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Dusek v. United Air Lines, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
Jul 8, 1949
9 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1949)

Opinion

         Josephine J. Dusek, administratrix, sued United Air Lines, Inc., and another to recover for death of the plaintiff's decedent in the crash of an airplane which was being operated by the named defendant, and which had been manufactured by the other defendant.

         The named defendant moved to strike before trial allegation of complaint that airplane at time of crash was under exclusive control and management of the named defendant.

         The District Court, Jones, Chief Judge, denied the named defendant's motion to strike that allegation, holding that whether allegation would be material as a foundation for res ipsa loquitur was not a matter which could be determined before trial.

          Michael M. Lucak, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio, M. C. Harrison, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

          C. M. Horn, McKeehan, Merrick, Arter & Stewart, Cleveland, Ohio, Parker Fulton, Harley J. McNeal, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant.


          JONES, Chief Judge.

         This action is for damages for the alleged wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent in an airplane crash. The complaint alleges that the airplane was operated by defendant United and was purchased by United from defendant Douglas.

         The following matters are for consideration:

         A motion by defendant United entitled Motion ‘ to correct complaint’ consisting of requests to strike paragraphs 7 and 12 of the Complaint, and

         Objections by defendant to certain interrogatories.

         1. (a) Paragraph 7, which defendant asks to be stricken, reads as follows: ‘ That said airplane at the time of the occurrence was under the exclusive control and management of said defendant United Air Lines, Inc., its pilots, servants, agents and employees.’

         Defendant asserts that res ipsa loquitur does not apply where there are two or more defendants charged with independent acts of negligence or where, even if there is only one defendant, there are specific acts of negligence alleged.

         Plaintiff, opposing the motion, agrees with defendant that if she proves negligence as to Douglas and/or specific acts of negligence as to United, then res ipsa loquitur would not apply. Neither would it apply, plaintiff admits, if she made a case against Douglas but proved no specific acts of negligence against United. Plaintiff contends, however, that defendants' motion is premature, that paragraph 7 should be allowed to remain in the pleading in case she is unable, at trial, to prove any negligence on the part of Douglas and no specific acts of negligence by United.

          At this stage no purpose would be served by granting the motion to strike. The paragraph complained of has not been shown to be prejudicial to defendant. Its remaining in the complaint could in no way affect the conduct of the trial or the outcome of the litigation. Whether the matter alleged in paragraph 7 will be material as a foundation for res ipsa loquitur is not a matter which can be determined before trial.

          (b) Plaintiff concedes that under the law of Utah, where the airplane crash occurred, she is not entitled to recover the funeral expenses of her decedent (plaintiff's brief, p. 8) and that therefore paragraph 12 of the complaint should be stricken.

         2. Defendant United objects to plaintiff's interrogatories Nos. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 44 for the reasons that they call for answers based upon ‘ defendants' inference, conclusion and opinion’ and therefore they are not within the scope of Rule 33, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

         It will be conceded that any person answering a question relating to a fact must base his answer upon conclusion, inferences, opinions or evaluations of certain things he has perceived. It also will be conceded that very little, if any, of the ‘ factual information’ possessed by a human being is not based upon inference, deduction or conclusion.          

          That Rule 33 permits examination of a party as to relevant information, not privileged, or information which might reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is clear from the wording of Rules 33 and 26(b). The courts have drawn a line, however, when, under Rule 33, an attempt is made to require a party to do more than supply information within its knowledge or possession.

         Thus, in Hoak v. Empire Steel Corp., D.C., N.D. Ohio 1946, 5 F.R.D. 330, this Court sustained objections to interrogatories which called for comparison and construction of certain patent claims and in Porter v. Central Chevrolet, D.C., N.D. Ohio 1946, 7 F.R.D. 86, 88, the Court rules that interrogatories requiring defendant ‘ to examine, analyze, audit, compile and correlate information from its books and records and then to state its conclusions as to what these records reveal’, were beyond the scope of Rule 33.

          Distinguishing between requests for information which reasonably might be expected to be available to defendant as matters of record or personal knowledge of its officers or agents and requests that defendant analyze, evaluate or substantiate certain facts or information, the rulings will be as follows:

Interrogatory:

28

Objection sustained. Plaintiff should have

asked (1) where were the fragments found?

and (2) what was the regular route of the

airplane?

29

Objection overruled.

30

Objection overruled. If this information is

now known to defendant, there is no reason

why it should not be given to plaintiff.

The evaluation-analysis-deduction process

having been completed (if the answer to

No. 28 is yes), the matter now is simply

factual information.

31

Objection overruled.

32

Objection overruled, sustained as to facts

warranting conclusions.

33

Objection overruled.

34

Objection overruled, sustained as to the part

relating to facts warranting answer.

37

Objection overruled.

38

Objection overruled.

39

Objection sustained.

40

Objection overruled; sustained as to part

relating to facts warranting conclusion.

41

Objection overruled.

42

Objection overruled; sustained as to part

relating to supporting facts.

44

Objection overruled.

         Summary.

         Defendants' motion to strike paragraph 7 of the complaint will be overruled.

         Defendants' motion to strike paragraph 12 of the complaint will be sustained.

         Plaintiff's motion to file rejoinder brief will be sustained.


Summaries of

Dusek v. United Air Lines, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division
Jul 8, 1949
9 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1949)
Case details for

Dusek v. United Air Lines, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:DUSEK v. UNITED AIR LINES, Inc. et al.

Court:United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

Date published: Jul 8, 1949

Citations

9 F.R.D. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1949)

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