Opinion
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Andrew Hess Turner, Ashley Kathryn Boothby, Ellen M. Kelman, Kelman Buescher Firm, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.
Brian Michael Mumaugh, Holland & Hart, LLP, Greenwood Village, CO, Bradford J. Williams, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendant.
ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS ACTION
Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiffs Katherine Dorman, Christina Thorsen, and Susan Forsyth (collectively "Plaintiffs") are current and former employees of Defendant and members of the Douglas County Federation ("DCF"), a labor organization. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of all teachers who were members of DCF in 2012 and who were approved for short term disability insurance ("STDI") benefits and/or paid premiums to increase STDI coverage. The Court finds oral argument would not materially assist in the adjudication of Plaintiffs’ motion. For every claim other than Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit cause of action, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of demonstrating the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3). Regarding the quantum meruit claim, the Court finds that individualized issues predominate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Douglas County School District and DCF maintained a collective bargaining relationship from 1972 through 2012. Am. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 34. The final collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the parties was effective from July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012 ("2012 CBA"). See ECF No. 42-1. Plaintiffs, current and former teachers for Defendant, were members of DCF while the 2012 CBA was in effect. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-10. The 2012 CBA contains two relevant provisions regarding sick leave. First, it grants nine annual days of paid sick leave to all full-time employees. ECF No. 42-1, at 6. Employees originally received ten sick days, and the reduction to nine days created the second relevant provision— the sick leave bank. Id. at 7. This provision required Defendant to place one sick day per employee in a sick leave bank each year. Id. Teachers who had used their accumulated sick and personal leave and who were unable to work due to illness or disability could apply to use days in the sick leave bank. Id. If the bank was exhausted, Defendant assessed one additional sick day against every full-time employee. Id. The 2012 CBA provided that "[a]ny days remaining in the sick leave bank at the end of a school year will be available for use during any subsequent school year." Id. Defendant paid sick leave bank days at 100% of the employee’s salary. ECF No. 42-5. Additionally, Defendant made employer contributions to PERA on behalf of teachers utilizing the sick leave bank benefit. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ First Reqs. for Admis. 4, ECF No. 42-6.
The Court "must accept the substantive allegations of the complaint as true" in determining motions for class certification. Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court relies on the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint to provide relevant background for its legal analysis.
The 2012 CBA expired on June 30, 2012, and the parties to the 2012 CBA did not reach a new agreement. See ECF No. 42-1; Am. Compl. ¶ 29. On September 13, 2012, Defendant notified its employees via email that it would discontinue the sick leave bank on October 1, 2012. ECF No. 42-10, at 1.
In lieu of the sick leave bank benefit, Defendant enrolled its employees in STDI coverage administered by the Standard Insurance Company. Id. ; ECF No. 42-12; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Second Reqs. for Admis. 3, ECF No. 42-29. Under this plan, employees who qualified for STDI received fifty percent of pre-disability earnings. ECF No. 42-12, at 4-6. Employees had the option to pay premiums and receive seventy percent of pre-disability earnings. Id. Defendant initially required employees to use ten, and no more than ten, sick or personal days before receiving STDI. ECF No. 42-13, at 3. However, in 2014, Defendant amended the STDI plan to require that employees use all individual sick leave before accessing STDI benefits. Id. at 5.
In November and December 2012, Defendant denied Plaintiffs’ requests for sick leave bank benefits and instead required Plaintiffs to use STDI. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 68, 75; Decl. of Katherine N. Dorman ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 42-16; Decl. of Christina Thorsen ¶ 8, ECF No. 42-15; Decl. of Susan R. Forsyth ¶ 8, ECF No. 42-18. Ms. Thorsen and Ms. Forsyth paid premiums to receive seventy percent of their salaries in STDI benefits. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 75; Decl. of Christina Thorsen ¶ 7; Decl. of Susan R. Forsyth ¶ 7.
As a result of the elimination of sick leave bank benefits, Plaintiffs sued Defendant in Colorado state court on February 15, 2013 for breach of the 2012 CBA. Compl., ECF No. 4. The state court ordered Plaintiffs to exhaust the administrative remedies for their breach of contract claim, and the parties subsequently engaged in a lengthy grievance arbitration process. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-113. During this process, the parties returned to state court to litigate a variety of pre-answer motions that ultimately resulted in Plaintiffs undergoing individual arbitrations for each of their grievances. See id. ; ECF Nos. 8-14. On March 29, 2017, after the arbitrations concluded, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which asserted federal causes of action. Am. Compl., ECF No. 15.
Defendant removed the case to this Court on April 27, 2017. ECF No. 1. On July 9, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the operative Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). Am. Compl., ECF No. 34. Plaintiffs assert six claims for relief: (1) impairing a contractual obligation in violation of Article II, Section 11 of the Colorado Constitution; (2) breach of contract; (3) impairing a contractual obligation in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution; (4) impermissible taking of property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; (5) impermissible taking of property in violation of Article II, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution; and (6) quantum meruit. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 127-200. Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint on July 24, 2017. Answer, ECF No. 36. On October 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the present Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 42. Plaintiffs seek to certify the following class of individuals:
All teachers who were members of the Douglas County Federation in 2012, worked under the 2011-2012 CBA with Defendant and either (1) have been approved for benefits under Defendant’s STDI plan and/or (2) paid premiums to buy-up coverage under Defendant’s STDI plan.
Mot. for Class Certification 2. According to Plaintiffs, each of the individuals in the proposed class was harmed by Defendant’s decision to eliminate the sick leave bank benefit. Id. at 8-9. Defendant responded to Plaintiffs’ motion on November 6, 2017. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification, ECF No. 48. Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ proposed class does not satisfy the commonality, typicality, and adequacy prerequisites to class certification. Id. at 4-13. Additionally, Defendant argues that issues common to the class members do not predominate. Id. at 13-20. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Reply in Support of Their Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 50.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits district courts to certify a class action "if the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of one of the types of classes in Rule 23(b)." DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010). "Rule 23(a) requires numerosity of class members, commonality of at least one question of fact or law among the class, typicality of named plaintiffs’ claims or defenses to the class’s claims or defenses, and adequacy of the named plaintiffs and their attorneys as class representatives." Id. at 1195. Relevant here, Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action if:
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
"The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proving Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied." D.G. ex rel. Stricklin, 594 F.3d at 1194. In determining whether a party carries his burden, courts "must accept the substantive allegations of the complaint as true." Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2004). However, courts should be mindful that "[t]he class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’ " Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) ). Class certification is "committed to the discretion of the trial court." Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir. 1982).
ANALYSIS
The Court holds Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23 as to all claims other than their quantum meruit cause of action. The Court first holds that Plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements as to all claims. Then, the Court finds that common issues predominate over all but Plaintiffs’ final cause of action. Lastly, the Court finds that a class action is the superior method to litigate Plaintiffs’ first five claims.
I. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites to Class Certification
A. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). There is "no set formula to determine if the class is so numerous that it should be so certified. The determination is to be made in the particular circumstances of the case." Rex v. Owens ex rel. State of Oklahoma, 585 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1978).
The Court finds the proposed class satisfies the numerosity requirement. Plaintiffs contend the class consists of more than 1,000 individuals, Mot. for Class Certification 12-13, ECF No. 42, and Defendant does not dispute that joinder of these individuals would be impracticable. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 3-4, ECF No. 48. Courts have regularly found Rule 23(a)(1) satisfied with significantly smaller proposed classes. Pliego v. Los Arcos Mexican Rests., Inc., 313 F.R.D. 117, 126 (D. Colo. 2016) (finding that a class of 177 members satisfied the numerosity requirement); In re Aluminum Phosphide Antitrust Litig., 160 F.R.D. 609, 613 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that a good faith estimate of "hundreds of customers" satisfied Rule 23(a)(1) ); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he size of the class in this case— 100 to 150 members— is within the range that generally satisfies the numerosity requirement."). Furthermore, the Court does not perceive any issues that would lead to the class being significantly smaller than that which Plaintiffs estimate. Because it would be impracticable to join over 1,000 individuals, Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).
B. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that questions of law or fact common to the class exist. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2). In interpreting Rule 23(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit has consistently stated that "commonality requires only a single issue common to the class." J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting K.L. v. Valdez, 167 F.R.D. 688, 690 (D.N.M. 1996) ); DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[A] discrete legal or factual question common to the class must exist."). However, this "common contention" "must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution— which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). Therefore, although factual differences between class members’ claims will not defeat certification, see, e.g., Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 938 (10th Cir. 1982), commonality is not present when the plaintiffs merely allege they have suffered a violation of the same provision of the law. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The named plaintiffs must "demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’ " Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) ).
In this case, Plaintiffs have identified a common contention that is capable of classwide resolution. The success of each of Plaintiffs’ claims depends on whether Defendant permissibly eliminated the sick leave bank benefit. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, if Defendant lawfully terminated the benefit at the expiration of the 2012 CBA, all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail. Mot. for Class Certification 14, ECF No. 42. Accordingly, the Court’s determination of whether Defendant permissibly refused to apply the remaining days in the sick leave bank will "resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541; see Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d 877, 884 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding commonality in a case challenging the elimination of retiree health benefits, because "each class member claims that the original collective bargaining agreement guaranteed them lifetime, fully-funded benefits").
Each individual claim also contains common issues. Plaintiffs’ second claim alleges Defendant breached the 2012 CBA by eliminating the sick leave bank benefit. Am. Compl. ¶ 146. Determining whether the 2012 CBA permitted Defendant to eliminate the remaining days in the sick leave benefit has the potential to resolve all of the class members’ breach of contract claims in one stroke. As for the contracts clause claims, determining whether Defendant’s uniform act of eliminating the sick leave bank substantially impaired its contractual relationship with one plaintiff will also resolve this issue as to the remaining plaintiffs. This is so, because Defendant had a single contractual relationship with all class members. Similarly, regarding Plaintiffs’ takings clause claims, if the 2012 CBA created a private property interest in sick leave benefits, it did so for every plaintiff. Furthermore, because every class member had a right to apply for sick leave bank benefits, a finding that Defendant’s decision did not constitute a "taking" of one plaintiff’s property would require a finding that Defendant did not take any plaintiff’s property. Finally, to prove their quantum meruit claim, Plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that Defendant received a benefit as a result of its decision to eliminate the remaining days in the sick leave bank. See Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 445 (Colo. 2000). Because Defendant made a uniform decision to eliminate the collective sick leave bank, whether Defendant received a benefit as a result of that decision is an issue common to all class members. Accordingly, common contentions exist as to Plaintiffs’ claims generally and as to each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action.
Defendant argues Plaintiffs do not carry their Rule 23(a)(2) burden, because commonality requires that all plaintiffs suffer the same injury, and the plaintiffs who merely bought up insurance coverage have not suffered any injury. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 5-6, ECF No. 48. According to Defendant, because it did not deny sick leave benefits to individuals who only paid STDI premiums, these class members have not suffered an injury. Id. The Court disagrees. These class members suffered the injury of having the remaining sick leave bank days eliminated, which allegedly forced them to pay premiums to receive what they had under the sick leave bank. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have asserted the common injury of not being able to use the sick leave bank days.
To be sure, the Plaintiffs who received STDI benefits and those who paid premiums were not affected in identical ways. Defendant’s decision to eliminate the remaining sick leave bank days caused some Plaintiffs to buy up coverage to receive a similar benefit to the sick leave bank. The decision forced other Plaintiffs to receive STDI benefits, which resulted in them earning less than they would have under the sick leave bank. However, this does not preclude a finding of commonality. See generally Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d at 938 ("[E]very member of the class need not be in a situation identical to that of the named plaintiff."). In Bittinger, the plaintiffs challenged the defendant’s elimination of their retiree health care plan. 123 F.3d at 884-85. The defendant argued that the class members did not suffer the same injury, because some members accepted benefits under the replacement health care plan, while others did not. Id. at 885. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. According to the court, "[t]hough the level of claimed injury may vary throughout the class ..the basic injury asserted is the same: [the defendant] violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement by unilaterally terminating fully-funded lifetime benefits." Id. Similarly, although some class members may have paid premiums and others may have received allegedly inferior STDI benefits, the underlying injury is the same: Defendant violated the terms of the 2012 CBA by terminating the sick leave bank benefit.
Because neither party asks the Court to divide the proposed class into subclasses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5), the Court does not consider whether it would be appropriate to do so at this time. However, should it prove more efficient to manage this class action with multiple subclasses, the Court retains discretion pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)(C) to amend this order and divide the original class into two or more subclasses.
Moreover, in the employment discrimination context, courts regularly certify classes of individuals who were affected in different ways by a defendant’s single discriminatory policy. See, e.g., Kerner v. City & County of Denver, No. 11-cv-00256-MSK-KMT, 2012 WL 7802744, at *4-5 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding that commonality existed among a class of individuals who were not hired or not promoted as a result of the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory policy). Indeed, in Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion in denying class certification to a group of female employees who were allegedly deprived of equal opportunities "in recruitment, hiring, promotion, and other conditions of employment." 690 F.2d 796, 798 (10th Cir. 1982). In an effort to guide the district court’s commonality and typicality determinations on remand, the Tenth Circuit stated, "the court should keep in mind ‘the well established rule that the claims of all the class need not be identical to those of the plaintiffs ....’ " Id. at 800 (quoting Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 271 n.8 (10th Cir. 1975) ). Therefore, that Defendant’s elimination of the sick leave bank affected Plaintiffs in varying ways does not preclude commonality.
To be sure, courts have found that individuals who were not hired did not suffer the same injury as individuals who were not promoted. See Gen. Tele. Co. of Sw., 457 U.S. at 157-58, 102 S.Ct. 2364; Britton v. Car Toys, Inc., No. 05-cv-00726-WYD-PAC, 2006 WL 4525699, at *4-5 (D. Colo. June 16, 2006). However, these courts rested their holdings on the fact that the evidence did not suggest the "policy of ethnic discrimination is reflected in petitioner’s other employment practices ...." Gen. Tele. Co. of Sw., 457 U.S. at 158, 102 S.Ct. 2364; Warren v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the named plaintiff did not suffer the same injury, because "her complaint falls far short of demonstrating that the Companies operated under a general policy of discrimination and that she was discriminated against in the same general fashion as those claimed to have been discriminatorily denied promotions"). Here, similar to a policy of discrimination that affects every plaintiff, the decision to eliminate the sick leave bank is a single act that affected each class member.
Furthermore, courts around the country regularly find commonality in class actions alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement against employers. See Harrington v. City of Albuquerque, 222 F.R.D. 505, 510 (D.N.M. 2004) (holding that commonality existed, because "the Plaintiffs allege that the entire class was subjected to the same unconstitutional practices" of collecting improper union fees); see also Thonen v. McNeil-Akron, Inc., 661 F.Supp. 1271, 1276 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (finding Rule 23(a)(2) satisfied in a case alleging that the class members’ former employer breached a CBA by altering the retiree benefit plan). Because Plaintiffs allege the entire class was subject to the same impermissible decision and because resolving the validity of that decision is central to each one of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court finds that commonality exists.
C. Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). "Differing fact situations of class members do not defeat typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) so long as the claims of the class representative and class members are based on the same legal or remedial theory." Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988); DG ex rel. Stricklin, 594 F.3d at 1198 ("The interests and claims of Named Plaintiffs and class members need not be identical to satisfy typicality."). Therefore, if each class member is "at risk of being subjected to the same harmful practices," typicality is satisfied. DG ex rel. Stricklin, 594 F.3d at 1199.
Here, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing typicality. Importantly, because the proposed class representatives assert the same claims as the proposed class, the claims of the class representatives and class members are based on the same legal theories. Additionally, regardless of whether a class member paid premiums, received STDI benefits, or both, each representative and member was subjected to the same allegedly invalid practice— elimination of the remaining sick leave bank days.
Moreover, "the alleged harm suffered by [the class representatives] is of the same type as the harm suffered by members of the proposed class ...." Smith v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 124 F.R.D. 665, 675 (D. Kan. 1989). Each class member allegedly paid premiums, received STDI benefits, or both. Ms. Thorsen and Ms. Forsyth paid premiums and received STDI benefits, while Ms. Dorman only received STDI benefits. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 68, 75; Decl. of Katherine N. Dorman ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 42-16; Decl. of Christina Thorsen ¶ 7-8, ECF No. 42-15; Decl. of Susan R. Forsyth ¶ 7-8, ECF No. 42-18.
Defendant contends that typicality does not exist, because no class representative only paid premiums. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 6-7. According to Defendant, because the individuals who only bought up coverage will be subject to unique exhaustion and standing defenses, the defenses applicable to the class representatives are not typical to those of the class members. Id. However, Defendant does not explain why it cannot assert these defenses against an individual who paid premiums and received STDI benefits. Indeed, Defendant may raise its exhaustion and standing defenses against Ms. Thorsen and Ms. Forsyth only as to the theory that they were damaged by paying premiums. Successfully doing so would result in a holding that the representatives do not have standing to assert they were damaged by paying premiums or that they did not exhaust their buy-up theory of damages. Because Rule 23(a)(3) does not require that the class representatives be in an identical position to that of every member of the putative class, see, e.g., Adamson, 855 F.2d at 676, the fact that no class representative suffered damages only in the form of paying premiums does not defeat typicality.
In sum, because the proposed class representatives assert claims based on the same legal or remedial theory as the claims the absent class members assert, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing typicality.
D. Adequacy
Rule 23’s final requirement demands that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). "Resolution of two questions determines legal adequacy: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?" Rutter & Willbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) ). The Court will first address these questions as they relate to Plaintiffs’ counsel and then as they pertain to the proposed class representatives.
1. Class Counsel
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed class counsel will adequately represent the interests of the class. There is no indication that counsel has conflicts of interest with any class members or that counsel will not vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the class. Indeed, Defendant does not challenge counsel’s qualifications, and two of Plaintiffs’ attorneys have experience serving as class counsel in employee benefit class action cases. Decl. of Andrew H. Turner ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 42-31; Decl of Ellen Kelman ¶ 6, ECF No. 42-32. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ellen Kelman, Andrew Turner, and Ashley Boothby are adequate class counsel.
2. Class Representatives
The Court also finds that the three proposed class representatives— Katherine Dorman, Christina Thorsen, and Susan Forsyth— satisfy Rule 23(a)(4). The representatives have no apparent conflicts of interest with class members, and there is no indication that they will not vigorously prosecute the action. Furthermore, the class members are "part of the class and possess the same interest" as the class members. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977) ). Defendant employed each of the class representatives at the time it eliminated the sick leave bank benefit, and the class representatives paid premiums, received STDI benefits, or both. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 68, 75; Decl. of Katherine N. Dorman ¶¶ 7-8; Decl. of Christina Thorsen ¶ 7-8; Decl. of Susan R. Forsyth ¶ 7-8. Furthermore, the class representatives and members share the common interest of recovering the benefits they would have received had Defendant not terminated the sick bank days.
Defendant argues Ms. Dorman is not an adequate class representative, because she is subject to a unique exhaustion defense. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 9-11. Additionally, Defendant contends Ms. Thorsen and Ms. Forsyth cannot adequately represent the interests of the class, because the vast majority of the class members will not be able to rely on Ms. Thorsen’s grievance to demonstrate exhaustion. Id. at 11-13. Both of these arguments rest on the theory that Ms. Dorman and the absent class members cannot satisfy the single filing rule so as to be "captured within" Ms. Thorsen’s grievance. See id. at 9-13. According to Defendant, Ms. Dorman cannot "piggyback" off of Ms. Thorsen’s grievance, because Ms. Dorman filed her own procedurally inadequate grievance. Id. at 9-11. Additionally, Defendant contends the absent class members cannot piggyback off of Ms. Thorsen’s grievance, because they cannot demonstrate Defendant denied them sick bank benefits within the fifteen days preceding the grievance. Id. at 11-13.
However, Plaintiffs’ exhaustion argument does not rely on the single filing rule. Therefore, there is no indication that Ms. Dorman is subject to unique defenses or that Ms. Thorsen and Ms. Forsyth cannot adequately represent the interests of the class members. Pursuant to the single filing rule, "if one plaintiff has filed a timely [administrative grievance] as to that plaintiff’s individual claim, then co-plaintiffs with individual claims arising out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame need not have satisfied the filing requirement." Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1197 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Importantly, Plaintiffs do not attempt to rely on Ms. Thorsen’s individual grievance. Instead, Plaintiffs claim every class member exhausted his or her claims through the union’s collective grievance. Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification 4, ECF No. 50 ("Defendant focuses on an alternative theory of exhaustion which the Court need never reach because all class members exhausted administrative remedies through the Thorsen/DCF grievance."). The 2012 CBA permitted the union to file such a grievance, see ECF No. 42-1, at 13, and courts have found that this type of grievance may exhaust class claims. See Kerner v. City and County of Denver, No. 11-cv-00256-MSK-KMT, 2012 WL 7802744, at *8 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2012) ("Plaintiff Kerner, as noted however, has alleged exhaustion of class administrative remedies through the EEOC on behalf of the whole class and therefore each member is not required to exhibit individual exhaustion." (citing Gulley v. Orr, 905 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1990) ) ). Therefore, under the exhaustion argument Plaintiffs advance, Ms. Dorman and the individual class members need not piggyback off of Ms. Thorsen’s individual grievance.
Even if Ms. Dorman is ultimately dismissed from this case for a reason such as failure to exhaust, this will not substantially prejudice the absent class members, as Ms. Thorsen and Ms. Forsyth also have claims common and typical to those of the class.
To be sure, Defendant may argue that the union grievance did not properly exhaust administrative remedies as to all class members, including Ms. Dorman. However, because this argument would apply equally to all class members on whose behalf the union filed the collective grievance, it does not destroy adequacy. In other words, it is not "a unique defense that is likely to become a major focus of the litigation." Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 301 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
In sum, the Court finds that the class representatives will adequately protect the interests of the absent class members. The class representatives do not have conflicts of interest with the class members, and they will vigorously prosecute this case on behalf of the class members. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing the Rule 23(a) prerequisites to class certification.
II. Rule 23(b)(3) : Predominance and Superiority
In addition to the class action prerequisites in Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must establish one of the three requirements in Rule 23(b). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). Plaintiffs seek to certify the proposed class action under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits a class action if "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and ... a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). The Court first finds that, although a close call, common issues of law and fact predominate over individual issues in every claim except Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit cause of action. Then, the Court holds that the class action is the superior method to adjudicate this case.
A. Predominance
"The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Although similar to commonality, the predominance requirement is far more demanding. Id. at 623-24, 117 S.Ct. 2231. However, Plaintiffs need not prove that "all of the elements of the claim entail questions of fact and law that are common to the class, nor that the answers to those common questions [are] dispositive." CGC Holding Co. v. Broad & Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs must show only that the "common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues." Id. (quoting 2 William B. Rubenstein et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 4:49, at 195-96 (5th ed. 2012) ). "The predominance requirement is met if th[e] common question is at the heart of the litigation." Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Defs. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007). In determining whether common issues predominate, district courts must "characterize the issues in the case as common or not, and then weigh which issues predominate." CGC Holding Co., 773 F.3d at 1087.
The Court first finds that individualized issues predominate Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claim. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion in so far as it seeks to certify a class action as to the quantum meruit claim. As for the remaining claims, the Court finds that common issues predominate, and a class action is the superior method of adjudication.
1. Quantum Meruit Claim
Plaintiffs’ sixth claim alleges Defendant unjustly retained a benefit by accepting Plaintiffs’ labor without providing the proper sick leave days. Am. Compl. ¶ 198. To succeed on their quantum meruit claim under Colorado law, Plaintiffs must show that: "(1) at [P]laintiff[s’] expense; (2) [D]efendant received a benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for [D]efendant to retain the benefit without paying." Dudding v. Norton Frickey & Assocs., 11 P.3d 441, 445 (Colo. 2000). Importantly, "[w]hether retention of the benefit is unjust is a fact-intensive inquiry in which courts look to, among other things, the intentions, expectations, and behavior of the parties." Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP v. Hannon Law Firm, LLC, 287 P.3d 842, 847 (Colo. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiffs will each have to demonstrate that, based on their individual expectations and behaviors, it was improper for Defendant to retain the sick leave bank days. See Britvar v. Schainuck, 791 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Colo.App. 1989) ("A plaintiff cannot recover for unjust enrichment on a quasi-contractual claim for services rendered absent proof of circumstances indicating that compensation is reasonably expected."); see also Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442, 445 (Colo.App. 1995) (finding the counterclaimant’s expectation that he would receive profit for his services relevant to whether retention of the benefit was unjust). Plaintiffs fail to explain how they will offer classwide proof on this inherently individualized issue. In fact, Plaintiffs’ reply brief does not rebut Defendant’s argument that individualized issues predominate the quantum meruit claim.
Because of the individualized nature of each class member’s intentions and expectations, "courts generally find that unjust enrichment claims are not appropriately certified for class treatment, as common questions will rarely, if ever, predominate." Friedman v. Dollar Thrifty Auto. Grp., Inc., 304 F.R.D. 601, 611 (D. Colo. 2015) (quoting In re Motions to Certify Classes Against Court Reporting Firms, 715 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1284 (S.D.Fla.2010) ); Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that individualized issues predominated in an unjust enrichment claim), abrogated on other grounds by Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1702, 198 L.Ed.2d 132 (2017). Because one of the issues at the heart of Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claim— whether each class member expected compensation for the remaining sick leave bank days— is a substantially individualized inquiry, common issues do not predominate this claim. Accordingly, this cause of action is not appropriate for class certification.
2. Remaining Claims
Each remaining claim involves common issues at the heart of the claim. To establish their contract clause claims, Plaintiffs must prove that a state action impaired a contractual obligation. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Colo. Const. art. 2, § 11. Whether Plaintiffs had a vested contractual right in the remaining sick leave bank days, and if so, whether eliminating the availability of those days substantially impaired Defendant’s obligation under the 2012 CBA are issues common to all class members. Indeed, these issues involve a single decision of Defendant under a single contract.
As for Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, whether eliminating the remaining days in the sick leave bank breached the 2012 CBA is an issue common to all Plaintiffs. If the 2012 CBA did not require that the remaining sick leave days survive the expiration of the agreement, no class member’s breach of contract claim succeeds, regardless of whether the employee paid premiums or received STDI benefits in lieu of sick bank benefits.
Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth claims allege an impermissible taking of property in violation of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 166-93, ECF No. 34. Both of these claims require Plaintiffs to prove they have a private vested property right in their sick leave benefit days. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."); Colo. Const. art. 2, § 15 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation."). Because the sick leave bank was a communal pool of benefits to which each employee contributed equally, if one plaintiff does not possess a private property interest in the sick leave bank benefits, neither will the remaining class members.
However, especially with regard to damages, individualized issues also exist. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs will have to submit different proof of damages for those who paid premiums and those who received STDI benefits. Class members who bought up coverage will have to demonstrate the amount of premiums they paid, while those who received STDI benefits must prove the amount their salary and PERA contributions decreased. Furthermore, because class members paid different premiums, calculating the damages for each plaintiff who paid premiums will require an individual assessment. Similarly, calculating the amount that each class member’s salary decreased by receiving STDI benefits will require individual data.
Additionally, a review of Plaintiffs’ damages model, see Mot. for Class Certification 16 n.9, ECF No. 42, demonstrates that calculating damages for those who received STDI benefit will require further individualized inquiries. Calculating unpaid PERA contributions requires using an individual PERA contribution rate. Determining the short term disability differential necessitates information regarding each plaintiff’s gross STDI benefit received and how much sick leave each employee had. Additionally, because sick leave benefits constituted taxable income and STDI benefits did not, ECF No. 42-4, at 35, individual tax information will be necessary to determine the appropriate amount each individual would have received as sick leave benefits.
Defendant argues that determining each class member’s unpaid PERA benefits will require individualized inquiries, because PERA benefits are determinable only at retirement. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 18, ECF No. 48. Therefore, according to Defendant, any damages model would have to make individualized assumptions about each class member’s future retirement plans. Id. Plaintiffs reply that the Colorado General Assembly has determined a precise formula for curing harm from insufficient PERA contributions. Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification 13, ECF No. 50; see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-51-402(3)(b). Although it appears Section 24-51-402 was enacted to cure the inefficiencies that result from suits to recover unpaid contributions by PERA against public employers, Defendant offers no reason why the formula in Section 24-51-402(3)(b) cannot serve as a reliable method for calculating damages based on insufficient PERA contributions. Indeed, Section 24-51-402(3)(b) does not require that an employee has already retired. Although the formula uses the cost of purchasing service credits, which are usually purchased post-employment, the statute uses them only to calculate the amount of payments an employer should have made in a given period.
Defendant contends the amount of each Plaintiff’s gross benefit received is not ascertainable, because Defendant does not know the dates during which each employee received STDI benefits. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 16, ECF No. 48. Additionally, Defendant asserts it cannot obtain these records from Standard Insurance— the company who processed STDI payments. Id. However, the Court does not perceive substantial difficulties in obtaining this information. It is undisputed that STDI benefits were not paid or taxed as normal income on payroll. Id. at 19; see Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ First Reqs. for Admis. 3-4, ECF No. 42-6. Accordingly, Defendant’s payroll records should indicate when an individual received STDI benefits. Furthermore, for at least some of the class members, Defendant sent letters indicating the individual’s STDI start and end dates. See ECF No. 42-20.
The amount of personal sick leave each employee had is relevant, because using the sick leave bank required employees to first exhaust personal sick leave. ECF No. 42-1, at 7. Before July 1, 2014, using STDI benefits did not require exhaustion of personal sick leave, and in fact only permitted employees to use ten personal days before being placed on short-term disability. ECF No. 42-13, at 3.
Defendant raises a variety of additional purportedly individualized issues. Specifically, Defendant contends individualized inquiry will be required to determine (1) whether class members would have qualified for sick leave bank benefits, (2) whether class members preferred sick leave benefits over STDI benefits, and (3) whether absent class members sought just compensation through state procedures for the alleged taking of their private property. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 13-18.
First, the Court finds that an individual’s receipt of STDI benefits constitutes generalized proof that the class member would have qualified for sick leave benefits. Importantly, Plaintiffs produce evidence that Defendant intended STDI benefits to serve as a substitute for sick leave bank benefits. See ECF No. 42-10, at 1 ("In place of the sick leave BANK, all eligible employees will receive a base amount of Short Term Disability coverage ...."); see also ECF No. 42-13, at 3 (stating that the sick leave bank will be "replaced with Short-term disability through Standard Insurance."). Defendant does not offer any evidence suggesting it intended STDI benefits to cover different illnesses than sick leave bank benefits.
Moreover, although there does not appear to be bright-line criteria applicable to qualifying for sick leave or STDI benefits, the general standards for receiving the two forms of benefits is similar. In response to interrogatory requests, DCF stated that, as a matter of policy, all employees who exhausted their sick and personal leave, were unable to work, and received approval from the Board of Education for a medical leave were granted sick leave bank benefits. DCF’s Resp. to Def.’s Second Disc. Reqs. 3, ECF No. 48-6. Similarly, being classified as disabled under the STDI plan required that the employee be unable to perform his or her occupation. ECF No. 42-11, at 9. Furthermore, Defendant approved a medical leave of absence for each of the individuals receiving STDI benefits. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Second Reqs. for Admis. 8, ECF No. 42-29. Therefore, individuals were capable of receiving sick leave bank and STDI benefits if they were unable to work and received approval for a medical leave of absence.
Pursuant to the 2012 CBA, DCF and Defendant’s Office of Human Resources had joint authority to grant or deny sick leave benefits. ECF No. 42-1, at 8.
Defendant argues the criteria for receiving STDI and sick leave bank benefits could not be the same, because the undisputed evidence suggests that eighty-five different categories of illnesses were approved for STDI benefits while only sixty-two categories were approved for sick leave bank benefits. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 14. However, that more illnesses were approved for STDI benefits does not necessarily mean that more illnesses qualified for STDI benefits. Instead, this could result from a more diverse group of individuals who applied for STDI benefits. Additionally, the disparity could result from the fact that the two benefit programs categorized illnesses differently. Compare ECF No. 49-2, with ECF No. 49-3. Indeed, Defendant admits that some of the categories for STDI benefits overlap. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 14. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that the individuals who received STDI benefits would have also qualified for sick leave bank benefits. Because Defendant does not offer any evidence to the contrary, qualification for sick leave bank benefits does not involve individualized issues precluding class certification.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs do not present evidence indicating which specific illnesses the absent class members had. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 14. Because the Court finds that receiving STDI benefits is generalized proof of qualifying for sick leave bank benefits, Plaintiffs need not provide the Court with such individualized evidence.
Second, the Court finds that whether class members would have preferred to receive sick leave bank benefits will not require individualized determinations. Because Plaintiffs seek to certify this class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), each class member can choose not to join the class action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (stating that "the (b)(3) class is not mandatory" and members can "withdraw from the class at their option"). By choosing to join a lawsuit that seeks reinstatement of the remaining days in the sick leave bank, the Court can infer that all class members prefer the sick leave bank benefit. Indeed, if a plaintiff prefers to receive STDI benefits, he or she can opt out of this lawsuit.
Third, the Court finds that whether absent class members sought just compensation through state procedures (as required by their Fifth Amendment takings claim) will not require individualized inquiries. Importantly, Plaintiffs contend they each satisfied this requirement when the union filed its grievance on behalf of all class members. Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Class Certification 11. Defendant may argue that this grievance did not satisfy the requirements of a takings claim. However, because the union filed its single grievance on behalf of all class members, resolving Defendant’s argument would decide the issue as to all Plaintiffs. Accordingly, this issue does not preclude class certification.
Therefore, the Court finds that, especially with regard to liability, each claim (other than Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit cause of action) involves multiple common issues. Individualized evidence will be required to prove the exact amount of each class member’s damages. Specifically, the Court will require individual information regarding each class member’s PERA contribution rate, salary, STDI benefits received, sick leave days available, and taxable income. The Court must now weigh these common and individualized issues to determine which questions predominate.
The Court finds that the common issues underlying Plaintiffs’ first five claims predominate. Importantly, the common contention that it was impermissible to eliminate the remaining days in the sick leave bank "is at the heart of the litigation." Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Defs. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the success of each of Plaintiffs’ first five claims depends on the result of this issue. Furthermore, as the above discussion demonstrates, Plaintiffs can establish many of the elements of each of their claims "in one stroke" as to all class members. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 350, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
Because the individualized issues in this litigation generally involve the calculation of damages, these questions do not outweigh the common issues as to liability. As a general matter, individual damages issues do not preclude a finding that common issues predominate. Newberg on Class Actions § 4.54 (5th ed. 2017) ("[C]ourts in every circuit have uniformly held that the 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is satisfied despite the need to make individualized damage determinations ...."); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2014) ("The presence of individualized damages issues would not change this result. Class-wide proof is not required for all issues."). Although individualized damages issues may become so complex so as to predominate over common issues, see Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Tr. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013), the individualized issues in this case are not considerably intricate. Indeed, many of the individualized issues, such as the amount of STDI benefits received and how much personal leave each employee had, can simply be inserted into a common damages formula. As the Court has already held, issues such as whether individuals would have qualified for sick leave bank benefits and whether they prefer STDI benefits will not require substantial individualized analysis so as to defeat predominance.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013), does not compel a different result. In that case, customers brought an antitrust action against Comcast alleging it had a monopoly over regional cable markets. Id. at 30, 133 S.Ct. 1426. The plaintiffs proposed four theories of impact, but the district court held that the plaintiffs could prove only one on a classwide basis. Id. at 31, 133 S.Ct. 1426. Because the plaintiffs’ damages model relied on all four theories of impact, the Supreme Court held that it could not be used to calculate damages on a classwide basis. Id. at 34-38, 133 S.Ct. 1426. Without a separate model estimating damages only as to the common impact, damages were not measurable on a classwide basis and predominance was destroyed. Id. at 34, 133 S.Ct. 1426.
Although a fair reading of Comcast may suggest that damages must be measurable on a classwide basis to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), courts have not interpreted the holding so broadly. In In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, the Tenth Circuit stated, "Comcast did not rest on the ability to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Instead, the decision was premised on the majority’s conclusion that without a way to measure damages on a class-wide basis, individualized questions would ‘inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.’ " 768 F.3d at 1257-58 (quoting Comcast, 569 U.S. at 34, 133 S.Ct. 1426). Therefore, that Plaintiffs’ damages cannot be calculated on a classwide basis with uniform evidence does not preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Unlike Comcast, where the court would have had to perform separate damages calculations for each of the more than two million class members, this Court will have to apply the formula Plaintiffs propose to just over 1,000 individuals. Because individual damages can be calculated without substantial individual analysis, the Court does not find that individualized issues predominate.
Other courts’ decisions to certify class actions in similar contexts support the Court’s predominance finding. In Healey v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 134, electricians sued their employer for breach of a CBA and their union for breach of the duty of fair representation. 296 F.R.D. 587, 589 (N.D.Ill. 2013). According to the former employees, the employer breached the CBA by not hiring electricians through a union referral hall, which resulted in the employees being laid off. Id. at 589-90. The court certified the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 597. The court recognized that individual issues were present with regard to class members’ wage rates and mitigation of damages. Id. at 596. Nevertheless, the common issue of whether the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement by not obtaining electricians through the union referral hall predominated over any individual damages issues. Id. ("[T]he common issues concerning liability significantly predominate over any individual damages issues."). Similarly, although some individual damages issues exist here, such as each class member’s salary and PERA contribution rate, whether Defendant permissibly eliminated the sick leave bank days predominates.
In Buchholtz v. Swift & Co., employees sued their union and employer arguing that the defendants impermissibly negotiated a settlement agreement that eliminated the employees’ unpaid vacation compensation. 62 F.R.D. 581, 584 (D. Minn. 1973), abrogated on other grounds by Griffin v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 618 F.Supp. 455, 458 (D. Minn. 1985). The court held that the common issue of whether the union breached its duty of fair representation predominated any individual issues. Id. at 598-99. The Court found it important that neither defendant could be held liable if the union did not breach its duty. Id. at 598. Here, defendant cannot be held liable on any of Plaintiffs’ claims if it permissibly terminated the sick leave bank benefit. Accordingly, this common question predominates any individual damages issues that will remain after liability is determined.
In sum, the Court finds that common questions predominate each of Plaintiffs’ claims except the quantum meruit cause of action. The only issues that will require some individualized analysis pertain to each class member’s damages. Because these issues can be resolved without substantial individual inquiry, they do not predominate over the common questions as to liability.
B. Superiority
In addition to finding that common issues predominate, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that a class action be the superior method to adjudicating the controversy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) provides four factors pertinent to this issue:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id. Accordingly, "class treatment is superior [when] it will ‘achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.’ " CGC Holding Co., 773 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615, 117 S.Ct. 2231).
The Court finds that a class action is the superior method to litigate this dispute. First, because Defendant’s liability rests on many common questions, each class member does not have a significant interest in controlling the prosecution of this case individually. See Harrington v. City of Albuquerque, 222 F.R.D. 505, 516-17 (D.N.M. 2004) (finding that a class action was the superior method for resolving the litigation, in part because, "the common questions of both law and fact are central, if not exclusive, to each class member’s claims"). Furthermore, especially for class members who merely paid premiums, it does not appear that the extent of each individual’s damages is particularly high. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985) (stating that Rule 23 permits "plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually").
Second, the Court is not aware of other litigation concerning Defendant’s elimination of the sick leave bank benefit or breach of the 2012 CBA generally. Third, because the validity of the sick leave bank elimination affects all of Plaintiffs’ claims, a strong desire to concentrate the litigation in this forum exists. Indeed, requiring individual cases could lead to different answers as to the validity of Defendant’s single action.
Defendant suggests that resolution of the common liability question in one individual action will have collateral estoppel effects in future litigation. Resp. to Mot. for Class Certification 20. Although this is true, Defendant’s suggestion would still require over one thousand individual cases asserting almost identical claims. The Court does not find this to be an efficient method to resolve this dispute.
Fourth, the Court does not perceive manageability concerns that render a class action inferior. To be sure, individualized issues exist that may make determination of damages complex. However, class actions often involve complex issues. The Court does not find the issues to be so complex so as to render a class action unmanageable. Therefore, given the common issues at the heart of this litigation, the Court finds that individual actions are not preferable to a class action.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [filed October 2, 2017; ECF No. 42 ] is granted in part and denied in part. The Court finds that, except with regard to their quantum meruit claim, Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Accordingly, the Court certifies the following class of individuals with regard to Plaintiffs’ first five causes of action: "All teachers who were members of the Douglas County Federation in 2012, worked under the 2012 CBA with Defendant and either (1) have been approved for benefits under Defendant’s STDI plan and/or (2) paid premiums to buy-up coverage under Defendant’s STDI plan." Additionally, the Court appoints Katherine Dorman, Christina Thorsen, and Susan Forsyth as class representatives and Ellen Kelman, Andrew Turner, and Ashley Boothby as class counsel. Within twenty-one days of this order, Plaintiffs shall move for approval of a plan for notifying the class pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2).