadings contain no request for incidental relief regarding the Beverly Hills property, and lack factual allegations suggesting the need for such relief. Neither the FAC, the SAC, nor the cross-complaint seeks an accounting or related relief; nor do they assert allegations regarding the parties’ expenditures related to the Beverly Hills property. The parties’ answers are similarly silent concerning these matters. Appellants acknowledge that neither their right to incidental relief nor the facts supporting such relief are stated in the pleadings. Accordingly, the trial court properly excluded the evidence they intended to submit regarding their claim for incidental relief.
Pointing to Demetris v. Demetris (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 440 and Donnelly v. Wetzel (1918) 37 Cal.App. 741, appellants contend that they were entitled to incidental relief, despite the pleadings’ silence. We disagree. In each case, the appellate court held that incidental relief had been properly granted to a party whose pleadings contained factual allegations regarding excessive property-related expenditures. (Demetris v. Demetris, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at pp. 444-445 [“As the facts with respect to the father ’s excess payments were alleged in the complaint no legal conclusion as to his right need be pleaded to permit the court to take these facts into consideration in decreeing an equitable solution.”]; Donnelly v. Wetzel, supra, 37 Cal.App. at pp. 742-743 [in partition action, trial court properly adjudicated party’s claim for $600 overpayment when party alleged overpayment in her pleadings].) Here, no such factual allegations are found in the parties’ pleadings.
Appellants also contend that the trial court, in ruling on the motion in limine, improperly relied upon a letter that Alaeddin first brought to the trial court’s attention at the hearing on the motion. During the hearing, Alaeddin’s counsel pointed to a January 4, 2007 letter he sent to appellants’ counsel, inviting appellants to describe their expenses related to the Beverly Hills property so that Alaeddin could pay his share of them. According to Alaeddin’s counsel, appellants never replied to the letter.
Appellants maintain that the argument at the hearing based on the letter denied them due process. However, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court relied upon the letter in ruling on the motion, and the record otherwise establishes an independent basis for affirming the ruling. Accordingly, we discern no reversible error. In sum, the motion in limine was properly granted.
C. Findings in November 2008 Statement of Decision
Appellants contend that the November 2008 statement of decision contains improper or unauthorized findings. The order states in pertinent part: “23. The Court finds that [] Alaeddin [] is the prevailing party in this action. [¶] 24. The Court finds that [] Alaeddin [] brought this partition action of the Beverly Hills [p]roperty and incurred costs and attorney[] fees for the common benefit of the parties in connection with [the] Beverly Hills [p]roperty.... [] Alaeddin [] is entitled to recover all costs and attorney’s fees[] that he is entitled to[, ] subject to the Court’s discretion at the time of the filing of a motion for attorney[] fees, incurred in this [a]ction in connection with the Beverly Hills [p]roperty, from [appellants].”
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in determining that Alaeddin is “the prevailing party” in the Beverly Hills portion of the action, as fees and costs are not awarded to the prevailing party in partition actions. As they note, within partition actions, attorney fees are not awarded to the prevailing party, but are apportioned among the parties according to their interests in the underlying property, unless special circumstances dictate an alternative apportionment. Section 874.040 provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this article, the court shall apportion the costs of partition among the parties in proportion to their interests or make such other apportionment as may be equitable.” The purpose of this statute “‘is to divide the cost of the legal services among the parties benefited by the result of the proceeding.’” (Stutz v. Davis (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 1, 4, quoting Stewart v. Abernathy (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 429, 433.)
We see no error in the “prevailing party” finding. Aside from seeking partition of the Beverly Hills property, Alaeddin asserted other claims in connection with it, and took action in opposition to appellants’ cross-complaint. Upon a proper showing by Alaeddin that he incurred recoverable costs in connection with claims outside the scope of the partition action, the trial court would be authorized to award these costs to him as the prevailing party. (See Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, 773, 779 [trial court has discretion to award costs to prevailing party when there is adequate evidence permitting segregation of allowable costs from nonrecoverable expenses].)
We do not decide whether Alaeddin can make such a showing. This is a matter for the trial court to resolve in further proceedings.
Appellants suggest that Alaeddin was not, in fact, the prevailing party. Under section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), a party is entitled as a matter of right to this status in specified situations. However, when, as here, no party falls within the specified situations, “the trial court [must] exercise[] its discretion to determine the prevailing party, ‘comparing the relief sought with that obtained, along with the parties’ litigation objectives as disclosed by their pleadings, briefs, and other such sources.’” (Chinn v. KMR Property Management (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 175, 187-188, quoting On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1087.) Here, the November 2008 interlocutory order and statement of decision establish that although Alaeddin failed to obtain a favorable ruling on his claims for cancellation of a deed, he achieved his central litigation goals. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that he was the prevailing party.
Subdivision (a)(4) of section 1032 provides: “‘Prevailing party ’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. When any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party ’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed[, ] may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides.... ”
Appellants also maintain that the trial court erred in rendering the findings regarding Alaeddin’s entitlement to a fee award in connection with the interlocutory order directing partition. We disagree. Generally, within partition actions, “whether the services of the attorneys for either or both parties have been for the common benefit, and the reasonable value thereof is a matter for determination at the conclusion of the litigation, at which time such fees may be specified and included in the final judgment.” (Williams, supra, 56 Cal.App.2d at p. 652.)
Nonetheless, a finding in an interlocutory order that a party has incurred fees for the common benefit, by itself, does not constitute a final determination that the party is entitled to a determinate fee award. In Regalado v. Regalado (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 549, 550-551, the plaintiff brought an action for partition and an accounting. The trial court issued an interlocutory judgment that authorized the plaintiff to recover the fees she had expended for the common benefit of the parties, but deferred the determination of the amount of the fees to the entry of final judgment. (Ibid.) When the defendant challenged the fee finding in the interlocutory judgment, the appellate court rejected the challenge, noting that the trial court had not determined the amount of fees to be awarded. (Ibid.) The court stated: “The court had jurisdiction to allow attorney’s fees insofar as the services pertained to the partition and were for the common benefit. [Citation.]... We cannot assume that on rendition of the final judgment the court will do more than allow plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees for services performed for the common benefit.” (Id. at p. 551.)
Here, the statement of decision contains a finding that appellant had incurred fees for the common benefit of the parties, but does not fix the amount of the fees. Nothing before us suggests that the trial court, in determining the fees (if any) to which Alaeddin is entitled, will contravene the principles governing fee awards in partition actions. On the contrary, the statement of decision underscores that the amount to be awarded remains within the trial court’s discretion.
Williams, supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 645, upon which appellants rely, is distinguishable. There, the appellant attacked an interlocutory order directing the partition of land by sale, contending that the land was properly partitioned in kind. (Id. at pp. 646-650.) In reversing the order on this basis, the appellate court also noted that there was no evidence to support a finding in the order that the respondents had incurred attorney fees for the common benefit. (Id. at pp. 651-652.) As fee awards are properly issued in connection with the final judgment in a partition action, the court remarked that the finding had “no place” in the interlocutory order. (Id. at p. 652.) Here, unlike Williams, we discern no basis for reversing the interlocutory order, and appellants do not suggest that the findings regarding Alaeddin’s fee expenditures for the common benefit are unsupported by substantial evidence. As the interlocutory order does not suggest that the trial court, in determining the amount of the fee award, will issue an improper award, we see no error in the finding. In sum, the November 2008 statement of decision contains no improper or unauthorized findings.
DISPOSITION
The November 2008 interlocutory order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P. J., SUZUKAWA, J.