Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:OO-CV-2729-D.
February 27, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A mechanic who suffered a severe eye injury when the halogen light bulb that he had removed from a tractor's headlight assembly shattered brings products liability- and negligence-based failure to warn claims against the tractor manufacturer and also sues the bulb manufacturer. The court must decide whether plaintiff has stated any claim at all against the bulb manufacturer, whether he can establish the essential elements of causation and duty with respect to his claims against the tractor manufacturer, and whether he is entitled to a trial of his claim for exemplary damages. For the reasons that follow, the court dismisses plaintiff's action against the bulb manufacturer and grants in part and denies in part the tractor manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.
I
Plaintiff Dana Edgar ("Edgar"), a tractor mechanic, removed two burned-out GE Model 894 ("GE 894") halogen light bulbs from the headlight assembly of a John Deere Gator tractor to replace them with new ones. The light bulbs were designed and manufactured by defendant General Electric Company ("General Electric"). The Gator tractor is a six-wheel utility tractor manufactured by defendant Deere and Company ("Deere"). While Edgar was sitting on a stool at the parts counter at his company's shop, he slowly touched the ends of the two lamps together. When he did, one bulb shattered, sending a small piece of glass into his right eye. As a result, Edgar has permanently lost his sight in that eye.
Edgar at times appears to use the terms "bulb," "lamp," and "headlight" interchangeably in his first amended original complaint and summary judgment brief. Although the court has attempted to reconcile such usage, its recitation of the facts and use of the terms may be imprecise as a result.
disputes the facts that led to the incident and the extent of Edgar's injuries. See Deere Br. at 2 n. 1. Because General Electric moves to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, the court in deciding the motion to dismiss or for judgment accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views them in the light most favorable Edgar. See infra § II. Because Deere moves for summary judgment, the court views the evidence favorably to Edgar as the nonmovant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000).
Edgar brings this action against General Electric and Deere. He maintains that he was unaware on the date of the incident that GE 894 lamps were under pressure and could shatter and that he should wear eye protection when handling them. Edgar alleges that Deere is liable for negligence in failing to warn him of these facts. He also contends Deere is strictly liable for a marketing defect in failing adequately to warn of the GE 894 bulb's dangers. Edgar sues Deere to recover exemplary damages on the ground that it intentionally and maliciously omitted warnings to wear eye protection when handling these bulbs.
General Electric moves to dismiss Edgar's action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). It contends that Edgar has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted or that General Electric is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. Edgar has not responded to this motion.
Deere moves for summary judgment contending that (1) Edgar cannot recover based on an alleged failure to warn because he never reviewed Deere's manuals or packaging and he admitted there was no need to do so; (2) Deere did not manufacture the bulb and thus had no duty to warn; (3) Edgar cannot establish that Deere was aware of the alleged unreasonably dangerous condition of the headlamps; and (4) Edgar cannot recover exemplary damages. Edgar opposes the motion.
Deere's February 25, 2002 motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix is denied. Having considered the rationale of Dethrow v. Parkland Health Hospital System, 204 F.R.D. 102, 104 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (Fitzwater, J.), the court concludes either that Deere has not shown sufficient cause to file a reply appendix or that the material in the appendix does not affect the court's decision on Deere's motion for summary judgment and need not be considered.
II
The court considers first General Electric's motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. Although Edgar mentions General Electric in his first amended original complaint ("amended complaint"), he does so either to describe the characteristics or dangers of the GE 894 lamp or to detail the written warnings that General Electric provides to distributors. See Am. Compl. ¶ I(1). He does not allege that General Electric was negligent on the occasion in question, although he asserts that Deere was. See id. ¶ I(5). Edgar limits the alleged marketing defect to the time the lamps left Deere's possession, not the custody of General Electric. See id. ¶ I(6). In his prayer for relief under count I, Edgar seeks to recover from Deere, not General Electric. See id. at 6 (prayer). In count II, Edgar asserts that Deere is liable for exemplary damages based on intentional and malicious conduct. See Id. ¶ II(6). He sues only Deere for exemplary damages, see id. ¶ II(10), and he prays for such relief only against Deere, id. at 7 (prayer).
When these allegations are considered inthe context of Edgar's opposition to Deere's motion for summary judgment they appear to be asserted more as a basis to establish liability against Deere ( i.e., it should have known of the need to issue its own warnings) than against General Electric.
"The court may dismiss a claim when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief" Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)). "In analyzing the complaint, [the court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. (citing Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996)). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim." Id. (citing Doe, 81 F.3d at 1401). "Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Under the allegations of Edgar's amended complaint, he seeks no relief against General Electric. Therefore, regardless how deferentially the court reads the pleading, it cannot say that he can prove any facts consistent with the allegations in the amended complaint that would entitle him to relief Edgar has not responded to General Electric's motion and so has failed to demonstrate any basis on which this court could reach a contrary result.
Accordingly, the court grants General Electric's motion to dismiss.
III A
The court now turns to Deere's motion for summary judgment as it relates to failure to warn in manuals or product packaging. Deere contends that Edgar's causes of action for negligent failure to warn and strict liability for a marketing defect based on a failure to warn must be dismissed because he cannot establish the essential element of causation. It maintains that Edgar cannot show a causal connection between his injury and Deere's alleged failure to place warnings in its manuals or on packaging because Edgar did not read the Gator operator's manual or technical manual before the incident. Deere also points to evidence that Edgar did not recall ever seeing Deere's packaging for Gator headlight replacement bulbs. It therefore argues that even if the manuals or packaging did not provide adequate warnings related to the bulb in the headlight assembly, Edgar cannot prove that these defects were the proximate or producing cause of his injuries because he did not review them any time before the accident.
Edgar opposes Deere's motion on the ground that this is not an adequate warning case but a no warning case. He therefore argues that the cases on which Deere relies are inapposite because they are decisions that involved inadequate warnings, and he also questions the authoritative value of decisions that Deere cites. Edgar further contends concerning his failure to read the operator's manual or technical manual that, once there is evidence of the failure to read a warning, the issue whether the user would heed the warning becomes one of fact for the trier of fact. He also argues that evidence of inattentiveness that is unrelated to a plaintiff's ability to perceive or heed warnings or instructions and that does not rise to the level of admissible habit evidence is inadmissible to prove that the plaintiff would have adequate warnings.
B
Under Texas law, whether Edgar seeks to recover for negligence or under strict liability, he must prove "actual causation in fact," that is, "that but for [the] omission the accident would not have occurred." Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1993). There is a presumption in a no warning case that had the defendant warned the plaintiff; he would have heeded the warning. Gillespie v. Century Prods. Co., 936 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.App. 1996, no writ) (citing Gen. Motors, 873 S.W.2d at 359). This presumption operates in the usual manner, shifting the burden of production to the party against whom it operates. Gen. Motors, 873 S.W.2d at 359. Once that burden is met and evidence contradicting the presumption has been offered, the presumption disappears and the evidence on the issue is evaluated as in any other case. Id. The presumption has no effect on the burden of persuasion, but the facts on which the presumption was based remain in evidence and support any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. Id.
As applied to the present case, Deere was obligated to introduce evidence that Edgar would not have heeded a warning had it been given. It met this burden by pointing to Edgar's testimony that he had never recalled looking at a Gator operator's or technical manual and felt no need to do so in order to change a tractor headlamp light bulb. Instead, he "could take a bulb out of a Gator, [and] figure out how to do that." Deere App. 6. Edgar also testified that he did not recall ever before seeing the replacement bulb packaging, although he probably handled one when taking inventory. Id. at 10. The burden then shifted to Edgar to introduce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find causation.
Edgar contends he had never worked with this type of bulb before, had not seen a boxed GE 894 bulb sold by Deere, and that there should have been warning, perhaps on the headlight assembly, where it would have been noticed before the bulb was removed. He testified that he might have worn safety glasses had he seen a warning marked on the base of the bulb, but he did not see the caution mark because it was placed where a person holds the bulb.
The summary judgment evidence would not permit a reasonable trier of fact to find causation as to the manuals and the product packaging. Edgar contends Deere should have given a warning in two manuals that he did not read and on packaging that he did not see because of his lack of prior exposure to GE 894 replacement bulbs, the nature of the maintenance task he was performing at the time, and the way the accident occurred. Edgar had removed the bulbs from the Gator tractor headlight assembly and was awaiting replacement bulbs when one of the removed bulbs exploded and injured him. Even if the replacement bulb had come in a package that warned him of the potential for explosion, he had not read a GE 894 Deere replacement box before (although he had probably handled one) and would not have seen the warning before he suffered the injury in question.
The summary judgment nonmovant's failure to adduce proof as to any essential element of his cause of action renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Therefore, Edgar's inability to prove the causation element of his claims for negligence and strict liability for a marketing defect in connection with manuals and product packaging precludes him as a matter of law from recovering on this basis.
IV A
Deere next moves for summaryjudgment concerningEdgar's headlight assembly-based failure to warn claims on the ground that it did not design and manufacture the bulb. It maintains that third-party defendant J. W. Speaker Corp. ("Speaker") supplied and manufactured the headlight assembly for Deere to install in its Gator tractors. Deere therefore argues that Edgar cannot establish that it owed him a duty to warn of the alleged unreasonable dangers associated with the headlight assembly or bulb by printing warnings on the headlight assembly. According to Deere, Speaker, as the component part manufacturer, is exclusively liable for negligence or a marketing defect based on a failure to place a warning on a component part that it manufactured and supplied. Alternatively, Deere maintains that even if it had a duty to warn, Edgar cannot show that Deere was in a position to foresee that a warning should be given.
B
The court disagrees with Deere's assertion that, under Texas law, "[c]omponent part manufacturers are held exclusively liable for any alleged failure to place a warning on its component part, when the component part is the product that allegedly caused the plaintiffs' injuries." Deere Br. at 10 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Deere reaches this conclusion by citing distinguishable cases and misreading § 5 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LLABILrrY (Proposed Final Draft, 1997).
With one exception, which the court addresses below, the Texas cases that Deere cites did not, as here, deal with component parts that a manufacturer incorporated into its final product before selling it. See Gen. Motors, 873 S.W.2d at 354 (water tank added to truck originally built as cab and chassis); Trevino v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 882 F.2d 182, 183 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (golf cart converted for maintenance work by adding chassis cover and carriage latch to basic golf cart); Elliott v. Century Chevrolet Co., 597 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (beer storage unit installed on bare truck chassis); Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 1978) (cab and chassis converted into garbage truck by adding compactor unit.) They are therefore distinguishable on their facts.
The court recognizes that Rego Co. v. Brannon, 682 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App. 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), did involve a component of a finished product — a valve that was incorporated into a pressurized propane gas cylinder before the cylinder was sold. Id. at 679. Rego did not hold, however, that only the component manufacturer (the valve maker), not the manufacturer of the propane gas cylinder, could be held liable for a failure to warn. The manufacturer of the propane gas cylinder settled before trial. Id. The jury found the valve manufacturer liable for failing adequately to warn that the automatic safety release would open the valve when a certain pressure threshold was reached. Id. The court of appeals upheld the component manufacturer's liability. It did not address whether the manufacturer of the propane gas cylinder, who had settled, could be held liable, other than to reject the cylinder manufacturer's attempt to shift its own liability to the manufacturer of the propane gas cylinder. Id. at 680-81.
Deere also misreads § 5 ofthe RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY. The part of § 5 that Deere quotes in its brief provides, in relevant part:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if (a) The component is defective in itself . . . and the defect causes the harm[.]
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5(a) (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). Section 5 is entitled, "LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF PRODUCT COMPONENTS FOR HARM CAUSED BY PRODUCTS INTO WHICH COMPONENTS ARE INTEGRATED." The fact that a component part seller or distributor can be held liable for a failure to warn does not of itself mean that the finished product manufacturer cannot also be held liable.
Deere relies on comment b to argue that a manufacturer of a final product can only be held liable for failure to warn when the design of the finished product, or the finished product manufacturer's integration of the component part, somehow contributes to or accentuates the part's defect, or the finished product manufacturer is a sophisticated buyer who uses the component part for an unsuitable, unforeseeable purpose. This is not what comment b provides. Comment b states that a commercial seller or other distributor of a product component is subject to liability for harm caused by a defect in the component, by a defectively designed component, or by a failure to supply reasonable instructions and warnings to the component buyer. Concerning the duty to warn, a component seller is required to provide instructions and warnings regarding risks associated with the use of the component product. When the comment refers to a sophisticated buyer who integrates a component into another product, it states that the component seller owes no duty to warn either the immediate buyer or ultimate consumers of dangers arising because the component is unsuited for the special purpose to which the buyer puts it. Comment b does not purport to excuse the seller of the finished product from liability. In fact, in at least one of the illustrations given under comment b (concerning a design defect), the Restatement concludes that both the component manufacturer and the finished product manufacturer would be liable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b, illus. 3 (Proposed Final Draft, 1997).
The court therefore holds that Speaker's liability, if any, as manufacturer of the headlight assembly does not, as a matter of law, excuse Deere from liability to Edgar.
C
Deere argues in the alternative that even if it had a duty to place a warning on the headlight assembly, Edgar cannot prove that Deere was in a position to foresee that such a warning was — required. It contends that he must, but cannot, in satisfying his proof of proximate cause show that the accident and the need for a warning were reasonably foreseeable to Deere. Deere contends that Edgar cannot adduce evidence or create a genuine fact issue that Deere could foresee that experienced service personnel would be injured by an exploding light bulb removed from the headlight assembly of a Gator tractor, or that Deere could have known that it needed to place a warning on the headlight assembly so that Gator users would take precautions.
This argument appears to be confined to Edgar's negligence claim, because Deere throughout refers to Edgar's inability to prove that its conduct proximately caused the accident and to the absence of evidence of foreseeability, see Deere Br. at 14-15, both of which are elements of a negligence cause of action.
Edgar has introduced evidence of warnings that General Electric gives to manufacturers that incorporate its bulb in their devices. P. App. 4-5. The "Important Notice" specifically says that "[t]he users of your device should be cautioned against the risks involved when using or handling this halogen bulb. See Caution on reverse side." Id. at 5. Although ajury might be required to rely on circumstantial evidence that Deere knew or should have known of this warning and of a potential risk of harm, it would not be unreasonable for it to find that the manufacturer of a tractor knew of product safety warnings being issued by the manufacturer of a component part used in the tractor. Among other evidence, Edgar has introduced proof that each bulb is stamped on the bottom with the inscription, "CAUTION ** READ NOTICE." P. App. 3. This could logically have led Deere to inquire what the notice said and to have learned of warnings being issued by General Electric.
Deere has introduced evidence that it purchases headlight assemblies directly from Speaker, who obtains GE 894 bulbs from General Electric, but that Deere does not obtain the bulbs directly from General Electric. See D. App. 4. It also has adduced proof that GE 894 bulbs that it sells under the John Deere brand name as replacement bulbs are packaged for Deere by another company and that Deere in-turn-delivers them to independent dealers for use as replacement bulbs in Gator tractors. Id.
Even if Deere was unaware of General Electric's specific warnings, Edgar has introduced evidence that GE 894 bulbs sold under other brand names that contain warnings on their packages concerning the danger that the bulb may shatter, burst, or rupture and of the need to wear protective eye wear. See P. App. 9-10, 12-13. This is additional circumstantial evidence that it would be foreseeable to a manufacturer that included such a bulb in its product that a person handling the bulb could be injured if he did not use protective eye wear.
The court therefore denies summary judgment on this ground.
V
Deere contends finally that Edgar cannot establish a basis to recover exemplary damages under a clear and convincing evidence standard because he cannot show the existence of an extreme degree of risk and evidence that Deere was actually aware of but ignored the risk. Deere also argues that even if Edgar could meet this burden, he cannot show that it committed malicious actions or omissions that are attributable to a Deere vice-principal or that it ratified the gross negligence of one of its agents. The court agrees.
When, as here, the party seeking summary judgment will not have the burden at trial concerning a cause of action, it can meet its summary judgment obligation by pointing the court to the absence of evidence to support the claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant does so, the nonmovant must then go beyond his pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). He must produce evidence to establish the existence of each element for which he bears the burden ofproof. See Dunn v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 927 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is mandatory when the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden. Little, 37 F.3d at 1076.
When a heightened proof standard will apply to the trial disposition of an issue, that standard applies at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) (holding that where clear and convincing evidence standard would apply at trial of libel action, it applied in determining merits of summary judgment motion). Section 41.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code establishes the standard for recovery of exemplary damages. The plaintiff must establish his right to such relief by clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 41.003(a), (b), (c) (Vernon 1997). "For exemplary damages purposes, clear and convincing evidence is defined as that `measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Foley v. Parker, ___ S.W.3d ___ 2002 WL 187111, at *5 (Tex.App. Feb. 7, 2002, no pet. h.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(2) (Vernon 1997); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994)). Under Texas law, this standard of evidence requires the plaintiff to adduce that is "sufficient to make the existence of the facts highly probable," not merely evidence that is "sufficient to make the existence of fact more probable than not, as required by the preponderance standard." Id. Therefore, the evidence must be "sufficient to produce in the mind of the fact finder a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegation sought to be established. Id. (citing In re D. T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex.App. 2000, pet. denied); Faram v. Gervitz-Faram, 895 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.App. 1995, no writ)).
The court holds that Edgar has not introduced evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find in his favor under a clear and convincing evidence standard. In response to Deere's motion; Edgar relics on the fact that Deere sells Gator tractors and — replacement bulbs, without adequate warnings that the bulb could shatter and cause injury if eye protection is not used. He asserts that it can be inferred that Deere acted consciously. See P. Br. at 15-16. But this is essentially nothing more than a contention that the same conduct that warrants holding Deere liable on the merits is sufficient to establish a right to exemplary damages. He has neither cited nor introduced proof that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by clear and convincing evidence the objective and subjective elements required to recover exemplary damages. Ordinary negligence is not enough. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 4 1.003(b) (Vernon 1997) ("The claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of exemplary damages as provided by this section. This burden of proof may not be shifted to the defendant or satisfied by evidence of ordinary negligence, bad faith, or a deceptive trade practice." (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, Edgar's claim for exemplary damages is dismissed with prejudice.
* * *
The court grants General Electric's January 15, 2002 motion to dismiss. Edgar's action against General Electric is dismissed with prejudice by Rule 54(b) judgment filed today. The court grants in part and denies in part Deere's January 16, 2002 motion for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.
February 27, 2002.
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE