Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 3300 (RCC) (GWG)
February 20, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION To the Honorable Richard C. Casey United States District Judge
Plaintiff Benton J. Drozdik has brought this action against the City of New York, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation ("HHC"), Elmhurst Hospital ("Elmhurst"), and ten unidentified individual defendants, alleging that his rights were violated when he was involuntarily committed at Elmhurst. The defendants have now moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The defendants filed a statement of undisputed facts as required by Local Rule 56.1 along with affidavits. Drozdik has not submitted any counterstatement or, indeed, any opposition to the defendants' motion. Accordingly, the facts discussed herein are based solely on the defendants' affidavits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
1. Factual History
Drozdik and his mother, Anna Drozdik (also known as Anna Drozdikova), lived together in Jackson Heights, New York for at least four years as of January 10, 2000. See Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, dated October 18, 2002 ("Def. 56.1 Statement"), ¶ 1. In November 1999, Anna Drozdik was admitted to St. John's Hospital ("St. John's") in order to repair a fractured pelvis. Id. ¶ 3. Drozdik and his mother would not agree to any discharge plan except to allow her to go home immediately. Id. ¶ 4. St. John's agreed to the plan and arranged for medicine and medical services to be provided for Anna Drozdik at her home. Id. ¶ 5. Drozdik, however, refused to allow his mother to receive the medicine and services. Id.
In an attempt to find out the reasons for Drozdik's refusal, St. John's referred the case to a City agency: Protective Services for Adults. Id. ¶ 6. Its caseworker, Etzer Leveille, attempted on three occasions to verify Anna Drozdik's condition but was denied entry to the apartment each time. Id. ¶ 7. Leveille obtained an Order to Gain Access and entered the apartment on January 10, 2000. Id. ¶ 8. The apartment was found in a decrepit state as it was littered with boxes creating tunnels between one room to another. Id. ¶ 9. In addition, an unidentified person, other than Drozdik and his mother, was found asleep on a mattress on the floor. See Report of the Court Evaluator Pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.09(3)(c), dated April 6, 2000 ("Mental Health Rpt.") (reproduced in Declaration of Attorney Michael DiChiara, dated October 18, 2002 ("DiChiara Decl."), Ex. C), ¶ 15. Leveille found that there was no blood pressure medication in the apartment. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 9; Mental Health Rpt. ¶ 15. When Emergency Medical Services came to the apartment, Anna Drozdik had elevated blood pressure and suffered from 2 severe dehydration. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 10; Mental Health Rpt. ¶ 15. Anna Drozdik was taken voluntarily to the emergency room at Elmhurst. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 11; Mental Health Rpt. ¶ 15.
Drozdik followed his mother to Elmhurst. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 11. Upon arrival, Drozdik was hostile, aggressive, and threatening. Id. ¶ 12. In addition, Drozdik appeared to be anxious, paranoid and delusional. Id. Dr. Anna Saas examined Drozdik and determined that he was schizophrenic, psychotic, paranoid, and threatening. Id. ¶ 13; Form OMH 476 (2-94), dated January 10, 2000 ("January 10 Form") (reproduced in DiChiara Decl. Ex. A), at 1. Because Drozdik's mental illnesses made him a danger to himself and others, Dr. Saas ordered Drozdik involuntarily committed for twenty four hours until he could be re-evaluated. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 14; January 10 Form at 1. Drozdik was provided with a notice of his rights. See Form OMH 476 SR (3-91) (reproduced in DiChiara Decl. Ex. A).
On January 11, 2000, Drozdik was re-evaluated by a psychiatrist, Dr. Felisa Y. Dakis. Form OMH 474 (2-94) page 2, dated January 11 ("Dakis Eval.") (reproduced in DiChiara Decl. Ex. A). Dr. Dakis found Drozdik exhibited symptoms of paranoia and impulsiveness, acted illogically, and lacked insight into his illness. Id. Dr. Dakis found that because Drozdik was unable to care for himself and was interfering with his mother's care, he posed a danger to himself and others. Id. Drozdik was diagnosed as psychotic and thus Dr. Dakis confirmed there was cause to continue Drozdik's confinement. Id. Dr. Dakis re-evaluated Drozdik on January 12, 2000, and continued to find that he was uncooperative, hostile, threatening, and suffered from paranoia. Progress Record, dated January 12, 2000 (reproduced in DiChiara Decl. Ex. A), at 1. On January 13, Drozdik was given medication but was not released by Elmhurst. Id. at 2.
On January 14, 2000, Drozdik was discharged from Elmhurst. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 19. Dr. Dakis found that after receiving medication, Drozdik's thoughts had become more organized and his mood had improved. See Discharge/Transfer Expiration Summary, dated January 14, 2000 (reproduced in DiChiara Decl. Ex. A), at 1-2. Drozdik had become "calm, cooperative with coherent, relevant speech." Id. at 2. Dr. Dakis found that Drozdik was now stable enough to be placed on outpatient management and allowed to return home. Id.
2. Procedural History
Drozdik filed the complaint in this action on April 19, 2001 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint, filed April 19, 2001 ("Complaint"). Drozdik alleged that he was falsely imprisoned, thereby violating his rights under the Constitution. See Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 38-41. Drozdik also raised state law claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, improper employment practices, and violations of unnamed sections of the New York State Constitution. See Complaint, ¶¶ 42-60. Drozdik requested damages, an injunction against the defendants, and a declaratory judgment removing his obligation to pay for his commitment. See Complaint at 7-8; ¶¶ 61-63.
Drozdik's application for a temporary restraining order (relating to his mother's status) was denied in January 2002. See Order, dated January 2, 2002 (Docket #8). His request for an injunction was denied on February 7, 2002. See Transcript of Conference, dated February 7, 2002 (Docket # 14), at 23-28. The Court thereafter set a discovery schedule.
On October 18, 2002, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Their motion papers included a notice to Drozdik advising him of the potential consequences of failing to respond to their motion as required in this Circuit. See, e.g., Irby v. New York City Transit Auth., 262 F.3d 412, 413-14 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The due date for Drozdik's response was November 8, 2002. See Memorandum Endorsement, filed September 27, 2002 (Docket #21). Drozdik submitted no response to the defendants' motion. On December 2, 2002, the Court issued an Order directing Drozdik to respond to the defendants' motion on or before December 31, 2002. See Order, filed December 4, 2002 (Docket #25). The Order explicitly warned Drozdik that if he failed to do so, the Court would "decide the motion based solely on the papers submitted by the defendant." Id. Drozdik never responded to the defendants' motion.
II. DISCUSSION 1. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). All evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the court draws all inferences in that party's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chemical Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "An issue of fact is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "Conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition, "[t]he 'mere existence of a scintilla of evidence' supporting the non-movant's case is also insufficient to defeat summary judgment." Niagara Mohawk, 315 F.3d at 175 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
2. Drozdik's Section 1983 Claims
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates no substantive rights but instead provides a "procedure of redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). In order to prevail on a claim under section 1983 a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendants were acting under color of state law when they committed the complained of acts and (2) the conduct complained of deprived the plaintiff of "a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). The defendants here have not disputed that they were acting under the color of state law. Thus, the only issue to be resolved is whether their conduct deprived Drozdik of a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution or federal law.
Drozdik was initially committed on January 10, 2000, pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.40. See January 10 Form at 1. His confinement after that date was pursuant to section 9.39 of the Mental Hygiene Law. See Form OMH 474 SR (9-97), dated January 11, 2000, ("January 11 Form") (reproduced in DiChiara Decl. Ex. A). Section 9.40 allows a qualified hospital to commit a person for observation for up to seventy two hours if the patient has a mental illness "which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others." N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.40(a). Under section 9.40, the patient must be released within twenty-four hours unless two psychiatrists determine the person is mentally ill and poses a danger. Id. § 9.40(c). Under section 9.39, a patient may be involuntarily admitted for up to fifteen days if the patient poses a danger of serious harm to the patient or to others. N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.39(a). Under both sections, "likely to result in serious harm" means
(a) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or herself; or (b) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.01; accord N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.39(a).
Involuntary civil commitment raises two potential constitutional issues: a person's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, see Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993), and the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995). The defendants' motion analyzes Drozdik's claims only under the Fourth Amendment. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 18, 2002, at 2-6. As Drozdik's complaint explicitly invokes the Fourteenth Amendment, see Complaint ¶ 39, the Court will consider Drozdik's claims under both constitutional provisions.
a. Drozdik's Due Process Right. "An involuntary civil commitment is a 'massive curtailment of liberty,' . . . and it therefore cannot permissibly be accomplished without due process of law." Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)) (citations omitted); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.") (citations omitted). An involuntary commitment violates a person's due process 7 rights unless the person poses a danger to himself or others. Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1061; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) ("a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.").
The New York statutory scheme for civil commitment requires a showing of dangerousness prior to commitment and, therefore, has been held to be constitutional. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) ("the New York civil commitment scheme . . . include[s] a showing of dangerousness, [and] meets minimum due process standards . . ."). The statutory scheme requires that a doctor make a medical decision that the patient poses a danger to himself or others. See Rodriquez, 72 F.3d at 1062-63. The doctor's judgment that a person poses a danger must not fall substantially below the generally accepted standards of the medical community. Id. at 1063.
Dr. Saas, who originally ordered the commitment, found that Drozdik appeared to be "schizophrenic, psychotic, paranoid [and] threatening." January 10 Form at 1. On January 11, 2000, Dr. Saas again found Drozdik to be a danger, concluding that he was "psychotic, acutely paranoid, delusional and threatening." January 11 Form at 1. These findings were confirmed by Dr. Dakis who diagnosed Drozdik as "anxious, hostile, aggressive and threatening." Dakis Eval. at 1. Dr. Dakis found that Drozdik posed a danger to himself and others because he was "not able to care for [him]self" and was "[i]nterfering in the care for his mother." Id.
Cases have found similar observations supported a finding that a person posed a danger to himself or others and thus comported with due process. See Glass, 984 F.2d at 57 ("demeanor was variously described . . . as hostile, guarded, angry, suspicious, uncooperative, and 8 paranoid."); see also Katzman v. Kahn, 67 F. Supp.2d 103, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (threats made to patient's girlfriend and police observations that patient was "behaving bizarrely and aggressively"), aff'd, 242 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2000); Sumay v. City of New York Health and Hosp. Corp., 1998 WL 205345, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998) (patient "arrived in the emergency room and became 'hostile, loud and argumentative,' with a 'threatening' demeanor."); Richardson v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 840 F. Supp. 219, 221-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (patient "found to be 'delusional, paranoid and potentially violent"). Drozdik has not met his burden of putting forward competent evidence that the findings of Drs. Saas and Dakis were erroneous or below accepted medical standards. Thus Drozdik cannot prevail on a claim that his due process rights were violated. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (where party opposing summary judgment bears burden of proof at trial, that party must give proof of essential elements of its claim)
b. Drozdik's rights under the Fourth Amendment. Cases have also analyzed involuntary commitment claims as implicating the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. See Glass, 984 F.2d at 58; see also Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("Although confinement of the mentally ill by state action generally is analyzed under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . we analyze the distinct right to be free from an unreasonable government seizure of the person for whatever purpose.") (citations omitted); cf. Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding the Fourth Amendment applicable to a hospital's retention of a child for drug testing), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 820 (2001). A person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when "'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 9 free to leave.'" Kia P., 235 F.3d at 762 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). In this case, Drozdik was seized once it was apparent that he was not free to leave Elmhurst. See id. at 762.
An involuntary hospitalization, however, passes constitutional muster "'if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to seizure under the governing legal standard.'" Glass, 984 F.2d at 58 (quoting Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992)). The New York Mental Hygiene laws require a finding that a person is a danger to themself or others before the person may be committed. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.39(a). As discussed above, Drs. Saas and Dakis made medical judgments that Drozdik posed such a danger. Accordingly, probable cause existed for the involuntary commitment of Drozdik and his seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
3. Drozdik's Remaining Claims
In addition to his section 1983 claim, Drozdik has also asserted a number of state law claims. See Complaint, ¶¶ 42-63. Because his federal claims have been dismissed, however, the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law claims. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P'ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); accord Marcus v. ATT Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In general, where the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.") (citing Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 843 F.2d 658, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (e). Such objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with copies sent to the Honorable Richard Conway Casey, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007, and to the undersigned at 40 Centre Street, New York, New York 10007. Any request for an extension of time to file objections must be directed to Judge Casey. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).