Opinion
No. CV02-0011511 S
July 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On October 1, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was amended on June 17, 2003 and amended for the final time on February 13, 2004. The second amended complaint raises claims in two counts: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel via several alleged failures or inadequacies; and 2) that the respondent has failed to correctly determine and apply statutory good time credits. The respondent's return denies these claims.
The matter came before this court on April 8, 2004 for a trial on the merits. After finding that the petitioner had presented no evidence in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as raised in count one of the operative complaint, the court denied the petition as to count one. As to count two, the court entered post-trial briefing orders giving the petitioner until April 16, 2004 and the respondent until April 23, 2004 to file their respective post-trial briefs. Additionally, the parties were ordered to notify the court if they elected not to file a brief. On June 21, 2004, the court received notification from the petitioner's counsel that both the petitioner and the respondent would not be filing post-trial briefs. On June 28, 2004, the court received separate notification from respondent's counsel reiterating that both parties would not be filing post-trial briefs.
Based upon the testimony by Department of Correction Records Specialist Robin Nedjoika and the petitioner, as well as the documents entered into evidence, the court makes the following findings of fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 24, 1995, the petitioner was sentenced, in accordance with a plea agreement, in the judicial district of Tolland on fourteen separate docket numbers, including: CR-94-0054426, CR-95-0056151, CR-95-0056152, CR-95-0056153, CR-95-0056154, CR-95-0056155, CR-95-0056156, CR-95-0056157, CR-95-0056162, CR-95-0056859, CR-95-0056860, CR-95-0056861, and CR-95-0057862.
2. The sentencing court (Hammer, J.) imposed a sentence on docket number CR-95-0056151 of fifteen years to serve. On docket number CR-95-0056152, the petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to serve, concurrent with CR-95-0056151. On docket numbers CR-95-0056153, CR-95-0056154, CR-95-0056155, CR-95-0056156 and CR-95-0056162, the petitioner also was sentenced to fifteen years to serve on each docket, to run concurrent with the sentences on docket numbers CR-95-0056151 and CR-95-0056152. On docket number CR-95-0056 157, the petitioner was sentenced to one year to serve, concurrent with the other sentences imposed at that time. On docket numbers CR-95-0056859, CR-95-0056860, CR-95-0056861 and CR-95-0056862, the petitioner was sentenced to ten years to serve on each docket, to run concurrent with the other sentences previously imposed. The total effective sentence imposed on August 24, 1995 by the court on all dockets was fifteen years to serve.
3. The following dockets at issue in the instant petition involved offense dates that precede October 1, 1994: CR-94-0054426 (July 3, 1994); CR-94-0056151 (August 18, 1994); CR-95-0056152 (August 30, 1994); CR-95-0056154 (September 1, 1994); and CR-95-0056162 (September 25, 1994). These cases hereinafter are referred to as "pre-October 1, 1994 offenses."
4. The following dockets at issue in the instant petition involved offense dates on or after October 1, 1994: CR-95-0056156 (December 8, 1994); CR-95-0056153 (December 15, 1994); CR-95-0056155 (December 15, 1994); CR-95-0057862 (January 1, 1995); CR-95-0056860 (January 5, 1995); CR-95-0056859 (January 5, 1995); CR-95-0056157 (January 10, 1995); and CR-95-0056861 (February 24, 1995). These cases hereinafter are referred to as "post-October 1, 1994 offenses."
5. In accordance with General Statutes § 18-100d and Velez v. Commissioner of Correction, 250 Conn. 536, 552, 738 A.2d 604 (1999) ("good time statutes [are] inapplicable to persons sentenced to a term of imprisonment for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1994"), the respondent has calculated and applied statutory good time credits for pre-October 1, 1994 offenses. The post-October 1, 1994 offenses have not, however, received any statutory good credits because such application would contravene § 18-100d and Velez.
6. The respondent has credited docket numbers CR-95-0056153, CR95-0056155 and CR-95-0056 156, which involve post-October 1, 1994 offenses and are not good time eligible, with presentence confinement (i.e., jail) credit only. The application of the presentence confinement credits to these three dockets results in a maximum release date of January 9, 2010 for each of these three dockets and renders all three simultaneously being the petitioner's current longest running and, therefore, controlling sentences.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
The petitioner in this matter seeks statutory good time credits. In count two of the second amended petition, the petitioner alleges that the respondent "has illegally calculated the years of incarceration, which petitioner received . . . as petitioner was arrested prior to October 1, 1994 and would have been entitled to good time . . ." This claim is directly addressed and controlled by our Supreme Court's decision in Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, 261 Conn. 806, 808 A.2d 653 (2002).
In Tyson, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he significance of October 1, 1994, is that a person who has committed a crime on or after that date and who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in connection with a conviction of such a crime is not entitled to earn good time credit, which serves to accelerate the date of release from confinement. Persons sentenced for crimes committed before October 1, 1994, however, remain entitled to such good time. The dispositive issue in [ Tyson], therefore, [was] which of the petitioner's two concurrent sentences governs his release date: the pre-1994 sentence or the post-1994 sentence." Id., at 808. (Internal citations omitted.)
The Tyson court "harmonize[d] the . . . [applicable] statutory provisions by recognizing that the status of a sentence as a controlling sentence can change while a prisoner is serving multiple, concurrent sentences where some but not all of those sentences are subject to reduction through the application of good time credit. [This] . . . construction of the statutory scheme is consistent with the requirement of § 18-7a(c) that good time be calculated on a monthly basis . . . [This] . . . construction also is consistent with the provisions of § 18-100d, which require a prisoner to serve the full term of a sentence imposed in connection with a crime committed on or after October 1, 1994. Under [this] construction of the statutory scheme, the petitioner obtains the benefit of good time credit under § 18-7a(c) with respect to his pre-1994 sentence, as was the intent of the legislature for crimes committed before October 1, 1994, and the legislative mandate that the petitioner serve the full term of his post-1994 sentence is satisfied." Id., at 827.
Applying Tyson to the facts of the instant petition, the petitioner's sentences imposed for offenses that were committed after October 1, 1994 are good time ineligible by operation of § 18-100d and Velez. Transfers of good time credits such as those permitted by Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 214; 756 A.2d 1264 (2000), from a good time earning sentence to a sentence that is good time ineligible are prohibited and would lead, according to the Tyson court, to "untenable results." Tyson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 261 Conn. 823. The Tyson court additionally noted "that, although Rivera is inapplicable to the facts of the present case, Rivera remains applicable to sentences imposed in connection with crimes committed prior to October 1, 1994. The present case [i.e., Tyson] involves, inter alia, a sentence for a crime committed on or after October 1, 1994, and, thus, to apply Rivera in such circumstances would thwart the purpose of § 18-100d, which of course, was not applicable in Rivera." Id., at 823 n. 17.
Therefore, and based on the foregoing application of Tyson to facts of this petition, the respondent has correctly determined the petitioner's controlling sentences and release date. The petitioner is not entitled to the relief he seeks. Judgment is entered denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
S.T. FUGER, JR., JUDGE