Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 0280 (SHS)
December 3, 2001
OPINION ORDER
Patrick Ellis filed this action against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor in response to the Secretary's dismissal of Ellis' administrative complaint alleging improprieties in the February 2000 election of the officers of the Civil Service Employees Association ("CSEA"). Ellis seeks: 1) a declaratory judgment invalidating the CSEA election and 2) an injunction requiring the Secretary to conduct and supervise a new election. The parties have cross moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the Secretary's refusal to file suit to set aside the election constitutes an abuse of discretion and violates his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. The Secretary argues that the Court lacks the authority to grant the relief Ellis seeks and maintains that the Secretary's Statement of Reasons Dismissing the Complaint ("Statement of Reasons") adequately explains her decision to dismiss plaintiffs' administrative complaint. Plaintiff also moves to amend his complaint to add allegations challenging the Secretary's conclusions given in the Statement of Reasons. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motions are denied and defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. Background
Ellis ran for statewide President of the CSEA in the union's February 2000 election, but lost. After exhausting internal union remedies, he filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 402(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (a). In that complaint, he alleged numerous improprieties in the CSEA's conduct of the election, ranging from improper storage of ballots to the inclusion of invalid votes in the tally.
Six months after the complaint was filed, Secretary Chao informed Ellis that the Department of Labor had investigated his complaint and determined that although certain of the union's rules regarding election observers violated the LMRDA, nonetheless, those violations had not affected the outcome of the election and therefore no further action against the union was warranted. Specifically, in a Statement of Reasons provided to plaintiff, the Secretary found that the union "denied candidates the right to effectively observe the election" by permitting candidates to have only one election observer and restricting observers' view of the election process. (Statement of Reasons at 3-4, annexed to the declaration of Michael M. Krauss as Ex. B.) Observers "were not able to see the names of the voters as voter eligibility was checked and were not able to verify the marks on ballots to determine whether ballots were being tallied correctly." (Statement of Reasons at 3); see 29 U.S.C. § 481 (c); 29 C.F.R. § 452.107.
The Statement of Reasons also concluded that, after investigation, there was no evidence supporting any of plaintiff's other allegations, "such as ineligible persons voting, ballot fraud or tally irregularities." (Statement of Reasons at 4.) Specifically, the Secretary had independently investigated, and found no evidence of, extra ballots mailed, ballots counted more than once, or invalid votes included in the tally. (Statement of Reasons at 2, 4-5.) The Secretary concluded, as noted above, that the violation concerning election observers had not affected the outcome of the election, that no further action was warranted, and that "we are closing our file on this matter." (Statement of Reasons at 4,6.)
Plaintiff then brought this action in federal court.
II. Discussion
Title IV of the LMRDA vests exclusive enforcement jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor. After first exhausting internal union remedies, a union member wishing to challenge an election may file a complaint with the Secretary, who is required to investigate the allegation. See 29 U.S.C. § 482 (a), (b). The Secretary may then bring suit in federal district court to set aside the election if she determines there is probable cause that 1) a violation occurred and 2) that the violation may have affected the outcome of the election. See 29 U.S.C. § 482 (b); 29 C.F.R. § 452.136; Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 570 (1975), overruled in not pertinent part by Local No. 82. Furniture Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 549 (1984). If the district court agrees with the Secretary's determination that the violation "may have affected the outcome of [the] election, " it "shall declare the election . . . to be void" and order a new election under the supervision of the Secretary.See 29 U.S.C. § 482 (c).
If the Secretary does not find probable cause to challenge the election, the district court may review the Secretary's decision only to determine if the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Brodsky v. Herman, 120 F. Supp.2d 347, 349 (S.D.N.Y 2000), citing Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 573. The court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary, id. at 572, nor consider a plaintiffs' challenges to "the factual bases for the Secretary's conclusion either that no violations occurred or that they did not affect the outcome of the election." Id. at 573.
Rather, as Justice Brennan lyrically wrote in Dunlop v. Bachowski, "except in what must be the rare case, the court's review should be confined to examination of the `reasons' statement [of the Secretary], and the determination whether the statement, without more, evinces that the Secretary's decision is so irrational as to constitute the decision arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 572-73. Only in the "rare ease" where the Secretary's decision is clearly beyond the bounds of the LMRDA — for example, if the Secretary announces her intention not to enforce Title IV of the LMRDA or proceeds in a constitutionally discriminatory manner — may a district court consider evidence outside the Statement of Reasons. See id. at 574.
Ellis contends that the present case falls within the "rare case" exception set by Dunlop because the violation of the LMRDA "operated to bar the Plaintiff from any observer tasks, and made impossible the conduct of a fair election." (See Pl.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to Serve an Amended Complaint at 3-4.) Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the union's violation of the LMRDA permits the court to consider outside evidence. Only gross misconduct by the Secretary, not the union, would allow the court to consider evidence other than the Statement of Reasons. See Brodsky, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 350. There is no evidence of such misconduct on the part of the Secretary. Aside from the plaintiff's conclusory allegations that the Department of Labor is somehow biased in favor of union incumbents, plaintiff provides no evidence that the Secretary abused her statutory authority in any way, much less in the egregious manner that would justify court intervention under the standard established in Dunlop. Accordingly, the court's review is limited to the Statement of Reasons.
Motion to Amend Complaint
Plaintiff seeks permission to add five paragraphs to his complaint, each challenging the Secretary's failure to find support for one of the allegations of election improprieties in plaintiff's administrative complaint. (Am. Compl., ¶ 40-45.) Because the proposed amendments would be futile, the motion is denied.
Leave to amend a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 is freely given, but should not be granted if the proposed amendment is futile.Jones v. New York State Div. of Military and Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1999); Smith v. Kessner, 183 F.R.D. 373, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Here, plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to question the results of the Secretary's investigation regarding election improprieties. As plaintiff himself concedes, "this Court may not inquire into the Secretary's factual determinations." (Pl's Memorandum of Law in Reply to Defendant's Answering Papers in Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 8); See Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 573. Since the Court may not inquire into the factual bases for the Secretary's conclusions, amending the complaint to include such challenges would be futile.
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment may be granted "only when the moving party demonstrates that `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor . . . and may grant summary judgment only when `no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party.'" Allen, 64 F.3d at 79 (quoting Lund's, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 870 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts to show there is a factual question that must be resolved at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Legal Aid Society v. City of New York, 114 F. Supp.2d 204, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993). In short, a nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The only question before the court is whether the Statement of Reasons is sufficient to show that the Secretary's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The Statement of Reasons must be "adequate to enable the court to determine whether the Secretary's decision was reached for an impermissible reason or for no reason at all" and should "inform the court and the complaining union member of both the grounds of the decision and the essential facts upon which the Secretary's inferences are based." Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 573-74. The Secretary is not required to address every issue raised in the plaintiffs' complaint. Brodsky v. Herman, 120 F. Supp.2d 347, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The Secretary "need only provide non-arbitrary permissible reasons for her decision" Id., citingDunlop, 421 U.S. at 573.
The Statement of Reasons classifies the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint into eighteen categories and subcategories. For each allegation, the Statement of Reasons describes the Secretary's investigation and sets forth its conclusions. As noted above, the Secretary found support for plaintiffs' position that the union had improperly interfered with his ability to observe the election, but found no evidence that this violation had affected the outcome of the election. (Statement of Reasons at 4.)
Ellis contends that the Secretary's determination that the improper procedures regarding election observers did not affect the election is arbitrary and capricious because it is "contrary to the Secretary's prior litigation position." (Pl.'s Memorandum of Law in Reply to Defendant's Answering Papers in Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 3); see Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778, 779-780 (D.C. Cir. 1987), (finding arbitrary and capricious the Secretary's decision not to sue to challenge an attendance requirement that disqualified 97% of union members from running for office where the Secretary's decision was "clearly at odds both with established legal precedent and with the Secretary's established litigation position with respect to the legality of union attendance requirements.")
As support for that position, plaintiff cites several cases in which the Secretary challenged an election in which there had been improper restrictions on election observers. See Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of America, 344 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1972); Hodgson v. Local 734, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 336 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Marshall v. Local 135, Laborers' International Union of North America, 1980 WL 18743 (E.D. Pa 1980). However, in each of those cases, other election improprieties — such as improper use of union funds to support incumbents, see 344 F. Supp at 22-25; failure to retain election records see 336 F. Supp at 1252; and manipulation of ballots,see 1980 WL 18743 *8 — were present. There is nothing in the case law to substantiate plaintiffs' position that improper restrictions on election observers per se mandate the Secretary's intervention.
Plaintiffs' claim that the Secretary's decision not to challenge the CSEA election violates his right to equal protection also fails. Plaintiffs citation of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), while imaginative, is inapposite. There is no evidence that the Secretary's actions had the effect of "valu[ing] one person's vote over that of another." Id. at 104-05. The Secretary's decision not to file suit based on her determination that no LMRDA violations had affected the outcome of the election was reasonable and non-arbitrary. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the holding of Bush v. Gore applies to internal union elections. The Supreme Court cautioned that its consideration in that case was "limited to the present circumstances." Id. at 109.
The Statement of Reasons adequately states the grounds of the Secretary's decision and the essential facts upon which the Secretary's inferences are based. See Dunlop, 421 U.S. at 573-74. Since the Secretary's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, summary judgment must be granted for defendant.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to challenge the conclusions of the Secretary's investigation is denied because those amendments would be futile. The Secretary's Statement of Reasons provides non-arbitrary reasons for her decision to dismiss plaintiffs' administrative complaint. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.