Opinion
MMXCV136010798
05-11-2016
Robert Doyle v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#129)
Elpedio N. Vitale, J.
The defendant Universal Underwriters Insurance Company (" Universal") moves for summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. Pursuant to P.B. § 17-44 et seq., the parties filed a Joint Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (" Joint Statement") concerning Universal's claim of collateral estoppel and the plaintiff's opposition thereto. The Joint Statement provides as follows:
Subject Accident
1. On or about November 3, 2010, the Plaintiff was involved in a multi-car motor vehicle accident (the " Subject Accident").
First Action
2. On or about January 3, 2011, the Plaintiff commenced an action against the driver of one of the other vehicles in the Subject Accident, Neil Nilson, captioned Robert Doyle v. Neil Nilson, and bearing Docket No. MMX-CV-11-6004423-S in the Judicial District of Middletown at Middlesex (the " First Action").
3. After the Subject Accident, the Plaintiff underwent medical treatment with, inter alia, Andrew Caputo, M.D. During the First Action, the Plaintiff disclosed Dr. Caputo as an expert witness from whom he intended to elicit an opinion or opinions for use in support of the Plaintiff's damages claims.
4. In response to discovery requests served in the First Action, the Plaintiff produced medical records and bills generated as a result of treatment he underwent arising out of the Subject Accident. These documents reflected that: (a) the Plaintiff last consulted with a medical provider for injuries arising out of the Subject Accident on or about March 22, 2011 when he spoke to Dr. Caputo over the phone; and (b) the total of the Plaintiff's medical bills was $15,924.
5. The Plaintiff was deposed in the First Action on or about January 20, 2012. Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the certified January 20, 2012 deposition transcript of Robert Doyle, taken in connection with the First Action.
6. On or about September 26, 2012, the Plaintiff sought leave to file an Amended Complaint. Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the Amended Complaint filed on behalf of the Plaintiff in the First Action. In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff claimed to have suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the Subject Accident. (Ex. B at ¶ 5.) Furthermore, in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that he " has incurred and will incur in the future, considerable expenses for hospital, doctor and medical care treatment, x-rays, medicines and medical supplies all to his financial detriment." (Id. at ¶ 8.)
7. Dr. Caputo was deposed on or about November 5, 2012. Exhibit C is a true and accurate copy of the certified November 5, 2012 deposition transcript of Andrew Caputo, M.D., taken in connection with the First Action.
High-Low Arbitration
8. Instead of trying the First Action to a jury, the Plaintiff voluntarily decided to participate in binding, high-low arbitration.
9. On January 28, 2013, the Plaintiff and Mr. Nilson participated in a hearing before an arbitrator, Richard Tynan, Esq., during which they presented evidence and testimony concerning both liability and damages arising out of the Subject Accident (the " Arbitration Hearing").
10. At the time of the Arbitration Hearing, the Plaintiff had consulted with Dr. Caputo more than once regarding his current prognosis and treatment alternatives. As of the date of Arbitration Hearing, the Plaintiff had elected not to undergo any surgical procedures to address any medical condition, which may have arisen from, or been exacerbated as a result of, the Subject Accident.
11. During the Arbitration Hearing, the Plaintiff presented evidence and testimony from multiple witnesses concerning the nature and extent of his damages--both economic and noneconomic. Specifically, the Plaintiff presented evidence and testimony regarding his physical limitations, pain, and suffering, as well as that, at the time of the Arbitration Hearing, he did not consider himself fully healed. The Plaintiff also presented evidence and testimony at the Arbitration Hearing regarding the possibility that he might need future medical treatment, including surgery, as a result of the Subject Accident. At the time of the Arbitration Hearing, the Plaintiff did not withhold from Attorney Tynan any evidence or testimony then known or available to him pertaining to his damages claim.
12. On or about March 6, 2013, Attorney Tynan issued a written statement containing his findings (the " Arbitration Award"). Exhibit D is a true and accurate copy of the Arbitration Award. In the Arbitration Award, Attorney Tynan concluded that the Plaintiff had met his burden of establishing that he had sustained his injuries as a result of the negligence of Mr. Nilson. Attorney Tynan explained that, after considering all of the evidence and testimony the parties had presented, he deemed it appropriate to award the Plaintiff damages in the amount of $105,924, consisting of: (a) the entirety of the claimed economic damages ($15,924); and (b) non-economic damages in the amount of $90,000.
13. After Mr. Nilson and the Plaintiff agreed on terms for, and executed, a Settlement and Release Agreement pertaining to the First Action, Mr. Nilson's insurance company paid to the Plaintiff the full limits of Mr. Nilson's automobile insurance policy, which was $100,000.
Second Action
14. On or about October 28, 2013, after receiving the $100,000 policy limits from Mr. Nilson's insurer, the Plaintiff filed the instant action against his automobile insurance carrier, Universal Underwriters, captioned Robert Doyle v. Universal Underwriters, and bearing Docket No. CV-13-6010798-S in the judicial district of Middletown (the " Second Action"). Exhibit E is a true and accurate copy of the Complaint file on behalf of the Plaintiff in the Second Action.
15. The Plaintiff claims that Mr. Nilson was underinsured at the time of the Subject Accident. (See Ex. E at ¶ 12.) In the Second Action, the Plaintiff further claims to have suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the Subject Accident. (See id. At ¶ 5.) Furthermore, in the Second Action, the Plaintiff alleges that he " has incurred and will incur in the future, considerable expenses for hospital, doctor and medical care treatment, x-rays, medicines and medical supplies all to his financial detriment." (Id. at ¶ 8.)
16. The nature and extent of the losses and damages the Plaintiff is claiming in the Second Action are, in essence, the same nature and extent of the losses and damages that the Plaintiff claimed in the First Action.
17. In 2015, the Plaintiff responded to Interrogatories and Requests for Production from Universal Underwriters. Exhibit F is a true and accurate copy of the Plaintiff's sworn Answers to Interrogatories. The Plaintiff referred to an attached " Schedule 'A'" in response to Interrogatories and Requests for Production concerning medical records and bills regarding his treatment arising out of the Subject Accident. Exhibit G is a true and accurate copy of the " Schedule 'A'" to which the Plaintiff referred in his responses, and a copy of which he produced in conjunction therewith. Exhibit G contains a chronology of the medical treatment the Plaintiff received as a result of the Subject Accident, as well as a list of medical bills corresponding to such treatment.
18. The Plaintiff has never elected to undergo surgery as a result of the Subject Accident. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not received any medical treatment or incurred any additional medical expenses concerning the Subject Accident since March 22, 2011.
Using the Joint Statement, the Universal's motion for summary judgment frames the precise issue as whether the Plaintiff, after litigating the issue of economic and non-economic damages arising out of the subject motor vehicle accident, by voluntarily entering into binding, high-low arbitration with the tortfeasor, may nonetheless seek to relitigate those same damages issues in a subsequent underinsured action against his insurer, because he feels as though the arbitrator undervalued his claim for damages in the arbitration award?
Universal argues that the " plaintiff is barred from relitigating his claim because he has already adjudicated it through arbitration." Consequently, Universal requests that judgment enter in favor of the plaintiff for $5,924. The plaintiff contends that " the arbitrator's decision as to value in his matter" is not binding, and that the defendant " has not asserted any contractual defense by way of language in the contract between the parties." Plaintiff also apparently asserts that the defendant cannot raise collateral estoppel as a defense because the underlying arbitration was determined in favor of the plaintiff, and because the defendant has raised the doctrine by choice, or " defensively."
The defendant filed its motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support on December 1, 2015, along with a proposed statement of facts and exhibits. The plaintiff filed his objection on January 15, 2016. The defendant filed a reply to the objection on January 21, 2016.
The matter was heard on short calendar on January 25, 2016.
Nature of the Proceedings
The plaintiff, Robert Doyle, filed this complaint against the defendant, Universal on November 12, 2013. The plaintiff alleges the following facts.
On or about November 3, 2010, at approximately 2:30 p.m., the plaintiff was operating his motor vehicle in a northerly direction on Maple Avenue in Durham, Connecticut, and had stopped at the intersection of Maple Avenue and Route 68. At that time, the tortfeasor, Neil Nilson, was operating his motor vehicle in a southerly direction on Maple Avenue in Durham, Connecticut, and had stopped at the intersection of Maple Avenue and Route 68. The tortfeasor then advanced across Route 68, struck another vehicle, causing that vehicle to strike the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries to his shoulder, nerve injury, a sprain of the spine, hand and wrist injuries, and a closed head injury.
At the time, the plaintiff was covered by the defendant under the provisions of a contract for automobile insurance, which included coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits. The tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured. The complaint alleges that the defendant is responsible for the cost of injuries and damages.
On January 28, 2013, the plaintiff and the tortfeasor chose to adjudicate the amount of damages owing to the plaintiff through binding arbitration. On March 6, 2013, the arbitrator Attorney Tynan awarded the plaintiff damages in the amount of $105,924. The tortfeasor's insurer paid to the plaintiff the policy limits of the tortfeasor's automobile insurance coverage, which was $100,000.
After receiving the $100,000 policy limit from the tortfeasor's insurer, the plaintiff filed the instant action against the defendant, his own insurance carrier.
The defendant filed his amended answer and special defense on October 22, 2015.
With respect to the decision by Arbitrator Tynan, the Joint Statement reveals that in the Arbitration Award, Arbitrator Tynan specifically found " that the plaintiff has sustained his burden in proving that he is entitled to fair, just and reasonable damages for those injuries he sustained through the negligence of the defendant Neil Nilson.
Discussion
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is not real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). " However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kakadelis v. DeFabritis, 191 Conn. 276, 282, 464 A.2d 57 (1983).
" To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). A party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Little v. Yale University, 92 Conn.App. 232, 234-35, 884 A.2d 427 (2005) (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Haesche v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213, 217, 640 A.2d 89 (1994) (" Although the moving party has the burden of presenting evidence that shows the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must substantiate its adverse claim with evidence disclosing the existence of an issue").
" Demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred . . . to establish the existence of a material fact, it is not enough for the party opposing summary judgment merely to assert the existence of a disputed issue . . . such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or brief. Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact." New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn.App. 240, 244-45, 659 A.2d 1226 (1995).
" To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
" Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata [or collateral estoppel]." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
The substantive point at issue is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Doyle from relitigating the amount of his damages. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It must also have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment . . . The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Jones abandoned the mutuality of parties rule, reasoning that, " to allow a party who has fully and fairly litigated an issue at a prior trial to avoid the force of a ruling against him simply because he later finds himself faced by a different opponent is inappropriate and unnecessary." Id., at 302.
" An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined . . . An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Efthimiou v. Smith, 268 Conn. 499, 506-07, 846 A.2d 222 (2004).
" Ordinarily a factual determination made in final and binding arbitration is entitled to preclusive effect." Corey v. Avco-Lycoming, 163 Conn. 309, 318, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S.Ct. 903, 34 L.Ed.2d 699 (1973); see also Convalescent Center of Bloomfield, Inc. v. Department of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn. 187, 198, 544 A.2d 604 (1988); Board of Education v. Waterbury Teachers' Ass'n, 174 Conn. 123, 126, 384 A.2d 350 (1977) (" [I]t is the policy of the law to favor settlement of disputes by arbitration").
" Collateral estoppel may be invoked against a party to a prior adverse proceeding or against those in privity with that party . . . The doctrine may be invoked offensively, in support of a party's affirmative claim against his opponent, or defensively, in opposition to his opponent's affirmative claim against him." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marques v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 Conn.App. 335, 339-40, 58 A.3d 393, (2013). In the present case, the defendant is invoking the doctrine defensively. " It is well established that privity is not required in the context of the defensive use of collateral estoppel . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 341.
In Marques v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, the court determined that an insured's claim against his insurer for underinsured motorist benefits following a motor vehicle accident was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as the issue of the insured's total compensatory damages resulting from the collision " was actually litigated and necessarily determined" in the binding arbitration hearing in his prior action against the other motorist. In Marques, the damages were found to be an amount equal to the liability coverage, and such amount was paid to the plaintiff. In instances in which the amount awarded to the plaintiff during arbitration against the tortfeasor was exceeded by the insurer's liability coverage, courts have entered summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor, awarding the additional amount as damages, and otherwise collaterally estopping further action. See Zhuta v. Brewer, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. UWY-CV126013992-S (December 17, 2014, Zemetis, J.) (court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment asserting collateral estoppel by entering judgment for plaintiff in amount of $15,267.22, where amount awarded by arbitrator was $115,267.22 and insurance company had already paid $100,000 to plaintiff); Siwek v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6017752-S (February 22, 2012, Blue, J.) (53 Conn. L. Rptr. 501) (where previous arbitrator awarded $25,129.66, and had paid $25,000 at time Superior Court suit filed, court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $129.66).
According to the Joint Statement, the plaintiff and tortfeasor entered a binding arbitration. The defendant has attached as an exhibit the arbitration award, written by the arbitrator, Richard Tynan. The letter states that after hearing testimony from the tortfeasor and the plaintiff, and reviewing depositions and numerous exhibits, the arbitrator found that the plaintiff suffered " a left scapula fracture, a left rib fracture, injury to the median nerve, aggravation of a chronic ulnar nerve or new injury to the ulnar nerve." The arbitrator further found that " the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving that he is entitled to fair, just and reasonable damages" and awarded " economic damages of $15,924 . . . and further . . . noneconomic damages of $90,000, making the total award $105,924." The parties have stipulated that the tortfeasor's insurance company paid the plaintiff $100,000. Universal seeks to prevent the plaintiff from relitigating a matter that was actually litigated and necessarily decided in a previous proceeding in which the plaintiff fully participated, and which issue is identical to the issue between the parties. The defendant relies on the arbitrator's decision in support of its position. A review of the Joint Statement, and Exhibit D, reveals that the plaintiff fully and fairly litigated his damages during the arbitration proceeding against Neil Nilson. One issue before the arbitrator was the determination of fair, just and reasonable compensatory damages. The claim for compensatory damages against Nilson is identical to the claim for contractual damages against Universal. See Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 359, 368, 641 A.2d 783 (1994) (in order to recover under the underinsured motorist policy, the insured must prove amount of damages and that the other motorist was underinsured and legally liable). Hence, the doctrine of defensive use of collateral estoppel is applicable.
Accordingly, the defendant has met its burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact that the plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits from the defendant is governed by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issue of the amount of the plaintiff's fair, just and reasonable damages was previously actually and necessarily decided in a voluntary and binding arbitration proceeding in which the plaintiff fully participated and is identical to the issue of damages/contractual underinsured motorist benefits now before the court.
The court has considered and is not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument attempting to distinguish Marques from the present case. The plaintiff's brief in opposition, however, does not address the aforementioned superior court decisions. This court is in agreement with the well reasoned decisions of Judge Zemetis and Judge Blue.
To the extent that the plaintiff has argued that the defendant was not a party to the underlying action, where the plaintiff was " adequately afforded an opportunity to make his case, " " it [is] fair to preclude him, on the basis of the accepted public policy reason behind collateral estoppel, from re-litigating the issue with a second party." Young v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Conn.App. 107, 118-19, 758 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 906, 762 A.2d 912 (2000). Raising the doctrine of collateral estoppel defensively in this way does not involve a second bite of the apple and is permissible. See id., 119. Lastly, the fact that a contract is the basis for an action does not exempt it from application of collateral estoppel. See Pollansky v. Pollansky, 162 Conn.App. 635, 133 A.3d 167 (2016) (son's breach of contract claim against sisters was precluded by doctrine of collateral estoppel).
The court therefore concludes that the arbitrator's prior determination of damages has preclusive effect here.
Therefore, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in that judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $5,924.00.