Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 00-3145.
February 15, 2001.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, or in the Alternative to Stay Proceedings (Rec. Doc. 10) filed by defendants Magee Devereux a/k/a William M. Magee, A Professional Corp., William M. Magee, Mary C. Devereux, A Professional Corp., Mary C. Devereux, and Marie Firmin (collectively "the M D defendants"). The motion, set for hearing on January 17, 2001, is before the Court on briefs, without oral argument. Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff was hired by the law firm of Magee Devereux ("M D") as a law clerk to perform services in conjunction with M D's representation of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Officer. M D and Plaintiff entered into a seven year employment contract whereby M D could only discharge Plaintiff for cause which included N D losing the Sheriff's Office as a client. Just six months into the contract, M D abruptly fired Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, M D told him that he was being fired for cause and to call back the following week if he wanted to know the reason.
Plaintiff sued M D for breach of contract in state court. M D moved for summary judgment, and in support thereof, submitted affidavits from the Sheriff, attorneys Magee and Devereux, and attorney Meg Kern — all attesting that the Sheriff's Office had discharged M D as counsel and hired Meg Kern instead. The district court granted M D's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff was fired for cause. Plaintiff is appealing that ruling and has filed a motion in the trial court to set aside the judgment due to fraud.
After the district judge granted N D's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed the instant suit in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. plaintiff alleges that the affidavits submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment in state court were fraudulent because M D continues to represent the Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff argues that by filing these fraudulent affidavits, defendants have deprived him of his constitutional right of access to the courts. His complaint also asserts an array of related state law claims.
Motion to Dismiss
The M D defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim under section 1983. They assert that no action was taken under color of state law because they are private citizens, and that the facts alleged do not constitute a denial of access to the courts.
Defendants Margaret Kern, Jones Fussell, L.L.P., and Rodney Strain, Jr., have not joined in the motion. Defendant Rodney Strain is the Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish. He is sued in his official and individual capacities. All other defendants are private citizens.
To state a claim under section 1983, plaintiff must allege facts tending to show (1) that he has been "deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and the laws' of the United States," and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person or persons acting "under color of" state law. Bass v. Parkwood Hospital, 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)). Failure to allege facts sufficient to support either prong is fatal to Plaintiff's case. See Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc., 75 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1996).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.p. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes all factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2609, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993).
Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, and assuming arguendo that defendants were acting under color of state law, the Court must determine whether defendants' actions, i.e., submitting fraudulent affidavits in the state court action in order to defeat Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, have deprived him of access to the courts. Plaintiff argues that defendants' actions have deprived him of meaningful and effective access to the courts notwithstanding his having been able to literally "access the courts" by filing suit. The M D defendants argue that the scope of the right does not encompass Plaintiff's claim.
Although the M D defendants are all private citizens, their acts would nevertheless be cognizable under section 1983 if they have conspired with state actors to deny plaintiff of a protected right.Brummet v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1991); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). This is true notwithstanding the state official's entitlement to immunity. Brummet, 946 F.2d at 371; Richardson, 651 F.2d at 1185.
Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants, including Sheriff Strain who is a government official, conspired to fraudulently defeat his claim in state court, thereby depriving him of a federally guaranteed right. Complaint, at ¶ 94. Thus, this allegation would likely be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on the state action prong of a section 1983 claim.
The right of access to the courts is a long recognized fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983). The right has been said to derive from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution, as well as from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the right to petition found in the First Amendment. Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Ryland, 708 F.2d at 971-72), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990)
Most of the decisional law defining the contours of the right has developed in the prison context. It is now well-established that the right protects physical access to the courts, i.e., the ability to actually file suit, as well as "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. Ryland, 708 F.2d at 972. The right also has implications outside the prison context, but as the Fifth Circuit has previously noted, its contours in this arena are somewhat "nebulous." Crowder, 884 F.2d at 811.
In our circuit, one of the key cases addressing the scope of the "adequate, effective, and meaningful" requirement of access to the courts outside the prison context is Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983). In Ryland, the Fifth Circuit held that state prosecutors, responsible for investigating the death of plaintiffs' daughter, violated plaintiffs' right of access to the courts by suppressing information that would have allowed them to file a wrongful death suit prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Id. at 973. Thus, the court found a violation of the right where plaintiffs had full physical access to the courts, but were deprived of information that would have allowed them to institute a timely civil suit.
In the instant case, Plaintiff relies on Ryland as support for his assertion that the right of access to the courts is broad enough to encompass his claim. Indeed, courts in other circuits have expanded Ryland's holding to cases where plaintiff had in fact filed suit but deceptive conduct on the part of government officials jeopardized plaintiff's chances of success at trial. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). But in Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit revisited Ryland and its successor Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1989), and made abundantly clear that those cases stood only for the proposition that the right of access to courts is implicated when government officials take actions that either delay or block plaintiffs' ability to file suit altogether, as was the case in Ryland. Id. at 430. The Foster court rejected the assertion that "meaningful and effective" access to courts includes a right to be free from discovery abuses and fraudulent tactics once litigation is underway. The Fifth Circuit also expressed its disagreement with other courts that had relied on Ryland for any broader interpretation of the right other than that it protects the right to institute suit. Id. n. 7. In short, Foster clarified that if Plaintiff is able to file suit, the right is simply not implicated.
It must be noted that Foster was decided in the context of a qualified immunity claim where the question before the court was the state of the law as of 1988 when the incident at issue occurred. Nevertheless, Foster clearly forecloses Plaintiff's arguments for an expansive interpretation of Ryland whether in 1988 or today.
As for the state of law today, the Foster court noted that as of 1994, when that case was decided, the law of this circuit remained that the right of access to courts is defined in terms of the right to institute suit. Foster, 28 F.3d at 430 n. 8. (citing Chrissy F. v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993))). The Fifth Circuit has not expanded the right since. See LaBarbera v. Angel, 95 F. Supp.2d 656 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Nevertheless, even after Foster, other circuits continue to rely onRyland in giving the right of access to courts a broader definition than that recognized in this circuit. See, e.g., Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Turning back to the instant case, and considering the state of the law in this circuit, the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not state a claim for deprivation of the constitutional right of access to the courts. No act by defendants prevented Plaintiff from filing suit, and he did in fact file suit. Assuming that defendants submitted fraudulent affidavits to defeat his breach of contract claim, his redress does not lie in a section 1983 suit but rather in the protections provided him in the state court system. The Court notes that Plaintiff is in fact attempting to pursue his state court remedies by appealing the trial court's decision and by motioning the trial court to set aside the judgment due to fraud. In Foster, the Fifth Circuit expressly stated that these state court remedies, as opposed to a section 1983 suit, are the appropriate mechanisms in a case such as this. Foster, 28 F.3d at 431 n. 9.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts to demonstrate that he was deprived of a federally guaranteed right, he has no claim under section 1983 against any of the defendants, including those who did not join in the instant motion. Given that the Court's analysis of the access to courts issue would not change based upon the identity of the defendants moving for dismissal, and given that Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to brief the issue in opposing the motion to dismiss filed by the M D defendants, the Court finds that the section 1983 claim should be dismissed as to all defendants. See Gutherie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing 5A C. Wright C. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1357, at 301 (1990)) (holding that the district court can consider the sufficiency of the complaint on its own initiative even when no Rule 12(b)(6) motion is filed). The remaining claims in Plaintiff's complaint are supplemental state laws over which the Court declines to access jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly;
Although Plaintiff's complaint also cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 as a source of relief, Plaintiff conceded in his opposition memorandum that he does not state a claim under that statute because he does not allege state action motivated by racial or other class-based animus. See Ryland, 708 F.2d at 973 n. 7. Plaintiff represented to the Court that he would withdraw that claim if suit were allowed to proceed.
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be and is hereby GRANTED and that Plaintiff's suit is DISMISSED. The supplemental state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.