Opinion
CIVIL NO. 00-CV-2509 (JBS)
January 8, 2001.
William M. Tambussi, Esquire BROWN CONNERY, LLP 360 Haddon Avenue P.O. Box 539 Westmont, New Jersey 08108 Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Nancy Conrad, Esquire HEIMBACH, SPITKO HECKMAN The Capri Building 535 Hamilton Street Suite 200 Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101-1512 Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION
Presently before the Court is the motion of defendants Kvaerner, Inc. and John Does I to X (collectively "defendants") to dismiss plaintiff Tracy Dunham's complaint based on improper venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Defendants also move under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss (from Count One of the Complaint) plaintiff's state law claims against defendant John Does I to X under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 959(h) ("PHRA"),See footnote 1 plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, and plaintiff's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") against John Does I to X, and to dismiss (from Count Two of the Complaint) plaintiff's claims against John Does I to X and all claims for compensatory and punitive damages under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) ("EPA").
Defendant's motion originally sought to have plaintiff's state law claims against all defendants, including Kvaerner, Inc., dismissed but in their reply brief defendants advised that they were withdrawing the "motion to dismiss Plaintiff's PHRA discrimination claim against Defendant, Kvaerner, Inc. on the basis of sex and national origin." (Defs.' Reply Br. at 3 n. 2.)
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania will be denied. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims as detailed above for failure to state a claim will be granted. Plaintiff's state law claims against John Does I to X in Count One will be dismissed without prejudice. The claims underlying defendants' remaining motions will be dismissed with prejudice as unopposed.See footnote 2
The Court notes that plaintiff opposed the dismissal of her claims asserted under Title VII against the non-individual John Doe organizations named in the Complaint. As discussed below, these claims are properly dismissed with prejudice pursuant to defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tracy A. Dunham ("Dunham") is an American female who presently resides at 16 Regency Drive, Voorhees, New Jersey. Plaintiff began her employment with defendant Kvaerner, Inc. ("Kvaerner") on or about March 29, 1993, at which time she was an Administrative Assistant. (Pls.' Opp. Br., Ex. A.) In or about 1994, plaintiff was promoted to the position of Benefits Manager. (Id.) In or about 1996, plaintiff was promoted to the position of Vice President of Human Resources in Kvaerner's Connecticut office. (Id.) In late 1997, plaintiff was advised that Kvaerner was relocating its corporate services to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in order to facilitate a takeover of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. (Compl., para. 18.) In or about April, 1998, plaintiff was transferred to Kvaerner's Philadelphia office, where she retained her position as Vice President of Human Resources. (Pls.' Opp. Br., Ex. A.) As part of an incentive to employees who were relocated, plaintiff was offered an unsecured company loan equal to one year's salary. (Compl., para. 22.) Plaintiff claims she was not interested in accepting such a loan, but relented and did so after repeated offers by Kvaerner. (Id., para 23.) On July 1, 1998, Dunham signed a demand promissory note (the "Note") promising to repay Kvaerner $100,000.00 with interest at 6.5% per year, beginning on January 1, 1999, and continuing until the loan was satisfied. (Defs.' Reply Br., Ex. A.) The construction of the Note is governed by the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Id.)
In or about January, 1999, Richard Brown, Executive Vice President of Human Resources, advised plaintiff that Kvaerner's Philadelphia office was closing and that she would be laid off. (Pls.' Opp., Ex. A.) On May 30, 1999, plaintiff was laid off. (Id.) Pal Lieungh, Vice President of the Legal Department, advised plaintiff that her severance package would be applied to satisfy her outstanding loan with Kvaerner. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges discrimination because she was not given a severance package when other subordinate employees were given the option of other employment or a severance package. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that other male executives had their company loans forgiven, while she was required to repay such a loan (Compl., para. 32), and that all Norwegian male employees impacted by the closing of the Philadelphia office were offered other employment opportunities, while she was terminated without such a relocation option. (Compl., paras. 33 to 34).
On June 29, 1999, plaintiff Dunham filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging discrimination by Kvaerner against her based on sex and national origin. (Pls.' Opp., Ex. A.) On September 10, 1999, plaintiff's complaint was cross-filed with the Philadelphia Commission of Human Relations ("PCHR"). (Pls.' Opp., Ex. B.) On December 28, 1999, plaintiff advised the EEOC of her intent to file a lawsuit and requested a Notice of Right to Sue. (Compl., para. 10.) On January 19, 2000, plaintiff advised PCHR of her intent to file suit and requested that the Commission waive its jurisdiction over the matter. (Compl., para. 12.) On February 24, 2000, after a commission meeting, PCHR entered a waiver for the EEOC to generate a Notice of Right to Sue. (Pls.' Opp., Ex. D.) On March 1, 2000, EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue. (Pls.' Opp., Ex. E.)
On May 23, 2000, plaintiff filed a two count complaint in this Court alleging that defendants willfully, knowingly, negligently and intentionally harassed and discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and national origin (Pls.' Compl., Count One, paras. 35 to 37) and that defendants violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) ("EPA"), by paying her a lower salary and denying her compensation offered to male employees at her level. (Pls.' Compl., Count Two, paras. 38 to 40.)
Presently before this Court is defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Also before this Court are defendants' Motion to Dismiss (from Count One) all plaintiff's state law claims against defendants John Does I to X, plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, and all Title VII claims asserted against John Does I to X, and defendants' Motion to Dismiss (from Count Two of the Complaint) plaintiff's claims against John Does I to X under the EPA, and all claims under the EPA for compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff submitted opposition to defendants' motion to transfer venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) and to defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims against all John Doe defendants under the PHRA and against all non-individual John Does I to X under Title VII. Defendants' other motions, which are unopposed, will be granted as such and those claims in plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' remaining opposed motions, as discussed below, will also be granted. Plaintiff's state law claims, Title VII claims, and EPA claims against Kvaerner were not the subject of any motion by defendants and survive this opinion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue
Kvaerner has moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) for lack of venue as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 or, alternatively, for transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In her Complaint, plaintiff asserts that venue is proper in the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The appropriate section of the codeSee footnote 3 reads:
Plaintiff invokes this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq . (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Equal Pay Act).
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The statute also provides that corporate defendants, such as Kvaerner, "shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
Defendants argue that venue is proper or more convenient in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Defs.' Br. at 2.) Defendants' base their argument on the factual allegations of the Complaint, which state that defendant Kvaerner is a Norwegian Corporation doing business in Pennsylvania, and that the events giving rise to her cause of action occurred at the Kvaerner office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Id.) Plaintiff responds by arguing that venue is proper in New Jersey because she routinely conducted work for Kvaerner from her home in New Jersey via the Internet and/or direct modem access, (Pls. Opp. Br. at 4-5) and because Kvaerner was doing business, and was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction, in New Jersey at the time the Complaint was filed (Pls. Opp. Br. at 4 and Ex F, para. 7).
The Court first considers whether dismissal is appropriate under the present circumstances. Plaintiff need not include allegations in the complaint showing that the district in which he has sued is the proper venue. 15 Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d, § 3826 at 256-57 (1986). The burden is on defendant to object to venue and demonstrate that the chosen venue is improper.Myers v. American Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1982).
Venue, as that term is defined by Congress, is proper in this district. Defendant, Kvaerner, Inc., is a corporation over which the State of New Jersey has personal jurisdiction,See footnote 4 making the District of New Jersey a proper venue for this litigation. Defendant does not deny that they are subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey they just argue that it would be more convenient to litigate in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Because Kvaerner is clearly subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of New Jersey, and because defendant has not offered any substantial justification for their convenience argument (this Court is only several miles away from the United States Courthouse for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania), defendants' motion to dismiss this action for improper venue will be denied.
Kvaerner, Inc. has a facility, Kvaerner Process, in Bridgewater, New Jersey and routinely does business in the state. In addition, plaintiff regularly conducted work for Kvaerner from her home in New Jersey over Internet or direct modem lines.
It having been determined that dismissal is not appropriate in this case, the Court now considers whether defendants' request for a transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is appropriate under the present circumstances. This Court finds that venue is proper in this district and that no transfer is necessary.
Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a case to any other district where venue is proper "[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of that section is to avoid wasting time, energy and money, and also to avoid exposing litigants, witnesses and the public to avoidable inconvenience and expense. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 22, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995); Hoffer v. Infospace.com, Inc., 102 F. Supp.2d 556 (D.N.J. 2000). There are three non-exhaustive factors to consider when determining whether to transfer a matter: (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the witnesses; and (3) the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Hoffer, 102 F. Supp.2d at 570. The moving party, here the defendants, has the burden of persuasion on a motion to transfer and must show not only that the proposed alternate forum is adequate, but also that it is more appropriate than the present forum. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879; Hoffer, 102 F. Supp.2d at 572.
Upon examination of defendants' briefs and the affidavits submitted in support thereof, this Court finds that they have failed to meet their burden of showing that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a more appropriate forum for the litigation of this case. Defendants do not dispute that this district is a proper venue for this case. The affidavit of Andrew Haller, President of Kvaerner Process, Houston Operations, asserts only that it would be more convenient to litigate in the Eastern District because the events giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action occurred in Philadelphia and because the demand promissory note, in which plaintiff promised to repay Kvaerner $100,000.00 at a 6.5% annual interest rate, is governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Defs.' Reply, Ex. A, Keller Aff., paras. 2, 5, 7.)
Defendants have not produced any significant evidence to convince this Court that a transfer of this litigation to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is necessary so as not to inconvenience the parties and witnesses and to promote the interest of justice. The plaintiff's choice of forum is not lightly to be displaced, the federal issues (rather than issues of Pennsylvania law) appear to predominate, issues arising from the defendant Kvaerner's employment of a resident of this state are an appropriate matter for devoting jury resources, and there is no demonstrable inconvenience to defendant in litigating this case on this side of the Delaware River, within a few miles of its new facility. The motion to transfer this action will be, therefore, denied
B. Unopposed Motions
In plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motions, plaintiff explicitly stated that she does not oppose defendants' motion to dismiss (from Count One) plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, the claims against individual John Doe defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), or defendants' motion to dismiss (from Count Two) plaintiff's claim for compensatory and punitive damages and plaintiff's claims against John Does I to X under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) ("EPA"). (Pls. Opp. at 2 n. 2.) Those motions will therefore be granted as unopposed. Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims, Title VII claims against the individual John Doe defendants only, claims against all defendants for compensatory and punitive damages under the EPA, and claims against defendants John Does I to X under the EPA will be dismissed with prejudice as unopposed.
C. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Remaining Claims Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's remaining state law claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 959(h) ("PHRA") in Count One against John Does I to X and also to dismiss all Title VII claims in Count One against the remaining John Doe organization defendants for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). A district court must accept any and all reasonable inferences derived from those facts. Unger v. National Residents Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 761 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (D.N.J. 1991); Gutman v. Howard Sav. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 260 (D.N.J. 1990).
It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead the facts that serve as the basis for the claim.Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Midlantic Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 758 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.J. 1990). The question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether she can prove any set of facts in support of her claims that would entitle her to relief. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). "Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 150 n. 3 (1984) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Therefore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court should look to the face of the complaint and decide whether, taking all of the allegations of fact as true and construing them in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, plaintiff's allegations state a legal claim. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d at 103. Only the allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint matter, and that is all that will be taken into consideration.Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990).
1. Plaintiff's PHRA Claims Against the John Does
Defendant moves to have plaintiff's claims against John Does I to X under the PHRA dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by that statute. Because this Court finds that plaintiff failed to properly name and identify John Does I to X in a PHRC complaint prior to initiating this suit, plaintiff's state law claims against those defendants will be dismissed without prejudice.
Section 959(a) of the PHRA reads, in part, as follows:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful discriminatory practice may make, sign and file with the CommissionSee footnote 5 a verified complaint, in writing, which shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory practice. . . .
The Commission, as defined in Section 956, refers to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. 43 P.S. § 956.
(emphasis added). Only after a plaintiff has pursued his or her remedy under 43 P.S. § 959(a), and the Commission has determined that the circumstances so require, may litigation be commenced against the person or entity identified in the complaint. See 43 P.S. § 959(d).
Pennsylvania case law similarly establishes that a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking redress in court.See Fugarino v. University Services, 2000 WL 1801852, *2 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (citing Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984));see also Bailey v Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206, 1214 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citingClay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 552 Pa. 86, 90-91, 559 A.2d 917, 919 (1989); Parsons v. City of Philadelphia Coordinating Office of Drug Alcohol Abuse Programs, 833 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D.Pa. 1993)). The Pennsylvania legislature intended this procedure, which postpones a complainant's right to seek redress in the courts, to use the greater expertise of administrative agencies such as the PHRC in the area of unlawful discrimination, to promote voluntary compliance, and to give notice to charged parties. Bailey, 729 A.2d at 1214 (citing Clay 522 Pa. at 91, 559 A.2d at 919).
Defendants argue that because plaintiff never named John Does I to X in her PHRC complaint, she is barred from prematurely naming them as defendants in this suit. Plaintiff does not dispute that John Does I to X were not named in her PHRC complaint and offers no argument or explanation for her failure to do so. As such, plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies as required by the PHRA. Additionally, because the PHRA requires that a claimant "state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory practice," when naming them in the administrative complaint, it would be improper to name unknown John Doe persons or organizations in a PHRC complaint. Even taking all of plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, she fails to assert all the necessary elements for a valid claim under the PHRA.
Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims under the PHRA against defendants John Does I to X for failure to exhaust administrative remedies will therefore be granted. Plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff's ability to file an appropriate complaint with the PHRC when and if such unknown defendants are identified.
2. Plaintiff's Title VII Claims Against John Doe Organizations
Defendants also move to have plaintiff's remaining claims under Title VII against the John Doe defendant organizations dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by that statute.See footnote 6 Plaintiff does not dispute that only Kvaerner was named in her EEOC complaint and plaintiff makes no argument why this claim should be allowed to continue against John Doe organizations I to X. Because this Court finds that plaintiff failed to properly name and identify any John Doe organizations in her EEOC complaint prior to initiating this suit, plaintiff's Title VII claims against those defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provides: "If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period or reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge . . . ." (emphasis added).
It is well settled law that a claimant must first file a complaint with the EEOC naming the party or parties charged with discrimination prior to initiating a suit in the district court. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1977); Pitman v. LaFontaine, 756 F. Supp. 834, 846 (D.N.J. 1991); Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 593, 595 (E.D.Pa. 1994). The purpose of this requirement is to "give notice to the charged party and to provide an avenue for voluntary compliance without resort to litigation." Dreisbach, 848 F. Supp. at 595-96 (quoting Glus, 562 F.2d at 885). Commencement of a suit against a defendant not named in the administrative complaint thwarts the intended purpose of the EEOC review. Dreisbach, 848 F. Supp. at 596.
There are, however, narrow exceptions to this rule. In Glus, the Third Circuit addressed a situation in which the plaintiff had named her local union but not her international union as defendants in her EEOC charge. The Third Circuit articulated the following test, with four non-exhaustive factors, for determining whether a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed against a party not named in an administrative complaint:
1) whether the role of the unnamed party could through reasonable effort by the complaint be ascertained at the time of the filing of the EEOC complaint; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named [sic] are so similar as the unnamed party's that for the purpose of obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance it would be unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC proceedings; 3) whether its absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of the unnamed party; 4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that its relationship with the complainant is to be through the named party.Glus, 562 F.2d at 888. Plaintiff makes no argument using the Glus factors to support her claims against John Does I to X. Indeed, it would be difficult to do so since she identifies them in her complaint only as "persons or organizations which assisted, supported and/or condoned the discriminatory actions of other defendants" and therefore an analysis under Glus would be difficult.
Without allegations in the complaint or affidavits submitted in support of plaintiff's apparent contention that the John Doe defendants are sufficiently similar or related to Kvaerner so as to excuse plaintiff's failure to name them in the EEOC complaint, this Court cannot find that plaintiff sufficiently exhausted her administrative remedies prior to initiating suit. The Court's research disclosed no other case in which the plaintiff chose to name John Doe defendants in a Title VII discrimination complaint. The Court additionally notes that Title VII claims are limited to those allegedly perpetrated by employers, employment agencies, labor organization, or joint labor management committee controlling the training or retraining of employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Narrowed as such, plaintiff has had ample time to determine whether and, if so, which other defendants should have been named in her EEOC complaint.
Defendants, in support of their motion to dismiss the Title VII claims against all John Doe defendants, cite to the Glus factors and argue that allowing this litigation to continue against the still unnamed John Doe organizations frustrates the purpose of the administrative review and prejudiced defendants by failing to provide notice to those unnamed in the administrative complaint.
Therefore, even taking all of plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, this Court finds that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against John Does I to X and therefore cannot allege all the necessary elements to state a valid claim against those defendants under Title VII. Plaintiff's Title VII claims against those defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) will be denied. Defendants' motion to dismiss certain of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim will be granted. Plaintiff's state law claims, Title VII claims, and EPA claims against Kvaerner were not the subject of any motion by defendants and survive this opinion. The accompanying order is entered.
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court upon the motion of defendant, Kvaerner, for dismissal of the complaint for improper venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) or, alternatively, for transfer to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and upon the motion of defendant Kvaerner for dismissal of several of plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and for the reasons expressed in the Opinion of today's date;
ORDERED that defendant Kvaerner's motion to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania be, and hereby is DENIED ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Kvaerner's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be, and hereby is GRANTED ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's state law claims under the PHRA against John Does I to X be, and hereby are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's hostile work environment claim be, and hereby is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Title VII claims against John Does I to X be, and hereby are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims under the EPA against John Does I to X be, and hereby are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE ; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims under the EPA for compensatory and punitive damages under the EPA be, and hereby are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .