Opinion
No. 107,321.
2013-02-8
Darron EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge. Darron Edwards, appellant pro se. Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge.
Darron Edwards, appellant pro se. Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ATCHESON, P.J., PIERRON, J., and LARSON, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This is Darron Edwards' appeal of the district court's denial without a hearing of his clearly successive K.S.A. 60–1507 motion.
On appeal, Edwards contends that because he raised a jurisdictional issue, the district court was required to hold a hearing.
The extensive record and the numerous appeals clearly shows Edwards' jurisdictional arguments have been or could have been addressed in numerous prior cases, which renders his current K.S.A. 60–1507 motion successive.
District courts are not required to entertain successive K.S.A. 60–1507 motions. Therefore, we affirm the district court's summary denial of Edwards' K.S.A. 60–1507 motion which is the subject of this appeal.
The records presented to us reveal that in 1992, Edwards pled guilty to aggravated criminal sodomy, aggravated burglary, attempted rape, two counts of rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. His sentences were affirmed on appeal in State v. Edwards, 254 Kan. 489, 491, 867 P.2d 355 (1994).
Over the next 16 years, “Edwards has filed more than 10 appeals from adverse decisions of the district court.” State v. Edwards, 290 Kan. 330, 332, 226 P.3d 1285 (2010). Most of the proceedings and appeals attempt to raise the same issue which is central to the appeal before us.
Edwards' most recent challenge was filed October 31, 2011, again pursuant to K.S.A. 60–1507, in which he challenges the jurisdiction of the district court over his original case. From an adverse ruling denying Edwards' latest K.S.A. 60–1507 motion, he has appealed.
The district court summarily denied Edwards' latest motion without a hearing, concluding the motion was successive and untimely. As such, we are obligated to conduct a de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively establish that Edwards was not entitled to any relief. See Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, 131–32, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009).
As the basis for his latest K.S.A. 60–1507 motion, Edwards claims the district court did not have jurisdiction to convict him of aggravated kidnapping because the amended complaint was defective and charged only simple kidnapping. Because this is an alleged jurisdictional issue, Edwards argues he avoids the timeliness requirement and the bar on successive motions contained in K.S.A. 60–1507(c), (f)(1).
Justice Luckert, in 290 Kan. at 332, clearly set forth the history of Edwards' numerous appeals and the issues raised when she stated:
“The basic theme of Edwards' prior appeals—involving postconviction motions and original actions—was to reduce the aggravated kidnapping convictions to simple kidnapping, and the primary supporting argument was that the complaint failed to allege bodily harm to the victims. As noted in a Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion, the defendant has made numerous attempts ‘to put a new cover on a worn out issue.’ State v. Edwards, No. 85,355, unpublished opinion filed January 25, 2002.
“In his 1994 direct appeal, Edwards argued, for the first time, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the aggravated kidnapping charges because the complaint was fatally defective for omitting the ‘bodily harm’ element of the offense. See K.S.A. 21–3421 (Ensley). However, after oral arguments but prior to this court's decision, Edwards' appellate attorney withdrew Edwards' request to be relieved from the plea agreement, the arguments for which included the argument related to the district court's jurisdiction over the aggravated kidnapping charges. We noted the voluntary dismissal of these claims. Edwards, 254 Kan. at 489.
“Thereafter, Edwards filed several motions challenging the legality of the sentences imposed for his convictions of aggravated kidnapping. He argued the district court lacked jurisdiction because the charging instrument lacked an element of the crime, depriving the court of jurisdiction over the aggravated kidnapping charges. Affirming the district court's denial of the motions in State v. Edwards, 260 Kan. 95, 97–98, 917 P.2d 1322 (1996), this court refused to address the merits of Edwards' jurisdiction claim, finding Edwards had abandoned the claim by withdrawing it from consideration in his prior appeal.”
While we need not quote from all of Edwards' unsuccessful K.S.A. 60–1507 motions and appeals, the argument he makes to us here was specifically considered by our court in Edwards v. State No. 84,493, unpublished opinion filed March 23, 2001, rev. denied 271 Kan. 1036 (2001), where our court analyzed the argument under the State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 763, 793 P.2d 737 (1990), factors and concluded: “Based on the common-sense rule announced in Hall, Edwards was adequately apprised of the crimes charged and voluntarily entered guilty pleas for aggravated kidnapping. The trial court had jurisdiction to convict Edwards of aggravated kidnapping and sentence him accordingly.” Edwards, No. 84,493, slip op. at 7.
Edwards has raised the precise issue before us numerous times and it has always been decided against him. His motion was successive and the district court's summary dismissal was proper. See K.S.A. 60–1507(c); Supreme Court Rule 183(d) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 259).
Edwards' attempt to argue that the jurisdictional question must be addressed independently, and it was not an issue in his 2001 appeal but only a component of his ineffective assistance of counsel argument, has absolutely no merit. Likewise, his citation of State v. Murray, 293 Kan. 1051, 271 P.3d 739 (2012), is unavailing as Murray is factually and legally different from the facts and decisions in Edwards' numerous prior cases. The record shows that our Supreme Court and this court have reached the merits of Edwards' claim and has determined jurisdiction was proper. See Edwards, 290 Kan. at 332;Edwards, No. 84,498, slip op. at 7. It makes no difference that the jurisdiction issue was raised as a part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The merits of the jurisdictional claim has been decided.
The motions, files, records, and numerous opinions from district court and appellate court cases conclusively establish that Edwards was not entitled to any relief and the district court correctly summarily denied his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion. See Trotter, 288 Kan. at 132.
We further deny all of Edwards' many motions seeking remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing or for other relief.
Affirmed.