Opinion
Civil Action No. DKC 2006-2554.
January 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination case are the cross motions for summary judgment of Defendant The Mental Health Authority of St. Mary's, Inc. (paper 11), and Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (paper 14). The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the cross motions for summary judgment will be denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), brings suit on behalf of Kathryn Hall, a former employee of Defendant, who alleges that she was fired in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment in the workplace, in violation of Section 704 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(4). Defendant employed Hall as a case manager at its Leonardtown, Maryland facility beginning in April 2004. Hall was supervised by Defendant's case manager supervisor Lynne Krause, until Krause left Defendant in July 2004. Krause has stated that she regarded Hall as "a fantastic employee" and that she prepared a favorable performance review for her, although no such review has been produced. After Krause left Defendant, Defendant's Executive Director Alexis Zoss appointed Ed Perez, a contractual worker, to replace Krause as the new case manager supervisor. Perez was contracted first by Defendant in November 2003 to perform a variety of administrative and managerial tasks and he functioned as Zoss's deputy and close confidant. In June 2004, Defendant's case coordinator, Courtney Eisenbach, informed Zoss that she had observed Perez staring at her breasts and at those of some of Defendant's other female employees. Defendant's finance manager, Tina Strolle confirmed to Zoss that she had experienced this inappropriate behavior from Perez as well. When Zoss confronted Perez with this information, he denied having done anything inappropriate. Zoss reminded Perez that there were many female employees at the office, but in light of his denials, took no further action. Soon thereafter, Zoss appointed Perez to case manager supervisor. When Hall learned that Perez had been appointed to supervise her, she welcomed him to the department and offered him any assistance he needed in getting acclimated. Perez responded by asking Hall if she would assist him in unpacking his files. This task was to occur at a time when none of their colleagues would have been present in the office, but Hall agreed to help, only to be unable to do so when a family emergency arose. Hall also provided Perez with her email address so that he could reach her via email if something arose during the days while she was working in the field.
At the time, case managers with the Mental Health Authority of St. Mary's did not have employer-based email accounts.
Perez sent Hall four emails between the evenings of July 19 and July 20, 2004. It appears that Perez mistakenly perceived Hall to have given him her email address with an interest toward initiating a personal relationship. In the first email, Perez indicated that he had created a "private" email account solely for purposes of contacting Hall and asked if she had been thinking about him that night, revealing that he hadn't thought of much else. He also asked "how `cool'" she could be towards him at that time and said that he would love for her to call him and that if she did he would simply erase the caller ID, presumably so that his wife would not see that he had received the call. Another email which appears to have been sent an hour and a half later at 11:28 p.m. stated that Perez was disappointed that he hadn't heard from her, but that he would see her "on the tail in." It also stated that he couldn't "believe [he was] doing this. But [he was] and the motivation [was] very real." Finally, the email informed Hall that Perez was free on Monday and Tuesday nights after 9:45 p.m. and on Saturdays and Sundays from 6:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. A third email from Perez to Hall, dated the next morning at 6:14 a.m., reveals that Perez awoke with a "super-paranoid thought" that he had "totally misinterpreted [Hall's] kindness; [her] helpfulness; [her] smile; and the depth [her] eyes when [they] talk for something other than friendliness." Perez stated that he would hate to find that she construed his attention as "unwanted, forward . . . well plain harassement [sic]." He said he'd never want to do that for both personal and professional reasons and asked her to "reassure" him that they were "on the same page and that where ever the journey leads, [they] take it willingly and together each step of the way?" Hall received these three emails at the same time that morning and promptly replied, indicating:
Ed,
I am truly at a loss for words here. Your paranoid thoughts are very correct. You have completely misread my kindness. I am only trying to be helpful and understanding to you being the new person aboard. Ed, you are a married man and what bothers me more than anything is that someone would even think I would cross that line. There is no pride in that type of relationship only hurt and sorrow for your wife. You would be willing to hurt her like that?
I will say, we are 2 adults here and can handle this matter on a professional level, I will continue to be the person I am because I know I have not lead [sic] you to believe otherwise. I have strenghth [sic] that would make most people crumble. I would appreciate that this incident be forgotten and we continue to move forward on no more than a work/friendship while at work level. I will continue to be helpful as long as it is understood "I am only being helpful."
When I gave you my e-mail address it was with only good intentions. I truly thought you may need to release a few frustrations or maybe you needed information about office procedures. I think now you can understand my shock when I read your e-mail.
Respectfully, Katy
Perez responded to Hall later that day.
Katy,
I am truely [sic] sorry that I misread this entire situation, but am glad I raised the issue and thus, obtained the needed clarification. Thanks.
I too have been "shocked" at my willingness to entertain the impossible, having found myself so strongly attracted to you from the very beginning . . . your first day on the job. And, to have that attraction affirmed through your kindness and attention just fed the fantasy even more. We "clicked" alright, but that just fed the fantasy that more.
Thanks, also for your mature comments and willingness to forget my gross oversight. I'll get my fantasy in check and we will maintain and even build upon our upon our emerging friendship . . . just as long as we are both clear about its professional boundaries. I now am.
Obviously, I had a sneaking suspision [sic] something was wrong this morning, and it was right to seek clarification. You have, in your beautiful honesty set the boundaries which I am pledged to accept. I have always been vulnerable to a beautiful, petite, kind, attentive and personable woman. Add a great body and totally intreiging [sic] eyes and you leap into my soul. You are all that . . . and as I've quickly learned . . . "and some"! So I'll apologize and we'll forget that I ever mentioned it. I'd appreciate it, of course, if you be kind enough to NEVER mention this to anyone; I'd be soooooooo enmbrassed [sic] and, of course, professionally compromised.
Thanks again for the reality check. Every so often, we all loose [sic] it in one way or the other. And, you are sooooo intoxicating. So, with that said, goodnight and I look forward to a renewed professional friendship, with proper boundaries, tomorrow. I can do this, and I know you will respect my momentary lapse of judgment; my heart just got in the way of my head, Sorry.
Ed (10:08pm)
Hall was surprised that Perez persisted in speaking to her in a sexual manner after she thought she had made clear to him that his advances were unwelcome. Hall considered the continuing unwelcome advances in light of her colleague's insistence that he had been staring at her breasts and his request for her assistance unpacking his files at a time when they would have been alone in the office and was concerned that her supervisor's unwanted sexual advances would continue. Accordingly, upon returning to work the next day, she submitted copies of the emails to Zoss and requested that Zoss keep Perez away from her. Zoss was disappointed and upset when she saw the emails and promptly terminated Perez. She later explained that she felt she had "no choice" but to fire him and that she was "shocked," "very disappointed," and "a little angry." According to Hall, Zoss was cold, looked hurt, and was visibly angry, telling Hall that this would teach her a lesson to be so helpful to people. Zoss then assumed the duties of supervisor to the case managers while continuing in her regular position as Executive Director of the organization as a whole. Zoss served in this capacity for six weeks, until Linda Weintraub was hired to be the new case manager supervisor.
As case manager supervisor, Weintraub had significant daily interactions with Hall and Zoss's interactions with Hall returned to their normal limited and sporadic pre-incident status. Close to four months after Weintraub started, Zoss requested that she prepare performance evaluations for each of the case managers. Weintraub provided these forms to Zoss, including one which rated Hall as performing satisfactorily. Weintraub said that she prepared a report which gave Hall an overall score of 57, which would have placed her performance on the higher end of the "average" range. Weintraub indicated that Zoss quickly "zeroed in" on Hall's review and ordered her to lower the rating so as to extend Hall's probationary status. Hall was the only employee whose performance rating was lowered so as to jeopardize her employment. Soon thereafter, Zoss pulled Weintraub into an office and told her that they had to "get rid of" Hall. Weintraub was surprised and didn't understand where Zoss was coming from. She felt that because she was Hall's direct supervisor, it was unusual that Zoss would be directing her to fire someone whom she perceived to be performing satisfactorily. Weintraub explained that Zoss told her she wanted to give Hall a performance improvement plan (PIP) and that the plan would be designed to guarantee Hall's failure, so that she could be fired. On Zoss's orders, Weintraub altered her evaluation of Hall to indicate that her performance was below average. Weintraub and Zoss then presented the review to Hall along with a PIP. Hall contends that Zoss could not provide any concrete examples of her behavior that warranted the low rating and did not provide adequate guidance about how to adjust her behavior to improve her performance. Hall states that Weintraub was silent during the meeting and later told Hall not to challenge her rating and to "just sign it, and let it go." The PIP listed four improvement goals: (1) that Hall establish appropriate boundaries between herself and her consumers; (2) that she demonstrate that she could carry a full caseload without anger or frustration; (3) that she demonstrate "good communication skills in the supervisory relationship"; and (4) that she improve attendance and adherence to the work schedule. The PIP was dated January 7, 2005 and was to remain in effect and be monitored until March 12, 2005.
Hall struggled to meet the requirements of that the PIP placed on her. Although her caseload was controlled by her supervisors, Hall was assigned five additional cases. In response to criticism that she appeared stressed, Hall increased her exercise regimen. In response to criticism that she required significant supervision, she reduced her interactions with her supervisor. She also increased her documentation of cases to demonstrate her improved communication skills. During this period, she had no interaction with Zoss.
Weintraub monitored Hall's performance closely in accord with her directive from Zoss. Weintraub reported to Zoss that she believed Hall was fulfilling the requirements of her PIP and that she did not think Hall required additional increased supervision. On three separate occasions Weintraub told Zoss that she thought Hall was meeting expectations and improving her performance and that she thought Hall deserved to keep her job.
When Hall's PIP was completed in March 2005, Zoss called Hall to her office. Zoss informed Hall that she saw no improvement in her performance and handed her a termination letter.
II. Standard of Review
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. However, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment." Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 810 (1997). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
The inquiry involved on a summary judgment motion "necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Where the movant also bears the burden of proof on the claims at trial, it "must do more than put the issue into genuine doubt; indeed, [it] must remove genuine doubt from the issue altogether." Hoover Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1204 (2000); see also Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F.Supp.2d 820, 822 (D.Md. 1998) (evidentiary showing by movant "must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party") (internal quotation and italics omitted). Summary judgment will not be appropriate unless the movant's evidence supporting the motion "demonstrate[s] an absence of a genuine dispute as to every fact material to each element of the movant's claim and the non-movant's response fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any one element." McIntyre v. Robinson, 126 F.Supp.2d 394, 400 (D.Md. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, as in this case, the court must consider "each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law." Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also havePower, LLC v. Gen. Electric Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 402, 406 (D.Md. 2003) (citing 10A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1983)). The court reviews each motion under the familiar standard for summary judgment, supra. The court must deny both motions if it finds there is a genuine issue of material fact, "[b]ut if there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment." 10A Federal Practice Procedure § 2720.
III. Analysis
There are two methods for proving intentional discrimination in employment: (1) through direct or indirect evidence of intentional discrimination, or (2) through circumstantial evidence under the three-step, burden-shifting scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). For the first method, an employee may utilize "ordinary principles of proof using any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue." Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d 373, 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action alleged. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). If the defendant succeeds in doing so, that will rebut the presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case. See Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 429 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 10). The plaintiff then must "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. In the end, "[t]he plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer intentionally discriminated against her." Evans v. Tech. Applications Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fired Hall in retaliation for her complaint about Perez's harassing emails in violation of Title VII. Principally, Plaintiff claims that Hall was fired because she complained about the emails which she reasonably perceived to be sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff concedes that Hall's belief that she was sexually harassed in violation of Title VII was mistaken, but insists that her belief was objectively reasonable and that firing was in retaliation for her complaining about the harassing emails.
Plaintiff asserts that it met its burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and that it undermined Defendant's purported legitimate nondiscriminatory reason as pretext. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant falsely asserted that Zoss relied on Weintraub's opinion that Hall was performing poorly and should be fired when Weintraub has indicated that this is not true. Plaintiff also relies on the deposition of Hall's prior supervisor Lynne Krause who stated that in the five months she supervised Hall, she never had any negative information about Hall that she passed along to Zoss. Krause states that Hall was a "great" and "fantastic" employee. Krause also recalls preparing a positive performance review for Hall, which she left with Zoss at her departure, but no such document has been found in Hall's performance file. What was found was a document that rated Hall poorly, which Weintraub indicates she falsely signed under pressure from Zoss and which was incorrectly dated to appear as if it was completed by Weintraub before Hall was fired when in fact it was not signed until after the firing and under much pressure from Zoss. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Zoss's stated intent to "get rid of" Hall soon after Hall left Zoss with "no choice" but to fire Perez indicates that Zoss's purported explanation for the firing is false and that retaliation was the real motivation.
Defendant cross filed for summary judgment and asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because it cannot show that Hall engaged in protected activity. Defendant contends that Hall's belief that she was subjected to sexual harassment in violation of Title VII was not objectively reasonable, and that accordingly Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between any protected activity and Hall's termination and that even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot undermine its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the firing as pretext.
A. Prima Facie Case
Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff may prove retaliation by using either the direct method or the indirect, burden-shifting method. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C, 257 F.3d 373, 391 (4th Cir. 2001). Under the indirect method of proof, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show: (1) Hall engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer took action that would be materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant, and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action. Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2007). In determining whether the alleged retaliatory action is materially adverse as required for the second element, the court should ask whether it was harmful enough to have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006). Plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie case is "not onerous" but only requires that a plaintiff prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence. Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the plaintiff makes such a showing, then the burden shifts to the employer to offer a non-discriminatory basis for the adverse employment action. Matvia v. Bald Head Island, 259 F.3d 261, 271 (4th Cir. 2001). The employee then has the opportunity to prove that the asserted reason is pretextual. Id.; see also Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir. 2000) ("The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme applies in analyzing retaliation claims under Title VII").
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff can meet the first element of the prima facie case by showing that Hall engaged in protected oppositional activity. The Fourth Circuit has addressed this issue in two recent opinions. In E.E.O.C. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer on the ground that the E.E.O.C. had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Noting that section 704(a) "protects activity in opposition not only to employment actions actually unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions an employee reasonably believes to be unlawful[,]" the court found that an employee's belief of unlawful discrimination was objectively reasonable where the employer has subjected an employee to "heightened scrutiny" as part of a "larger plan" to discharge the employee, including a "special review," being placed on probation, and being told there was nothing that could be done to avoid being terminated. Id. at 407-10. This evidence of a desire to terminate, increased scrutiny, and an unwillingness to indicate how the employee could avoid termination, when taken in conjunction with evidence of a plan to terminate that arose shortly after the employee complained of racial discrimination in the workplace, was sufficient to bar the entry of summary judgment for the employer. The court revisited this issue the next year in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). Reiterating that "an employee seeking protection from retaliation must have an objectively reasonable belief in light of all the circumstances that a Title VII violation has happened or is in progress," the Fourth Circuit concluded that, based on the facts alleged, the employee could not have reasonably believed that he was complaining of a hostile work environment made unlawful under Title VII and thus could not have been engaged in protected opposition activity for purposes of stating a retaliation claim. Id. at 341. Jordan, an African-American employee of IBM, overheard one of his colleagues make a highly offensive racial slur and was fired a month after having complained about the remark to his supervisor. In explaining why Jordan's claim was not objectively reasonable as in Navy Federal, the Jordan court emphasized three key differences. First, the court explained that the Navy Federal management had "a secret and elaborate scheme to create an unfavorable personnel record and then, based on the fabricated record, fire [the employee]." Id. at 340. Next, the court explained that Jordan's claim was weaker because the offensive comments he heard were not directed to him, but were merely uttered by a coworker in his presence. The court seemed to indicate that a colleague's remarks that are merely overheard differ from those directed at an individual in terms of their potential to produce a hostile environment. It was stressed that the comments were made by a mere coworker while the important indication would be whether the workplace environment as a whole was affected. Finally, the court indicated that Jordan's claim was weaker because there was nothing to indicate that racially offensive remarks "were likely to recur at a level sufficient to create a hostile work environment." Id. at 342.
Although it poses a close case, Plaintiff's case is more akin to Navy Federal than it is to Jordan. Indeed, none of the emphasized distinctions from Navy Federal that undermined Jordan's complaint are present here. First, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Zoss created and implemented an elaborate scheme to justify Hall's termination. Second, the offensive conduct that led to Hall's oppositional activity was directed at her, and was the conduct of her direct supervisor. He was the senior employee in the office building in which she conducted her desk work, and he personally directed inappropriate sexually-charged emails towards her. Thus, unlike Jordan, the case at bar does not involve indirect overhearing of offensive language from a colleague, but rather directed inappropriate conduct from one's immediate supervisor. Finally, Plaintiff presented evidence that suggests that the inappropriate behavior that spawned Hall's oppositional conduct was likely to continue. After receiving two highly inappropriate and sexually-charged emails from her direct supervisor, Hall responded to her supervisor and respectfully and firmly indicated that such conduct was unwelcome. Nonetheless, her supervisor persisted with inappropriate emailing of her, writing that he was
so strongly attracted to you from the very beginning . . . from your first day on the job . . . I have always been vulnerable to a beautiful, petite, kind, attentive and personable woman. Add a great body and totally intreiging [sic] eyes and you leap into my soul. You are all that . . . and as I've quickly learned . . . "and some"! . . . And you are sooooo intoxicating.
Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Jordan, Hall had received an indication that the offending conduct was not a mere one time occurrence, but rather was something that continued, at least to some extent, in the face of her direct opposition of it.
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff cannot meet the prima facie burden to establish a causal connection between any protected activity and the adverse employment action. "Normally, very little evidence of a causal connection is required to establish a prima facie case." Tinsley v. First Union Nat. Bank, 155 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 1998) (abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Gilliam v. South Carolina Dept. Of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2007)). Mere closeness in time between engaging in protected activity and an employer's firing an employee may be sufficient for the prima facie causation element of a retaliation claim. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989) (an employee's firing within three and a half months of her engaging in protected activity was sufficient to establish the causation element). Here, though, Hall was not fired until more than seven months after she complained to Zoss about Perez's emails. Even where temporal proximity is lacking, however, "courts may look to the intervening period for other evidence of retaliatory animus" and "evidence of recurring retaliatory animus during the intervening period can be sufficient to satisfy the element of causation." Lettieri, 478 F.3d at 650. Plaintiff argues that continuing retaliatory conduct and animus were directed at Hall as evidenced by Zoss's indications that she wanted to fire Hall, her insistence on subjecting her to increased scrutiny, her refusal to respect Hall's immediate supervisor's requests that she be removed from probationary status, and her lowering of her performance reviews during the period in question. Because the plaintiff's burden of proof at the prima facie stage "is not onerous," Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, Plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of a causal connection. Accordingly, Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.
B. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason and Pretext
Defendant asserts that Hall's termination was because of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Plaintiff does not contest that Defendant meets its burden of production and the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to establish that Defendant's justification was pretext and that unlawful discrimination was the real reason for Hall's firing.
An employer is entitled to judgment where "the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Thus, a key factor for courts to consider is "the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false." Id. at 149. Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent explain that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311, 317 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). However, a court's rejection of the defendant's proffered legitimate reasons will permit a finding of discrimination, but only where "the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination," a standard which is not necessarily met by a mere showing that the employer's articulated reason is untrue. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-515 (1993).
When reviewing a defendant's proffered reason for discharge and a plaintiff's corresponding claim of pretext, the court must "keep in mind that Title VII is not a vehicle for substituting the judgment of a court for that of the employer." DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 1995)). The court "does not sit as a kind of super-personnel department weighing the prudence of employment decisions." DeJarnette, 133 F.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Giannopoulos v. Brach Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997)). Thus, once Defendant articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for Hall's termination, it did not become this court's "province to decide whether the reason was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason" for the adverse employment action. DeJarnette, 133 F.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Giannopoulos, 109 F.3d at 410-11).
To establish pretext, Plaintiff points to evidence that Zoss's claim that she fired Hall in reliance on the opinion of Hall's immediate supervisor Weintraub is false. Plaintiff notes that Weintraub denies ever recommending that Hall be placed on a PIP or that she be terminated. Plaintiff also notes that Krause, Hall's prior immediate supervisor, states that she did not convey negative information about Hall's performance to Zoss and that she believed Zoss was "great" and "fantastic" as an employee. Plaintiff also presents deposition testimony that two favorable performance evaluations for Hall are missing from her file and one negative rating for Hall has been undermined as backdated and signed under much coercion. Finally, Plaintiff points to Zoss's professed plan to "get rid of" Hall as evidence of her animus against Hall. On this record, Plaintiff has presented a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant's purported reasons for Hall's termination were pretext. Accordingly, neither party is entitled to summary judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the cross motions for summary judgment will be denied by separate order.