Opinion
No. 00-2121-KHV.
June 20, 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Kent Edmonds filed suit against U.S.D. #341, Randy Carreno, and the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, alleging that they violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to the termination of his employment with U.S.D. #341. Plaintiff also alleges that Carreno falsely imprisoned him. This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Defendants Randy Carreno and Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, Jefferson County, Kansas (Doc #11) filed April 14, 2000; Defendant U.S.D. #341's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #21) filed April 28, 2000; and defendants' Motion to Stay Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, Scheduling Conference, and Discovery Pending Decision on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. #27) filed May 30, 2000. For reasons stated below, the Court finds that both motions to dismiss should be sustained, at least in part, and that defendants' motion to stay should be overruled as moot.
Motion to Dismiss Standards
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must assume as true all well pleaded facts in plaintiffs complaint and view them in a light most favorable to plaintiff.Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). The Court must make all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff; and liberally construe the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Lafoy v. HMO Colo., 988 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir. 1993). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint is not whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.
The Court may not dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his theories of recovery that would entitle him to relief. See Jacobs, Visconsi Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991). Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of his claims, plaintiff must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Factual Background
For the purposes of defendants' motions to dismiss, the allegations in plaintiffs complaint are taken as true.
Until his termination in January 1999, U.S.D. #341, Jefferson County, Kansas ("the school district") employed Kent Edmonds as a school teacher. On November 4, 1998, plaintiff did not attend a school field trip to Forbes Field in Topeka, Kansas, which he was scheduled to sponsor. On about November 7 or 8, 1998, the school district began to investigate a report that Edmonds had been at Harrah's Casino during school hours. The school district asked Randy Carreno, a detective with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department to investigate Edmonds' whereabouts on November 4.
Acting under color of state law, Carreno contacted Harrah's Casino and obtained a security camera surveillance tape which showed plaintiff at the casino on November 4. Carreno informed the school district of the videotape and questioned Edmonds on the matter. On three occasions, twice in the school district superintendent's office and once at the Jefferson County Law Enforcement Center, Carreno interrogated plaintiff concerning his whereabouts on November 4. Carreno led plaintiff to believe that he was being investigated on possible criminal charges. Edmonds admitted to Carreno that he was at the casino on November 4. Although the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department had no reason to believe plaintiff had committed a crime, it was aware of Carreno's actions.
At a due process hearing pursuant to the Kansas Teacher's Due Process Act, K.S.A. §§ 72-5436, et. seq. the school district presented the evidence which Carreno had obtained during his interrogation of plaintiff. The hearing officer ruled in favor of the school district and permitted it to terminate Edmonds' employment.
Plaintiff brought the current action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants deprived him of his property interest in his job in violation of his rights to procedural and substantive due process. Plaintiff also alleges that Carreno falsely imprisoned him.
Analysis
I. Randy Carreno and Jefferson County Sheriff's Department's Motion to Dismiss
A. Substantive Due Process Claim
Plaintiff claims Carreno violated his substantive due process rights by interrogating him about his presence at the casino and forcing his confession by threatening to file criminal charges against him. "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government," Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), including the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (substantive due process protects against government power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). In cases of "abusive executive action," only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be "arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
As the Tenth Circuit has noted, "the standard for judging a substantive due process claim is whether the challenged government action would 'shock the conscience of federal judges.'" Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 528 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotingUhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 573 (10th Cir. 1995)). To satisfy' this standard, "a plaintiff must do more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power." Id. Instead, a plaintiff "must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking." Id. Generally conscience shocking behavior falls on the far side of the culpability spectrum, requiring the plaintiff to show that the government actor performed with an intent to harm. InRadecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit expanded this narrow reading. There, the court held that "[w]here the state actor has the luxury to truly deliberate about the decisions he or she is making, something less than unjustifiable intent to harm, such as calculated indifference, may suffice to shock the conscience." Id.
The Supreme Court has set forth three guiding principles to be used in evaluating substantive due process claims: (1) the need for restraint in their scope; (2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3) the need for deference to local policymaking bodies. See id. at 1230 (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125-129). To prevent an imprudent expansion of substantive due process claims, courts generally dismiss § 1983 claims that are more appropriately addressed by state tort law. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs. 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation."). Because plaintiff has a more specific remedy available to him under state tort law, his substantive due process claim cannot stand. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979) (falsely accusing individual of crime may constitute false imprisonment, but does not deprive individual of substantive due process right); see also Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1539 (10th Cir. 1995) (filing of baseless criminal charges more appropriately addressed under Fourth Amendment rather than the due process clause). Plaintiff's allegations against Carreno are more specifically analyzed in his false imprisonment claim than under the "generalized protections of substantive due process." Gehl Group, 63 F.3d at 1539; see Baker, 443 U.S. at 144.
Moreover, while plaintiff alleges that Carreno conducted interrogations which led him to believe that he was the subject of a criminal investigation, that allegation does not approach the outrageousness required to "shock the conscience." In his complaint, plaintiff alleges conduct that at most constitutes misuse of government power, not activities which can be considered as abusive and outrageous. A threat to file baseless criminal charges does not constitute a deprivation of substantive due process rights. See Gehl Group, 63 F.3d at 1539; cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (an invasion of one's body, such as pumping a suspect's stomach, will "shock the conscience"). Because Carreno's alleged actions are not so egregious as to "shock the conscience" and because plaintiff has an available state tort law remedy for his injuries, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's substantive due process claim is sustained.
B. False Imprisonment Claim
Defendants argue that plaintiff's false imprisonment claim should be dismissed because it is time barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. See K.S.A. 60-514(b). The Kansas Tort Claims Act, however, extends the statute of limitations beyond one year if necessary for plaintiff to comply with its terms. See K.S.A. 12-105b(d). Plaintiff claims that Carreno falsely imprisoned him on three occasions, the first of which occurred on November 25, 1998. Plaintiff sent notice of the claims to defendants on October 13, 1999, and defendants were given 120 days to respond. Defendants never responded, and plaintiff's claims were deemed rejected. The last day for plaintiff to file was thus extended 120 days from November 25, 1999 to March 24, 2000. See King v. Pimintel, 20 Kan. App.2d 579, 591-2, 890 P.2d 1217, 1226 (1995). Plaintiff filed suit on March 17, 2000, within the time period allowed by the Kansas Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim is not time barred and defendants' motion to dismiss it must be overruled.
II. Defendant U.S.D. #341's Motion to Dismiss
A. Procedural Due Process Claim
Plaintiff alleges that the school district wrongfully procured Carreno' s assistance to investigate him, and used the results of the investigation to terminate him. In order to prove a violation of procedural due process, plaintiff must show that (1) he possessed a protected interest such that due process protections were necessary, and (2) defendant deprived him of the appropriate level of process.See Hatfield v. Board of County Comm'rs, 52 F.3d 858, 862 (10th Cir. 1995). The Court assumes that plaintiff has adequately alleged a property interest in his job with the school district.
The school district contends that plaintiff has not adequately alleged that his procedural due process rights were violated by specific conduct of a representative of U.S.D. #341. The Court agrees. In his opposition brief, plaintiff attempts to explain that in using the results of Carreno's investigation during the due process hearing the school district deprived him of a "fair and impartial hearing based on substantial evidence." See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of Defendant, U.S.D. #341 (Doc. #24) (citing Kansas Teacher's Due Process Act, K.S.A. § 72-5439(f)). Plaintiff has not included this allegation in the complaint. In addition, plaintiff has not specified how the school district deprived him of his right to a "fair and impartial hearing based on substantial evidence," e.g., that it used inadmissible evidence or otherwise acted contrary to the statute. In sum, plaintiff has not stated a claim against the school district upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). U.S.D. #341's motion to dismiss Count I is therefore granted.
In his opposition brief, plaintiff did not request leave to amend. Even if he had done so, the Court would have overruled his request because he could have appealed any adverse decision of the hearing officer to a state district court. See K.S.A. § 72-5443(b). "The existence of this state judicial review mechanism constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy." Hartwick v. Board of Trustees of Johnson Co. Community College, 782 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D. Kan. 1992). Accordingly. plaintiff has no procedural due process claim under section 1983. See Smith v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 23 F.3d 339 (10th Cir. 1994) (due process guarantees pertaining to property are satisfied when adequate state post-deprivation remedy exists).
B. False Imprisonment Claim
In Count II of his complaint for false imprisonment, plaintiff does not name U.S.D. #341 as a party defendant. The Court therefore need not consider the false imprisonment claim with respect to the school district's motion to dismiss.
The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining claim for false imprisonment. According to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once it has dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See Lancaster v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998); Henry v. Board of Leavenworth County Commr's., 64 F. Supp.2d 1042, 1060-61 (D. Kan. 1999). If all federal claims are dismissed before trial, state law claims will generally be dismissed as well. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966); Thatcher Enters. v. Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990). Because the Court has dismissed plaintiff's federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law false imprisonment claim.
IF IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Defendants Randy Carreno and Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. Jefferson County. Kansas (Doc #11) filed April 14, 2000 be and hereby is SUSTAINED with respect to plaintiff's substantive due process claim and OVERRULED with respect to plaintiff's false imprisonment claim. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's false imprisonment claim and it is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant U.S.D. #341's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #21) filed April 28, 2000 be and hereby is SUSTAINED.
IF IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Stay Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, Scheduling Conference, and Discovery Pending Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. #27) filed May 30, 2000 be and hereby is OVERRULED as moot.