Summary
holding service valid where service was upon corporation president's receptionist, who was "situated outside the office of the defendant's president" at its place of business, and this manner of service "had been effected ... on at least six prior occasions," clothing the receptionist "with apparent authority to receive service on behalf of the defendant"
Summary of this case from Bell v. Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp.Opinion
July 26, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Coppola, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
We find no error in the denial of the defendant's motion, made pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4), to vacate its default. To this end, we note that service of process at the defendant's place of business, effected upon the receptionist situated outside the office of the defendant's president, complied with CPLR 311 (1). Indeed, since the record reveals that service had been effected in this manner on at least six prior occasions, the receptionist was clothed with apparent authority to receive service on behalf of the defendant (cf., Todaro v. Wales Chem. Co., 173 A.D.2d 696, 697; Hoffman v. Petrizzi, 144 A.D.2d 437, 439). In any event, even if the receptionist was not authorized to receive process on the defendant's behalf, service upon the defendant was still properly effected. We note that the process server observed the defendant's president in his office a few feet away, heard his presence announced by the receptionist, and unavailingly waited 10 minutes for him to come out and accept service. These facts evince that service was effected in a manner which was calculated to give the corporation fair notice (see, Fashion Page v. Zurich Ins. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 272) and, further, that the process server, in the face of the recalcitrant corporate officer, exhibited "due diligence" in fulfilling the statutory requirements of service upon the corporate defendant (see, McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 115).
In addition, since the defendant wholly failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its default, the Supreme Court properly denied its motion to vacate the default pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) (see, Torres v. Houses "R" Us, 182 A.D.2d 684; Trapani v Imlug Seven Corp., 140 A.D.2d 690, 692). Thompson, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Santucci, JJ., concur.