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noting that the five circuits that have addressed the issue have extended Monell to private corporations
Summary of this case from Duffie v. Wichita Cnty.Opinion
3:04-CV-1312-M.
August 19, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the District Court in implementation thereof, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a state inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: Plaintiff is currently confined at the Dawson State Jail of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Correctional Institutions Division in Dallas, Texas. Defendants are the Dawson State Jail or Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), Warden C. Keeton, Assistant Warden R. Byrd, and Chief of Security B. Brown. The court has not issued process in this case. However, on July 13, 2004, the magistrate judge issued a questionnaire to Plaintiff, who filed his answers on August 13, 2004.
Statement of Case: The complaint challenges the unsanitary and hazardous conditions of confinement in dormitory 6C at the Dawson State Jail. Plaintiff has being diagnosed with impetigo, and endured open wounds and lesions on his left leg as a result of the unsanitary conditions of confinement in his dorm. The complaint also challenges the practice of serving cold and unsanitary food and of permitting smoking in the dorms despite TDCJ non-smoking policy. Plaintiff requests monetary and injunctive relief.
Findings and Conclusions: The court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is, thus, subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which imposes a screening responsibility on the district court. Section 1915A reads in pertinent part as follows:
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b) (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A complaint is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (" PLRA"), provides as follows:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
The Supreme Court has held that "the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably monetary damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). When a prisoner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, without a valid excuse, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the prisoner's complaint, but the dismissal must be without prejudice to refiling after exhausting his administrative remedies. Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998).
TDCJ currently provides a two-step procedure for presenting administrative grievances. v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998). The Dawson State Jail, which is part of TDCJ-CID, follows the same two-step procedures.
In paragraph three of the civil rights complaint form, Plaintiff alleges he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to all of his claims. In support he submits copies of Step 1 and Step 2 grievances filed respectively on February 19 and April 15, 2004. A review of the above grievances reflects Plaintiff did not raise at either step 1 nor at step 2 his claims challenging the practice of serving cold and unsanitary food and of permitting smoking in the dorms. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims challenging the practice of serving cold and unsanitary food and of permitting smoking in the dorms, as well as Officer Spueling (who is being sued only with respect to the latter practice) should be dismissed without prejudice to refiling after exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In connection with his conditions of confinement claims, Plaintiff's seeks to sue the Dawson State Jail, a private prison operated by CCA. The complaint, however, does not allege whether the unsanitary and hazardous conditions of confinement were pursuant to any policy or custom of CCA or the Dawson State Jail. Therefore, the only potential liability of the Dawson State Jail and/or CCA would be vicarious liability for the actions of prison employees.
A defendant cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior or vicarious liability basis. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell involved a municipal corporation, but the five circuits that have addressed the issue have uniformly extended the Monell holding to private corporations as well. See Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 817-18 (6th Cir. 1996) (compiling cases from the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits). The Fifth Circuit has indicated that a corporation can be liable under § 1983 if there is a showing of official sanction or "imprimatur" of the conduct or practice at issue. Auster Oil Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 602 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint against the Dawson State Jail and CCA should be dismissed.
In addition to CCA and the Dawson State Jail, Plaintiff seeks to sue Warden C. Keeton because of his job title. (Answer to Question 2). Neither Plaintiff's complaint nor his answers to the questionnaire allege any facts which this court could liberally construe to allege that Warden Keeton was personally involved in the acts causing the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights.
To be liable under § 1983, an individual must be personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of a person's constitutional rights. See Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1983). It is well settled that supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable for their subordinates' actions under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1988);Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Supervisory officials may be held liable only if they (i) affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivation, or (ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff's injury. See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1985).
The answers to the magistrate judge's questionnaire reflect that Plaintiff cannot meet either of the above standards. (See answer to Question 2). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Warden Keeton lack an arguable basis in law and should be dismissed.
Accepting as true Plaintiff's allegations with respect to the unsanitary and hazardous conditions of confinement in dorm 6C, the magistrate judge concludes that Plaintiff has arguably raised a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Gates v. Cook, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 1440601 (5th Cir. Jun. 28, 2004) (setting out a two-part test for conditions of confinement claims on the basis of Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994): (1) the conditions must be shown to be objectively "serious as to deprive prisoners of the minimal measure of life's necessities," and (2) responsible prison officials must be shown to have acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's conditions of confinement). Therefore, Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims against Assistant Warden R. Byrd and Chief of Security B. Brown are not subject to dismissal at the screening stage. RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Defendant Spueling and Plaintiff's claims challenging cold and unsanitary food and smoking in the dorms should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
It is further recommended that Corrections Corporation of America and Warden C. Keeton be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous, and that process be issued as to Assistant Warden R. Byrd and Chief of Security B. Brown on Plaintiff's claims of unsanitary and hazardous conditions of confinement at the Dawson State Jail.
A copy of this recommendation will be mailed to Plaintiff Ulyesses Eldridge, #1197327, TDCJ, Dawson State Jail, P.O. Box 650051, Dallas, Texas 75265.