Summary
concluding that substance of "motion to reinstate" in response to summary judgment was a motion for new trial
Summary of this case from In re OpronaOpinion
No. 01-05-00079-CV
Opinion issued January 26, 2006.
On Appeal from the 133rd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2003-45152.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, JENNINGS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We deny appellant's motion for rehearing. Tex.R.App.P. 49.3. We withdraw our December 8, 2005 opinion, substitute this opinion in its place, and vacate our December 8, 2005 judgment.
Appellant, Alvin Charles Duncan, challenges the trial court's rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellee, the City of Houston (the "City"), in his suit alleging that the City was negligent in failing to maintain its sidewalks and keep them "free, clean and inspect[ed] from defect[s]." In two issues, Duncan contends that the trial court erred (1) in granting the City's summary judgment motion on the ground that Duncan failed to satisfy the notice requirements of the Texas Tort Claims Act, and (2) in failing to rule on his motion for appointment of counsel, motion to compel discovery, and various post-judgment motions, including his motion for appointment of appellate counsel, motion to obtain copy of trial court's order, motion to reinstate, motion for extension of time to file motion for new trial, and motion for new trial. We affirm.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.101 (Vernon 2005).
Factual and Procedural Background
Duncan alleged that on September 19, 2001, while riding a bicycle on a sidewalk in the 3600 block of Des Chaumes Street in Houston, he sustained personal injuries when he fell head first onto the sidewalk after striking a guy wire, which was installed in the middle of the sidewalk and connected to a pole.
On October 15, 2001, Duncan sent a letter to the claims department of Reliant Energy/Houston Lighting Power Co. ("Reliant"), stating that he was injured when he was riding his bicycle and struck a guy wire, which was supporting a utility pole. The letter further stated that the wire "posed a substantial tripping hazard" and that the installation of the wire was "grossly negligent." On January 31, 2002, Reliant sent a letter to Duncan stating that it was investigating Duncan's claim. On June 28, 2002, Reliant sent Duncan a letter stating that the wire was not installed by Reliant and that it belonged to Time Warner Communications ("Time Warner"). Reliant informed Duncan that it would be unable to assist him with his claim. On November 5, 2002, apparently after Duncan contacted Time Warner, Time Warner's insurer sent Duncan a letter denying his claim and suggesting that Duncan submit his claim to the City's liability carrier.
Duncan does not provide the Court with a record citation to the June 28, 2003 letter from Reliant. See Till v. Thomas, 10 S.W.3d 730, 733-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stating that documents attached as exhibits or appendices to briefs are not part of record and thus may not be considered on appeal).
Duncan filed suit against the City on August 11, 2003, almost two years after Duncan sustained his injuries. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that Duncan failed to comply with the notice provisions in section 101.101(a) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, which provides that the City is entitled to receive notice of a claim against it not later than six months after the day that the incident giving rise to the claim occurred. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 2005). The City also moved for summary judgment on the ground that Duncan failed to comply with the notice provisions in the City charter, which requires a person who is injured to provide the City written notice of such injury within ninety days after sustaining the injury. City of Houston Charter art. IX, § 11. The City attached to its summary judgment motion a copy of the City charter and an affidavit from Anna Russell, the City secretary, stating that she reviewed the City's records and that Duncan did not provide the City with any notice of a claim for damages.
The City previously filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. The City then filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Holding that a court of appeals has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction challenging notice, our sister court dismissed the City's appeal. City of Houston v. Duncan, No. 14-04-00319-CV, 2004 WL 2222279, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 5, 2004, no pet. h.) (mem. op).
Duncan filed an "objection" to the City's summary judgment motion, and attached what appears to be a copy of a page from a Southwestern Bell telephone book, labeled "Government Offices-City," which provides a listing, under the subheading "Public Works Engineering Department," for "Street Light Repair HLP Customer Service." The City responded to Duncan's objection by presenting the trial court with an assumed name certificate for "Houston Industries Incorporated, doing business as Reliant Energy HLP." The trial court granted the City's summary judgment motion based on Duncan's "failure to satisfy the mandatory requirements of Article IX, Chapter 11 of the Charter, City of Houston, and section 101.101 of the Texas Tort Claims Act."
Standard of Review
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, a movant has the burden of proving that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). We may affirm a summary judgment only when the record shows that a movant has disproved at least one element of each of the plaintiff's claims or has established all of the elements of an affirmative defense as to each claim. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). We must accept as true evidence in favor of the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341.
Notice Requirements
In his first issue, Duncan argues that the trial court erred in granting the City's summary judgment motion because he provided the City with timely formal notice and that the City had actual notice of his claim.
A plaintiff must provide a governmental unit with notice of a claim against it not later than six months after the day the incident giving rise to the claim occurred, and such notice must reasonably describe (1) the damage or injury claimed, (2) the time and place of the incident, and (3) the incident. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.101(a). Section 101.101(b) provides that "[a] City's charter and ordinance provisions requiring notice within a charter period permitted by law are ratified and approved." Id. § 101.101(b). The City's charter provides that before the City may be held liable for personal injuries,
the person injured . . . or some one in his behalf, shall give the Mayor and City Council notice in writing of such injury or destruction, duly verified, within ninety days after the same has been sustained, stating in such written notice when, where and how the injury or destruction occurred, and the apparent extent thereof, the amount of damage sustained, the amount for which claimant will settle, the actual residence of the claimant by street and number at the date the claim is presented, and the actual residence of such claimant for six months immediately preceding the occurrence of such injuries or destruction, and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he relies to establish his claim. . . .
City of Houston Charter art. IX, § 11; see also City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 589 n. 1, 592 (Tex. 1981).
Notice of a claim against a governmental unit, as mandated by either section 101.101(a) or the City charter, is not required if the governmental unit has "actual notice" that the claimant has received some injury. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.101(c). "[A]ctual notice under section 101.101(c) requires that a governmental unit have knowledge of the information that it is entitled to be given under section 101.101(a) and a subjective awareness that its fault produced or contributed to the claimed injury." Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 2004). Actual notice may be imputed to the governmental unit by an agent or representative of the entity charged with a duty to investigate the facts and report them to a person of sufficient authority. See McDonald v. State, 936 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, no pet.); Dinh v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 896 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Whether an entity has actual notice is generally a question of fact. Dinh, 896 S.W.2d at 252-53. However, where the evidence is insufficient to raise a fact issue, the existence of actual notice may be determined as a matter of law. Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 348; McDonald, 936 S.W.2d at 738.
In regard to Duncan's assertion that he provided the City with timely notice, we note that the only notice contained in the record is Duncan's October 15, 2001 letter to Reliant and that the City presented an affidavit stating that Duncan did not provide the City with timely notice of his claim. Thus, the summary judgment evidence establishes that Duncan did not provide the City with notice of his claim in compliance with section 101.101(a) or the City charter.
In support of his contention that the City had actual notice of his claim, Duncan asserts that Reliant is "an agent or representative of governmental unit of City engineer." Here, Duncan does not allege, or present any argument or supporting evidence, that a City employee charged with a duty to investigate and report facts to a person of sufficient authority had any knowledge of Duncan's injury or had a subjective awareness that the City's fault produced or contributed to Duncan's injury. Duncan's mere reference to an unauthenticated page of a phone book does not provide any evidence that Reliant, or any of Reliant's employees, served as a representative or agent of the City. Conversely, the Citypresented testimony that it did not receive notice of Duncan's injuries and also presented evidence that "Reliant Energy HLP" was an assumed name for Houston Industries Incorporated, a distinct corporate entity. Duncan's argument that the City had actual notice because the guy wire was removed from the sidewalk after he was injured is also misplaced. Here, even if Duncan had presented competent summary judgment evidence showing that the guy wire was removed by the City, which he did not, there is no evidence that the City, or any of its agents or representatives, was aware that Duncan was injured as a result of tripping over the guy wire or that the City's fault produced or contributed to Duncan's injury.
Duncan's argument that "it is shown City engineer repair[s] street light[s] for HLP [as] an agent or representative" is not supported by competent summary judgment evidence and, in large part, is incomprehensible. Additionally, Duncan's argument that Reliant "is a public utility corporation under franchise agreement with City of Houston to provide electric services which is under Public Utility Regulatory Act . . . Utility Code 14.001, 14.008, [and] is subject to the reporting requirements as agent or representative with City under the Public Utility Regulatory Act" is irrelevant.
We note that The Texas Tort Claims Act does not specifically provide a definition for "agent" or "representative," but the Act does define employee as "a person, including an officer or agent, who is in the paid service of a governmental unit by competent authority, but does not include an independent contractor, an agent or employee of an independent contractor, or a person who performs tasks the details of which the governmental unit does not have the legal right to control." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(2) (Vernon 2005).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the City's summary judgment motion on the ground that Duncan failed to satisfy the notice requirements of section 101.101 of the Texas Tort Claims Act.
We overrule Duncan's first issue.
Trial Court's Failure to Rule on Various Motions
In his second issue, Duncan argues that the trial court erred in failing to rule on his various pretrial and post-judgment motions because a trial court must rule on such motions within a reasonable time. In the body of his argument, Duncan also complains about the trial court's failure to rule on his motion to compel further response to plaintiff's second set of interrogatories.
The City's only response to Duncan's argument about the trial court's failure to rule on these motions is that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. However, as recognized by the City in its brief, the Texas Supreme Court has recently held that "the failure to give notice of a claim as required by section 101.101 does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction over an action on the claim." Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Tex. 2004).
The record reveals that Duncan filed the following motions: (1) a motion for appointment of counsel, (2) multiple motions to compel, (3) a motion to reinstate, (4) a motion for extension of time to file motion for new trial, and (5) a motion for new trial. The record also reveals that Duncan filed notices of submission and/or hearing on his motion for appointment of counsel, motions to compel, motion to reinstate, motion for extension of time to file motion for new trial, and motion for new trial. There is no indication in the record that the trial court ruled on these motions.
The record does not contain a copy of a motion for appointment of appellate counsel or a motion to obtain copy of trial court's order, and thus we do not specifically address those motions.
Duncan previously filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the trial court to rule on his pending motions (1) to appoint counsel to represent him both at trial and on appeal, and (2) to compel production of discovery and for sanctions. Our sister court denied Duncan's petition, holding that Duncan failed to meet his burden to prove his entitlement to mandamus relief. In re Duncan, No. 14-04-00434-CV, 2004 WL 1172084, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2004, orig. proceeding). Specifically, our sister court held that the record failed to demonstrate that Duncan's motions were properly filed and that the trial court had actual knowledge of them. Id.
It is true that a trial court is generally required to consider and rule upon a motion within a reasonable time. Safety Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding); Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). However, in light of the circumstances presented as demonstrated below, we hold that the trial court's failure to rule on Duncan's motions did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(a).
First, in regard to Duncan's motion to appoint counsel, we would ordinarily review a trial court's refusal to appoint trial counsel in a civil case for an abuse of discretion. Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. 2003); Wigfall v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 137 S.W.3d 268, 274-75 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The Texas Supreme Court has suggested that a trial court could appoint counsel to an indigent civil litigant in exceptional circumstances. Id. "In evaluating what might constitute exceptional circumstances, we are to consider the `unique circumstances' of the case and determine whether the trial court had `no reasonable alternative but to appoint counsel.'" Wigfall, 137 S.W.3d at 274-75 (quoting Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d at 713).
Duncan contended he was without sufficient funds to hire an attorney and that he had made several attempts to hire an attorney, but was unsuccessful. Duncan also contended that the case was complex and that, because of conflicting testimony, "skill in presentation and cross examination" would be required. Like the supreme court in Tolbert and this Court in Wigfall, we note that indigent plaintiffs routinely obtain legal representation through contingent fee contracts, and Duncan's indigence should not have prevented him from obtaining legal counsel, provided that his claims were meritorious. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d at 713; Wigfall, 137 S.W.3d at 275. We conclude that the circumstances presented by Duncan's case are not exceptional, and that the trial court's denial of Duncan's motion for appointment of counsel would not have been in error. Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court's error, if any, in failing to rule on Duncan's motion to appoint counsel did not "probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment." Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(a).
Second, in regard to Duncan's motions to compel, we note that the record establishes, as a matter of law, that Duncan failed to satisfy the notice requirements of section 101.101. It is undisputed that the only notice on which Duncan relies is a letter he sent to Reliant, a distinct corporate entity. The City presented uncontradicted testimony that it did not receive timely notice of Duncan's claim. Duncan does not allege, much less present argument supported by competent summary judgment evidence, that the City, or any of its agents or representatives, was aware that Duncan was injured as a result of tripping over the guy wire. There is also no evidence that a City employee, agent, or representative charged with a duty to investigate and report facts to a person of sufficient authority had any knowledge of Duncan's injury or had a subjective awareness that the City's fault produced or contributed to Duncan's injury. We hold that, to the extent that the trial court committed error in failing to rule on Duncan's motions to compel, such error did not "probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment." Id.
Finally, in regard to Duncan's motion to reinstate, motion for extension of time to file motion for new trial, and motion for new trial, the trial court granted the City's summary judgment motion on December 20, 2004. On January 18, 2005, less than thirty days from the date of the judgment, Duncan filed a "motion to reinstate." This motion was, in substance, a motion for new trial and was timely filed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a). Duncan's motion was overruled by operation of law and his complaint concerning the trial court's refusal to rule on his motion to reinstate, motion for extension of time to file motion for new trial, and motion for new trial lacks merit. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
We note that, in his motion to reinstate, Duncan conceded that he had received a card from the Harris County clerk notifying him that the "final summary judgment was signed on December 20, 2004." It appears that he may have received the required notice. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(3). Duncan "assumed" that the trial court entered judgment in favor of the City, but contended that he had no knowledge whether the judgment "was for or against [him]." We also note that Duncan filed his notice of appeal on January 19, 2005, and that, while Duncan alleged that he did not receive a copy of the order granting the City's motion for summary judgment until January 24, 2005, he assumed that judgment had been entered in favor of the City.
Accordingly, we overrule Duncan's second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.