Opinion
Civil No. 01-16-HA
June 7, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER
I. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff, who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, is a former temporary employee of Alpenrose Farm Trust. He alleges that he was discriminated against because of his age, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 621-634. In addition to Alpenrose Rose Farm Trust, he has sued two related entities, Alpenrose Dairy, Incorporated and Alpenrose BMX, Inc. (collectively "the Alpenrose defendants"). Additionally, plaintiff has sued Defendants Geoff Miller and Jeffery Meade, two individual employees of the Alpenrose defendants. Plaintiff's complaint is unclear, but he may also be alleging state-law claims against the individual defendants and the Alpenrose defendants. He has also sued the State Accident Insurance Corporation ("SAIF"), an Oregon state entity involved in the processing of worker's compensation claims.
The defendants have filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. First, the individual defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's federal age-discrimination claim. The Ninth Circuit has held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") does not create a cause of action against co-employees or supervisory employees. Miller v. Maxwell's International, Ltd., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993). A plaintiff can only sue his or her employer for the alleged acts of discrimination by supervisors or employers. Id. Therefore, plaintiff's ADEA claim against Defendant Miller and Meade must be dismissed.
A court is not required to grant leave to amend a claim brought by a pro se plaintiff where the claim has no legal bases and cannot be saved by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000); Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Second, to the extent that plaintiff is attempting to allege an ADEA claim against Defendant SAIF, plaintiff cannot do so because SAIF never employed plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 623(a) (providing an action for "employees" who have been subjected to age discrimination by an "employer"). Plaintiff also alleges that SAIF violated his constitutional rights by asking him to provide a complete set of medical records when it processed plaintiff's worker's compensation claim. The court finds, however, that a request for the medical records of a claimant by a state agency processing the claimant's worker's compensation claim does not violate the claimant's constitutional rights. See Strong v. Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 902 F.2d 208 (2nd Cir. 1990) (finding that a school board's request for the medical records of a teacher requesting extensive sick leave did not violate her right to privacy); Guttierez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534 (6th Cir. 1987) (ordinance requiring police officers to submit medical records did not violate right to privacy); In re Search Warrant, 810 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987) (disclosure of medical records of patients of doctors accused of insurance fraud does not violate a privacy interest); Crawford v. Mannion, 1997 WL 148066 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (a plaintiff waives the right to privacy by bringing a lawsuit in which medical history is a pertinent issue). Therefore, plaintiff's claims against SAIF must be dismissed.
Finally, the Alpenrose Farm defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. They argue that plaintiff was employed by Alpenrose Farm Trust; yet his discrimination charge filed with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries ("BOLI") and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") complained of discrimination by Alpenrose Dairy, Incorporated, a different entity from plaintiff's actual employer, Alpenrose Farm Trust. Therefore, the Alpenrose defendants argue that plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirement that he seek relief from BOLI and the EEOC before filing a lawsuit against his employer, and the time for doing so has now past. See Sanchez v. Pacific Powder Co., 147 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1998) (in a state where a state agency investigates charges of discrimination, those charges must be filed with the agency within 300 days of the alleged conduct). Alternatively, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to file his lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(e).
Before ruling on a motion for summary judgment filed against a litigant who is not represented by an attorney, the court must advise the litigant of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment. Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, plaintiff is granted 30 additional days to file additional materials or arguments that address the requirements set forth below. The Alpenrose defendants shall have 10 days thereafter to file a supplemental response.
II. Requirements for Defending Against A Motion for Summary Judgment.
NOTICE — WARNING
This Notice is Required to be Given to You by The Court
The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact — that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.
III. Conclusion
Defendant State Accident Insurance Corporation's motion to dismiss, (doc. 13), is granted. Plaintiff's claims against the State Accident Insurance Corporation are dismissed with prejudice. Defendants Miller and Meade's motion to dismiss, (doc. 9), plaintiff's ADEA claim is granted. Plaintiff's ADEA claim against Defendants Miller and Meade is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff is given 30 days from the date of this order to file additional materials or arguments in opposition to the Alpenrose defendants' motion for summary judgment, (doc. 9). The Alpenrose defendants are given 10 days from the filing of any additional materials or argument to file a supplemental response. Plaintiff's "motion for a continuance," (doc. 19), is denied as moot. The Alpenrose defendants' motion to strike as untimely plaintiff's pleadings in response to the motion for summary judgment, (doc. 21), is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.