Opinion
No. C 99-3022 SI
May 15, 2001
JUDGMENT
This Court having found that the Administrative Law Judge's decision was based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence in the record, the decision by the Commissioner is affirmed and judgment is entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
JUDGMENT
Defendant brings this motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs action, which seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S C. section 405(g). The Commissioner found that plaintiff is not disabled and denied plaintiffs claims for disability insurance benefits and social security insurance under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
On January 28, 1997, plaintiff Robin Edwards applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (CT. at 63-65). The Social Security Administration ("Administration") initially denied the applications on March 5, 1997, finding that Ms. Edwards was not disabled according to the provisions of the Social Security Act. (C.T. 39, 41-44, 51). Ms. Edwards filed for reconsideration on March 14, 1997, and the Administration affirmed the denial of benefits on March 20, 1997. (C.T. at 49, 51-54). In April of 1997, Ms. Edwards requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), which occurred on December 1, 1997. (C.T. at 12, 28-38). On December 31, 1997, the ALJ issued a decision, finding that Ms. Edwards was not disabled, had no significant limitations on her ability to perform basic work activities, and could perform her past relevant work, and therefore, Ms. Edwards was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or entitled to supplemental social security income. (C.T. at 12-17). Ms. Edwards appealed that decision to the Social Security Administration Appeals Council. The Appeals Council considered new evidence submitted by Ms. Edwards and concluded that neither Ms. Edwards' contentions nor the additional evidence provided a basis for changing the ALJ's decision. (C.T. at 4-5). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Ms. Edwards, appearing without counsel, filed this action for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) and 1383(c)(3).
The facts surrounding Ms. Edwards' claim are as follows. Ms. Edwards is a thirty-nine year old women. (C.T. 63). She attended school until the twelfth grade and has previous work experience as an adult day care worker, cooking instructor, and fast food worker. (C.T. 13, 31, 91-96). Ms. Edwards filed for social security benefits after sustaining a back injury while at work on October 11, 1996, claiming that as a result of her injury she was unable to continue working. (C.T. 31, 63, 113, 129). She alleged that she was unable to work due to back, foot, and knee pain. (C.T. 71).
On October 15, 1996, Ms. Edwards was examined and treated by Dr. Carl Bricca. (CT. 126). Dr. Bncca diagnosed Ms. Edwards with a back sprain, and told her to ice her back for fifteen minutes three times a day, to avoid prolonged sitting, and to be careful doing activities requiring bending. (C.T. 127). He found that she would be able to return to work on October 21, 1996. (C.T. 127). Dr. Bricca examined Ms. Edwards on several more occasions in October, November, and
December of 1996. In the course of his examinations, Dr. Bricca found that Ms. Edwards, while complaining of constant pain, appeared to be able to sit comfortably, did not appear to "be in any pain whatsoever during the entire examination," and "spontaneously she seems to" to be able to move more "than she does when requested." (C.T. 113-127). In response to her subjective complaints of pain, Dr. Bricca prescribed a course of physical therapy. Dr. Bricca last examined Ms. Edwards on December 26, 1996, stating that she had been given state disability until January 27, 1997. (CT. 113). At this time, Ms. Edwards stated she was finding her own private physician. (CT. 113).
On October 23, 1996, Ms. Edwards was examined by Dr. Robert Ferretti for an orthopedic consultation. (CT. 129). Ms. Edwards told Dr. Ferretti that she had "pins and needles in the middle of her back" and that she felt she had not improved since her injury. (CT. 130). Dr. Ferretti found that Ms. Edwards was suffering from a probable low back strain or sprain and that she had "somewhat protracted symptoms and inconsistent findings on her medical exam." (C .T. 131). However, due to her subjective complaints, Dr. Ferretti found that Ms. Edwards should not be allowed to return to work on October 24, 1996, and instead, recommended that her disability time be extended another one or two weeks. (CT. 132).
On November 11, 1996, Ms. Edwards was examined by Dr. James Soong. (C.T. 134). Dr. Soong agreed that she had suffered a lumbosacral strain on October 11, 1996. However, Dr. Soong found that in his medical opinion, there were no "subjective or objective factors of disability" and that Ms. Edwards was "able to return to work, to full duties, at any time." (C.T. 137). Furthermore, Dr. Soong explicitly stated that there was "no evidence of disability." (CT. 138). Ms. Edwards was involved in a car accident in October 1997. (C.T. 155, 159). Following the accident, Ms. Edwards was examined by Dr. Vickman, Dr. Galvin, and Physicians Assistant Juliana Farjo. (C.T. 153-163). The records from these examinations were not submitted to the ALJ but were submitted as evidence and considered by the Appeals Council. (C.T. 4-5, 151-163). Dr. Vickman states, in a certified form, that Ms. Edwards would be able to return to work on May 29, 1998. (CT. 153). On August 4, 1998, Ms. Edwards was examined by Dr. Galvin. (C.T. 158). Dr. Galvin noted that Ms. Edward's physical examination was difficult because of "several inconsistencies." (C.T. 158). "Giving the patient the benefit of the doubt," Dr. Galvin felt that Ms. Edwards would be able to return to work on December 1, 1998. (C.T. 158).
LEGAL STANDARD
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for disability. See Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984)). To establish disability the claimant must show that: (1) the claimant "suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months"; and (2) that the impairment renders the claimant "incapable of performing the work that" she "previously performed and is incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy." Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A)).
In reviewing the denial of disability benefits, courts will not set aside the ALJ's decision so long as the ALJ's findings are based upon correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Ma allanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) see also Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984); Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla" but "less than a preponderance"; it is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971 ) (citation omitted see also Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health Human Serv., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, courts must look at the record as a whole, considering both evidence that supports and that undermines the ALJ's findings. See Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 576. However, the Ails decision must be upheld if the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. See Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1453 see also Allen v. Secretary of Health Human Serv., 726 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1984); Allen, 749 F.2d at 579 (holding that where there are conflicting medical reports or testimony, the ALJ's decision must be affirmed); Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating, "It is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts in the evidence."). Even if substantial evidence supports the Secretary's fact findings, the decision must nonetheless be set aside if improper legal standards were applied in reaching that decision. See Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).
DISCUSSION
Ms. Edwards claims that she is permanently disabled due to a back injury sustained on October 11, 1996, and as the result of injuries that occurred in various non-work settings. The ALJ found, after thoroughly evaluating the medical evidence, that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council considered additional evidence submitted by Ms. Edwards, but found that the evidence did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ's determination. In evaluating the evidence submitted, the Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. None of the medical reports submitted by Ms. Edwards established or even indicated that she was permanently disabled according to the Social Security Act.
Under the Social Security Act, disability as defined as:
[T]he inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. To meet this definition, you must have severe impairment, which makes you unable to do your previous work or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy.20 C.F.R. § 416.905.
Furthermore, the Commissioner, through the ALJ's decision, properly discounted Ms. Edwards' subjective complaints. Under Ninth Circuit law, "subjective symptoms of pain are a significant factor in determining whether there exists a "disability' as defined in the Act." Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1455 (quoting Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1965)). The ALJ took into consideration Ms. Edwards' subjective complaints of pain, but specifically found that "the claimant's subjective complaints are not credible or consistent with the medical evidence of record." (C.T. 16).
The ALJ's rejection of Edwards' subjective complaints of pain is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See. e.g., Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991).
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.