Opinion
Case No. 02-60709-CIV-ZLOCH
August 13, 2002
FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant, the Internal Revenue Service's Motion To Dismiss (DE 3). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.
The Court notes that the Plaintiff, Joseph Earl (hereinafter "Earl") commenced the above-styled cause by filing an Amended Petition For Declaratory Judgment (DE 1, Ex. A) in state court seeking a declaration of his homestead rights under Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution. Earl also sought a declaration enjoining the Defendant, the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter the "IRS") from placing or maintaining a Notice of Lien for federal taxes on his homestead property. Specifically, Earl alleges that his homestead property is protected by Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution and that the IRS's lien does not lie upon or against his property.
Article X, Section 4 of the Florida constitution states in relevant part that "[t]here shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, . .. the following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead, . ." Art. X, § 4(a)( 1), Fla. const.
In the instant Motion, the IRS argues that (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction over the IRS because the United States of America (hereinafter the "USA") enjoys sovereign immunity; (2) Earl cannot obtain a declaratory judgment or other injunctive relief with respect to federal taxes; and (3) Earl fails to state a claim for relief because state exemptions are not binding on the federal government. Earl responds by arguing that (1) the IRS waives immunity when it moves against a citizen's property; (2) this case falls within the equity jurisdiction of this Court; and (3) the IRS cannot remained "unscathed" when it takes property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
I. Discussion
The Court notes that only a generalized statement of facts need be set out to comply with the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A classic formulation of the test often applied to determine the sufficiency of a complaint was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Coney v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), wherein the Court stated:
. . . In appraising the sufficiency of the Complaint we follow . . . the accepted rule that a Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
The Court adds that a complaint may not be dismissed because the plaintiff's claim does not support the legal theory he relies on since the Court must determine if the allegations provide relief on any possible theory. See Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1967)
Here, however, the Court finds that Earl's Amended Petition must be dismissed for a number of reasons. First, lawsuits against the IRS are essentially lawsuits against the USA and such suits cannot be brought unless the USA waives sovereign immunity. Swofford v. United States of America, 2000 WL 1039495, at *2 (S.D.Ill. 2000); see also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) ("It is elementary that [t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain suit."). Earl bears the burden of establishing the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity. Swofford, 2000 WL 1039495, at *2; Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). He must point to a specific statutory provision in which the USA has waived its sovereign immunity. Swofford, 2000 WL 1039495, at *2. He has failed to do so. And his argument that the IRS waives immunity when it moves against a citizen's property is without merit. Therefore, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the IRS in this case.
Second, the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421, which states that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed," bars claims for injunctive relief and declaratory relief with respect to federal taxes. See McCarthy v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 236, 240-41 (N.D.Ill. 1983). There are a number of statutory exceptions to this prohibition, but none apply to this case. And there is a narrow judicial exception which likewise does not apply. The judicial exception states that the Anti-Injunction Act applies (1) unless the United States can prevail under no circumstances; and (2) if equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. Enochs v. Williams Packing Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). Here, the IRS could clearly prevail in this matter because their lien against the property is valid. See Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1962) (tax lien by United States against homestead property valid). And equity jurisdiction does not lie because Earl has not established that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. Earl has offered nothing to show that he could not go to Tax Court or that he could not pay his taxes and file a refund suit. Therefore, Earl's argument that this case falls squarely under the equity jurisdiction of this Court fails.
The Court also finds that Earl's due process argument is without merit. As noted above, Earl has not claimed he was denied the opportunity to go to Tax Court or to pay his taxes and file suit seeking a refund. "Where constitutionally valid remedies such as these exist . . . and [Earl] does not allege he was precluded from their use, the requirements of due process are satisfied." McCarthy, 563 F. Supp. at 239.
Third, even assuming this Court could exercise jurisdiction over the above-styled cause (which it cannot), Earl fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Florida's homestead exemption does not apply to the IRS. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190. 204 (1971) (federal law, not exempt status under state law, governs what is exempt from federal levy).
Accordingly, after due consideration, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Defendant, the Internal Revenue Service's Motion To Dismiss (DE 3) be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
2. The above-styled cause be and the same is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice; and
3. To the extent no otherwise disposed of herein, all pending Motions are DENIED as moot.