Opinion
NO. 1:03-cv-00080-LJM-VSS
March 9, 2004
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is now before the Court on the defendants', the City of Bloomington ("Bloomington"), Officer Jeffers ("Jeffers"), and Officer Grass ("Grass") (collectively, "Bloomington Defendants"), Motion for Summary Judgment on the claims brought against them in this action by the plaintiff, William Anthony Douglas ("Douglas"). The Bloomington Defendants assert that Douglas' prior action alleging unlawful arrest filed on January 18, 2001, in the Monroe County Circuit Court is res judicata as to the claims brought by Douglas in this action. Douglas contends that res judicata does not apply because identical evidence does not support both the claims he brought in state court and the claims brought in the instant suit, because application of the Indiana Tort Claims Act was the only issue actually decided by the state court, and because the state court's dismissal was without prejudice.
Defendant, Monroe County, has been dismissed. Neither the State of Indiana nor Trooper Jeffrey Frye have joined in this motion.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Bloomington Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts are these: On October 22, 2001, William A. Douglas filed suit against Bloomington, Jeffers and Grass in the Monroe County Circuit Court alleging that Jeffers and Grass had unlawfully arrested him on January 18, 2001. Defs.' Exh. 1, Certified Copy of Pl.'s Verified Compl. for Damages, 53CO3-0110-CP-1657 ("State Compl."). On November 28, 2001, Douglas amended his complaint. Defs.' Exh. 2, Certified Copy of Am. Compl., 53CO3-0110-CP-1647 ("State Am. Compl.").
The operative facts of the state-filed amended complaint are: On January 18, 2001, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Grass and Jeffers of the Bloomington Police Department knocked on Douglas' front door. State Am. Compl. ¶ 2; Fed. Compl. ¶ 13. When Douglas answered the door, the officers immediately began to question him about his personal information. State Am. Compl. ¶ 3; Fed. Compl. ¶ 16. Douglas responded to the officers' questions knowing that he had not committed any crime. Id.
When Douglas asked the officers if they had a warrant, they responded that they did not need one. State Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Fed. Compl. ¶ 16. Douglas then turned to make a phone call and the officers entered his residence, tackled him, and forcibly restrained him with his face in the sofa. Id.
The officers transported Douglas to the Monroe County Detention Center. State Am. Compl. ¶ 5; Fed. Compl. ¶ 17. Douglas asked to use the telephone, but was denied its use. Id. Douglas was punished for his request by being grabbed by the nape of the neck and the seat of his pants and tossed into the drunk tank. Id. Douglas suffers from a seizure disorder and was not provided with his medication for thirty-six hours while he was incarcerated. State Am. Compl. ¶ 6; Fed. Compl. ¶ 18.
The next day, January 19, 2001, Douglas appeared for his initial hearing at which time he learned that he was being charged with several counts of dealing and conspiracy to deal marijuana as well as resisting law enforcement. State Am. Compl. ¶ 7; Fed. Compl. ¶ 20. Douglas was immediately suspended by his employer, pending the resolution of the criminal charges. State Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Fed. Compl. ¶ 22.
The Monroe County Prosecutor's office refused to dismiss the felony charges against Douglas for three months despite clear indications that he had not committed a crime. State Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Fed. Compl. ¶ 23. The charges were dismissed on April 20, 2001, citing "an essential State's witness is missing; and, therefore, the State is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." State Am. Compl. ¶ 12; Fed. Compl. ¶ 23.
On December 10, 2001, Bloomington, Jeffers and Grass moved to dismiss the state court action on the grounds that Douglas failed to comply with the Indiana Tort Claims Act and that Jeffers and Grass were immune from suit under state law pursuant to the immunity provisions of the Tort Claims Act. Defs.' Exh. 3, Order on Mot. to Dismiss of Defs., City of Bloomington, Bloomington Police Dep't Officers Jeffers Grass, Cause No. 53C03-0110-CP-01657, at 1 (Monroe, Ind. Cir. Court Dec. 11, 2001) ("State Order on Mot. to Dismiss"). Douglas filed his response to the motion on January 29, 2002. Id. On May 3, 2002, the Monroe County Circuit Court held a hearing on the matter. Id. On December 11, 2002, that court issued its order in which it found that the individual police officers were immune from liability under state law pursuant to Indiana Code § 34-13-3-5, and that all claims against Bloomington and the officers were barred by Douglas' failure to file a timely notice of tort claim. Id. at 2-3.
Douglas filed the instant suit on January 17, 2003, in which he alleges that the actions of the Defendants described above deprived Douglas of his constitutional rights for which he seeks recompense pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fed. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 30-41. Douglas' federal complaint also alleges that the Defendants committed battery against him when Jeffers and Grass tackled him in his home, forcefully handcuffed him, and forcefully grabbed him by the nape of the neck and the seat of his pants and tossed him into the drunk tank. Id. ¶¶ 25-29.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A disputed fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law. Id.
The moving party has the initial burden to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1999); Schroeder v. Barth, Inc., 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1992). This burden does not entail producing evidence to negate claims on which the opposing party has the burden of proof. See Green v. Whiteco. Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a summary judgment motion bears an affirmative burden of presenting evidence that a disputed issue of material fact exists. See Wollin, 192 F.3d at 621.
In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw allreasonable inferences "in the light most favorable" to the opposing party. Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992). If a reasonable fact finder could find for the opposing party, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chi. Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992). When the standard embraced in Rule 56(c) is met, summary judgment is mandatory. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
The Bloomington Defendants assert that the allegations in Douglas' Monroe County action are the same facts that support his claims in this action, that the Monroe County Superior Court could have adjudicated Douglas' federal claims, and that the former suit was an adjudication on the merits. Because all of the elements of claim preclusion are met, the Bloomington Defendants argue that Douglas' instant claims against them are barred by res judicata, or claim preclusion.
In contrast, Douglas contends that the nature of the constitutional violations that he alleges in his federal complaint differ in the proof of injury and damages from his prior Monroe County suit. Therefore, identical evidence will not bar this suit.
The Court finds that the doctrine of res judicata applies to this case; therefore, the Court must dismiss Douglas' claims against Bloomington, Jeffers and Grass. "Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have instate court." Licari v. City of Chi., 298 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court must look to Indiana state law to determine whether its courts would preclude Douglas' claims against Bloomington, Jeffers and Grass. In Indiana, the elements of res judicata, or claim preclusion, are: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the matter at issue was, or might have been, determined in the former suit; (3) the controversy adjudicated in the former suit was between parties to the present suit; and (4) the judgment in the former suit was rendered on the merits. Leal v. Krajewski, 803 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1986); Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., 402 N.E.2d 448, 460 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980). Douglas does not challenge elements one and three; therefore, the Court will focus on elements two and four.
A. ELEMENT (2): THE MATTER AT ISSUE WAS, OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN, DETERMINED IN THE FORMER SUIT
With respect to the second element of claim preclusion, in Indiana "Whether the matter at issue was, or might have been, determined in the former suit" turns on "Whether the same evidence will support the issues involved in both actions." Leal, 803 F.2d at 335 (citing Hoffman v. Dunn, 496 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986); Biggs v. Marsh, 446 N.E.2d 977, 982 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983); Ratliff v. Meltzer, 487 N.E.2d 836, 841 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981)). See also Ind. State Highway Comm'n v. Speidel, 392 N.E.2d 1172, 1175, 181 Ind. App. 448, 453 (1979) (stating that "the test is whether identical evidence will support the issues involved in both actions"). The Seventh Circuit has interpreted this test to be a practical one rather than a literal one because a literal approach would "invite piecemeal litigation with a vengeance." Atkins v. Hancock County Sheriff's Merit Bd., 910 F.2d 403, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing Leal, 803 F.2d at 332, and Biggs, 446 N.E.2d at 982).
The Bloomington Defendants assert that Douglas' state law false arrest claim required him to prove the same elements as his false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both claims require proof of lack of probable cause. Defs.' Reply, at 2 (citing Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 746 (7th Cir. 2003)). In addition, the material facts for each claim are identical, as evidenced by the nearly identical statement of facts in Douglas' state complaint and his federal complaint.
Douglas asserts that his claim in the instant suit "bear[s] no relation to the issues in the [state] Complaint [sic] for false arrest and negligence." Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n, at 3. Douglas argues that "[t]he civil rights claim requires proof of injury and damages that false arrest and negligence claims did not require." Id. (citing Ind. State Highway Comm'n, 392 N.E.2d at 1175; Ill. Cent. Gulf RR v. Parks, 390 N.E.2d 1078, 181 Ind. App. 141 (1979); Nichols v. Yater, 258 N.E.2d 66, 147 Ind. App. 29 (1970)).
The Court agrees with the Bloomington Defendants that the evidence that would support Douglas' state law claims for false arrest and negligence are nearly identical to the evidence that would support Douglas' federal claims for unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment for the same acts. Each of the claims turn on whether or not Jeffers and Grass had a good faith belief that they had probable cause to arrest Douglas. See United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (for an arrest, Fourth Amendment requires that the police have probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime); Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (stating that "in false arrest cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proof of the absence of probably cause . . . to arrest . . . or whether the officer believe din good faith that the arrest was made with probable cause and that such belief was reasonable). The evidence to prove each cause of action is the same. Therefore, if the state law claims were adjudicated on the merits, Douglas' § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim would be precluded by res judicata in this action.
Douglas' state complaint makes clear that his negligence claim is based on the Bloomington Defendants' failure to exercise ordinary care in issuing a warrant. Therefore, the facts surrounding his false arrest and negligence claims in the Monroe County action are nearly identical.
However, Douglas' federal complaint also alleges violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Douglas alleges that the Bloomington Defendants failed to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as required by the Sixth Amendment. Fed. Compl. ¶ 39.b). In addition, Douglas alleges that the Bloomington Defendants deprived him of liberty without due process of law, apparently when they failed to allow him to make a phone call and failed to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him until the next day, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶ 39.c). Although the Court would agree that these two causes of action are nearly identical, as the Court has phrased them, the evidence that would prove these claims is not identical to the evidence that would prove Douglas' state law false arrest and negligence claims. The Bloomington Defendants argue that Douglas does not point the Court to the differences between these causes of action and his state false arrest and negligence claims, however, it is clear that the facts to support these two alleged constitutional violations will not turn on the facts related to Jeffers' and Grass' good faith belief they had probable cause to arrest Douglas. These causes of actions allege violation of constitutional rights that attached after Douglas had been seized, lawfully or not.
The Court notes that Douglas neither states in the federal complaint nor argues in his brief the specific acts of the Bloomington Defendants that support his federal claims. The Court used the extensive factual outline in the federal complaint to infer the actions of which Douglas intended to complain.
The Bloomington Defendants also seem to argue that the doctrine of res judicata would preclude these claims as well because Douglas was "required to litigate all causes of action, federal or state, occasioned by his arrest on January 18, 2001" in the same action. Defs.' Reply, at 5. See also Defs.' Mem. in Support, at 5 (citing Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1984); Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1983)). However, the cases the Bloomington Defendants cite for this proposition, were decided under Illinois law. The Seventh Circuit in those cases were looking at a different approach to claim preclusion, namely the transactional approach, which does bar a multiplicity of suits arising from the same transaction or occurrence. Hagee, 729 F.2d at 514 (discussing the theory of res judicata followed by Illinois courts and the rationale behind that approach); Mandarino, 718 F.2d at 849 (discussing traditional res judicata principles under Illinois law). Under Indiana law, however, which uses the "identity of evidence" approach, only claims, or causes of action, that completely overlap as a practical matter are precluded.
In the case at bar, although the facts relevant to Douglas' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action were stated in both complaints, they were not relevant to the actual causes of action that Douglas brought in his state complaint. As the Indiana Court of Appeals has stated:
[A] party is not allowed to split a cause of action, pursuing it in a piecemeal fashion and subjecting a defendant to needless multiple suits. However, two (or more) separate causes of action may arise from the same tortious act, and in such case a judgment on one action does not bar suit on the second.
. . . [T]he test is whether identical evidence will support the issue involved in both actions.Speidel, 392 N.E.2d at 1175 (citations omitted). See also Xantech Corp. v. Ramco. Indust., Inc., 159 F.3d 1089, 1093 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "Indiana's formulation for what constitutes a matter at issue is more narrow than our federal rule"); Atkins, 910 F.2d at 405 (discussing the "identity of evidence" approach used by Indiana courts); Peterson, 402 N.E.2d at 461 (discussing Middelkamp v. Hanewich, 364 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App. 1977), and stating that "[a]ctions are identical if identical evidence will support the issues tendered in both"). In other words, unless the identical evidence will support the issues involved in both actions, there is no bar to the second suit based on the same incident. Douglas' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action clearly rely upon different evidence than the evidence that would be used to support the issues arising from his state-filed false arrest and negligence claims. For this reason, Douglas' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action are properly before the Court.
The Bloomington Defendants cite Xantech for the proposition that Indiana follows the "transaction" rule like Illinois. However, that is not the law as stated by the most recent Indiana decisions on the subject. See, e.g., Meyer v. Marine Builders, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) ("The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute . . . . Claim preclusion applies where a final judgment on the merits has been rendered which acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same issue or claim between those parties and their privies." (citations omitted)).
In summary, the Court has found that with respect to element (2) of claim preclusion, Douglas' Fourth Amendment cause of action was at issue in his prior state court action; however, his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action were not.
B. ELEMENT (4): THE JUDGMENT IN THE FORMER SUIT WAS RENDERED ON THE MERITS
The next element at issue is element (4), whether or not the judgment in the former suit was rendered on the merits. The only cause of action that the Court needs to look at is Douglas' Fourth Amendment cause of action because that is the only cause of action that the Court has determined requires the same evidence as Douglas' formerly-filed state causes of action.
Douglas argues that the Monroe County Circuit Court's dismissal of his state lawsuit was not a decision on the merits because it the Monroe County Circuit Court only decided the application of the Indiana Tort Claims Act to the facts Douglas alleged. Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n, at 4 (citing, inter alia, Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found., 402 N.E.2d 448, 461 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980). In other words, Douglas contends that the former judgment only acts as an estoppel on issues actually controverted and actually determined in the former action. Id. In addition, Douglas argues that the state court dismissed his action without prejudice, therefore, it cannot form the basis for res judicata. Id. at 5 (citing Peterson, 402 N.E.2d at 461).
The Bloomington Defendants assert that the Monroe County Circuit Court decision is a final judgment on the merits pursuant to Creech v. Town of Walkerton, 472 N.E.2d 226, 228-29 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) and England v. Dana Corp., 259 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ind.Ct.App. 1970). In Creech, a town brought a mandatory injunction action against landowners for the demolition of two houses because those homes were nuisances. Creech, 472 N.E.2d at 226. The landowners brought a counterclaim against the town alleging that the town's action had caused some of the disrepair. Id. The landowners had brought an original action against the town alleging the same damage in a former action. However, the landowners had failed to notify the town of their claims within 180 days as required by the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and that original action was dismissed. Id. at 226-27'.
The trial court in the town's case against the landowners barred the landowners' counterclaim under res judicata. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. The Creech court reasoned that "[a]n adjudication based upon the running of a statute of limitation, as a bar to further action, is . . . a judgment on the merits." Id. at 228 (citations omitted). Because the notice provision of a governmental tort claims act was a statute of limitations, an adjudication based on the notice provision was an adjudication on the merits. Id. at 228-29 (citations omitted). In England v. Dana Corp., the Indiana Court of Appeals explained that "[f]ollowing the sustaining of a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff may amend the complaint pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule 15, or elect to stand upon the complaint and to appeal from the order of dismissal." 259 N.E.2d at 284 284 n. 7 (noting that the interplay of the federal rules are the same as the interplay of their Indiana counterparts). Upon dismissal, a plaintiff has two options, amend his complaint or announce his election to stand on the complaint and appeal from the judgment. Id. at 284 (citing Asher v. Ruppa, 173 F.2d 10, 11 (7th Cir. 1949)).
In the instant case, it is clear that the Monroe County Circuit Court made findings under Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) that related to qualified immunity as to Jeffers and Grass, and the notice provision of the Indiana Tort Claims Act as to Bloomington. Defs.' Exh. 3, State Order on Mot. to Dismiss, at 1-3. Under Indiana law these rulings would act as an adjudication on the merits. Equally clear is that Douglas failed to amend his state complaint and he failed to make an appeal. Although this circumstance is not exactly like that in England or Asher, in which the complaining party appealed, Douglas' failure either to amend his complaint or to appeal can only mean that he intends to let stand the judgment of the Monroe County Circuit Court. Under these circumstances, the Court must find that the former judgment by the Monroe County Circuit Court on Douglas' claims against the Bloomington Defendants is a final adjudication on the merits. Because all the elements for application of the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, apply to Douglas' Fourth Amendment claim, that claim must be dismissed as to the Bloomington Defendants.
In summary, the Court has found that Douglas' Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Bloomington, Jeffers and Grass, is barred by res judicata. Douglas' remaining claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment are not barred.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has found that the plaintiffs, William Anthony Douglas, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment against certain defendants, the City of Bloomington, Officer Jeffers, and Officer Grass, are barred by res judicata. The plaintiff's remaining claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment against those same defendants are not so barred. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.IT IS SO ORDERED.