Opinion
Civil Action 6:20-2749-MGL-KFM
01-24-2022
Leon Edwards, Plaintiff, v. James Parrish, O. Colbert, J. Brown, Sgt. Dayshawn Johnson, and M. Cleveland, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the defendants' amended motion for summary judgment (doc. 157). The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under § 1983.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
This action arises out of the defendants' alleged use of excessive force on the plaintiff at Broad River Correctional Institution ("Broad River") in the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") on June 28, 2019. According to the plaintiff, he and his cellmate, Richard Cochran ("Cochran"), were denied an opportunity to take a shower on the day in question because he allegedly masturbated when a nurse walked by to distribute medications (docs. 118-5 at 1-3).
The plaintiff indicated that he intended to rely on the arguments submitted in his response to the defendants' first motion for summary judgment (doc. 118), as well as his response to their amended motion (doc. 164). Accordingly, the undersigned will consider both responses in conjunction.
Officer Shaqui Cabbagestalk ("Ofc. Cabbagestalk") submits that he was conducting showers and opened the plaintiff and Cochran's cell (doc. 157-5 at 5). However, Ofc. Cabbagestalk subsequently remembered that he had been advised to keep their cell on lockdown (id.). Ofc. Cabbagestalk claims that he returned to their cell immediately and attempted to secure the door with his foot and arm (id.). Moreover, Officer Richard Lantigua ("Ofc. Lantigua") came to assist him (id.; doc. 157-6, Lantigua decl. ¶¶ 4-5). Ofc. Cabbagestalk provides that he gave the plaintiff and Cochran repeated directives to stay in their cell (doc. 157-5 at 5-6). However, the plaintiff hit him in the face, and the inmates left the cell while "posturing as if to fight" (id.). Ofc. Cabbagestalk and the plaintiff then engaged in a fist fight and mutual combat, while Ofc. Lantigua grabbed Cochran (doc. 157-6, Lantigua decl. ¶¶ 10-12). According to the incident report, Cochran stated, "Let's kill these motherf-ckers," and then a third inmate emerged with a weapon (doc. 157-5 at 6). The third inmate then stabbed Ofc. Cabbagestalk (id.). Ofc. Lantigua grabbed the third inmate, punched him, and threw him to the floor (doc. 157-6, Lantigua decl. ¶ 15). At that point, all three inmates began fighting with Ofc. Lantigua (id. ¶ 16). One of the inmates ripped off Ofc. Lantigua's vest, one inmate hit him with a broomstick, and the third inmate tried to stab Ofc. Lantigua (id. ¶¶ 16-17). All three inmates then chased Ofc. Lantigua saying, "[K]ill that n----" (id. ¶ 18). Ofc. Lantigua was able to evade the inmates by hiding in a closet momentarily (id. ¶ 19).
The defendants contend that Ofc. Lantigua identified the plaintiff's cell as the cell containing two of the inmates involved in the attack (doc. 157-11, Parrish decl. ¶ 8). Officers then went to the plaintiff's cell to extract the plaintiff and Cochran (id. ¶ 9). The plaintiff and Cochran refused directives to come to the door to be handcuffed, were starting to put up sheets in front of the door to deflect chemical munitions, and began to "armor" themselves (id. ¶¶ 10-11). Major James Parrish (“Major Parrish”) then deployed chemical munitions (id. ¶ 13). The plaintiff and Cochran thereafter complied and were handcuffed (id. ¶ 14). Officers then escorted the plaintiff and Cochran out of their cell and gave them a pat down to search for weapons or other contraband on the flood zone steps (id. ¶ 16). The plaintiff and Cochran were then escorted to the RHU (id.).
The plaintiff's account of the incident, however, varies. The plaintiff contends that Ofc. Cabbagestalk began unlocking doors so that inmates could take showers, but he did not unlock the plaintiff and Cochran's cell and told them that their cell was "on dead lock" (doc. 118-5 at 2). When Ofc. Cabbagestalk walked back through the dorm, the plaintiff began talking to him in an attempt to get him to let Cochran out of their cell for a shower (doc. 157-2 at 16-17). Cochran and Ofc. Cabbagestalk then began arguing and cursing at each other (id. at 17). Ofc. Cabbagestalk asked them, "[W]hy do y'all inmates always do this, talk sh-t behind the door, then as soon as I pop the door y'all inmates go straight to the shower and say thank you" (doc. 118-5 at 2). Cochran then stated, "[W]ell pop the door then" (id.). Ofc. Cabbagestalk opened the door and continued talking with Cochran in the doorway (id. at 2-3; doc. 157-2 at 19). Ofc. Cabbagestalk never told the plaintiff or Cochran that they could leave the cell (doc. 157-2 at 23). The plaintiff then tried to push Cochran out of the door and towards Ofc. Cabbagestalk three times (id. at 21-22). After each push, Ofc. Cabbagestalk pushed Cochran back towards the plaintiff (id.). Following the third push, Cochran ducked under Ofc. Cabbagestalk's hand and left the cell, and Ofc. Cabbagestalk punched the plaintiff in the face (id. at 22-23). The plaintiff then ran out of the cell and up the flood zone steps (id. at 24-25). The plaintiff tripped on the steps, and Ofc. Cabbagestalk caught up to him and started swinging punches (id. at 25-26). After dodging the punches, the plaintiff ran back into his cell, with Cochran arriving a few seconds behind him (id. at 26-27).
The plaintiff contends that, about 15 to 20 minutes after he re-entered his cell, officers arrived at his cell in the Wateree Unit and made threatening comments to him and Cochran (docs. 118 at 1-2; 118-5 at 4). The plaintiff submits that he and Cochran attempted to comply and be restrained by the officers, but Major Parrish sprayed chemical munitions through the food flap (doc. 118 at 2). The plaintiff submits that he and Cochran began coughing and attempted to be restrained again but ultimately were not restrained (id.). After about five to ten minutes, he and Cochran were handcuffed (id.). Then, Officer Micquel Cleveland ("Ofc. Cleveland") "snatched" the plaintiff out of his cell by his handcuffs and slammed him to the ground (id.). The plaintiff claims that the defendants then punched and kicked him numerous times (id.). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants carried him by his arms and legs in a hog tie fashion and intentionally let his head hit the steps twice (id. at 2-3). The plaintiff claims that the defendants slammed him on the ground again and then punched and kicked him numerous times (id. at 2). The plaintiff submits that the defendants stopped beating him when an officer reminded them about a camera (id.).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants then picked him up and transported him to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) (doc. 118 at 3). While the plaintiff was being escorted, Officer John Brown ("Ofc. Brown") pushed his head into a door frame (id.). The defendants then made the plaintiff walk in an uncomfortable position with his arms lifted behind his head, causing him to trip and fall (id.). The plaintiff contends that he would start to trip, and the defendants would intentionally loosen their grip and let him fall to the ground (id.). The defendants would then pick him up and continue escorting him to the RHU (id.).
The plaintiff alleges that when he arrived at the RHU, Ofc. Cleveland slammed him to the ground, and Sergeant Dayshawn Johnson ("Sgt. Johnson") punched him in the face five times while yelling threatening comments (doc. 118 at 3). Further, the plaintiff alleges that Ofc. Cleveland and Lieutenant O'Brian Colbert ("Lt. Colbert") kicked and stomped on him (id.). The plaintiff submits that he was then put into a holding cell and left in restraints (id.). The defendants came back into the holding cell two more times, and they assaulted the plaintiff on both occasions (id.). Agents with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") then came into the cell, removed the plaintiff's restraints, and took pictures of his injuries (id.). The plaintiff alleges that, despite his requests, he was not given medical attention (id.). Later that day, the plaintiff and Cochran were transferred to Kirkland Correctional Institution's Super Max Unit ("KCI Super Max") (id. at 12-13).
The plaintiff acknowledges that the officers arrived at his cell to extract him because an officer had been stabbed and that he and Cochran were suspects (doc. 118 at 1, 4). Further, the plaintiff acknowledges that he was ultimately convicted of a disciplinary violation for assaulting an officer on this date (doc. 157-2 at 12-13). When asked specifically about his involvement in an assault on an officer at his first deposition, the plaintiff invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination (id.). At the time of the deposition, the plaintiff had two pending criminal charges from this incident for assault and battery third degree and rioting or inciting prisoners to riot. Richland County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Richland/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (Edwards, Leon, 2020-GS-4003976, 2020-GS-4004037) (last visited January 20, 2022). Subsequently, in September 2021, a nolle prosequi was entered regarding the assault and battery third degree charge, and the petitioner pled guilty to rioting or inciting prisoner to riot. Id.
The court takes judicial notice of the records in the petitioner's criminal cases in South Carolina in Case Nos. 2020-GS-4003976, 2020-GS-4004037. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Richland/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited January 20, 2022); see also Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff filed a complaint on July 27, 2020, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983 (doc. 1). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 16, 2021 (doc. 101). By order filed on April 19, 2021, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion (doc. 102). The plaintiff filed a response on June 30, 2021 (doc. 118). On July 14, 2021, the defendants filed a reply (doc. 123), and the plaintiff filed a sur reply on July 26, 2021 (doc. 124). On August 10, 2021, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation recommending that the district court grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 101) as to the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim; stay the case until the conclusion of the plaintiff's state criminal proceedings; and deny the defendants' motion regarding the plaintiff's excessive force claim with leave to refile once the stay was lifted (doc. 126). On September 17, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion to lift the stay, informing the court that his state criminal proceedings had concluded (doc. 132). On the same day, the undersigned issued a text order withdrawing the report and recommendation filed on August 10, 2021, and directing the defendants to respond to the plaintiff's motion with information regarding the plaintiff's state criminal proceedings and any impact those proceedings have on their pending motion for summary judgment (doc. 133). The defendants filed a motion seeking to reconvene the plaintiff's deposition on October 15, 2021 (doc. 144). The undersigned granted the defendants' motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) and directed the defendants to file their amended motion for summary judgment by December 3, 2021 (doc. 148). After receiving one extension of time, the defendants filed their amended motion for summary judgment on December 10, 2021 (doc. 157). By order filed on December 13, 2021, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was advised of the motion for summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendants' motion (doc. 159). On January 2, 2022, the plaintiff filed a response (doc. 164). This matter is now ripe for review.
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.
B. Exhaustion
The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding both of his claims for deliberate indifference and excessive force (doc. 157 at 7-15). The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996)), mandates, among other things, that prisoners exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing civil actions concerning prison conditions under § 1983 or any other federal law. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) ("There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court"). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory," Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), and "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The PLRA requires "proper exhaustion" of available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006). As the Supreme Court has noted, "Aggrieved parties may prefer not to exhaust administrative remedies for a variety of reasons," whether it be concerns about efficiency or "bad faith." Id. at 89-90. This is especially true in a prison context. Id. at 90 n.1. Nevertheless, "[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91.
"[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it." Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, an administrative remedy is considered unavailable when: (1) "it operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates"; (2) it is "so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use"; or (3) "prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016).
The SCDC's administrative remedies process for prisoners is outlined in SCDC Policy GA-01.12. This court may take judicial notice of this policy. Al-Haqq v. Bryant, C. A. No. 2:14-cv-0008-TMC-MGB, 2016 WL 769121, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (citing Malik v. Ward, C. A. No. 9:08-cv-01886, 2010 WL 936777, at *2 n.4 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2010)). The policy provides in relevant part:
13.2 Inmates must make an effort to informally resolve a grievance by submitting a Request to Staff Member Form to the appropriate supervisor/staff within eight (8) working days of the incident. However, in certain cases, informal resolution may not be appropriate or possible.... If informal resolution is not possible, the grievant will complete Form 10-5, Step 1, which is located in common areas, i.e., living areas, libraries, etc. and will place the form in a designated grievance drop box within five (5) working days of the alleged incident. . . . All information must be placed on SCDC Form 10-5, "Inmate Grievance Form." An inmate will submit a grievance within the time frames established in the policy. . . .
. . .
13.3 All grievances will be picked up on a daily basis, during normal working hours, by an employee designated by the Warden (not the IGC). All grievances will be numbered and entered into the automated system (regardless of whether the issue is grievable or non-grievable) within three (3) working days by an employee designated by the Warden (not the IGC). The employee designated by the Warden will give the grievances to the IGC after the grievance has been entered into the automated system. Upon receipt of a grievance, the IGC will, within three (3) working days, complete the additional text for the grievance into the CRT screen and enter the grievance information in the grievance log book. The time frame for responding to the grievance will begin once the text for the grievance has been entered into the OMS system. The IGC will conduct an investigation (i.e., talking with the appropriate staff and/or inmate(s), reviewing all documents and/or reports, etc.) into the situation and will make recommendations to the Warden concerning disposition of the matter. No. employee involved or addressed in a grievance will be assigned to conduct any investigation regarding the same. If the IGC determines that the grievance will not be processed, the IGC will note this on the SCDC Form 10-5, Step 1, under "Action Taken by the IGC," maintain the original for the inmate
grievance file, enter "non-grievable" into the automated system, and mail a copy of the SCDC Form 10-5, Step 1, to the inmate in a sealed envelope. Unprocessed grievances may only be appealed by utilizing SCDC Form 19-11," Inmate Request To Staff Member," (RTSM) to the Branch Chief within ten (10) days of the grievance being returned to the inmate. The inmate must provide a copy of the unprocessed grievance with the RTSM. The inmate can not file a grievance against the IGC for un-processing the grievance. If the inmate has failed to provide necessary information, or has not signed and dated the grievance, s/he will be given five (5) calendar days to re-file a properly filled out grievance; this will be noted on the Step 1 form with a due back date included. This information will also be entered into the CRT narrative when the grievance is closed as unprocessed. Unprocessed grievances that have been given five (5) days to re-file cannot be appealed to the Branch Chief.
13.5 The Warden will respond to the grievant in writing (in the space provided on SCDC Form 10-5, Step 1) indicating in detail the rationale for the decision rendered and any recommended remedies. The grievant will also be informed of his/her rights to appeal to the next level. The Warden will respond to the grievant no later than 45 days from the date the grievance was formally entered into the OMS system by the IGC. . . .
13.7 Appeal Process: The grievant may appeal by completing the SCDC Form 10-5a, Step 2 to the IGC within five (5) calendar days of the receipt of the response by the grievant. . . . The Inmate Grievance Branch will confirm receipt to the appeal, conduct any further investigation necessary, prepare a report, and present all available information to the responsible official. The responsible official will render the final decision on the grievance within 90 days from the date that the IGC received the appeal of the Warden's decision. . . .
SCDC Policy GA-01.12 §§ 13.2, 13.3, 13.5, 13.7.
The plaintiff asserts that he filed his first Step 1 grievance while at KCI Super Max (doc. 118 at 9). However, no party has produced any evidence of this grievance. Nevertheless, the plaintiff and the defendants have both produced three subsequent Step 1 grievances regarding this incident that the plaintiff filed while at Perry Correctional Institution ("PCI") (docs. 1-10; 1-11; 1-12; 157-7 at 6-11). The plaintiff filed the first Step 1 grievance at PCI on March 16, 2020, alleging deliberate indifference, and PCI transferred the grievance to Broad River ("grievance no. BRCI-0319-20") (doc. 157-7 at 6). The plaintiff then filed another Step 1 grievance at PCI on April 8, 2020, alleging excessive force ("grievance no. PCI-0255-20") (id. at 8). On April 30, 2021, the plaintiff filed a third Step 1 grievance, indicating that he was appealing the decision made regarding grievance no. PCI-0255-20 (id. at 10).
The inmate grievance coordinator ("IGC") determined that grievance no. BRCI-0319-20 was untimely (doc. 157-7 at 7). On the Step 1 grievance form, there is a section titled "Action Taken by IGC" under which the IGC can check a box next to the word "processed," "unprocessed," or "other" (id. at 6). Here, the IGC did not check any of the boxes on grievance no. BRCI-0319-20 (id.). However, under the section titled "Warden's Decision and Reason," the IGC indicated that the plaintiff's "grievance is being Processed and Returned to [him]" (id. at 7). Regarding grievance no. PCI-0255-20, the IGC determined that the grievance was duplicative to issues raised in grievance no. BRCI-0319-20 (id. at 9). On this form, the IGC checked the box that the plaintiff's grievance was processed (id. at 8). In the plaintiff's third Step 1 grievance, the plaintiff argued that grievance no. PCI-0255-20 was not duplicative and noted that grievance no. BRCI-0319-20 involved allegations of deliberate indifference, while grievance no. PCI-0255-20 involved allegations of excessive force (id. at 10). The IGC determined that the plaintiff's grievance raised a non-grievable issue, as it was regarding the disposition of another grievance (id. at 11). The IGC checked the box for processed (id. at 10). It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not file any Step 2 grievances or appeals to the Branch Chief.
While, on its face, it appears that the plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies due to his failure to file a Step 2 grievance or an appeal to the Branch Chief regarding his claims of excessive force or deliberate indifference, the undersigned cannot conclude that the administrative process was available to him. SCDC Policy GA-01.12 provides that non-grievable and untimely grievances will be deemed unprocessed, non-grievable issues include the disposition on another grievance, and unprocessed grievances may only be appealed on an RTSM form to the Branch Chief. SCDC Policy GA-01.12 §§ 8.5, 13.3, 18.5. Here, all of the plaintiff's Step 1 grievances were found to be either untimely or non-grievable due to being in regard to the disposition of another grievance. However, the plaintiff's grievances, through the checked boxes or comments therein, were labeled as processed, in conflict with the policy. This incorrect labeling has implications in the exhaustion process because, as set out above, the difference in labeling impacts the proper method for appealing. Moreover, it is clear that the plaintiff attempted to appeal despite this confusion by filing a third Step 1 grievance and indicating that it was an appeal.
Additionally, the defendants have submitted a declaration from Sherman L. Anderson ("Mr. Anderson"), the Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch at SCDC, that appears to be in conflict with SCDC Policy GA-01.12 (see doc. 157-7, Anderson decl.). While the policy provides for appeals of unprocessed grievances on RTSM forms to the Branch Chief, Mr. Anderson asserts that processed grievances are appealed in this manner (id. ¶¶ 10, 16). Mr. Anderson does not discuss the "unprocessed grievance" terminology in his declaration (see generally id.). Mr. Anderson concludes that the plaintiff failed to exhaust because his grievances were processed and returned yet he did not file an appeal to the Branch Chief (id. ¶¶ 22, 26-30, 32-34).
The plaintiff also raises allegations, which are corroborated by declarations from other inmates, that he was placed on a "gag order" while at KCI Super Max (docs. 118-2 at 5; 118-7 at 1; 118-9 at 1). Specifically, the plaintiff contends that officers would not provide him with the forms he needed to file grievances (id.). The plaintiff submits that this "gag order" prevented him from filing his Step 1 grievances within the time frame provided for in the policy (id.).
Based on the foregoing, including the plaintiff's supported allegations of officers preventing him from obtaining the requisite forms for submitting timely grievances and the confusion and potential mis-labeling of processed versus unprocessed grievances, the undersigned finds that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether the administrative process was unavailable to the plaintiff. Specifically, the undersigned finds that questions remain regarding whether the administrative remedy was so opaque that it became, practically speaking, incapable of use and whether prison administrators thwarted the plaintiff from taking advantage of the grievance process. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds.
C. Deliberate Indifference
The defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim related to his alleged serious medical needs (doc. 157 at 25-27). Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners have the right to receive adequate medical care while incarcerated. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 2016). When a prison official demonstrates "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's serious medical needs, a constitutional violation occurs under the Eighth Amendment. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-06 (1976). To state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017). A "serious medical need" is a condition "diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225-26. Moreover, to establish a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim under § 1983 against nonmedical supervisory prison personnel, the plaintiff must prove (1) the supervisory defendants failed promptly to provide an inmate with needed medical care, (2) that the supervisory defendants deliberately interfered with the prison doctors' performance, or (3) that the supervisory defendants tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' constitutional violations. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990).
In the complaint, the plaintiff contends that after he was in the cell in the RHU, he asked a SLED agent for medical attention (doc. 1 at 12). The SLED agent then told the plaintiff, "[W]e're going to handle all that" (id.). However, the plaintiff alleges that he never received any medical attention while at Broad River (id.). The same day, the plaintiff was transferred to KCI Super Max, where the plaintiff asserts that a nurse arrived, "cleaned [him] up," and gave him some pain medication (id. at 12-13). The plaintiff contends that he had a cut in the back of his head, various places on his face were bleeding and swollen, his lower back was hurting, and his right knee was hurting (id. at 14). The plaintiff also contends that, since this incident, his right knee and lower back are always in pain, he lost feeling on the top of both of his hands near the thumb area, and he has had to start taking medications for post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health issues (id. at 13). The plaintiff has produced photographs of his injuries (doc. 118-21 at 1-15).
The undersigned finds that the plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendants being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. As an initial matter, the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence showing that he had a medical need that was serious, or a need that has been diagnosed by a physician as serious or is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. While the plaintiff submitted photographs depicting his scratches, bumps, and bruises, these photographs alone do not elicit a genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff had a serious medical need or a need for immediate medical attention. Further, the plaintiff actually received treatment and pain medications from a nurse on the same day as the incident in question. While the plaintiff argues that he would have liked medical attention sooner, the undersigned finds that receiving this treatment on the same day of his injuries, but not as quickly as the plaintiff desired, is not "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness," as is required to show deliberate indifference. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851; Kindell v. Orangeburg-Calhoun Reg'l Det. Ctr. Med. Staff, C/A No. 4:12-30-TMC, 2012 WL 1192029, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 10, 2012) ("[A] prisoner's disagreement as to the appropriate treatment fails to rise to the level of a constitutional claim and fails to create a genuine issue of material fact."). In addition, it is undisputed that the plaintiff never asked any of the defendants for medical care, but, rather, he only asked a SLED agent. Although the plaintiff argues that the defendants were deliberately indifferent because he was "visibly wounded" when they encountered him, a visible injury does not necessarily constitute a serious medical need. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to show that the medical treatment that he received on the day in question was not prompt, that the defendants deliberately interfered with the prison doctors' performance, or that the defendants tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' constitutional violations. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court grant summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim.
D. Excessive Force
1. Lieutenant Colbert, Sergeant Johnson, Officer Brown, and Officer Cleveland
The defendants further argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive force claim against Lt. Colbert, Sgt. Johnson, Ofc. Brown, and Ofc. Cleveland (doc. 157 at 20-23). The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In order to recover on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish that the "prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component); and [that] the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component)." Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). Thus, courts must analyze both subjective and objective components. "[T]he 'core judicial inquiry' regarding the subjective component of an excessive force claim is 'whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Parker v. Stevenson, 625 F. App'x. 196, 198 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 239). The Fourth Circuit has identified the following four factors to consider when determining whether a prison official's actions were carried out "maliciously and sadistically" to cause harm:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.Id. (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 239); see also Whitley Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986). To establish the objective component, a plaintiff must show "that the alleged wrongdoing is objectively 'harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation" in the context of "contemporary standards of decency." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)). When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, there always exists a constitutional violation regardless of how significant a plaintiff's injury may be. Id. at 9; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010).
The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive force claim against Lt. Colbert, Sgt. Johnson, Ofc. Brown, and Ofc. Cleveland because the plaintiff has not shown any evidence of their personal involvement with the alleged excessive force (doc. 157 at 20-23). As set out above, the plaintiff alleges that these defendants were dispatched to the Wateree Unit for a first response call and came to extract him and Cochran from their cell (docs. 1 at 9; 118 at 2). The plaintiff claims that, after he was handcuffed, Ofc. Cleveland "snatched" the plaintiff out of his cell by his handcuffs and slammed him to the ground (doc. 118 at 2). These defendants then punched and kicked him numerous times (id.). Moreover, Ofc. Cleveland, Lt. Colbert, Ofc. Brown, and one other officer began to transport him to the RHU, carrying him by his arms and legs and twice letting his head hit the steps intentionally (id. at 2-3). He alleges that these defendants slammed him on the ground again and then punched and kicked him numerous times (id. at 2). The defendants only stopped beating him when an officer reminded them about a camera (id.). Ofc. Cleveland and another individual then picked the plaintiff up and continued to transport him to the RHU (id. at 3). While the plaintiff was being escorted, Ofc. Brown pushed his head into a door frame (id.). Ofc. Cleveland, Ofc. Brown, and Lt. Colbert then made the plaintiff walk in an uncomfortable position with his arms lifted behind his head, causing him to trip and fall (id.). Further, the plaintiff would start to trip, and these defendants would intentionally loosen their grip and let him fall to the ground (id.). The plaintiff claims that when he arrived at the RHU, Ofc. Cleveland slammed him to the ground and Sgt. Johnson punched him in the face five times while yelling threatening comments (id.). Further, Ofc. Cleveland and Lt. Colbert kicked and stomped on him (id.). The plaintiff was then put into a holding cell and left in restraints (id.). These defendants came back into the holding cell two more times, and they assaulted the plaintiff on both occasions (id.).
While the defendants allege that the plaintiff was injured in an attack on Ofc. Cabbagestalk, extracted from his cell, patted down on the flood zone steps, and escorted to the RHU without excessive force, both the plaintiff and the defendants have submitted affidavits and declarations supporting their version of the facts (docs. 118-2; 118-3; 118-4; 118-13; 157-3; 157-6; 157-7; 157-8; 157-9; 157-11; 157-12). Moreover, the plaintiff has highlighted inconsistencies in the declarations provided by the defendants (doc. 118 at 22-27). For example, Lt. Colbert provided in his declaration that he escorted Ofc. Cabbagestalk to medical and then went to the plaintiff's room with Major Parrish (doc. 157-8, Colbert decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 8-9). After Major Parrish deployed chemical munitions into the cell, Lt. Colbert put handcuffs on Cochran and escorted him to the RHU with Lieutenant Williams (id. ¶¶ 10-14). Lt. Colbert then left the RHU and did not go back to the Wateree Unit (id. ¶¶ 15, 17-18). However, as noted by the plaintiff, Ofc. Cleveland provided in his answers to interrogatories that Lt. Colbert was one of the officers who carried the plaintiff up the flood zone steps (doc. 118-17 at 4).
In addition, Sgt. Johnson submitted a declaration in which he provided that he was assigned to the RHU on the day in question (doc. 157-9, Johnson decl. ¶ 4). Assistance was requested in the Wateree Unit, so Sgt. Johnson went to the unit, entered the sally port, and opened the door of the unit (id. ¶ 5). However, he did not enter the unit itself (id.). Sgt. Johnson then assisted escorting Cochran to the RHU (id. ¶¶ 9-12). Sgt. Johnson put Cochran in a holding cell, which was the end of his involvement (id. ¶¶ 14, 19). However, in his answers to interrogatories, Sgt. Johnson stated that he went to the Wateree Unit, right side, to provide assistance (doc. 118-19 at 1). Moreover, Ofc. Cleveland provided in his answers to interrogatories that Sgt. Johnson helped him carry the plaintiff up the flood zone steps (doc. 118-17 at 4).
Further, Ofc. Brown provided a declaration in which he states that he was working in the yard on the day in question (doc. 157-3, Brown decl. ¶ 4). Assistance was requested in the Wateree Unit, so Ofc. Brown went to the unit (id. ¶ 5). Ofc. Brown saw Ofc. Cabbagestalk being assisted out of the unit by Lt. Colbert and Officer Cleveland, as well as inmates out of their cell (id. ¶¶ 6-8). Ofc. Brown and several other staff members were collectively able to lock down the unit (id. ¶ 10). Ofc. Brown then reported back to the yard (id. ¶ 11). Ofc. Brown submits that he was not in the Wateree Unit when any inmates were taken from their cells and he did not escort any inmates to the RHU (id. ¶¶ 12-13). However, Major Parrish, in his declaration and answers to interrogatories, provided that Ofc. Brown was present when extracting the plaintiff from his cell (docs. 157-11, Parrish decl. ¶ 9; 118-16 at 1, 3). Ofc. Cleveland also provided in his answers to interrogatories that Ofc. Brown was present when extracting the plaintiff from his cell (doc. 118-17 at 1).
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim fails because he has not been able to concretely identify the officers that were allegedly involved (doc. 157 at 20). Specifically, the defendants highlight that the plaintiff indicated that he only knows some of the defendants by face and that he got the other defendants' names by talking to other inmates and through incident reports (docs. 118 at 21; 157-2 at 1-2). However, the undersigned finds that there is sufficient evidence of the defendants' alleged involvement to survive their motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff notes that he knows Major Parrish, Ofc. Cleveland, and Sgt. Johnson by face (doc. 118 at 20). Further, there is evidence of these defendants' involvement in both the plaintiff's and defendants' declarations (docs. 118-2; 118-3; 118-16; 118-17; 157-11; 157-12). Moreover, the defendants' declarations and answers to interrogatories show that Lt. Colbert and Ofc. Brown were present during the events in question (docs. 157-10; 157-11; 118-16; 118-17). Therefore, the defendants' argument is unavailing.
Because of the inconsistencies in the defendants' declarations and answers to interrogatories, as well as the fact that both parties' version of the events in question is supported by declarations, the undersigned is constrained to recommend denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive force claim against Lt. Colbert, Sgt. Johnson, Ofc. Brown, and Ofc. Cleveland. Genuine issues of material fact remain, and whether the plaintiff's or the defendants' version of the incident is more accurate is a question best reserved for a jury. Moreover, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether the defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the plaintiff was sufficiently serious. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive force claim against Lt. Colbert, Sgt. Johnson, Ofc. Brown, and Ofc. Cleveland.
2. Major Parrish
The defendants also argue that Major Parrish is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of excessive force (doc. 157 at 15-20). In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Major Parrish used excessive force against him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights (doc. 1 at 7). However, the plaintiff has subsequently provided that he is not alleging that Major Parrish used excessive force through the deployment of chemical munitions but that Major Parrish is liable due to his supervisory position (docs. 118 at 15; 157-4 at 20-21). Relevant to this claim, the plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Major Parrish arrived at his cell with the other defendants to extract Cochran and him from their cell (doc. 1 at 9). Several other defendants made threatening comments to him and Cochran (id.). Officers put the plaintiff and Cochran in handcuffs, and Ofc. Cleveland snatched the plaintiff out of his cell by his handcuffs and slammed him to the ground (id.). Numerous officers then began punching and kicking the plaintiff in his head, face, and body (id.). Several of the defendants then carried the plaintiff up the flood zone steps in a hog tie fashion, intentionally letting his head hit the steps twice (id. at 10). The defendants slammed the plaintiff on the ground and punch and kicked him numerous times (id.). The plaintiff alleges that, during this time, while the other defendants were beating him, "Major Parrish stood by the flood zone steps watching the assault and never once ordered his officers to stop" (id.).
The plaintiff alleges that, prior to being handcuffed, Major Parrish sprayed chemical munitions into his cell through the food flap (doc. 1 at 9). However, the plaintiff notes that Major Parrish's use of chemical munitions was not excessive and is not the basis for his claim (docs. 118 at 15; 157-4 at 20-22).
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim against Major Parrish should be dismissed because the plaintiff brought a claim for excessive force and did not state a claim for supervisory liability in his complaint (doc. 157 at 15-16). However, as set out above, the plaintiff alleges that Major Parrish's subordinate officers assaulted him while Major Parrish stood by and watched and without intervening. Liberally construing the plaintiff's pro se pleadings, the undersigned finds these allegations to be sufficient to bring a claim for supervisory liability. Consequently, the undersigned will address the defendants' motion regarding the merits the plaintiff's claim herein.
In § 1983 actions, while the doctrine of respondeat superior generally is not applicable, Polk County. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), supervisors may be held liable when the following circumstances are met: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). In Randall v. Prince George's County, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit further explained these three factors and stated that, "[u]nder the first prong of Shaw, the conduct engaged in by the supervisor's subordinates must be 'pervasive,' meaning that the 'conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions.'" 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). Moreover, in establishing deliberate indifference under Shaw's second prong, a plaintiff "[o]rdinarily ... cannot satisfy his burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents ... for a supervisor cannot be expected ... to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct." Id. (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Major Parrish had supervisory authority over the security officers involved in the incident at issue here (doc. 164 at 5). Moreover, the plaintiff alleges that Major Parrish was at the plaintiff's cell while the other defendants made threatening comments about harming the plaintiff and Cochran (doc. 118 at 1-2). Further, he alleges that Major Parrish watched Ofc. Cleveland snatch the plaintiff out of his cell by his handcuffs and slam him onto the ground; numerous officers punch and kick the plaintiff; Ofc. Cleveland, Lt. Colbert, and Ofc. Brown grab the plaintiff and carry him up the flood zone steps in a hog tie fashion; officers purposely hit the plaintiff's head on the steps twice; and officers slam the plaintiff onto the ground again and then punch and kick him numerous times (id.). However, the plaintiff claims that Major Parrish stood by the flood zone steps and watched the actions of his subordinate officers and did not intervene or order his officers to stop (id. at 2, 15). Further, the plaintiff claims that Major Parrish did not ensure that the officers did not beat him again when escorting him to, and once he was inside, the RHU (id. at 15).
The undersigned finds that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether Major Parrish is liable in a supervisory capacity. First, the plaintiff alleges that Major Parrish had actual knowledge that his subordinate officers were engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to him, as he submits that Major Parrish watched and did not intervene while his subordinate officers injured him. Moreover, as discussed above, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether these subordinate officers' actions during this alleged assault constitute excessive force. Second, the plaintiff alleges that Major Parrish's inaction was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the officers' conduct through his contentions that Major Parrish did not intervene or order the subordinate officers to stop and allowed these same officers to escort the plaintiff to the RHU. Third, the plaintiff alleges that there is an affirmative causal link between Major Parrish's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury, as the plaintiff contends that Major Parrish could have intervened to stop the officers' actions while it was taking place and could have prevented further beating from occurring while the plaintiff was being led to, and while he was inside, the RHU (doc. 164 at 7). The defendants argue that there is no affirmative causal link because the plaintiff's allegations regarding the other officers show that their actions were spontaneous and immediate and there was nothing that Major Parrish could have done to stop it (doc. 157- at 16-17). However, the undersigned finds that the plaintiff's allegations that the subordinate officers punched and kicked him on more than one occasion after he was handcuffed without Major Parrish intervening, and Major Parrish permitted the same officers to escort the plaintiff to the RHU, are sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding Major Parrish's inaction being an affirmative causal link. The plaintiff has presented declarations from other inmates in support of these allegations (docs. 118-2; 118-3; 118-4). Consequently, although the defendants have presented varied allegations, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Major Parrish's inaction in the context of supervisory liability.
The defendants further argue that Major Parrish is entitled to qualified immunity (doc. 157 at 18-20). Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id.
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court must determine whether a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (per curiam); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). "The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Here, as discussed above, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Major Parrish violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, Major Parrish is not entitled to summary judgment on the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See Hewitt v. Bennett, C/A No. 6:19-1927-JFA-KFM, 2020 WL 3420756, at *4-5 (D.S.C. June 22, 2020) (finding that summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was improper where material factual disputes remained regarding the conduct of the defendant (citations omitted)); see also Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[T]o the extent that a dispute of material fact precludes a conclusive ruling on qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the district court should submit the factual questions to the jury and reserve for itself the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on the facts found by the jury."); Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long as there remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendant."). Moreover, this right was clearly established as the time of the alleged violation, as discussed in the above-cited cases. Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity at this time.
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 157) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the court recommends that the district court grant the defendants' motion as to the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim and deny the motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's supervisory liability claim against Major Parrish and excessive force claim against Lt. Colbert, Ofc. Cleveland, Ofc. Brown, and Sgt. Johnson.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).