Opinion
C. A. N22C-05-088 WCC
11-30-2022
JUDITH DUKO, Plaintiff, v. KANAN ENTERPRISES, INC. Individually and as the parent company of King Nut Companies, a foreign corporation; Defendants.
Raeann C. Warner, Esquire; Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., Attorney for Plaintiff. William A. Crawford, Esquire; Oleh V. Bilynsky, Esquire; Franklin & Prokopik, P.C., Attorneys for Defendants.
Submitted: August 11, 2022
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss - DENIED
Raeann C. Warner, Esquire; Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., Attorney for Plaintiff.
William A. Crawford, Esquire; Oleh V. Bilynsky, Esquire; Franklin & Prokopik, P.C., Attorneys for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILLIAM C. CARPENTER, JR. JUDGE
This is a civil action for damages arising from an alleged violation of warranties related to a product produced by Defendants, Kanan Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendants" or "Kanan"). Kanan has moved to dismiss pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 8119, arguing primarily that Plaintiff Judith Duko's ("Plaintiff" or "Duko") claims are time-barred under the statute of limitations. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In July 2019, while incarcerated at Baylor Correctional Institute, Plaintiff purchased and consumed a package of King Nut trail mix. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her mouth due to the existence of a piece of glass that was inside the trail mix container. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on May 12, 2022,asserting two separate claims for relief: (i) breach of implied warranty; and (ii) breach of express warranty.
Compl. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Compl.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the Complaint was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims under 10 Del. C. § 8119.
Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 5, (June 29, 2022) ("Def.'s Mot.").
II. Standard of Review
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court "must determine whether the claimant 'may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.'" It must also accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, and draw every reasonable factual inference in favor of the non-moving party. At this preliminary stage, dismissal will be granted only when the claimant would not be entitled to relief under "any set of facts that could be proven to support the claims asserted" in the pleading.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Wilmington Tr., Nat'l Ass'n, 2018 WL 3805740, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2018) (quoting Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978)).
Id.
See Furnari v. Wallpang Inc., 2014 WL 1678419, at *3-4 (Del. Super. Apr. 16, 2014) (citing Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)).
III. The Issue
A. Statute of Limitations
The present conflict arises because of the possible applicability of two different statutes of limitation to the case. Plaintiff seeks damages for personal injuries, but her claims are for breach of implied and express warranties.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims are untimely, arguing that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies. Defendants cite 10 Del. C. § 8119, which they argue requires a tort claim for personal injuries be brought within two years from the date of the injury.
Def.'s Mot. ¶ 4.
Section 8119 states, "no action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged personal injuries shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained. . . ."
ii. 6 Del. C. § 2-725(1)-(2)
In response, Plaintiff argues that her claims are for breach of implied and express warranties. Plaintiff argues such claims have a statute of limitations of four years after the sale of the product pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2-725(1)-(2).
Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 2.
The relevant text of § 2-725(1) provides that "[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued . . ." Section 2-725(2) provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach.""A breach of warranty occurs when delivery is made, except where a warranty explicitly extends to future performances of the goods . . ."
Id.
The Supreme Court of Delaware has explained the legislature intended § 2-725 preempt § 8119. Thus, breach of implied warranty actions are governed by the statute of limitations of § 2-725, not § 8119.
Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154, 158 (Del. 1980).
Id.
IV. Discussion
While the Court appreciates Defendants' attempt to highlight the statute of limitations dispute, the fact is that it is simply too early in the litigation to address this issue. If the allegations made by Plaintiff fit within the realm of matters covered by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), there is no question the statute of limitations is four years as set forth in 6 Del. C. § 2-725(1)-(2). The Delaware Supreme Court has ruled as such on multiple occasions and has even stated that it "applies even if the warranty breach resulted in personal injury."
Evans v. Johnson & Johnson Co., 2020 WL 616575, at *9 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2020) (citing Addison v. Emerson Elec. Co., 1997 WL 129327, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 1997) and Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154, 158 (Del. 1980)).
At this early juncture in the litigation the Court must accept Plaintiff's assertions as alleged in the Complaint. She has alleged UCC warranty violations and thus the four-year statute of limitations applies. If at some point in the litigation there is a motion asserting the conduct here does not fit the "contract for sale" language found in § 2-725, the statute of limitations issue may be raised again. But at this point the Motion is denied and Defendants must answer the Complaint within 30 days of this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William C. Carpenter, Jr. Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.