Opinion
No. CV 10-6013163 S
December 8, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs filed a fifteen-count complaint against the defendants, the Board of Assessment Appeals of the city of New Haven and the city of New Haven, on July 27, 2010.
The plaintiffs in the present action are Edgewood Corners, Inc., Edgewood Village, Inc., Edgewood Elm Housing, Inc., Yeshiva of New Haven, Inc. and Friends of Hagan, Inc.
Specifically, the plaintiffs challenge the assessment of taxes on certain items of personal property located within various real properties in the city of New Haven. Counts two, five, eight, eleven and fourteen of the complaint allege deprivation of constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and corresponding provisions of the Connecticut state constitution. Paragraph four of the prayer for relief seeks "payment of triple its costs including interest on any taxes paid." Paragraph six of the prayer for relief seeks attorneys fees as permitted under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
These counts mistakenly refer to the statute as 28 U.S.C. § 1981.
This paragraph mistakenly refers to the statute as 28 U.S.C. § 1983.
On October 1, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss counts two, five, eight, eleven and fourteen of the complaint and paragraphs four and six of the prayer for relief due to the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs filed an objection to this motion with a supporting memorandum of law on October 15, 2010. On October 22, 2010, the defendants filed a reply memorandum. Oral argument on this motion was heard at short calendar on October 25, 2010.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).
"Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] courts lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 802, 970 A.2d 640 (2009).
"[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox v. Webster Ins. Co., 294 Conn. 206, 214, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).
The defendants argue that the United States Supreme Court's decision in National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court's decisions in Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), and Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Crystal, 236 Conn. 701, 674 A.2d 834 (1996), show that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs argue the cases cited above may be distinguished. Zizka clearly states that if an adequate remedy exists at law for challenging a state tax assessment, state courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge under § 1983. Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, 195 Conn. 690. In that case, "[t]he plaintiffs brought an action in the Superior Court seeking a judgment declaring that the formula utilized by [the defendants] for a [tax] assessment violated the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and due process of law under the federal constitution. They alleged that such violations were actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . and also claimed compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief and attorneys fees." Id., 682-83. In reviewing the plaintiff's claim for declaratory and monetary relief, the court stated: "Since the General Assembly has fashioned an exclusive adequate remedial system for challenging excessive sewer assessments . . . we see no need to subject state tax collectors to state actions brought under § 1983 . . . The trial court was, therefore, correct in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the present law suit." (Citations omitted.) Id., 690.
The plaintiffs also argue that Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Hartford v. Faith Center, Inc., 196 Conn. 487, 493 A.2d 883 (1985), and the United States District Court's opinion in Finzie v. Bridgeport, 880 F.Sup. 89 (D.Conn. 1995) expressly sanction such actions. These cases predate National Private Truck Council and Jade Aircraft and are therefore inapposite.
Nearly ten years later, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in National Private Truck Council in order to "resolve a conflict among the state courts as to whether, in tax cases, state courts must provide relief under § 1983 when adequate remedies exist under state law." National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra, 515 U.S. 586. In that case, the plaintiffs challenged a decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which ordered refunds pursuant to state law, but held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983 or attorneys fees under § 1988(b). Id., 583. The court held: "[W]hen a litigant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief against a state tax pursuant to § 1983 . . . state courts, like their federal counterparts, must refrain from granting federal relief under § 1983 when there is an adequate legal remedy." Id., 592.
Citing Zizka, the United States Supreme Court identified Connecticut as a jurisdiction that holds that "[s]tates need not provide [a] § 1983 remedy in state tax cases" if an adequate remedy is provided for in state law. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra, 515 U.S. 586 n. 3.
In reaching this conclusion, however, the United States Supreme Court was careful to note that its reasoning was not limited to confines of equity. Id., 589-90. Specifically, the court stated: "Until [ Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 70 L.Ed.2d 271, 102 S.Ct. 177 (1981)], one could have construed these cases as concerning only the equitable powers of the federal court . . . In Fair Assessment the principle of noninterference with state taxation led us to construe § 1983 narrowly. We held that § 1983 does not permit federal courts to award damages in state tax cases when state law provides an adequate remedy . . . Although there was much discussion of the limitations on equity power, that discussion was useful only insofar as it provided a background against which § 1983 must be interpreted." (Citations omitted.) National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra, 515 U.S. 589-90.
The Connecticut Supreme Court echoed these conclusions again in Jade Aircraft. In that case, the plaintiff alleged violations of its constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983. Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Crystal, supra, 236 Conn. 701. Citing Zizka and National Private Truck Council, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's constitutional claims because state law afforded an "adequate legal remedy." Id.
The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Zizka, National Private Truck Council, and Jade Aircraft in three ways. First, the plaintiffs contend that, unlike the plaintiffs in the cases cited above, the present case does not involve equitable relief. Second, the plaintiffs argue that Jade Aircraft prohibits only "constitutional challenges to a tax assessment in a separate lawsuit." Finally, the plaintiffs argue that National Private Truck Council only operates to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts.
With respect to the first argument, the United States Supreme Court specifically stated that their holding in National Private Truck Council applied to all claims made pursuant to § 1983, not simply those seeking equitable relief. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra, 515 U.S. 589-90. Moreover, even if the court was to assume that this conclusion is incorrect, the plaintiffs in the present case are seeking equitable relief. Specifically, the prayer for relief asks "that the valuations of these properties on October 1, 2009 be reduced to 70% of its true and actual value;" "that the valuations of these properties on October 1, 2009, be modified so that they do not bear an excessive or disproportionate share of the tax burden in the city;" "that the court restores the plaintiffs' classification of properties and buildings under the second, fifth, eighth, eleventh and fourteenth counts to a tax exempt status as set forth in Connecticut General Statutes § 12-89;" and "such other relief as the court deems appropriate." Such remedies are equitable in nature.
Their next argument is that Jade Aircraft prohibits only "constitutional challenges to a tax assessment in a separate lawsuit." The plaintiff in Jade Aircraft pursued both state law and federal constitutional claims at the trial court. Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Crystal, supra, 236 Conn. 703. Nonetheless, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the count seeking recovery for constitutional violations. Id., 710. Consequently, Jade Aircraft cannot be distinguished on this basis.
The final argument of the plaintiffs is that National Private Truck does not operate to limit the jurisdiction of state courts. While it is true that the United States Supreme Court discussed the impact of certain statutes which endeavor to define the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the court clearly stated that although "there is no similar statute divesting state courts of the authority to enter an injunction under federal law when an adequate legal remedy exists" such a silence is irrelevant "because we do not understand § 1983 to call for courts (whether federal or state) to enjoin the collection of state taxes when an adequate remedy is available under state law . . . After all, an injunction issued by a state court pursuant to § 1983 is just as disruptive as one entered by a federal court." National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra, 515 U.S. 590-91. Indeed, it was the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court being appealed National Private Truck. Id., 591. ("Because petitioners had an adequate legal remedy, the Oklahoma courts could not have awarded either declaratory or injunctive relief against the state taxes under § 1983.")
The plaintiffs have failed to distinguish Zizka, National Private Truck Council, and Jade Aircraft. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the counts of the complaint seeking recovery under § 1983 if an adequate legal remedy is afforded by state law. The plaintiffs do not argue that the statutory scheme currently existing in this state, of which they are in the process of availing themselves, is inadequate. Given the absence of such an argument, the plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden of proving the jurisdiction. Consequently, counts two, five, eight, eleven and fourteen of the complaint are dismissed.
Further, the plaintiffs have not made any arguments nor provided any legal authority relating to the jurisdiction of this court over the fourth paragraph of their prayer for relief in which they request: "That the Court order the payment of triple its costs including interest on any taxes paid." The plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the fourth paragraph of the plaintiffs' prayer for relief is also dismissed.
Lastly, the plaintiffs claim that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over paragraph six of their prayer for relief pursuant to § 1988(b). This statute states, in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . . of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorneys fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated: "when no relief can be awarded pursuant to § 1983, no attorneys fees can be awarded under § 1988." National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra, 515 U.S. 592. Therefore, the sixth paragraph of the plaintiffs' prayer for relief is also dismissed.