Opinion
Case No. 3:03CV7042
June 17, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiffs Richard H. Eatherton and B. Lynn Eatherton bring this suit against defendants New York Life Insurance Company and Brian Nowak for breach of employment contract, age discrimination, tortious interference with business relationships, defamation, and loss of consortium. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1367. Pending are plaintiffs' motions to dismiss voluntarily the federal claim and remand the remaining state law claims and defendants' motion to compel arbitration. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' motions shall be granted and defendants' motion shall be denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
On December 31, 2002, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Lucas County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas alleging unlawful discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and state common law tort claims. Defendants removed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b), asserting federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs now move to dismiss the ADEA claim voluntarily with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41 and remand the state law claims. Defendants oppose the motion for remand and move to stay the current litigation and compel arbitration.
DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) if —
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
In this case, plaintiff moves to dismiss voluntarily the only claim over which this court has original jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the statute, this court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction" over the remaining state law claims. § 1367(c).
In deciding whether to exercise its discretion, a court should weigh the issues of "judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). A court's discretion "is bounded by constitutional and prudential limits on the use of federal judicial power." Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996). According to the Sixth Circuit, "[a]s a rule of thumb . . . [w]hen all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was removed."Id. at 1254-55 (citing Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n. 7).
In Carnegie-Mellon, the plaintiffs filed suit in Pennsylvania state court alleging federal age discrimination and other state law claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court, but plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to delete the federal claim. Plaintiffs thereafter moved to remand to state court, and defendants opposed the motion.
The Supreme Court explained that,
a district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate. The discretion to remand enables district courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.484 U.S. at 357.
Congress codified this approach in § 1367(c)(3). Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996).
Following the reasoning of Musson, the state and federal interests present in this case are best served by declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. There are no significant issues of judicial economy because the case is not so far advanced that litigation in state court would result in a duplication or waste of judicial resources. See e.g., Pitchford v. GMC, 248 F. Supp.2d 675, 678 (W.D.Mich. 2003); WHS Entm't Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 997 F. Supp. 946, 954 (M.D.Tenn. 1998).
Considerations of comity also favor dismissal of the state law claims. The concept of "comity" involves having the proper respect for the respective functions and interests of the federal and state judicial systems. State ex rel. Pierotti v. 777 N. White Station Rd., 937 F. Supp. 1296, 1306 (W.D.Tenn. 1996) (citing Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987)). The only claims remaining require interpretation of Ohio law — questions more properly addressed by Ohio courts. See e.g. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 64 F. Supp.2d 657, 668 (E.D.Mich. 1999); WHS Entm't Ventures, 997 F. Supp. at 955.
Defendants argue that important federal policies would be effectuated by retaining jurisdiction over the case and granting their ancillary motion for arbitration. Defendants' reasoning does not follow, however, because state courts would have the same interests in enforcing their public policies in favor of arbitration.
Finally, defendants have not alleged that they would be unfairly prejudiced or inconvenienced by a remand. Accordingly, this court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
Defendants argue that this case should be retained because the plaintiffs are attempting to manipulate the forum. The Supreme Court stated in Carnegie-Mellon that courts should consider forum manipulation dangers as one factor when deciding motions to remand. 484 U.S. at 357. In this case, plaintiff's ADEA claim will be dismissed with prejudice. This eliminates a major forum manipulation concern. Moreover, the forum manipulation concern does not outweigh the important factors of state comity, judicial economy, and litigation efficiency — all of which point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
Defendants also cite several cases that allegedly stand for the proposition that a plaintiff's amendment of his or her complaint does not destroy the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See e.g., Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff's deletion of references to ERISA by amending his complaint did not divest the district court of jurisdiction); Idoux v. Lamar University System, 817 F. Supp. 637, 642 (S.D.Tex. 1993); ("[O]nce federal jurisdiction is established, a plaintiff cannot precipitate a remand by amending the complaint to eliminate the grounds upon which jurisdiction is based. In other words, if a federal question appears at the moment of removal, the Plaintiff can do nothing to defeat jurisdiction.") (citing Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3d § 3722 (1985)). As noted above, however, § 1367(c) gives this court the discretion to dismiss or remand state law claims when a federal claim has been dismissed. Unlike the cases cited by defendants, defendants in this case have not given the court a reason to decline to exercise its discretion.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore,ORDERED THAT
1. Plaintiffs' ADEA claim be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.
2. Plaintiffs' motion to remand be, and hereby is, granted.
3. Defendants' motion to stay and compel arbitration be, and hereby is, denied.