Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:20-cv-02276-HMH-JDA
07-09-2020
Roderick Drennon, Plaintiff, v. Kemet Electronics Corporation, S B Phillips Company, Inc., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' partial motion to dismiss. [Doc. 8.] Plaintiff alleges discrimination and retaliation claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as state law claims for assault and battery. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.
This case was filed in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas and removed to this Court on June 16, 2020. [Docs. 1; 1-1; 1-2.] On June 23, 2020, Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, requesting dismissal of Plaintiff's two state-law claims. [Doc. 8.] On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff filed a response. [Doc. 11.] Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 30, 2020. [Doc. 15.] Defendants then filed a reply to Plaintiff's response on July 1, 2020. [Doc. 17.] Accordingly, Defendants' partial motion to dismiss is ripe for review.
Although "an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect," Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001), "[i]f some of the defects raised in the original motion [to dismiss] remain in the new pleading, the court simply may consider the motion as being addressed to the amended pleading [because to] hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance," 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2011). Such is the case here.
BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was employed with KEMET Corporation ("KEMET") as a machine operator and that during his employ, he "was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment and discrimination and assault and battery by Defendants' agents and employees because of his race" and that "he was further subjected to retaliation because of his complaints of discrimination, harassment, and assault and battery." [Doc. 15 ¶¶ 9, 11, 12.] Plaintiff cites two incidents as the basis for his assault and battery claims. He alleges that on or about January 24, 2020, he "asked his lead technician and immediate supervisor, James Elgin, if he could take a break," but Elgin "became irate and yelled at [Plaintiff] that he had already taken a break" and "then assaulted [Plaintiff] by aggressively pushing him and yelling 'Go on break!'" [Id. ¶ 14.] As the second incident, Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 2, 2020, "his new supervisor, Kipp" used all five of his fingers to "forcefully dig[] into Plaintiff's shoulder" and then, after "Plaintiff told [Kipp] to take his hands off of him," Kipp "put his hands on [Plaintiff's] shoulder a second time." [Id. ¶¶ 25-26.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests actual and punitive damages as well as attorneys' fees. [Id. at 9-10.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standards
Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) examines whether the complaint fails to state facts upon which jurisdiction can be founded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). It is the plaintiff's burden to prove jurisdiction, and the court is to "regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To resolve a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider undisputed facts and any jurisdictional facts that it determines. See id. The court may dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any of the following bases: "'(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.'" Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Rule 12(b)(6)Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts" nor "accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.").
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)—the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's two state-law causes of action—for assault and battery—should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") [Doc. 8-1], which provides in relevant part that
[t]he rights and remedies granted by this title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury . . ., shall exclude all other rights and
remedies of such employee . . . at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury . . . .S.C. Code. Ann. § 42-1-540. In his response, Plaintiff argues that the alleged injury that is the subject of his assault and battery claims falls outside of the exclusivity provision because he alleges it was intentionally caused by his employer. [Doc. 11.] The Court agrees with Defendants that the claims should be dismissed.
South Carolina courts have opined that an employee's injury that was intentionally caused by a co-employee who is the "alter ego" of the employer falls outside of Act, so that the exclusivity provision does not apply. Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 428 S.E.2d 700, 701 (S.C. 1993). Importantly, however, South Carolina courts have held that, for this purpose, "alter ego" does not generally extend to "supervisory employees such as [an] office manager," but rather, includes only "'dominant corporate owners and officers.'" Id. Accordingly, when a plaintiff seeks to recover in tort for a workplace injury, the intentional nature of the injury can take the injury outside the scope of the Act only if the plaintiff has alleged that the tortfeasor was a dominant corporate owner or officer of the employer. Williams v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 1:18-cv-01346-JMC, 2019 WL 211087, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 16, 2019).
In this case, although Plaintiff contends that his Amended Complaint alleges that his employer intentionally caused his injuries, in actuality it alleges only that his supervisors intentionally caused his injuries. [Doc. 15 ¶¶ 14, 26.] Because Plaintiff does not allege that either of the individuals who allegedly assaulted him were dominant corporate owners or officers of KEMET, he has failed to allege facts that would take his claim outside of the exclusivity provision. See Williams, 2019 WL 211087, at *7. Thus, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for assault or battery, and the Court therefore recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss these two claims be granted. Id.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' partial motion to dismiss [Doc. 8] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge July 9, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina