Summary
observing that "[i]n a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault"
Summary of this case from Talley v. Danek MedicalOpinion
44296 Record No. 810713.
March 2, 1982
Present: Carrico, C.J., Cochran, Poff, Compton, Thompson, Stephenson, JJ., and Harrison, Retired Justice.
Violation of Code Sec. 46.1-357(2), requiring a licensed operator to be on front seat with driver holding instruction permit, may be proximate cause of injury under circumstances and presents question of fact for Jury; other issues.
(1) Negligence — Motor Vehicles — Evidence — Proximate Cause — Licensing, Persons Under Eighteen; Exceptions, Etc. [Code Sec. 46.1-357(2)] — Requirement that Licensed Operator Etc., Occupy Seat by Driver — When No Evidence of Causal Connection Between Violation and Accident, Violation Usually Irrelevant in Determining Fault.
(2) Negligence — Motor Vehicles — Evidence — Proximate Cause — Licensing, Persons Under Eighteen; Exceptions, Etc. [Code Sec. 46.1-357(2)] — Requirement that Licensed Operator, Etc., Occupy Seat by Driver — Evidence of Violation of Statute and Circumstances Suggests Possible Causal Connection to Injury and Admissible — Instructions — Instruction to Jury That Violation of Code Sec. 46.1-357(2) Negligence Was Proper.
(3) Negligence — Motor Vehicles — Proximate Cause — Licensing, Persons Under Eighteen; Exceptions, Etc. [Code Sec. 46.1-357(2)] — Requirement that Licensed Operator, Etc., Occupy Seat by Driver — Proximate Cause by Violation Question of Fact for Jury and Verdict Not Disturbed.
An infant plaintiff sued the infant defendant for injuries sustained when the plaintiff was hit by an automobile driven by the defendant. At the time of the accident, the defendant was fifteen years old and held a temporary instruction permit. She was driving a car in a trailer park and saw the four-year-old plaintiff playing on the side of the road. The plaintiff darted into the road, and the defendant, unable to stop, struck her.
Over defendant's objection at trial, the Jury heard evidence that the defendant possessed only a temporary instructor's permit and, in violation of Code Sec. 46.1-357(2), was alone in the car. The Court instructed the Jury that this violation of the law was negligence. The Court further instructed the jurors to find for the plaintiff if they believed such negligence to be a proximate cause of the accident. Judgment was entered on a verdict for the plaintiff. Conceding her violation of the Code was negligence per se the defendant contends her negligence, as a matter of law, was not a proximate cause of the accident.
1. When there is no evidence of a causal connection between a violation of a driver's licensing statute and an accident, the fact of the violation is usually irrelevant to the determination of who is at fault in the accident.
2. Here the accident might not have occurred if an adult passenger in the car had anticipated that the infant plaintiff might move in front of the car or had intervened to stop the vehicle. The proximate causation of the injury by defendant's violation of Code Sec. 46.1-357(2) was a question of fact. The Court did not err in admitting evidence of the violation and in instructing the Jury that this violation was negligent.
3. Proximate cause, being a question of fact, a Jury issue was presented and the verdict will not be disturbed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County. Hon. Kenneth I. Devore, judge presiding.
Affirmed.
Jerry K. Jebo (Stephen D. Rosenthal; Jebo Rosenthal. on briefs), for appellant.
Edwin C. Stone, (Davis. Stone Wall, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Rene Duncan, the defendant at trial, appeals a judgment in the amount of $25,000 in favor of Rebecca Hixon. Hixon suffered personal injuries when she was struck by an automobile driven by Duncan. Duncan contends the court erred in admitting evidence that she was operating the automobile in violation of Code Sec. 46.1-357(2) and in instructing the jury that this violation constituted negligence.
At the time of the accident, Duncan was fifteen years old and held a temporary instruction permit. Code Sec. 46.1-357(2) allows the holder of such a permit to operate a motor vehicle "when accompanied by a licensed operator or chauffeur eighteen years of age or older who is actually occupying a seat by the driver."
On the afternoon of June 20, 1979, Duncan was operating an automobile within the confines of the Belmont Trailer Park, where she resided. She observed four-year-old Rebecca Hixon and Rebecca's six-year-old sister playing with a tricycle on the right-hand portion of the roadway. Duncan applied the brakes and maneuvered to the left. Confident the children had seen her, and acting on the assumption they would remain where they were, Duncan turned her attention to the roadway ahead, removed her foot from the brake, and permitted the automobile to continue its forward progress at approximately five miles per hour. Unseen by Duncan, Rebecca Hixon darted into the path of the automobile and was struck.
Over Duncan's objection, the jury heard evidence that she possessed only a temporary instruction permit, and that, contrary to law, she was alone when the accident occurred. Also over objection, the court instructed the jury that:
[T]he defendant violated the law when she operated this vehicle under a temporary instruction permit without a licensed driver over the age of eighteen years on the seat beside her. This violation of the law was negligence.
And if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that any such negligence in violating the law was a proximate cause of this accident, then you shall return your verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Conceding her violation of Code Sec. 46.1-357(2) was negligence per se, Duncan argues this negligence, as a matter of law, was not a proximate cause of the accident.
In a majority of accident cases, the violation of a licensing statute by a driver is not held relevant to the determination of fault. See, Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 963 (1953). We have followed this view in White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 43 S.E.2d 870 (1947), and Laughlin v. Rose, Administratrix, 200 Va. 127, 104 S.E.2d 782 (1958).
In White, a "thoroughly competent" driver failed through an oversight to have his license renewed. 186 Va. at 672, 43 S.E.2d at 871. We held there was "an entire lack of evidence of any causal connection between the statutory violations . . ." and the accident. Id.
Similarly, in Laughlin, the defendant, in violation of statute, allowed an unlicensed driver to operate his car. We said: "The lack of a driver's license did not proximately cause or contribute to the collision. Nor would it have been avoided had she had a license." 200 Va. at 133, 104 S.E.2d at 786.
In the present case, unlike White and Laughlin, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that Duncan's statutory violation was not a cause of the accident. She made a judgment that the infant plaintiff would not move in front of her car. Had the judgment of an adult licensed driver been substituted for hers, the outcome might have been different. Given the slow speed of the vehicle, we cannot say an adult passenger would not have had time to effectively intervene.
Ordinarily, proximate cause is a question for the jury. It becomes one of law only when the minds of reasonable men could not differ. Taylor v. A. P., 209 Va. 64, 66, 161 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1968). In the present case, we believe a jury issue was presented, and, therefore the verdict will not be disturbed.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.