Opinion
B159378.
7-29-2003
ELLER MEDIA COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Richard Hamlin Attorneys and Paul A. Jacobs for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Jeri L. Burge, Assistant City Attorney, and Terry P. Kaufmann Macias, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
Eller Media Company (Eller) appeals from a judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles (City), its Department of Building and Safety (Department), and its Board of Building and Safety Commissioners (Board) (collectively, respondents). After Eller obtained a permit, and in reliance on the permit constructed a billboard, Department revoked the permit on the ground it was issued in error. Ellers billboard violated Citys spacing requirements by being too near another billboard, whose owner had been issued an earlier permit having priority over Ellers permit. The earlier permit was not discovered until after Eller constructed its billboard. On administrative appeal, Board concluded Department did not err or abuse its discretion by revoking Ellers permit. The trial court denied Ellers petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The trial court rejected Ellers contentions that Eller obtained a vested right to maintain the billboard, or that Department is estopped to revoke Ellers permit, or that denial of a continuance of the administrative hearing deprived Eller of due process. Eller reiterates those contentions here.
We affirm. As a matter of law, Eller did not obtain a vested right to maintain the billboard, and Department is not estopped to revoke Ellers permit. This renders moot Ellers contention that Board abused its discretion by denying a continuance of the administrative hearing.
BACKGROUND
Parties
Eller is engaged in the outdoor advertising sign business. Eller has a relationship with THB Corporation (THB), which is engaged in the business of locating and leasing potential sites for "off-site signs," commonly known as billboards. Under their arrangement, THB obtains a permit and a lease, then assigns them to Eller, which constructs and maintains the billboard. THB was involved in entering a lease and obtaining the permit in this case but then assigned its rights to Eller. THB and Eller were both parties to the administrative and trial court proceedings, but only Eller has appealed from the judgment.
Legal
The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) requires that off-site signs on the same side of the street be spaced a minimum distance from each other, depending upon their size. Signs having an area greater than 300 square feet, as in this case, must be at least 600 feet apart. (LAMC § 91.6218.4.)
Where more than one permit has been issued and the effect of those permits when considered together results in a violation of these requirements, "all permits except the permit with the earlier date and time of issuance shall be invalid." (LAMC § 91.6205.16(2).)
Department "shall have the authority to revoke any permit . . . whenever such action was granted in error or in violation of other provisions of the Code and conditions are such that the action should not have been allowed." (LAMC § 98.0601(a)(2).)
Factual
Ellers billboard (24 ft. by 25 ft., i.e., 600 square feet in size, and double faced), on the roof of a building at 2300 South Robertson Boulevard in Los Angeles, a commercial street, was only 416 feet from another billboard (14 ft. by 48 ft., i.e., 672 square feet in size, and double faced) owned by Regency Outdoor Advertising on the roof of a building at 2012 South Robertson Boulevard. Departments senior inspector, Alan Wendell, explained at the administrative hearing that the two billboards were near each other on either side of Cadillac Avenue and that the street addresses surrounding this intersection "skip" from the 2000s to the 2300s. In fact, he explained, this is one reason why Department failed to detect Regencys prior permit when Department conducted a plan check on THBs application for a permit by following the then customary procedure of checking for permits with addresses within 150 numbers of the target address. He conceded Department erred in failing to detect the Regency permit.
Regencys billboard had existed for 20 years at the 2012 address. But Regency obtained a permit to demolish the old one and construct a new one. Regency demolished the old billboard, and was issued a permit for the new one on June 4, 1999, but did not construct it immediately.
In May 1999, Chris Carlile, president of THB, noticed the previously existing Regency billboard had been removed. He reviewed a listing of recent site pre-inspections (SPI) conducted in the area and did not find any entry for the Regency property. In his opinion removal of this billboard opened up spacing for a new billboard along that portion of Robertson Boulevard, and he began contacting property owners about leasing space. On May 19, 1999, THB applied for a permit for a billboard at the 2300 address.
According to appellants opening brief, SPI is a process during a permit application that includes an investigation of the proposed site to determine if the location is suitable by reason of zoning regulations, proximity to freeways, and existence of other off-site signs located in the same community.
On June 15, 1999, a Department inspector conducted an SPI for the 2300 address. Although Department had procedures designed to detect potential violations of the spacing requirement so as to prevent issuance of multiple permits that taken together result in violations, he did not detect that a permit had been issued to Regency on June 4, 1999, for construction of a billboard at the 2012 address. At this time there was no billboard in place at the 2012 address to alert anyone visually of its nearness to Ellers proposed billboard at the 2300 address.
Neither in connection with the SPI conducted on June 15, 1999, nor a "plan check" conducted on June 30, 1999, did Department inform Carlile of the existence of the Regency permit for an address within 416 feet of the address proposed in THBs permit application. Had Carlile been informed during the permit process of the existence of Regencys permit and that THBs application could not be approved because of the locations proximity to Regencys location, he would not have pursued a permit or incurred additional costs.
On June 30, 1999, THB entered a five-year lease with the property owner. Subject to issuance of the permit, the property owner was to receive payment of $ 25,000 a year, with four payments ($ 100,000) up front.
On September 1, 1999, Department issued a permit to THB. At about the same time, THB assigned its interests to Eller for $ 175,000. Ellers real estate manager, John Carroll, was unaware of Regencys permit.
In reliance on its permit, Eller constructed its billboard in October 1999. Eller expended $ 57,526 for construction costs. In December 1999, Eller paid the property owner up front $ 100,000 for the first four years lease payments. Eller expected to make advertising revenues of $ 450,000 in the first five years.
In December 1999, Regency constructed its billboard.
The existence of the two billboards too near each other came to Departments attention as a result of citizen complaints as well as an inquiry by Carlile about how Regency obtained a permit for a billboard so near Ellers.
Department determined the billboards violated the spacing requirement in the code (they were 416 feet apart, not the required 600 feet). On February 8, 2000, Department issued to Eller and THB a notice of intent to revoke the permit. The notice explained the violation and the fact that Regencys permit was issued on June 4, 1999, before THBs permit was issued on September 1, 1999. It cited Departments authority to revoke a permit issued in error. It gave THB and Eller 15 days to respond why the permit should not be revoked. THBs attorney submitted a reply opposing revocation, primarily contending Department was estopped to revoke the permit. On March 1, 2000, Department replied it was not persuaded by this argument, and that the permit was revoked. It stated the decision was appealable to Board. Department sent the property owner a "notice to comply," requiring that he remove the billboard and restore the building roof to its original condition.
Procedural
THB and Eller appealed the decision to Board. On August 9, 2000, Board gave notice setting the hearing on the administrative appeal for August 22, 2000. On August 15, 2000, THBs attorney submitted a written request to continue the hearing to August 29, 2000. The request stated, "The continuance is necessary because Chris Carlile, President of THB, is unavailable that day and as the representative of the applicant and a percipient witness his attendance is necessary. Further, I have today just returned from a lengthy vacation and as such my schedule for the next week is extremely busy."
On August 16, 2000, Departments representative Alan Wendell left a voice mail message for THBs attorney stating, "I just wanted to let you know that we did receive your request for the continuance, and theres no need for anyone to be at the hearing next Tuesday. Ill indicate to the court that we concur with that based on the fact that we also needed a little bit of additional time to gather some factual information. Thanks for the help and well see you on the 29th."
Nevertheless, the hearing was not continued. The record does not reveal the intervening communications. On August 22, THBs attorney, Ellers attorney, and Wendell, representing Department, all appeared at the hearing. After conceding Department erred in not detecting Regencys prior permit before issuing a permit to THB, Wendell expressed Departments position why revocation of Ellers permit was not error or an abuse of discretion. In regard to plaintiffs assertion of estoppel based on detrimental reliance, Wendell argued, "And Mr. Carlile has submitted a sworn declaration in conjunction with the request saying that he had no knowledge of the Regency permit. That might be technically correct. Perhaps he did not know of the Regency permit. But . . . Mr. Carlile should have been aware of the existence of either the permit or the existing sign. . . . Mr. Carlile is a very experienced sign permit expediter. Hes been working in the City of Los Angeles for a number of years. Hes got extensive knowledge of the permit issuance and inspection procedures. Hes obtained . . . 15 permits this year alone. And therefore, hes very knowledgeable of what the Department of Building and Safety does. . . . There was a sign free inspection made at 2012 Robertson. Did Mr. Carlile have access to that information? I have been informed by plan check that there is located on the Lotus Notes system of the department computer, information that relates to sign free inspections. That is available to the general public. It gives the job address, when a sign free inspection is submitted and the status of the sign free inspection. Therefore, we would submit to you that Mr. Carlile could have found out that a PCIS [ ] at . . . 2012 Robertson had been submitted to the department. . . . Its very difficult for me to believe that Mr. Carlile is not going to know where every sign is in the City of Los Angeles. . . . Also as to research, Mr. Carlile has been involved in the permit issuance process and the research is a part of the public information that is handed out to people that obtain sign permits. Therefore, we would submit to you that its likely that he was aware of the research that would be made at the final stages of the permitting issuance process."
This appears to refer to a method of searching for permits by addresses.
THBs attorney renewed her request for a continuance "after hearing Mr. Wendells representation . . . of what Mr. Carlile knew or what he didnt know when hes not here to be able to refute that testimony. And it violates his due process rights as well as Ellers and [THBs] rights to have this hearing held." One board member, seconded by another, denied the request for a one-week continuance, commenting, "Youve had a long time with the use of an illegal board thats been sitting there without a permit and I dont think one more week is appropriate. And Mr. Carlile knew of this hearing and he could have been here." Ellers attorney concurred in the request for a continuance, commenting, "Theres so much reliance being given to what Mr. Carlile knew about public records, to continue to deny continuance on the assumption that the sign is illegal, before we even have a full opportunity to address that, it seems to me to be premature and unfair." Another board member, who dissented on the merits and would have allowed the billboard to remain, commented he was basing his vote on the sequence of events and not on what Carlile knew or did not know. However, the ruling denying a continuance was not changed. On the merits, the appeal was denied, with one board member, seconded by another, commenting, "the department has the ability to revoke the permit if its issued in error. So if it was issued in error, the department has that ability, regardless of whether there was a permit issued for the billboard or not. The department has the authority to do it. So, in my view, the department did not err or abuse its discretion because the law right there states they have the ability to revoke it."
Board gave notice of its decision denying a continuance and concluding Department did not err or abuse its discretion by revoking the permit. Plaintiffs promptly filed in superior court a complaint including a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus.
The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate, after considering the petition, the opposition, the reply, and oral argument, and taking into evidence the administrative record and matters of judicial notice. It concluded, "Both the vested rights and equitable estoppel doctrines require that Petitioners have been issued a valid permit. . . . Here, because the later-issued Eller permit was invalid, Petitioners have no vested rights in the sign and cannot assert equitable estoppel against the City." The court held the denial of a continuance of the administrative hearing did not deprive petitioners of due process, because the hearing was duly noticed, petitioners counsel were present, evidence was presented on petitioners behalf, and whatever Carlile knew or did not know was irrelevant to the validity of the permit. It held, "Substantial evidence supports Respondents findings as to the invalidity of Petitioners permit. Revocation of the permit was not an abuse of discretion."
VESTED RIGHT
Eller contends that its performance of substantial work, at substantial expense, in reliance on the permit issued to THB gave Eller a "vested right" to maintain the billboard even if the billboard did not comply with the spacing requirement and the permit was issued in error.
There is no merit to this contention. Typically the vested right doctrine is asserted when a party was issued a valid permit for a project that was lawful at the time the permit was issued, but thereafter a change in the law rendered the project unlawful. By performing substantial work and incurring substantial expense in reliance on the valid permit before the change in the law, the party may have acquired a vested right to complete the project. (See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 791, 793, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546; Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (1988) 44 Cal.3d 839, 845-846, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682, 750 P.2d 324; 9 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2001) § 25:224, pp. 686-687; 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, §§ 487-488, pp. 676-678.)
This theory does not apply where, as here, an invalid permit was issued in error. (Millbrae Assn. for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae (1968) 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 246, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251; 9 Miller & Starr, op. cit., supra, § 25:226, p. 706.)
Therefore, Eller had no absolute "vested right" to maintain the billboard in place, because the permit on which Eller relied was not valid. Whether City could be equitably estopped to revoke the invalid permit requires a separate analysis, to which we now turn.
ESTOPPEL
Legal Background
Even where no vested right is involved, equitable estoppel may in some circumstances be asserted against the government. The applicable principles are set forth by the California Supreme Court in City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423 (Mansell). The requisite elements for equitable estoppel against a private party are: (1) the party to be estopped was apprised of the facts, (2) the party to be estopped intended by conduct to induce reliance by the other party, or acted so as to cause the other party reasonably to believe reliance was intended, (3) the party asserting estoppel was ignorant of the facts, and (4) the party asserting estoppel suffered injury in reliance on the conduct. (Id. at p. 489.) "The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the government where justice and right require it. [Citations.] Correlative to this general rule, however, is the well-established proposition that an estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public . . . . [Citation.] The tension between these twin principles makes up the doctrinal context in which concrete cases are decided." (Id. at p. 493.) "The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel." (Id. at pp. 496-497, italics added.)
Respondents do not dispute that Eller established the elements of equitable estoppel applicable to private parties. Department knew, or was bound to know, of the existence of the prior Regency permit and that THBs permit should not issue because the proposed location violated the spacing requirement. Solely through Departments mistake, Department nevertheless issued a permit to THB, intending or acting so as to cause THB and Eller reasonably to rely on it. Eller reasonably relied on the permit by constructing a billboard and making other significant payments.
Respondents do not rely on the theory suggested by Wendell at the administrative hearing that Carlile should have discovered the mistake even though Department did not. Respondents contend that as a matter of law estoppel cannot be applied to prevent enforcement of Citys public policy on billboards, even assuming Carlile was innocently ignorant of the facts.
Respondents contention is that estoppel may not be asserted against the government in this case because it would defeat enforcement of a strong public policy in the billboard spacing ordinance. (Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 499 [assuming elements of estoppel against private party are present, the issue is whether enforcing estoppel against the government would adversely affect public policy].)
Respondents rely on Pettitt v. City of Fresno (1973) 34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Pettitt). There, the plaintiffs building in a residential zone had a preexisting permitted nonconforming commercial use as to a portion of the building. The planning department, in violation of the zoning ordinance that prohibited expansion of nonconforming use, erroneously issued a permit to expand the entire building to a commercial use. The plaintiff reasonably relied to his detriment by remodeling the building for commercial use at substantial expense. The appellate court concluded as a matter of law the city was not estopped to revoke the invalid permit. It concluded the injustice to the plaintiff was outweighed by a strong public interest in enforcing the zoning law. "All the residents of the community have a protectable property and personal interest in maintaining the character of the area as established by comprehensive and carefully considered zoning plans in order to promote the orderly physical development of the district and the city and to prevent the property of one person from being damaged by the use of neighboring property in a manner not compatible with the general location of the two parcels. [Citation.] These protectable interests further manifest themselves in the preservation of land values, in esthetic considerations and in the desire to increase safety by lowering traffic volume. To hold that the City can be estopped would not punish the City but it would assuredly injure the area residents, who in no way can be held responsible for the Citys mistake. Thus, permitting the violation to continue gives no consideration to the interest of the public in the area nor to the strong public policy in favor of eliminating nonconforming uses and against expansion of such uses." (Id. at p. 823.)
The same court that decided Pettitt applied it in a billboard context in People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (1974) 39 Cal. App. 3d 804, 114 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Ryan). There the department allowed the owner to move two billboards and issued permits to maintain them in the new location. Later the department demanded they be removed because they were too close to the highway according to the applicable statute. The owner argued the government was estopped to enforce the statute because the owner had relied to its detriment on the permission previously granted. After reviewing Mansell and Pettitt, the appellate court rejected estoppel, concluding the government was entitled to enforce the public policy restricting billboard placement. "The state law prohibiting the placement of advertising displays in prohibited areas has a striking resemblance to the objects and purposes intended to be accomplished by zoning. Cities and counties retain the authority to regulate signs and billboards by zoning, and a city may pass such regulations by general ordinance. The identical policy against the expansion or change of such nonconforming uses should apply with equal force in the case of nonconforming billboards as is applicable in zoning practice. Accordingly and by a parity of reasoning, we have concluded that to apply estoppel would effectively nullify a strong public policy adopted for the benefit of the public and we view the illegal placing of billboards in violation of the Outdoor Advertising Act in the same category as that involved in permission to expand a nonconforming use. Equitable principles therefore will not protect Ryan from being required to remove the billboards in the case at bench." (Ryan, supra, 39 Cal. App. 3d at p. 813, citations omitted.)
Eller, on the other hand, contends estoppel is appropriate here because the injustice to Eller is great and the public policy that would be thwarted by applying estoppel is not strong in these particular circumstances. Eller cites Anderson v. City of La Mesa (1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 657, 173 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Anderson). There, the owner was issued a building permit under the citys "standard" zoning ordinance requiring that single family dwellings be set back five feet from the side lot lines. The owner built the house, and one wall was seven feet from the lot line, in compliance with the permit and the standard ordinance. But then the city discovered that a "specific plan" ordinance required a 10-foot setback, and the city refused to grant a variance or issue a certificate of occupancy unless the wall was moved three more feet from the lot line. This would have cost the owner $ 6,000, and there was no substantial evidence that the seven-foot setback harmed anyone or caused a problem for adjacent owners or the neighborhood. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts judgment that the city was estopped. The court noted the owners reasonable reliance on the permit issued and her compliance with the setback required by the standard ordinance, the substantial harm to the owner of modifying the completed construction to conform to the specific plan ordinance, and the lack of any evidence of harm to other persons. "These findings, coupled with the nature of the zoning violation involved here, a two-and-one-half-foot setback encroachment, serve to distinguish this case from holdings that estoppel may not be used to justify nonconforming uses, based upon building permits issued in violation of existing zoning ordinances [citing Pettitt among other cases]." (Id. at p. 661.)
Eller also cites an Illinois case having remarkably similar facts. In Drury Displays, Inc. v. Brown (Ill.Ct.App. 1999) 306 Ill. App. 3d 1160, 715 N.E.2d 1230, 240 Ill. Dec. 173 (Drury), the plaintiff was issued a permit for a billboard and completed its construction at a cost of over $ 49,000, then the department revoked the permit on the ground the department issued it in error, because the billboard was within 500 feet of another location as to which an earlier permit had been issued to another owner. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts summary judgment for a writ of mandamus compelling the department to reissue the permit, on the ground of estoppel. It stated that under Illinois law a party who detrimentally relied on conduct of a government agency and would suffer a substantial loss if the agency were permitted to retract its previous representation could invoke estoppel against the government, and all those elements were present. (Id. at pp. 1234-1235.)
Public Policies in This Case
The purposes of the division of the LAMC relating to signs are stated in LAMC section 91.6201.2: "The purpose of this division is to promote public safety and welfare by regulating signs in keeping with the following objectives: [P] 1. That the design, construction, installation, repair and maintenance of signs will not interfere with traffic safety or otherwise endanger public safety; [P] 2. That the regulations will provide reasonable protection to the visual environment while providing adequate conditions for meeting sign users needs; [P] 3. That incompatibility between signs and their surroundings will be reduced; [P] 4. That both the public and sign users will benefit from signs having improved legibility, readability and visibility; [P] 5. That consideration will be given to equalizing the opportunity for messages to be displayed; [P] 6. That adequacy of message opportunity will be available to sign users without dominating the visual appearance of the area."
THBs attorney argued in a letter to Department and a memorandum to Board that the hardship to THB and Eller outweighed any possible harm to these public policies if estoppel were applied. He pointed out the zoning law did not prohibit a billboard on this commercial street; the billboard was otherwise permissible had it been located an additional 184 feet away from Regencys billboard (i.e., 600 feet away instead of 416 feet). He argued Department had apparently seen no significant traffic or public safety issue, because Department issued the permit. He suggested the visual environment would not be significantly harmed in light of the technical violation of the spacing requirement that he characterized as "minimal," with a "significant" distance between the billboards still remaining. He argued the other purposes of the ordinance did not conflict with, or indeed would be promoted by, permitting the billboard to remain in place.
Boards staff submitted a short report to Board containing no recommendation, only a brief summary of the applicable ordinance sections. Photographs of the street and its billboards were submitted. The specific public interests involved in the spacing requirement were not expressly discussed in oral argument at the administrative hearing of August 22, 2000.
After that hearing, but before the trial court ruled on the petition for administrative mandamus, THB and Eller sought administrative relief by an alternative means: a request to Department and Board to allow a "significant modification" of the sign requirement. In response to that request Board received letters from a number of citizens vigorously opposing modification. The request for modification was denied on the ground it did not conform with the spirit of the objectives of the sign ordinance. Although these developments occurred after the Board hearing of August 22, 2000, these letters from citizens were included in the administrative record in this case. In general, these citizens contended no exception should be made, because billboards constituted a visual blight even though the boulevard was a business street, and any expansion of billboards negated local efforts to beautify and upgrade the boulevard and harmed the environment of the surrounding residential streets.
LAMC sections 91.6204.1 and 91.6204.2 allow Board to "grant significant modifications from these sign regulations" if Board finds "(1) that a special, individual reason makes the strict letter of the ordinance impractical and (2) that the requested modification is in conformity with the spirit and purposes of each of the objectives set forth in Section 91.6201.2"
In December 2000, after Boards administrative hearing of August 22, 2000, the Los Angeles City Council enacted a moratorium on issuance of building permits for off-site signs. The City Council declared it was considering a new sign ordinance that would ban the construction of new billboards and provide for removal of others, and a moratorium was necessary to prevent proliferation that would negate the effectiveness of a new ordinance. It stated the proliferation of billboards was a blighting influence in many areas of the city and possibly a distraction to motorists on heavily-traveled thoroughfares.
Discussion
As a result of Departments mistake in issuing a permit it should have known was invalid, Eller has been subjected to significant expense: it paid $ 57,256 for construction, $ 175,000 to THB for assignment of the permit and lease, and $ 100,000 up front to the lessor.
The record does not reveal whether the contracts require return of the money paid to THB and the lessor in these circumstances.
Although the injustice to Eller is substantial, the law does not support estopping Department to enforce the billboard ordinance. The basic rule, under Mansell, is that "estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public." (Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493.) In Ryan, supra, 39 Cal. App. 3d 804, 813, the court specifically held that "to apply estoppel [against a statute regulating the placement of billboards] would effectively nullify a strong public policy adopted for the benefit of the public." Thus, under California law, applying estoppel in this billboard case would have an "effect upon public interest or policy." (Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 496-497.)
Despite its nearly identical facts, the Illinois case cited by Eller, Drury, supra, 715 N.E.2d 1230, is not persuasive. The Drury opinion fails to weigh, or even discuss, the public policies that would be nullified by applying estoppel against the governments enforcement of billboard placement statutes; Drury relies solely on the plaintiffs financial loss in reliance on the permit. This is inconsistent with established California case law that requires us to weigh the effect on public policy of applying estoppel.
Engaging in that weighing process in this case, we conclude the public policy must prevail over the injustice to Eller. The effect on public policy is not de minimis, as in Anderson, supra, 118 Cal. App. 3d 657, cited by Eller. There a two-or three-foot discrepancy in the setback of a single residence from a neighbors adjoining lot caused no discernible harm to the specific neighbor or the neighborhood. Here a 184-foot departure from the spacing requirement for large billboards affects the entire neighborhood, which is apparent from the statutory purposes and the photographs in evidence at the administrative hearing. Even without considering the subsequent neighborhood protests and Citys moratorium on sign permits, the departure from the required standards interferes with the statutory purposes of providing "reasonable protection to the visual environment" and reducing the "incompatibility between signs and their surroundings." (LAMC § 91.6201.2.) According to Ryan, supra, 39 Cal. App. 3d 804, 813, these purposes are important public policies similar to those promoted by zoning laws. Enforcing estoppel would "injure the area residents, who in no way can be held responsible for the Citys mistake." (Pettitt, supra, 34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 823, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262.)
In our considered view as a court of equity, the injustice to Eller that would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel in this particular case is not "of sufficient dimension to justify" the negative "effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel." (Mansell, supra, 3 Cal.3d 462, 496-497.) This is not the "extraordinary case" in which to apply estoppel against the government. (Smith v. County of Santa Barbara (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 770, 775.) We conclude as a matter of law (id. at p. 776) that Department is not estopped to enforce the billboard ordinance.
This conclusion renders moot Ellers other contentions. Whether Board should have granted a continuance to enable Carlile to testify as to his good faith ignorance of the facts is moot because even assuming Eller made that showing, estoppel is precluded as a matter of law. (See Levy v. Skywalker Sound (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 753, 771.) Because the controlling issue is legal, we also need not decide whether the trial court should have exercised its independent judgment on the evidence. (See Karpe v. Teachers Retirement Bd. (1976) 64 Cal. App. 3d 868, 870, 135 Cal. Rptr. 21.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HASTINGS, J., CURRY, J.