Summary
dismissing retaliation claim, where prisoner alleged he was retaliated against for refusing to snitch because First Amendment rights were not implicated
Summary of this case from Milliken v. SturdevantOpinion
Case No. 19-cv-06005-PJH
02-06-2020
AARON ELLIOTT, Plaintiff, v. J. CABALLERO, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The amended complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint.
DISCUSSION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the "plausible on its face" standard of Twombly: "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
LEGAL CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty of several false disciplinary violations in retaliation for his protected conduct.
"'Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the lawfulness of confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.'" Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). "An inmate's challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983." Id.
Habeas is the "exclusive remedy" for the prisoner who seeks "'immediate or speedier release'" from confinement. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); see Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). "Where the prisoner's claim would not 'necessarily spell speedier release,' however, suit may be brought under § 1983.'" Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533-34 (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82). In fact, a § 1983 action is the exclusive remedy for claims by state prisoners that do not "lie at the 'core of habeas corpus.'" Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487). A claim that meets the statutory criteria of § 1983 may be asserted unless it is within the core of habeas corpus because "its success would release the claimant from confinement or shorten its duration." Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500). A challenge to a disciplinary finding that resulted in assessment of time credits must be brought in habeas if reinstatement of the time credits would "necessarily spell speedier release." See Skinner, 561 U.S. at 525.
"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from circumstantial evidence).
Plaintiff states that the sole defendant in this case, Caballero, fabricated evidence that plaintiff was in possession of a cell phone in December 2018. Plaintiff states that this was in retaliation for plaintiff refusing to be a snitch. Plaintiff states that as a result of defendant's actions he lost 120 days of good time credits.
Plaintiff also alleges that on February 13, 2019, he received a disciplinary finding for possession of drug paraphernalia and at the hearing plaintiff requested pictures of the evidence and witnesses which may have been denied by Lt. Martinez. Though, Lt. Martinez is not named as a defendant in this action. It is also possible that plaintiff was prevented from viewing evidence and calling witnesses with respect to the disciplinary finding involving defendant and the cell phone, though it is not clear. It is also not clear if there were two separate hearings or if there was one hearing for both disciplinary incidents. The court is also uncertain if the loss of good time credits was only for one disciplinary finding and what was the other punishment.
The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information and for plaintiff to clearly present his claims and identify the defendants. Plaintiff must state if there were two separate hearings, and if so, what were the punishments for each. He must also identify who are the defendants and how each defendant violated his rights. He may wish to include exhibits of the hearings and disciplinary findings.
For the retaliation claim, plaintiff has cited no cases and the court has not found caselaw indicating that refusing to snitch is considered protected conduct for a retaliation claim. The Ninth Circuit has held, in a matter involving an alleged vindictive prosecution, that "there is no constitutional right not to snitch." Paguio v. Acosta, 114 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1990)).
Plaintiff is also informed that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Where a claim seeking expungement of a disciplinary finding would, if successful, "necessarily accelerate" the prisoner's release on parole, Heck applies. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 858-59 (interpreting Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997)).
In this case plaintiff only seeks money damages, but some of his claims may be barred by Heck while some aspect of the claims could possibly continue in a civil rights action. Plaintiff must provide the additional information described above for the court to determine if plaintiff can continue in civil rights or if he must proceed in habeas.
CONCLUSION
1. The second amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set forth above. The third amended complaint must be filed no later than March 9, 2020, and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to file an amended complaint may result in dismissal of this case.
2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice of Change of Address," and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: February 6, 2020
/s/ Phyllis J . Hamilton
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge