Summary
finding sufficient evidence that defendant's asserted cost savings was pretext where, soon after plaintiff's termination, defendant announced plans to replace plaintiff with another high level executive who was younger
Summary of this case from Ford v. Miss. Methodist Senior Servs., Inc.Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-0299-M
October 2, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 10, 2002. Tom Easterling ("Easterling") has sued the Young Men's Christian Association of Metropolitan Dallas ("YMCA") for claims arising from his employment by the YMCA. Easterling's claims include age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), TEX. LABOR CODE § 21.001, et seq. sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., ("Title VII") and the TCHRA; and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Based on the analysis contained herein, the Court finds there are genuine issues of material fact and, therefore, DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
FACTUAL PREDICATE
In 1997, the YMCA hired Easterling to be the Executive Director of its downtown branch in Dallas, Texas. Easterling held that position until March 2000, when Phil DiCasolo, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the YMCA, and J. Ben Casey, President and Chief Executive Officer of the YMCA, terminated Easterling. Casey and DiCasolo claimed it was necessary to eliminate Easterling's position because of floundering finances at the downtown YMCA. They assert Easterling was running a variance-to-budget — i.e., a paper, projected loss for the 2000 fiscal year — of approximately $92,000, and the YMCA could not afford his salary. Easterling claims he was running an actual profit of approximately $82,000 and asserts that the YMCA discriminated against him because of his age, sex, and race.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Easterling may prove his claim of intentional discrimination either by direct or circumstantial evidence. Because Easterling' s record evidence contains only circumstantial evidence, the Court, in reviewing the YMCA's Motion for Summary Judgment, applies the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting framework to Easterling's age, sex, and race discrimination claims.
See Bauer v. Abemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999); Chaline v. KCOH, 693 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982); Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476-77 (Tex. 2001).
The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine approach requires three steps. First, Easterling must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Next, if Easterling establishes hisprima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the YMCA to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Easterling. This is solely a burden of production, not persuasion, and cannot involve the resolution of any disputed credibility issues. If the YMCA produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then Easterling must present evidence that the YMCA's proffered reason is simply a pretext for discrimination. If there is competent evidence of pretext, the jury then must decide if the evidence Easterling provides proves a case of discrimination. The plaintiffs prima facie case plus sufficient evidence showing the employer's proffered reason to be false may be all the jury needs to conclude the employer unlawfully discriminated.
See Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
Within this framework, the first two burdens are not difficult to meet. First, to establish a prima facie case for each claim, Easterling need only "make a very minimal showing to [initially] shift the burden" of production to the YMCA. Second, to put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the employer need only "raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Because these two burdens are easily met, discrimination cases typically turn on the evidence and analysis of pretext.
Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp, 81 F.3d 38, 41 (1996); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("[The] burden of establishing a prima facie [in a discrimination] case is not onerous."); Ambugey v. Cohart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 813 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that for a discrimination case, "a prima facie case is easily made out").
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (The employer must only "introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.") (emphasis in original).
The Court applies the summary judgment standard to the above framework. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to judgment. A dispute is "genuine" if the issue could be resolved in favor of either party, and a "material" fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." In addition, the Court must also view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. In the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework if Easterling — through evidence that is more than merely speculative or subjective — raises a "genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not he has established pretext, that will suffice to avoid summary judgment."
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993).
Nichols, 81 F.3d at 41-2.
ANALYSIS A. Can Easterling Present a Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination?
Under the ADEA, there are four elements of a prima facie case for age discrimination. Easterling must establish (1) he belonged to the protected group, i.e., workers over 40; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he was discharged; and (4) he was replaced by someone outside the protected class, someone younger, or was otherwise discharged because of age. In cases where the employer alleges that the termination resulted from a necessary reduction in force ("RIF") and, therefore, the employer never planned to replace the terminated individual, the Fifth Circuit has modified the fourth prong of the ADEAprima facie case. That modification would require Easterling to establish evidence from which the jury might reasonably conclude the YMCA intended to discriminate in its decision to terminate him.Under either approach, the Court finds sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that Easterling will be able to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Easterling was over forty at the time the YMCA discharged him, and he was qualified for the job he held and others within the YMCA. He, therefore, meets the first three elements. As for the final element, if one considers his discharge to be other than a RIF, the YMCA replaced him with Eric Cappel, a younger employee. Even if his termination were a RIF, the Court believes the summary judgment record contains sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude reflects an intent to discriminate. Thus, summary judgment for the YMCA on Easterling's age discrimination claim is inappropriate.
Although Defendant urges this Court to require that a replacement be "substantially" younger the law under the ADEA requires that the replacement need only be "younger." See Bauer v. Albemarle, Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999); Lassetter v. Strategic Materials, Inc., 192 F. Supp.2d 698, 701 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
B. Can Easterling Present a Prima Facie Case of Reverse Sex and Race Discrimination?
The elements of a prima facie case of reverse discrimination are the same as a traditional discrimination case and are identical under Title VII and § 1981. For a traditional prima facie case for discrimination based on sex or race, Easterling must establish (1) he belonged to the protected group, i.e., a specific race or sex; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3); he was discharged; and (4) he was replaced by someone not a member of his protected class, i.e., someone of a different sex or race. In cases where the employer contends it did not intend to replace the terminated individual, the Fifth Circuit has modified the fourth element. That modification requires Easterling to establish that at the time of his discharge, others similarly situated but not of Easterling's sex or race remained in their positions.
See Chaline v. KCOH, 693 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982).
Meinecke v. H R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 83.
Easterling satisfies the first element simply by being a member of a race and sex. Although some courts require majority plaintiffs to provide evidence demonstrating that the defendant is the "unusual employer who discriminates against the majority," cases in the Fifth Circuit generally impose no such heightened standard for establishing a prima facie case on a reverse discrimination claimant. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, made it quite clear that Title VII and § 1981 both prohibit discrimination against whites as whites. This Court sees no reason why the logic of McDonald, that discrimination laws protect those in the racial majority, should not also apply to protect males from discrimination just as they protect females. The first three elements can thus be established.
See, e.g., Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) ("Complainant bears the burden to show he was discriminated against despite his majority status.") (internal citations omitted).
Craven v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice-Inst. Div., 151 F. Supp.2d 757, 765 n. 5 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., A Div. of Exxon Corp., 824 F. Supp. 677, 683 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
427 U.S. 273, 279, 287 (1976).
As to the fourth element, the YMCA contends that when it discharged Easterling it did not intend to replace him because it wanted to save the cost of his salary. Easterling, therefore, need only demonstrate that, at the time of his discharge, others similarly-situated but not of his sex or race remained in similar positions. Easterling's record evidence demonstrates that the YMCA allowed similarly-situated minorities and females to retain their positions. Easterling, thus, can establish all elements of his prima facie case for reverse race and sex discrimination, and, therefore, the YMCA's request for summary judgment on this claim must be denied.
C. Can the YMCA Produce Evidence of a Nondiscriminatory Reason for Easterling's Discharge?
By establishing a prima facie case, Easterling creates a presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden to the YMCA to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Easterling's discharge. The YMCA contends it eliminated Easterling's position to reduce operating expenses because of a financial crisis at the downtown YMCA. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the YMCA's proffered reason for firing Easterling, and a reasonable factfinder could find this explanation to be legitimate. The YMCA, therefore, can meet its burden of production, leaving Easterling with the ultimate burden of persuasion, i.e., convincing a jury that discrimination motivated his discharge.
D. Does Easterling Raise Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether the YMCA's Nondiscriminatory Reason for Discharge is Pretextual?
Because the YMCA will be able to meet its burden of production, Easterling must then prove that the YMCA's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination, i.e, that the YMCA fired him because of his age, race, and/or sex. When viewed in the light most favorable to Easterling, the nonmovant, the record evidence raises genuine issues of material fact about the YMCA' s explanation, allowing a reasonable juror to conclude discrimination motivated the YMCA to discharge Easterling.
In particular, Easterling submits the following evidence regarding events prior to his discharge. Before Easterling's hire date in 1997, Casey opposed Easterling's candidacy and wanted to hire a woman in her mid-thirties. When hired, Easterling inherited a $7,827 actual deficit and a $96,093 variance-to-budget, but he balanced the budget within four months. Easterling also balanced his budgets for the 1998 and 1999 fiscal years. In November 1999, he received an excellent performance rating and a unanimous endorsement from the Executive Committee of the Board of Managers of the downtown branch. In November of 1999, Casey complained of Easterling's job performance and talked of replacing him. Although the two apparently never made personal contact, Casey apparently made an effort to contact an African-American female about possibly filling Easterling's position.
According to Easterling, in the first part of 2000, he was running an actual profit of approximately $82,000 at the downtown branch. DiCasolo focused on an approximate $92,000 variance-to-budget. It was apparently not unusual for Executive Directors to run such paper losses at different times during the year because new members joined at concentrated parts of the year, resulting in budgets typically balancing out by the end of the fiscal year. In late February or early March of 2000, DiCasolo gave Easterling sixty days to solve the variance issue. However, roughly thirty days later, DiCasolo terminated Easterling, ostensibly for financial reasons, although Easterling had reduced the variance-to-budget from approximately $92,000 to approximately $16,000. Several members of the Board of Managers of the downtown YMCA resigned over Easterling's termination.
The YMCA contends that it intended all along to eliminate Easterling's position to save the cost of his salary, so as to alleviate the financial difficulties at the downtown YMCA and balance the budget. The record, however, demonstrates that DiCasolo and Casey, soon after they fired Easterling, announced plans to replace Easterling and to again incur the cost of an Executive Director's salary. Despite claims that the variance-to-budget was a key financial impetus to Easterling's ouster, it also appears that the YMCA treated similarly-situated younger, minority, and female branch Executive Directors differently during Easterling's employment. The YMCA allowed these other employees to maintain their positions while they ran actual, not paper, deficits ranging from $15,000 to $222,000. These facts raise genuine issues that preclude summary judgment as to Easterling's pretext argument.
The procedural posture of this case and the amount and quantity of evidence submitted by Easterling make this case distinguishable from Lassetter v. Strategic Materials, Inc., In Lassetter, this Court granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to refute several of the explanations proffered by the defendant employer, and the Court concluded, after all the evidence was presented, that there was legally insufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination. Here all of the YMCA's explanations boil down to one: the YMCA terminated Easterling to save the cost of his salary at the financially troubled downtown YMCA. The record evidence Easterling submitted raises genuine issues of material fact regarding that reason, and those issues of fact are now for the jury to determine. If post-verdict motions are appropriate, the Court will, as it did in Lassetter, review them in light of the evidence adduced.
192 F. Supp.2d 698 (N.D. Tex 2002).
CONCLUSION
The Court, therefore, DENIES the YMCA's motion for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.