Opinion
1 Div. 708.
March 17, 1932.
Frank J. Yerger, of Mobile, for petitioner.
Section 601, USCA, tit. 46, ch. 18, is not limited by section 544 thereof. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co. v. Byrne, 239 U.S. 460, 36 S.Ct. 132, 60 L.Ed. 382; Burns v. Fred L. Davis Co. (C. C. A.) 271 F. 439; The Amelia (D.C.) 183 F. 899; Merchants' Laclede Bank v. Troy Gro. Co., 144 Ala. 607, 39 So. 476; L. N. R. Co. v. Pettis, 206 Ala. 96, 89 So. 201. The codification of section 12 of the Act of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. p. 1169), as section 601 of title 46 of the United States Code (46 USCA § 601) is a legislative adoption of the known judicial construction placed on said section 12 of the act of 1915. Holley v. Brunson, 221 Ala. 572, 130 So. 173; Allen v. Allen, 223 Ala. 223, 135 So. 169.
A. S. Whiting and Leo Berman, both of Mobile, for respondent.
The exemption of seamen's wages from garnishment does not apply to seamen engaged in coastwise trade, or river trade. 46 US CA c. 18, §§ 544, 601; Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co. v. Byrne, 239 U.S. 459, 36 S.Ct. 132, 60 L.Ed. 382; U.S. v. The Grace Lothrop, 95 U.S. 527, 24 L.Ed. 514; Ravesies: v. U.S. (C. C.) 37 F. 447. A later law, which is merely a reenactment of a former, does not repeal an intermediate act which qualifies or limits the first one, but such intermediate act will be deemed to remain in force and to qualify or modify the new act in the same manner as it did the first. 36 Cyc. 1084; Hacken v. Isenberg, 210 Ill. App. 120; Horn v. State (Ga. Sup.) 40 S.E. 297; Goodrich v. Hackley-Phelps-Bonnell Co., 141 Mich. 343, 104 N.W. 669; Powell v. King, 78 Minn. 83, 80 N.W. 850; State v. Beard, 21 Nev. 218, 29 P. 531; Co-op. Asso. v. Fawick, 11 S.D. 589, 79 N.W. 847; Taggart v. Hillman, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 93 S.W. 245; Bentley v. Adams, 92 Wis. 386, 66 N.W. 505. Upon revision or codification, the re-enactment of substantially the same provisions as those contained in former statutes is a legislative adoption of their known judicial construction. 46 USCA c. 18, §§ 544, 601; U.S.C. Comp. Ed. p. 1; Duramus v. Harrison, 26 Ala. 326; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U.S. 619, 4 S.Ct. 142, 28 L.Ed. 269. The Act of March 4, 1915, USCA, tit. 46, c. 18, § 601, did not work a repeal of the Act of June 9, 1874, USCA, tit. 46, c. 18, § 544. Repeal by implication is not favored; and where there is a reasonable field of operation by a just construction for both statutes, which are repugnant to each other, both will be given effect. Act May 29, 1928, c. 910 (1 USCA § 51 et seq.); 36 Cyc. 1084; State ex rel. v. Smiley, 219 Ala. 119, 121 So. 398; Cook v. Meyer, 73 Ala. 580, Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 15 S.Ct. 532, 39 L.Ed. 614; U.S. v. Healey, 160 U.S. 136, 16 S.Ct. 247, 40 L.Ed. 369; Birmingham v. So. Exp. Co., 164 Ala. 529, 51 So. 159.
If it be conceded that the Act of Congress of March 4, 1915, § 12 (38 Stat. 1169), had the effect of repealing the limitation upon the Act of Cong. June 7, 1872 (17 Stat. 262), which was provided by the Act of Cong. June 9, 1874 (18 Stat. 64), as was held in Burns v. Fred L. Davis Co. (C.C.A.) 271 F. 439, and that such repealing statute continued in effect until the adoption of the present United States Code, that concession does not show error in the result reached by the Court of Appeals of Alabama in this case.
As pointed out in that opinion, by the adoption of the United States Code by Act approved June 30, 1926 (44 Stat. 777), the provisions of the act of 1874, and of March 4, 1915, were re-enacted — the former as 46 USCA § 544, the latter as 46 USCA § 601. So that, by thus re-enacting the provisions of the act of 1874 along with that of March 4, 1915, the former was made a restriction upon the effect of the latter, just as it had been held to be a restriction upon the act of 1872 (Inter-Island Nav. Co. v. Byrne, 239 U.S. 459, 36 S.Ct. 132, 60 L.Ed. 362) whose provisions were merely extended by the act of 1915 to include fishermen. So that, whatever may have been the status of the law from March 4, 1915, to June 30, 1926, the date of the adoption of the code, and though it be as affirmed in the Burns Case, supra, we agree that, after the adoption of the Code, both sections 544 and 601 of 46 USCA became operative, and the former was a limitation on the latter.
Writ denied.
ANDERSON, C. J., and BROWN and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.