Summary
In Dwight v. Fancher (245 N.Y. 71) the court said: "Evidence of extrinsic circumstances may sometimes assist the court in the construction of language which a testator has used to express his testamentary intention; but here the language of the will, even when read in the light of extrinsic circumstances, admits of but one construction.
Summary of this case from Matter of CasperOpinion
Argued March 2, 1927
Decided March 29, 1927
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
Lewis E. Carr, J. Harris Loucks and William L. Visscher for appellants.
Howard Thayer Kingsbury for Victoire L. Niel et al., respondents.
George L. Shearer and William A.W. Stewart for United States Trust Company, as trustee, respondent.
J. Noble Hayes for Pauline A. de la Metre et al., respondents. Charles F. McGovern for Edgar T. Cantwell, guardian ad litem, respondent.
John A. Stephens for Jeane V. Dwight et al., respondents.
Evidence of extrinsic circumstances may sometimes assist the court in the construction of language which a testator has used to express his testamentary intention; but here the language of the will, even when read in the light of extrinsic circumstances, admits of but one construction. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that the testatrix did not mean what she has said in words, though these words may have been chosen by the attorney who drafted the will rather than by the testatrix. ( Reynolds v. Robinson, 82 N.Y. 103.) We do not pass upon the question of whether the attorney was a competent witness in this action. (Civ. Prac. Act, secs. 353, 354.) The evidence would not be admissible though given by a witness who was competent.
The judgment should be affirmed, without costs.
CARDOZO, Ch. J., POUND, CRANE, ANDREWS, LEHMAN and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur; KELLOGG, J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.