Opinion
No. 78-976
Decided May 31, 1979. Rehearing denied June 21, 1979. Certiorari denied October 22, 1979.
City appealed dismissal of citations issued to the operator of an ambulance service for failure to have a city license.
Affirmed
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Licensing — Ambulance Services — Preempted — Statute — Other Governmental Entities — May Not License. While the availability and quality of ambulance service is of local concern, providing a coordinated system of emergency medical care is of statewide concern, and since the General Assembly has so indicated by providing a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the field, governmental entities other than those provided in the statute may not license ambulances.
Appeal from the District Court of Jefferson County, Honorable Joseph P. Lewis, Judge.
Hochstadt, Straw Davis, P.C., Richard S. Strauss, for plaintiff-appellee.
Timothy L. Fasing, Assistant City Attorney, for defendants-appellants.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether, after a county has adopted regulations licensing ambulance services under the Colorado Emergency Medical Services Act, § 25-3.5-101, et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), a city may enforce an ordinance requiring ambulance services to obtain a city license.
The plaintiff, Michael DuHamel, operates Life Ambulance Service, Inc., based in Wheat Ridge, for which he obtained a license from the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners, pursuant to § 25-3.5-301, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.). On February 1, 1978, DuHamel's ambulance service transported a person from within the City of Arvada to a medical facility outside the city. DuHamel was issued two citations for operating an ambulance within the city without a license, contrary to Arvada Ordinance No. 1174 which requires ambulance services that pick up patients in the city to be licensed.
DuHamel sought relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and C.R.C.P 106 in the district court. The court ordered dismissal if the municipal court found DuHamel's ambulances were not based in Arvada. The parties so stipulated; the citations were dismissed, and the city appeals.
The city contends that the regulation of ambulance services is a field of mixed state and local concern, and that, therefore, a home rule city, such as Arvada, may regulate those services if the regulations do not conflict with the statute. It also argues that the Emergency Medical Services Act specifically allows the city to regulate ambulance services so long as the city's standards are more stringent than those of the statute. We reject both of these arguments.
In matters of purely statewide concern, the statute governs; in those of purely local concern the ordinance governs; and in matters of mixed concern, if there is a conflict between the statute and ordinance, the statute must prevail. DeLong v. City County of Denver, 195 Colo. 27, 576 P.2d 537 (1978); Huff v. Mayor of Colorado Springs, 182 Colo. 108, 512 P.2d 632 (1973).
While the availability and quality of ambulance service is of local concern, providing a coordinated system of emergency medical care is of statewide concern. See § 25-3.5-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.). The statute implements this coordinated system by providing that the Boards of County Commissioners are to license ambulances, § 25-3.5-301(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), and sets forth the terms and requirements for licenses, § 25-3.5-302, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.).
[1] Thus, since the General Assembly has indicated this matter to be of statewide concern and has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the field, governmental entities other than those provided in the statute may not license ambulances. See Century Electric Service Repair, Inc. v. Stone, 193 Colo. 181, 564 P.2d 953 (1977); Cf. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973).
To subject ambulance companies to the authority of two jurisdictions is contrary to the stated purpose of the statute because it fragments the coordinated system, and could reduce the availability of service. As pointed out by the trial court, if Arvada's licensing ordinance were to provide that sirens not exceed a 100 decibel output, and an adjacent city were to require a 110 decibel minimum, ambulance companies would be effectively excluded from operating in both cities. Likewise, were a county and a city within the county to adopt differing license requirements, ambulances based in the city could not be operated.
The city contends that § 25-3.5-106, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), expressly allows a city to license ambulances, that statute states:
"Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent a municipality or special district from adopting standards more stringent than those provided in this article."
However, this section does not refer to licensing of ambulances and thus is inapposite to the issue before us.
The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE VAN CISE concur.