Opinion
No. CV05-4005258
January 11, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#108)
FACTS
On May 5, 2005, after filing a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (the commission), the plaintiff, George Dumas, brought this one-count employment discrimination action, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-58(a) and 46a-60(a)(1). The Bridgeport Board of Education (the board) was named as the defendant.
The grievance was filed with the commission on August 27, 2004.
The following facts are alleged in the complaint. The board employed Dumas as a teacher at Bassick High School (Bassick) from 1979 until 2004. Throughout his tenure at Bassick, Dumas taught marketing education classes and was in charge of the marketing program. After 1990, however, Dumas began experiencing a pattern of harassment and disparate treatment in comparison to white teachers who were otherwise similarly situated. Specifically, from 1995 until his retirement in 2004, he was transferred out of the classroom where he had taught, he was denied the necessary equipment to conduct his classes in a proper manner, he was given classroom assignments during the day that required him to walk long distances in a short period of time which because of his medical problems was difficult for him, and the "white Caucasian" teachers were not subjected to this kind of treatment. Furthermore, his responsibilities in the marketing department were scheduled to be given to a "white Caucasian female" who was less experienced and less qualified than he was. The physical and emotional strain that was deliberately imposed upon him by the school administration became so intolerable that on May 11, 2004, Dumas submitted his retirement papers, effective on July 1, 2004. As a result of being forced to prematurely retire, he also suffered a significant reduction in his pension. These incidents occurred because Dumas was discriminated against on the basis of his race and color.
On May 25, 2007, the board filed this motion for summary judgment, a supporting memorandum of law, an affidavit of the principal at Bassick and one of the allegations filed with the commission on August 27, 2004, a certified copy of Dumas's deposition and various other documentary evidence. The board moves for summary judgment on the ground that Dumas's complaint "is either time barred or based on trivial events," which have nondiscriminatory justifications. Dumas filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on July 26, 2007. He submitted a copy of an excerpt of his certified deposition, an affidavit from a member of the guidance department at Bassick and other documentary evidence. The board filed a reply memorandum accompanied by a supplementary affidavit from the principal. The motion was heard on the short calendar on September 17, 2007.
The evidence relied on by the board and Dumas in support of and in opposition of the motion for summary judgment respectively is properly admissible as required by New Haven v. Pantani, 89 Conn.App. 675, CT Page 401 678-79, 874 A.2d 849 (2005).
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., 284 Conn. 16, 26, 930 A.2d 682 (2007). "[T]he `genuine issue' aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred . . . A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).
"[If] documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, CT Page 392 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).
Furthermore, it is widely recognized that courts must be "particularly cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case when the employer's intent is in question. Because direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent will rarely be found, affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schwapp v. Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, courts have found that "the summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile . . . if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 97 Conn.App. 527, 539, 906 A.2d 14 (2006). Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court has established that "even with respect to motive, intent or good faith, the party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his argument in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 250, 618 A.2d 506 (1992).
Connecticut courts "review federal precedent concerning employment discrimination for guidance in enforcing [Connecticut's] own antidiscrimination statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Savin Rock Condominium Assn., Inc., 273 Conn. 373, 386, 870 A.2d 457 (2005), quoting Levy v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the board argues that the alleged discriminatory events being contested by Dumas fail to comply with the procedural requirements of General Statutes § 46a-82(e), as they occurred prior to the 180-day statute of limitations period before Dumas filed his grievance with the commission. The board further argues that these incidents alleged by Dumas do not constitute a continuous violation. Instead, the board asserts that the alleged discriminatory acts are discrete incidents that are not actionable if time barred, even if they relate to acts or incidents that have been found to be timely. Based on this statutory limitations period, the board argues that all of the incidents alleged by Dumas are untimely and not actionable, except for his claim that his marketing classes were scheduled to be reassigned during the 2004/2005 school year. Alternatively, the board argues that, even if some of these alleged incidents are found not to be time barred, no genuine issue of material fact exists because Dumas cannot show that any incident establishes a minimal prima facie case of employment discrimination.
In response, Dumas argues that his complaint is timely because the discriminatory incidents being alleged show a continuing violation within the 180-day framework. These allegations include: the decision made by the administration in the spring of 2004 to reassign his marketing education classes to a Caucasian teacher, who lacked certification for marketing education; the difficulty he had in teaching his classes the three years prior to his retirement because he was constantly required to transfer from one classroom to another should be considered as circumstantial evidence of the intent of the board to force him out of his job; the unavailability of proper equipment for him to use when he was being moved around; his assignment to cafeteria duty by the principal, which ignored his health issues with respect to his ambulation; and that, it was not until he filed his complaint with the commission in 2004 that the board decided to hire an African-American teacher to assume the duties of the marketing education program. Further, Dumas maintains that these allegations are substantiated by sufficient evidence to raise a material fact issue of discrimination and establish a minimal prima facie case of race discrimination.
To determine whether any alleged acts of discrimination are time barred, this court must first examine § 46a-82. To be considered timely, § 46a-82(e) provides in relevant part, "[a] complaint filed pursuant to this section must be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination . . ." General Statutes § 46a-82(e). The Connecticut Supreme Court has found that the time limit of § 46a-82(e) operates as a statute of limitations and not as a subject matter jurisdictional bar. Williams v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 278, 282, 777 A.2d 645 (2001). In the Williams case, the court also concluded that this statutory time limit "is mandatory, and thus the commission could properly dismiss the plaintiff's complaint if it was not filed within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 284. Furthermore, because General Statutes § 46a-100 provides that "any person who has timely filed a complaint with the Commission . . . in accordance with section 46a-82 . . . may also bring an action in the superior court," if the allegations within a complaint are untimely when the complaint was filed with the commission, both the individual allegations and/or the entire complaint may be subject to dismissal by the Superior Court. See id.
In the present case, since Dumas filed his complaint with the commission on August 27, 2004, all discrete events that are alleged to have occurred more than 180 days before that date of filing, that is, before February 27, 2004, should be disregarded as being untimely. To determine whether the allegations within Dumas's complaint are time barred, this court must determine when each of the alleged incidents occurred. In making this decision, this court reiterates that the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., supra, 284 Conn. 26. Applying this standard of review, the court notes that the only alleged incident to be timely is the schedule reassignment that occurred in the spring of 2004 for the following year. Although the parties do not agree on exactly when the schedule was distributed, both parties agree that the distribution occurred some time after March of 2004, which is within the 180-day limitation period and, therefore, timely.
It should be noted that in September of 2007, the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an employment discrimination case in which the Connecticut Appellate Court throughly discussed the 180-day limitation period of § 46a-82(e) and ultimately, it decided not to follow the federal rules, adopting a new standard to determine precisely when an alleged discriminatory incident occurred. See Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn.App. 188, 928 A.2d 586, cert. granted, 284 Conn. 920, 933 A.2d 722 (2007). The rule established in Vollemans v. Wallingford, however, does not apply to the present case and, therefore, regardless of the court's ruling on certiorari, the analysis of the present case will not be affected. The Vollemans case specifically deals with the question of whether the 180-day statute of limitations period begins to run when an employee receives notice of a future termination or on an employee's final day of work. Therein, the plaintiff was arguing that his final day of employment constitutes the discriminatory act from which the 180 days begins to run. The present case can be distinguished because Dumas was not terminated by his employer, but, instead, submitted his retirement papers. Although Dumas claims this voluntary retirement constitutes a constructive discharge, the Vollemans case can be distinguished because this situation does not involve an unequivocal notice of termination.
The other alleged discriminatory incidents, however, occurred more then 180 days before Dumas filed his complaint with the commission in August of 2004. Based on his deposition, in which he testified that the last alleged room transfer and the last complaint regarding lack of instructional support transpired in October of 2003 and his assignment to physical tasks such as cafeteria duty did not occur after the 2002/2003 school year, all of these other incidents of discriminatory acts alleged by Dumas transpired well before the 180-day statutory limitation period prescribed by § 46-82(e). As a result, all incidents except for the scheduling reassignment are time barred and thus, cannot constitute an actionable incident of discrimination. Furthermore, the board argues that although the limitations period of § 46a-82(e) may be equitably tolled where an employer engages in continuing acts of discrimination, the incidents alleged in Dumas's complaint are discrete acts because Dumas has failed to identify a policy or practice of discrimination and mere conclusory allegations of a continuing violation are not sufficient. The board asserts that, while the "Connecticut courts have recognized a continuing violation theory in the context of discriminatory employment practices"; Langner v. Stop Shop Supermarkets, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 95 0377385 (January 27, 2000, Licari, J.); the United States Supreme Court recently determined that the applicability of such a tolling provision depends on the nature of the alleged discrimination. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). As stated by the court, "multiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a continuing discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation." Id., 111. Instead, "[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act." Id., 113. For example, this doctrine only applies when there is evidence of specific discriminatory practices, such as "the repeated use of discriminatory seniority lists or employment tests." Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907 (2d Cir. 1997).
To determine whether the alleged discriminatory incidents constitute a continuing violation, which would allow for a tolling of the 180-day statute of limitations, this court must first conclude that these incidents were part of some continuing discriminatory policy or practice being carried out by the board. After reviewing the evidence submitted by both parties, this court finds that Dumas has provided nothing to support the conclusion that the alleged incidents were part of a continuing discriminatory policy. Because Dumas has failed to identify a policy or practice of discrimination and mere conclusory allegations of a continuing violation are not sufficient, this court finds that these incidents do not constitute a single continuing violation of discrimination and thus, they remain time barred and not actionable. Nevertheless, based on established case law, this court notes that the time-barred incidents can still be used as circumstantial evidence to help prove a case of discrimination. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); see also Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1981).
Having determined that the schedule reassignment is the only actionable incident of discrimination alleged in Dumas's complaint, this court must next determine whether Dumas has shown that this incident satisfies the requirements necessary to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Dumas argues that he has established a prima facie case and has raised genuine issues of material fact that the board's actions, which forced him into early retirement, were based on racial discrimination. Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination in a discrimination case, the Connecticut courts apply the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which requires the plaintiff to initially establish a minimal prima facie case of discrimination in order to survive summary judgment. See Levy v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 236 Conn. 102-05. "[A] plaintiff can avoid dismissal by presenting the minimal prima facie case defined by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas . . . By making out this minimal prima facie case . . . the plaintiff creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated, and thus places a burden of production on the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its action . . . [O]nce the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption completely drops out of the picture . . . Thus, once the employer has proffered its nondiscriminatory reason, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment . . . unless the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 705, 900 A.2d 498 (2006).
"In order to establish a prima facie case [of discrimination], the complainant must prove that: (1) he [was] in the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, 278 Conn. 705. Courts have held that "[t]he plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case, however, is not onerous." Levy v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 236 Conn. 107.
In the present case, the board argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Dumas has failed to satisfy the third and fourth prongs required to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Specifically, the board asserts that the third prong cannot be satisfied because Dumas has failed to provide any evidence that could show that the change in his teaching assignments constituted an adverse employment action. The board also argues that there is no evidence to show that Dumas's resignation amounted to a constructive discharge. Lastly, the board argues that the fourth prong cannot be satisfied because Dumas not only failed to prove that an adverse action occurred, but he also failed to establish that any of the alleged discriminatory acts occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Because the board argues that Dumas has failed to satisfy only the third and fourth prongs of a prima facie case, it is assumed that the board is simultaneously conceding that the first and second prongs have been satisfied as: (1) Dumas is a member of a protected racial class and (2) he was qualified to teach the classes from which we was removed. Accordingly, the court needs not to address the first two prongs.
The board's first argument as to why the schedule reassignment was not an adverse employment action is based on the allegation that Dumas has confused the chronology of events. It is the board's assertion that the schedule Dumas claims to have viewed in May of 2004, which alerted him to the fact that he would no longer be teaching his marketing class, was actually released after he announced his retirement. The board contends that Dumas's providing notice of his retirement prior to the release of the schedule demonstrates that there was nothing improper about reassigning his class to a replacement teacher; thus, this reassignment cannot be considered an adverse employment action.
The board's rendition of the events, however, is contrary to the evidence submitted by the parties. Both parties submitted identical copies of the schedule for the 2004/2005 class year. While the board attempts to claim that the schedule in question was released after Dumas announced his retirement, the schedule that the board provided included his assignment to teach several classes, other than the marketing class, the following year. Thus, it is evident that Dumas did not announce his retirement before the board made the new schedule. For these reasons, the board's first argument that Dumas confused the chronology of the events must be rejected.
In the alternative, the board argues that reassigning a teacher to teach a different class is simply too minor, as a matter of law, to constitute an adverse employment action. The board maintains that although Dumas might be dissatisfied with his new class assignment, courts have held that job changes, without a loss in pay or benefits, fail to constitute an adverse employment action. Pipkin v. Bridgeport Board of Education, 323 F.Sup.2d 326, 332-33 (D.Conn. 2004) (court determined that a transfer back to general classroom of a math resource teacher, who held that position for 23 years, was not an adverse employment action). In determining whether there has been a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment a court typically looks for "[a] termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices . . . unique to the particular situation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). In addition "[l]esser actions may [also] be considered adverse employment actions [including] . . . negative evaluation letters, express accusations of lying, assignment of lunchroom duty, reduction of class preparation periods, failure to process teacher's insurance forms, transfer from library to classroom teaching as an alleged demotion, and [an] assignment to [a] classroom on the fifth floor which aggravated a teacher's physical disabilities." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Galligan v. Milford Public Schools, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 04 0085584 (January 27, 2006, Stevens, J.), quoting Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.2d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 2001). Courts, however, have held that, "because there are no bright-line rules," the analysis of each case must be fact specific, that is "[a court] must [pore] over each case to determine whether the challenged employment action reaches the level of adverse." Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir. 1997).
The board contends that the reassignment of Dumas's marketing classes should not be found to be a materially adverse job action because he has failed to introduce any evidence to show that the reassignment resulted in a change of responsibilities so significant as to constitute a setback in his career. "In cases . . . which involve an involuntary transfer, the `key inquiry' is `whether the transfer constitutes a negative employment action tantamount to a demotion.' . . . There must be a deprivation of opportunity or position." (Citation omitted.) Johnson v. Eastchester Union Free School District, 211 F.Sup.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Based on the evidence that has been introduced, the board contends that the only adverse result of the class reassignment is that Dumas would no longer teach one particular class at Bassick; a class which Dumas admitted constituted only one of several instructional classes that he typically taught every year. Stated differently, the board argues that even if the schedule reassignment did occur before Dumas announced his retirement, had he not left, Dumas would have remained a teacher, at the same school, with the same salary and the same benefits that he received before the reassignment. Thus, because Dumas has not shown that this reassignment resulted in some setback in his career, it cannot constitute an adverse employment act. To support its claim, the board cites several cases in which courts have clearly declined to find that the changing of teaching assignments or the moving of a teacher's classroom constituted an adverse action. See, e.g., Pipkin v. Bridgeport Board of Education, supra, 323 F.Sup.2d 326 (no evidence submitted by the plaintiff that her career suffered a setback due to the transfer to be considered an adverse employment action); see also Galabya v. Board of Education, 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (lateral transfer that resulted in "minor administrative miscues" and not "a radical change in the nature of the work" was not an adverse employment action).
On the other hand, Dumas contends that this teaching reassignment was more like a demotion that, without notice took away the program, the position and the responsibilities he had cultivated at Bassick for over twenty years. Dumas, however, has failed to provide this court with any direct or circumstantial evidence to show that his being removed from teaching his marketing class and being reassigned to teach more keyboarding classes resulted in a setback to his career, such that any prospects for advancement were negatively affected or that his current position was less prestigious. Thus, his transfer in teaching assignments, which did not materially alter the nature of his work, did not fall within the purview of an adverse employment action.
Next, on the issue of a constructive discharge, Dumas, in his complaint, not only alleges that the teaching reassignment itself was an adverse employment action, but also that this incident served as the final straw in a string of deliberately imposed incidents, which ultimately forced him to quit his teaching job and retire early. Dumas asserts that, when all of the alleged discriminatory actions are considered together, the court should find that they constitute a constructive discharge, satisfying the adverse employment act requirement.
"[A] [c]onstructive discharge occurs when an employer renders an employee's working conditions so difficult and intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign . . . A claim of constructive discharge must be supported by more than the employee's subjective opinion that the job conditions have become so intolerable that he or she was forced to resign." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 53 Conn.App. 252, 261, 730 A.2d 88 (1999), rev'd in part on other grounds, 254 Conn. 205, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "To plead a prima facie case of constructive discharge, a plaintiff must allege two elements. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted deliberately to create an intolerable work environment. Deliberateness exists only if the actions complained of were intended by the employer as an effort to force the employee to quit . . . The second element requires that the working conditions be intolerable. Intolerability is measured by a reasonable person standard and not by the employee's subjective feelings . . . An employee's subjective opinion that her working conditions are intolerable is not sufficient to establish constructive discharge . . . Mere reduction or change in job responsibility does not constitute constructive discharge." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Leson v. ARI of Connecticut, Inc., 51 F.Sup.2d 135, 143-49 (D.Conn. 1999).
In addition, courts have found that "[t]he standard to prove a constructive discharge is indeed a demanding one." Martin v. CitiBank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 1985). Given this strict standard, several courts have summarily rejected claims alleging a constructive discharge. For example, a reassignment of job responsibilities coupled with allegations of harassment has been found to be insufficient to establish a claim for constructive discharge. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Oppenheimer, 701 F.Sup. 29, 31 (D.Conn. 1987) (transfer to a monotonous and demeaning job along with cold treatment from supervisors is insufficient to support a claim); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (no constructive discharge when employer made it clear it wished employee to remain as employee and there was no loss of pay in new position). Similarly, in Leson v. ARI of Connecticut, Inc., supra, the court granted summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff, who was being reassigned to a new position that she viewed as a demotion, claimed constructive discharge and quit before ever working one day at the new position. In that case, the court found there was no constructive discharge because "[a] reasonable person will usually explore alternative avenues before coming to the conclusion that resignation is the only option." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 144.
In this case, although Dumas has personally claimed that he felt forced to retire, this court again finds that he has failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the situation he experienced at Bassick was objectively intolerable, that is, that a reasonable person in Dumas's shoes would also have felt compelled to resign. The only evidence that Dumas provided to support his own subjective assertions that his working conditions were intolerable was the statement made during his retirement dinner, in which the principal stated that he never had a teacher go along with so many transfers to different classrooms throughout the school. Furthermore, because the alleged room transfers occurred outside the statutory 180-day period, this statement may be considered only circumstantial evidence that a reasonable person in Dumas's shoes would also have felt compelled to quit. Lastly, similar to the Leson decision, a reasonable person in Dumas's position would have at least attempted to explore alternative options that would enable him to maintain his current salary and benefits, rather than deciding to retire even before seeing if the new schedule assignment would work out. Thus, this court finds that because Dumas has failed to show that he suffered any type of adverse employment action, he will be unable to satisfy the third prong of his prima facie case of employment discrimination.
Additionally, the test for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is phrased in the conjunctive. See Fenton v. Hisan, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 1999) (when the test for establishing a prima facie case is phrased in the conjunctive, all prongs of the test must be satisfied). That means that all four prongs must be satisfied by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and to create a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him. Since Dumas has failed to show that he suffered an adverse employment action he cannot make out a prima facie case against the board and the court need not examine the fourth prong, that "the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to [an] interference of discrimination." Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, 278 Conn. 705.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, since Dumas has failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to having sustained an adverse employment action, the court grants the board's motion for summary judgment.